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ABSTRACT
Leonard Woolf was one of the most prolific writers on 
international relations in Britain during the first half of 
the twentieth century. In common with most thinkers of the 
time he is universally regarded as a utopian. This is 
largely due to his support for the 'ill-fated' League of 
Nations and his 'simple-minded' belief in the possibility 
of progress through reason. This thesis examines Woolf's 
thought in the light of this denigratory interpretation. 
First, an analysis of the way in which the so-called 
utopian school has been represented in post-War 
International Relations shows that the core or defining 
characteristics of the school are far from clear. It is 
argued that the label 'utopian' is more a term of rhetoric 
than a meaningful social scientific category. Second, to 
the extent that certain defining 'utopian' features can be 
identified, it is argued that they apply to Woolf's thought 
only partially. Woolf was a diverse thinker both in terms 
of the subjects he tackled and the conclusions he reached. 
He was also an eclectic thinker who borrowed from a number 
of intellectual traditions: Owenism, Cobdenism, Fabianism, 
Radicalism, and Functionalism. The thesis shows that 
although flawed in a number of respects, Woolf's thought in 
three key areas - international government, imperialism, 
and international economic organization - defies the simple 
designation 'utopian'. The complexity of the picture is 
complicated further when Woolf's response to Carr's 
landmark 'realist' critique of utopianism is taken into 
account. Although Woolf disagreed with many aspects of 
Carr's analysis - notably his 'worship' of power and his 
belief in the 'permanence' of conflicting interests - it is 
clear that the two men, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
had much in common. These commonalities demonstrate that 
the dichotomy between 'utopianism' and 'realism' which has 
prevailed in interpretations of the thought of the period 
is of doubtful descriptive and analytical value.
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PREFACE
This thesis attempts to add to a body of literature that 
has grown up in recent years which casts doubt on the 
conventional picture of inter-war international thought. 
Since the publication of E. H. Carr's famous critique, The 
Twenty Years' Crisis, this period has been almost 
invariably seen as the 'utopian' phase of IR thinking. The 
working hypothesis of this study is that this largely 
pejorative label deceives as much as it reveals. Although 
they were guilty of many things the so called Utopians were 
not as naive in their assumptions, as simplistic in their 
analysis, nor as uniform in their outlook as the received 
wisdom suggests. I attempt to demonstrate this through a 
detailed analysis of one of the most prolific writers on 
international questions during the period, Leonard Woolf.
The thesis has been in the making, on and off, for 
nine years. During that time I have incurred many debts of 
gratitude and it gives me particular pleasure to record 
some of them here. I was lucky enough to receive an 
Economic and Social Research Council Competition Award for 
the years 1987/88 and 1988/89. This enabled me to get the 
project off the ground. Paul Taylor, my supervisor, first 
suggested that Leonard Woolf might be an interesting 
character to have a look at. He has been a consistent 
source of encouragement and good advice. I have benefitted 
considerably from conversations on the subject with Elaine
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Childs, Christopher Coker, Michael Donelan, David H. Dunn, 
Hugh Dyer, Christopher Hill, Mark Hoffman, Hayo Krombach, 
Cornelia Navari, Hugh McNeal, James Mayall, the late Tom 
Millar, Brian Porter, Razeen Sally, Hidemi Suganami, 
Michael Yahuda, Nicholas Wheeler, and Philip Windsor. The 
late and great John Vincent played more than a small role 
in getting me interested in the history of ideas and was 
from the outset positive about a detailed study of a 
'utopian' thinker despite considering them 'beta not 
alpha'. Many of my thoughts were forged while working with 
David Long on an edited book which grew out of our shared 
interest in the subject. His input has been profound. 
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal translated the French passages in 
Woolf's compendious After the Deluge. I would like to 
record my thanks even though I have not used these passages 
here. Archivists Leila Luedeking, Nancy Turner, and 
Elizabeth Inglis were extremely helpful and generous with 
their time during research visits to the Library of Leonard 
and Virginia Woolf (Washington State University), the Sir 
Norman Angell Papers (Ball State University), and the 
Leonard Woolf Papers (University of Sussex). The 
administrative and secretarial assistance I have received 
from Liz Leslie, Hilary Parker, and Chris Parsons has been 
valuable in more ways than one.
An earlier version of what became Chapters 3 and 4 was 
presented to the British International Studies Association 
Conference at Newcastle in 1990. A slightly modified 
version of Chapter 2 was presented to the Millennium
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Anniversary Conference in 1996. Various bits and pieces of 
'work in progress' were presented to seminars and workshops 
at the LSE during 1989 and 1990. The comments, 
suggestions, and criticisms received at these meetings have 
been invaluable as have those of Katerina Delacoura, who 
read Chapter 7, Margot Light, who read Chapter 8, and 
especially Spyros Economides, who found the time during a 
busy teaching schedule to read and comment on the entire 
thesis.
Finally I would like to express my deep gratitude to 
Debra Mo who has had to live with this as long as I have, 
and to my parents, Ted and Gladys, who will be almost as 
pleased as I to see it done.
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Chapter One 
Fabian, Co-operator, Internationalist, Anti-Imperialist, 
and ... Utopian?
By way of introduction this chapter does two things. 
Firstly, it provides a sketch of Woolf's life and political 
career. Secondly, it enquires into and seeks to ascertain 
Woolf's position and reputation in post-war international 
studies.1
Woolf's Career
Leonard Sidney Woolf (1880-1969) was born in London, the 
son of a prominent Q . C . . He was educated at St. Paul' s 
and, on winning a scholarship, at Trinity College, 
Cambridge. Not long after arriving at Cambridge he was 
invited to join the Apostles. It was as a member of this 
exclusive intellectual and aesthetic circle that he first 
met J. M. Keynes, E. M. Forster, Lytton Strachey, Thoby 
Stephen (whose sister, Virginia Stephen, later became his 
wife), and his tutor, G. E. Moore. Moore's philosophy that 
all essential truths are simple truths had a profound 
influence on the group. In a way it constituted the 
intellectual cement which held it together, in one form or 
another, long after Cambridge.
On graduation Woolf decided to pursue a career in the
1 In using this term I have in mind not only the works 
of professional IR scholars, but any work - historical, 
philosophical, sociological, and so on - which seeks to 
advance our understanding of the relations between states 
and other significant actors in world politics.
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civil service. His first choice of department, the Home 
Office, turned him down. Disappointed, he changed tack and 
applied, this time successfully, for an Eastern Cadetship. 
In 1904 he set sail for Ceylon. Woolf served as a colonial 
administrator in Ceylon from 1904-1911, gaining a 
reputation as a tough but efficient administrator. It is 
likely that he would have achieved high office had he 
remained in the colony.2 But he missed the rarefied 
atmosphere of Cambridge, and in 1911 he resigned his 
commission, returned to England, and embarked on an at 
first highly precarious literary career. Within a few 
years he had married Virginia and published his first book, 
a novel subtly critical of imperialism, based on his 
experiences in Ceylon.3
Woolf's first foray into politics came with the 
suffrage movement and, in particular, the Women's Co­
operative Guild. During the early War years he wrote a 
number of pamphlets for the Guild on Co-operative economic 
organisation.4 It was at this time that Woolf became a
2 See Woolf, Growing; An Autobiography of the Years 
1904-1911 (London, 1961); Letters of Leonard Woolf. 
(Frederic Spotts, ed.), (London, 1990); and T. J. Barron, 
'Before the Deluge: Leonard Woolf in Ceylon', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History. 6, 1 (1977), 47-63.
3 Woolf, The Village in the Jungle (Oxford, 1981 [first 
published in 1913] ) . This is the only non-autobiographical 
work of Woolf's still in print.
4 For example, The Control of Industry by Co-operators 
and Trade Unionists (London, 1914); Education and the Co­
operative Movement (London, 1914); Co-operation and the 
War: Co-operative Action in National Crises (London, 1915). 
Woolf was a lifelong supporter of the Co-operative 
Movement.
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Fabian socialist. His first work for the Fabians, 
commissioned by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, was a study of 
professional associations. But before the work was 
finished Sidney Webb, conscious of Woolf's overseas 
experience, invited him to write a study on 'such 
international agreements as may prevent another war'.5 Up 
until this point the Fabian Society had shown remarkably 
little interest in the world beyond Britain. Woolf's study 
was the first major project on international relations to 
be commissioned by the Society.6 As well as being Woolf's 
first work on the subject it is also his most substantial 
and enduring. Sir Duncan Wilson has described it as 
'perhaps the most permanently valuable of his political 
writings' .7
The combination of overseas experience and critical 
acclaim for his books secured for him the position of 
Fabian 'expert' on international affairs, a status he 
retained throughout the inter-war period. He took part in 
lecture tours and became a prominent member of various 
Fabian committees including the International and Colonial
5 Letter from Sidney Webb to Woolf, quoted in Duncan 
Wilson, Leonard Woolf: A Political Biography (London, 
1978), 62. The project was funded by a donation solicited 
by George Bernard Shaw from the Quaker philanthropist 
Joseph Rowntree.
6 It was first published in the New Statesman 
('Suggestions for the Prevention of War', Special 
Supplement Parts I and II, 10 and 17 July 1915); and later 
in book form, together with a much larger section on non­
governmental organizations, as International Government 
(London, 1916) [further details provided in Chapter 3].
7 Wilson, Leonard Woolf, 62.
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Bureaux of the Fabian Society Research Department. In 
1918, however, his principal political affiliation shifted 
from the Fabian Society to the Labour party. In that year 
the Labour party commissioned Woolf to write his 
influential Empire and Commerce in Africa. The book 
established Woolf's reputation as a leading anti­
imperialist thinker. From 1918-1945 he was Secretary of 
the Labour party's Advisory Committee on International 
Questions, and from 1924-1945 he was Secretary of the 
party's sister committee on Imperial Questions.
Outside the Labour movement, Woolf was a co-founder of 
the League of Nations Society, and a prominent member the 
Union of Democratic Control. He founded the Hogarth Press 
with Virginia in 1917. The press quickly established 
itself as a major publisher of modernist literature and 
poetry, publishing works by Eliot, Forster, Joyce, Keynes, 
Isherwood, Spender, Virginia Woolf, and some of the first 
English translations of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Freud.8 
He helped to establish the Centre-Left journal Political 
Quarterly, and was one of its editors from its inception in 
1931 until 1959. He also held, at various times, posts 
with newspapers, journals, and reviews, including the 
Contemporary Review (editor), the Nation (political and 
later literary editor), and the New Statesman (director).
Woolf wrote on a range of subjects, but his main works
8 The Woolfs were also great innovators in book design. 
Cover and title-page designs were often commissioned from 
Vanessa Bell, Roger Fry, Duncan Grant, and other Bloomsbury 
artists.
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concern international relations broadly defined. During 
his long career he wrote more than two dozen books, most 
notable among them being, along with his highly acclaimed 
five volume autobiography, International Government. Empire 
and Commerce in Africa, Imperialism and Civilization 
(1928) , Barbarians at the Gate (1939) , and The War for 
Peace (1940). He wrote about the same number of pamphlets, 
most notably The League and Abyssinia (1936), The 
International Post-War Settlement (1944), and the 
controversial Foreign Policy: The Labour Party's Dilemma 
(1947), and numerous articles. Woolf was also a prolific 
reviewer of books, reviewing many hundreds on a wide range 
of subjects with a strong preference for biographical and 
historical works.9
Woolf's Reputation
There are few references to Woolf's work in the landmark 
texts of post-1945 international studies. This is mainly 
due to the fact that Woolf is generally regarded, along 
with many other more or less like-minded thinkers, as an 
'idealist' or 'utopian'.10 Since the publication of E. H.
9 For an analysis of Woolf's career as a reviewer see 
Leila Luedeking, 'Leonard Woolf and the Book Review', in 
Luedeking and Edmonds, Leonard Woolf: A Bibliography. 284- 
90. 1,703 items are listed in this outstanding work, around 
1,000 of them book reviews.
10 Carr used the term 'utopian' . Most writers since, 
especially American, have used the term 'idealist'. The 
terms have become very largely interchangeable. I use the 
terms interchangeably throughout this study. For the most 
part I use 'utopian'.
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Carr's famous assault on utopianism such thinkers have been 
generally viewed, in Bull's words, as 'not at all profound' 
and 'not worth reading now except for the light they throw 
on the preoccupations and presuppositions of their time and 
place'.11 Yet Woolf does not feature in Carr's remarkably 
short list of utopian thinkers.12 Like so many men of his 
time his fate seems to have been decided by his association 
with (a) the inter-war period, (b) progressivist writing, 
and (c) the League of Nations. Even though it is far from 
certain that Carr meant the term to be understood in this 
way, it seems to be the case that all those writing at that 
time who believed in the desirability and possibility of 
progressive change, and who saw the League as a useful 
instrument for bringing it about, have thereby stood 
condemned of 'utopian' inclinations.
The concept of utopianism will be scrutinized in the 
following chapter. At this point it is interesting to note 
that those post-war scholars who looked at Woolf's work in 
any detail have tended to shy away from using such 
uncompromising language. Martin Wight, for example, 
describes Woolf as a rationalist. J. H. Grainger describes 
him, somewhat elaborately, as a 'strenuous rationalist 
world-citizen in politics'. George Modelski, by way of
11 Hedley Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics 
1919-1969', in Brian Porter (ed.), The Abervstwvth Papers: 
International Politics 1919-1969 (London, 1972), 34.
12 See Peter Wilson, 'The Twenty Years' Crisis and the 
Category of 'Idealism' in International Relations', in 
David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty 
Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford,
1995), 1-24.
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contrast, sees him as a pluralist. And Craig Murphy, to 
briefly cite another example, sees him as a 'critical 
liberal internationalist' .13
In the post-war period four authors in particular have 
discussed or drawn from Woolf's work. That fact that each 
of these authors focus on different facets of it and offer 
different interpretations as to the kind of thinker Woolf 
was suggests that his thought is far more complex than the 
simple label 'utopian' implies. In order to set the scene 
for the chapters that follow I propose to briefly summarize 
what they have to say.
Thomson, Mever. and Briggs on Woolf
In their impressive and regrettably neglected study of the 
principles and processes of peacemaking, Thomson, Meyer, 
and Briggs assess contemporary proposals for a 'New Order' 
in terms of the dichotomy between realism and utopianism. 
The differences between the two, they contend, are (a) 
psychological, and (b) sociological. Concerning (a), the 
two perspectives differ with respect to 'the capacity of 
human nature to adapt itself to organized society, whether 
on the national or the international level'. Utopians tend 
to be optimistic about the extent to which 'by deliberate 
and rational effort' human beings can control their own
13 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three
Traditions, eds. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (London, 
1991), 12 9; J. H. Grainger, Patriotisms: Britain 1900-1939 
(London, 1986), 331; George Modelski, The Principles of
World Politics (New York, 1972), 320; Craig Murphy,
International Organization and Industrial Change: Global
Governance since 1850 (Cambridge, 1994), 25, 268.
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lives and the social environment in which they live. As a 
consequence, 'the gist and tone of [their] argument tends 
to become a sustained effort to persuade all men to accept 
one set of beliefs: and the assumption is that if only
enough people can be converted to these beliefs, the 
problem will be solved.' Realists, in contrast, tend to be 
pessimistic and sceptical. Their argument takes the form 
of 'a demonstration of the consequences which are likely to 
follow from actual developments ... a warning rather than 
an exhortation ... an analysis of prevailing and probable 
conditions, and a calculation of the likely trend of 
events.'
But theories and proposals differ not only on the 
conception of human nature on which they are premised, and 
their assessment of human capabilities. They also differ 
on (b) what human beings should try to achieve. At one 
extreme, Utopians 'propound a long range vision of what is 
desirable, with their eyes on the furthest horizon and 
their minds fixed on ends rather than means.' At the other 
extreme, realists insist that 'only the most short-range 
vision of what is attainable in the given circumstances has 
any practical importance'. The 'power of idealism', they 
contend, is 'circumscribed by immediate material 
conditions'.
An important set of proposals, however, do not fall 
neatly into either the utopian or the realist categories. 
Thomson et al therefore propose a further category, 'semi- 
utopian' . In this category 'Utopianism and optimism
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predominate7 but proposals are 7considerably qualified in
detail and application7. Semi-utopian proposals 7try to
keep in tune7 with existing political, social, economic,
and psychological conditions, but recognize that the real
world of tomorrow may not be the same as the real world of
today. Even though the targets set by semi-Utopians may
not be realistic now, they may become so with changed
circumstances in the not-too-distant-future.14
For Thomson and his team the writings of Leonard Woolf
constitute the 7most striking example7 of proposals of this
kind. They describe International Government as
a brilliant examination of the technique of 
peacemaking, and of how rational order and the rule of 
law might replace the disastrous 7balance of power7 
sought by pre-war diplomacy. It was a prophetic book, 
called utopian at the time, yet making proposals of 
the very kind that were attempted in 1919.
Moreover
after the failure of the League and the breakdown of 
all international government, Mr Woolf re-stated his 
thesis in modern terms. He adhered to the basic 
principles of the League of Nations (or rather of a 
League of Nations) , as distinct from the cult of 
federalism then prevailing, and at the same time he 
counter-attacked the "Realists7 who regarded the 
conceptions of the League as dead and discredited. 
Again, with the shift of prevalent opinion away from 
federalism towards the notion of a 7 revised League7, 
Mr Woolf has had the sad satisfaction of seeing his 
"utopian7 proposals reaching their target a few years 
later.15
It is also worth noting that the authors of this study 
placed Woolf"s International Government and his The War for 
Peace alongside Carr"s The Twenty Years7 Crisis and
14 David Thomson, E. Meyer, and Asa Briggs, Patterns of 
Peacemaking (London, 1945), 149-50, 162.
15 Ibid. 163.
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Conditions of Peace. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom. 
Mannheim"s Ideology and Utopia and Man and Society, and 
David Mitrany's A Working Peace System, as books "which 
have evolved a more scientific approach to international 
relations, and which have exerted a special influence on 
contemporary thought about peacemaking'.16 With respect to 
one important study at least, therefore, Woolf's utopianism 
was qualified and not of such a kind as to preclude him 
from serious scholarly attention.
Archer on Woolf
In his wide-ranging historical survey and theoretical 
analysis of writings on international organization, Clive 
Archer divides his subject-matter into four categories: 
traditionalist, revisionist, Marxist, and Third World. He 
points out that these categories are not watertight and 
that there is some overlap especially between the 
traditionalist and the revisionist paradigms on the one 
hand, and the Marxist and the Third World paradigms on the 
other. The primary distinction between them is level of 
analysis. Traditionalists conceive international relations 
in terms of inter-state relations; revisionists in terms of 
inter-societal or transnational relations; Marxists in 
terms of class; and Third World writers in terms of class 
and core-periphery relations. Within each paradigm Archer 
identifies several main lines of thought. The
traditionalist paradigm, for example, contains four such
16 Ibid. 389.
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lines of thought: international law, world law,
international government, and realist.17
Woolf is chosen as an exemplar of the international 
government perspective. Archer does not define what he 
means by 'international government'. Nor does he reflect 
on the various meanings that have been given to the term in 
the past. He, nonetheless, proceeds to summarize the major 
tenets of Woolf's position. He records Woolf's view that 
international government was not an entirely new phenomenon 
and that it had already, by 1916, been accepted in 
diplomatic gatherings, public and private international 
unions, and commodity agreements. Archer then briefly 
describes Woolf's plans for the further regulation of 
international activity and outlines his proposals for an 
'Supranational Authority to Prevent War'. This would 
consist of: (a) an 'International High Court' for the
settlement of justiciable disputes; (b) an 'International 
Council' of state representatives for the settlement of 
non-justiciable disputes; and, (c) an 'International 
Secretariat' for general administration, investigation, and 
recommendation. Woolf's proposal of a twelve month 
'cooling off' period is noted, as is plan for a generalized 
system of sanctions in which all states would be bound to 
make 'common cause, even to the point of war, against any 
state violating a fundamental obligation.18
17 Clive Archer, International Organizations (London, 
1983), 68-125.
18 Ibid. 73-4.
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Although Archer regards Woolf as an exemplar of and, 
indeed, the main contributor to the international 
government perspective, he also recognizes that he was a 
forerunner of functionalism, and that there is therefore a 
considerable 'revisionist' element in his work. Indeed, 
Archer draws extensively on International Government for 
his own account of the nineteenth century development of 
both international governmental organizations and 
international non-governmental organizations19.
Archer notes that Woolf along with other practical and 
intellectual supporters of the League are often classified 
as 'idealists' or ' neo-Grotians'20. He relies on his 
assessment of the international government approach on 
Hedley Bull's analysis and critique of neo-Grotianism. 
Accordingly, Woolf: (a) overestimated the degree of
solidarity in international relations; (b) exalted the 
international interest over the national interest without 
explaining how the former could be determined; (c) 
advocated constitutional reform over revolution as a means 
of transcending the international society without enquiring 
into whether 'states could become the agents of their own 
extinction'; (d) gave priority to respect for legality over 
the need for change; and, (e) failed to recognize the 
static nature of the international legal system as they
19 Ibid. 12-13, 83.
20 Significantly, Archer puts the former term in 
inverted commas but not the latter. Ibid. 74.
19
construed it.21
There are a number of problems with Archer's reliance 
on Bull's critique and these will be examined in Chapter 4. 
For the time being it is only necessary to note Archer's 
hesitation to use the label 'idealist' as a descriptive 
term for Woolf's thought on international government, and 
his reliance, instead, on 'traditionalism', 'revisionism', 
and 'neo-grotianism'.
Etherinoton on Woolf
Woolf's writing on imperialism is critically discussed by 
Norman Etherington in his Theories of Imperialism. 
Etherington has no doubt about the impact of Woolf's work. 
He describes how, through books like Empire and Commerce in 
Africa and Economic Imperialism, and his political and 
propaganda work for the Labour party and the Fabian 
Society, Woolf became a major figure in the inter-war anti- 
imperialist movement. His ideas influenced some of the 
most prominent anti-colonialist writers and propagandists 
of the time. Indeed Empire and Commerce in Africa 'changed 
the way English-speaking peoples thought and wrote about 
imperialism'. It joined Hobson's Imperialism as a standard 
work on the subject and ' (b) ecause it supplied far more 
historical detail than Hobson's book, it was much more
21 Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian Conception of 
International Society', in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, 
(eds.) Diplomatic Investigations (London, 1966), 51-73.
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useful as a reference'.n
But the extensive impact of Woolf's book is not 
something Etherington deems particularly worthy of 
celebration. He criticizes Woolf for his ignorance of pre­
war debates and for not considering the classical theories 
of Hobson, Lenin, Hilferding, and Luxemburg. Woolf's work 
thus represented a 'sharp break with the past'. It also 
set in motion a 'monumental misunderstanding' of the 
meaning and significance of imperialism as a socio­
political phenomenon.23
Although Empire and Commerce contains many detailed 
and fascinating accounts of British and French activities, 
official and non-official, in various parts of Africa, 
Woolf sometimes, Etherington contends, displays a 
remarkable disregard for chronological accuracy. He 
unwittingly, for example, gives not one but several dates 
for the onset of economic imperialism: ranging from 1839 to 
the 1880s. This cavalier lack of precision severely blunts 
his analysis. Etherington further contends that although 
most of Woolf's examples are taken from the 1890s, an 
incautious reading would give the impression that all of 
Europe's dealings with Africa in the nineteenth century, 
not just the colonial annexations of the last decade, were 
motivated by economics.
According to Etherington, Woolf made five innovations
22 Norman Etherington, Theories of Imperialism: War, 
Conquest and Capital (Beckenham, 1984), 182.
23 Ibid. 176-7.
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in the definition and explanation of imperialism which many- 
later scholars - including conservative-minded Round Table 
scholars whose object was to disprove Woolf's theory of 
economic imperialism - uncritically accepted. First, 
questions of imperialism became separated from broader 
questions of militarism, protectionism, and war. The 
classical theorists, by way of contrast, had linked these 
phenomena in an explicitly structural way. Second, the 
definition of imperialism became restricted to only those 
situations where, in Woolf's words, 'the power and 
influence of the European form of state' is used in those 
areas 'where the European form of state has not developed' . 
Actions not involving the state were not therefore 
considered to imperialistic. In sharp contrast to Lenin 
and other Eastern and Central European thinkers, Woolf thus 
excluded the non-colonizing nations from the imperialist 
camp: he wrote for the most part as if imperialism and the 
acquisition of colonies were synonymous. Third, the term 
'imperialism' became associated with virtually all of 
Europe's colonizing activity in the nineteenth century. 
Pre-war theorists, by contrast, had used it to describe 
those colonizing and other aggressive activities that were 
a product of the economic necessities generated by the 
'late nineteenth century crisis of capitalism'. Fourth, 
Africa became widely accepted as the 'test case' of 
imperialism and causal theories about it. Hobson, by 
contrast, had considered Asia to be more important. 
Finally, Woolf's work led to the role of trade and trading
22
companies in the imperialist embroglio receiving much 
greater attention than the role of 'surplus' or 'finance' 
capital. Hobson, Hilferding, and Lenin had attached much 
greater importance to the latter than the former.
Suganami on Woolf
In his study of the importance of the domestic analogy in 
world order proposals, Hidemi Suganami selects Woolf as a 
representative of those thinkers who have applied the 
analogy in a straight-forward, unsophisticated, way. 
Suganami arrives at a five-fold typology of the various 
proposals for world order that have been put forward in the 
last two centuries or so: legal, diplomatic, democratic
confederal, federal, and welfare institutional. The first 
two types are accurately seen as poles on a spectrum. The 
reason for this is that, in practice, those who have 
thought along these lines do not fall purely into one camp 
or the other, but rest somewhere along the spectrum, 
according to whether their legalistic use of the domestic 
analogy outweighs their belief in traditional diplomacy. 
Suganami considers Woolf's views as representative of those 
on the legalistic end of the spectrum. These thinkers 
advocate the 'peace through law' approach which, in its 
fullest form, urges the creation of an international 
organization equipped with judicial, legislative, and 
executive functions, parallel to those found domestically. 
Suganami contrasts the approach of Woolf with the American 
opponent of the League of Nations, Edwin Borchard.
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Borchard rejected the domestic analogy and insisted that 
the pre-1914 system was superior to the League system. 
Legal prohibitions on the resort to war, the division of 
belligerents into aggressors and victims, and collective 
action to assist victims, while central to Woolf's 
thinking, were considered by Borchard to be not only 
ineffective, but positively harmful. Woolf argued that a 
collective security system was essential if war was to be 
prevented. Borchard argued that such a system was more 
likely to result in the extension and intensification of 
conflicts rather than their mitigation and resolution.
Suganami points out that Woolf did not consider the 
problem of war and the maintenance of peace to be sui 
generis. In Woolf's view the resolution of international 
conflict was qualitatively the same type of problem as the 
resolution of any other conflict. It was not therefore 
true that there was no experience to draw on in building a 
new international order. On the contrary, Woolf asserted, 
there was a wealth of experience, in fact four thousand 
years' worth. Just as cannibalism, duelling, cock- 
fighting, witch-burning, and slavery had been largely 
eradicated, so could war. Woolf accepted that the 
prevention of war may be a more complex problem, but it was 
not an essentially different one.24
Suganami also points out that Woolf was one of the 
principal exponents of the 'reformed League idea'. Soon
24 Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World 
Order Proposals (Cambridge, 1989), 94-113.
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after the onset of the Second World War the question arose 
as to whether a new organization should be created to 
replace the discredited League and, if so, what form it 
should it take. By this time the League had many critics, 
ranging from those who wanted a revision of the Covenant, 
meaning primarily a strengthening of its collective 
security procedures, to those who believed that the whole 
idea was flawed. Woolf maintained that the League's 
approach to the problem of world order was essentially 
correct. He recognized that it had failed to preserve the 
peace, but contended that one instance of failure did not 
prove that the whole idea was wrong. He had an answer to 
those critics, like Carr, who condemned the League as 
utopian. Carr's view that the interests of nation-states 
were inherently incompatible and that leagues of nations 
were therefore impossible was nothing more than a realist 
dogma. For Woolf there was no a priori reason why power 
had a different nature and reality in international than it 
had in domestic society. Both were 'equally amenable to 
elimination and control'. The failure of the League did 
not mean that the League idea was intrinsically utopian any 
more than the failure of appeasement, Carr's preferred 
policy, meant that the idea of appeasement was 
intrinsically utopian. As Suganami explains, the main 
cause of the League's failure in Woolf's view was 'lack of 
psychological motivation on the part of its members to 
uphold its principles'. Another devastating war, he 
argued, would serve to induce such motivation in the
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future. Woolf thus recommended moderate reform of the 
League, particularly the regionalization of its collective 
security procedures.25
It is not Suganami's main concern to critique Woolf's 
position, but he does make a number of penetrating remarks. 
He contends, for example, that Woolf's approach is 
underpinned by two problematic assumptions: (i) that the
punishment of a murderer is the central problem of 
government (aggressors being analogous to murderers); (ii) 
that the problem of maintaining order between two large, 
organized groups of individuals is the same as maintaining 
order between a small number of individuals. He argues 
with respect to (i) that the main job of government is not 
to cope with individual murderers, but to manage the 
demands of large powerful groups. Following Carr, Claude, 
and Brierly, he asserts that if experience tells us 
anything it is not how certain states manage to 
successfully deal with murderers but how some states manage 
to avoid civil wars. With respect to (ii) he argues that 
when united a group of individuals possesses a strength 
qualitatively different from that which each possesses 
individually. Following Claude, he describes the tendency 
to draw simple analogies between individuals and groups 
when thinking about social order as ' schoolboyish'.26
25 Ibid. 95.
26 Ibid. 180-81.
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Chapter Two 
Utopianism and International Relations: A Framework for 
Analysis
Notwithstanding the reluctance of Thomson et al, Archer, 
Etherington, and Suganami to label Woolf 'utopian', such 
characterization predominates in IR. As mentioned, this is 
largely due to the time during which he for the most part 
wrote, his enthusiasm for the League, and his strongly held 
progressive beliefs. But does being utopian amount to 
anything more than these rather general things? In order 
to answer this question I propose, first of all, to 
examine, in chronological order of publication, ten well 
known and widely-relied-upon overviews of inter-war 
utopianism. These overviews vary in length, purpose, 
style, and structure. In the interests of clarity and 
coherence I will examine them in terms of five simple 
categories: premises; substantive hypotheses;
prescriptions; assessment; and idealists cited. What do 
each of the accounts hold to be the central premises of 
utopianism, its main hypotheses, and its principal 
prescriptions? What conclusions have been reached with 
regard to their validity? Which thinkers and/or 
practitioners are considered significant and/or 
representative?
I accept that this approach results in some loss of 
intellectual context, stylistic continuity, and subtlety of 
exposition. Hollis and Smith, for example, are interested
27
in utopianism only in so far as it throws light on certain 
methodological issues, and their account is tailored 
accordingly. Yet the approach does have the merit of 
setting out in a highly visible form the various meanings 
that have been ascribed to this most slippery of concepts.
In the interests of precision I have sought, within 
the grammatical and stylistic constraints imposed by 
abstraction, to use the words of the authors themselves. 
Without wishing to anticipate the outcome of this enquiry, 
it transpires that the degree of consensus on what it means 
to be utopian is at best moderate. The guilt Woolf shares 
partly by association is therefore accompanied by a degree 
of uncertainty as to the nature of the crime.
Analysis
1. Bull1
For Bull the idealist or 'progressivist' doctrines of the 
1920s and 193 0s grew out of the experiences of World War 
One - though their origins can be traced back to the 
nineteenth century and, more immediately, to 'pre-war 
writings about arbitration, international understanding, 
and the binding effects of world finance and commerce'. 
Premises (i) Belief in progress.2
1 Hedley Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics, 
1919-1969', in Brian Porter (ed.), The Abervstwvth Papers: 
International Politics 1919-1969 (London, 1972), 33-6.
2 This, for Bull , is the 'distinctive characteristic' 
of idealism. Ibid. 34-5.
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Hypotheses (i) World War One demonstrated that radical 
change was needed in the international system. (ii) The 
international system that gave rise to World War One is 
'capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more 
peaceful and just world order7 . (iii) Such an order is 7 in 
the making7 as a result of 7 the awakening of democracy7, 
the growth of the 7 international mind7, the creation of the 
League of Nations, and the 7good works7 and "teachings7 of 
"men of peace or the enlightenment7 . (iv) The
responsibility of students of international relations is to 
"assist this march of progress to overcome the ignorance, 
the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests 
that stood in its way". (iv) The War and the creation of. 
the League represents a sharp break with the past. The 
"pre-war system" does not provide a source of guidance but 
"a series of object lessons" about anarchy and disorder. 
Present and future possibilities are not limited by the 
"test of previous experience" but are "deducible from the 
needs of progress".
Prescriptions (i) Disarmament. (ii) Outlawing war. (iii) 
Establishing an international police force. (iv)
Collective security. (v) Peaceful change.
Assessment Bull puts 7 idealism" in inverted commas arguing 
that in some respects it is a misleading term. 7 [I]t is not 
the case", he suggests, "that these writers were especially 
insistent on the moral dimension of international
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relations, and still less that they contributed anything 
important to our understanding of it' . In saying this Bull 
sets the tone for the rest of his article. He says, 
following Carr, that utopian doctrine 'clearly' became the 
special ideology of the satisfied powers; and he asserts 
that '[t]he "idealists" were not remarkable for their 
intellectual depth or powers of explanation, only for their 
intense commitment to a particular vision of what should 
happen. In their disparagement of the past they lost sight 
of a great deal that was already known: in some respects 
their work represented not an advance but a decline in 
understanding of international relations, an unlearning of 
old lessons which a later generation found it necessary to 
restate'. Bull further criticizes idealists for: being 
guided more by their hopes than 'the evidence at hand'; 
being preoccupied with international law, organization, and 
society at the expense of international politics; 'exalting 
the international interest over national interests (but 
without asking how the former was to be determined) ' ; 
elevating 'constitutional reform over revolution as a means 
of transcending the society of sovereign states (but 
without considering whether states could become the agents 
of their own extinction)'; and privileging 'respect for 
legality over the need for change (but without facing up to 
the fact that the international legal system, as they 
construed it, could not accommodate change)'. In addition 
he arraigns them for their 'innocence', 'facile optimism', 
'narrow moralism', and their parochialism of human
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sympathies.
Utopians Cited Alfred Zimmern, S. H. Bailey, Philip Noel- 
Baker, David Mitrany, James T. Shotwell, Pitman Potter, 
Parker T. Moon, H. N. Brailsford, Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson, Leonard Woolf, Norman Angell, Jan Smuts, Arthur 
Ponsonby.
2. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff3
In their popular textbook Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff trace 
the intellectual origins of inter-war utopianism to 
eighteenth century Enlightenment optimism, nineteenth 
century liberalism, and twentieth century Wilsonian 
idealism.
Premises (i) Faith in reason.4 (ii) Human behaviour is 
improvable, 'perhaps even perfectible'. (iii) Assumption 
of a natural harmony of interests among nations. (iv) 
'Confidence in the peace-building function of the "world 
court of public opinion".' (v) Assumption that 'statesmen
enjoy broad freedom of choice in the making of foreign 
policy'.
3 J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 
Contending Theories of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey. 2nd edn., (New York, 1981), 4-6, 84- 
5.
4 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff refer rather vaguely to 
utopianism's 'heavy reliance on reason in human affairs'. 
Ibid. 5.
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Hypotheses (i) ' [P]olitics can be made to conform to an
ethical standard'. (ii) The nation-state system can be 
transformed through international law and organization.
Prescriptions (i) International law and organization.5
(ii) Disarmament.
Assessment Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff's account, as they 
acknowledge, 'draws heavily' from Carr. . It is not 
surprising, therefore, that they are most critical of 
utopianism for its legalism and moralism. Their model 
utopian is, however, rather insubstantial and given Premise
(ii), somewhat straw-man-like.
Utopians Cited Woodrow Wilson.
3. Vascruez6
Like Bull, John Vasquez traces the 'immediate origins' of 
the 'idealist paradigm' to the experience of the First 
World War and the feeling that such a conflagration must 
never be allowed to happen again.
Premises (i) Faith in reason, particularly the ability of 
reason to 'overcome the problem of war'. (ii) Belief in a
5 It is difficult to be more specific since Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff are vague on the means by which Utopians 
felt 'international law and organization' was to play its 
transformatory role. Ibid. 84-5.
6 John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A 
Critique. (London, 1983), 13-19.
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basic harmony of interests and a 'nascent world community' 
of all humankind.
Hypotheses (i) A 'system of peace' can be established 
under 'proper conditions', (ii) The scholar's purpose is to 
reveal this fundamental truth. (iii) Democracy leads to 
peace whereas dictatorship leads to war.7 (iv) The masses 
never benefit from war.
Prescriptions (i) The promotion of democracy to enable the 
masses to 'prevent sinister interests from promulgating 
wars'. (ii) The promotion of education to eliminate 
ignorance and prejudice. (iii) The creation at the global 
level of those institutions effective at preventing 
violence at the domestic level. (iv) Allied to this, 
emphasis on international law, arbitration, disarmament, 
collective security, and peaceful change, (v) The study, 
empirical and normative, of international organizations.
Assessment This account is also couched in neutral terms. 
Vasquez describes the beliefs of idealists, however, as 
' theory-laden' , and concludes that ' [i]n many ways, the 
purpose of the idealist paradigm was to provide a panacea 
for the major problem of the twentieth century - war' . 
This could be construed as pejorative. Similarly, he 
accepts unreflectingly, if in different - Kuhnian - terms,
7 According to Vasquez this 'Wilsonian' contention 
constitutes the 'heart of the paradigm'. Ibid. 14.
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Carr's judgement about the inadequacy of the theory and 
practice of utopianism in the 1930s. According to Vasquez, 
World War Two was an 'anomaly' for the idealist paradigm 
which precipitated a 'scientific crisis' that led to its 
displacement by realism.
Utopians Cited Woodrow Wilson, Alfred Zimmern, S. H. 
Bailey, Philip Noel-Baker, David Mitrany, James T. 
Shotwell, Pitman Potter, Parker T. Moon, James Bryce.
4. Tavlor8
In one of the most detailed analyses published since The 
Twenty Years' Crisis9 - though still a slender one compared 
with historiographical studies of other schools of thought 
- Trevor Taylor states that ' [i]n general utopianism is 
concerned with the formulation of an ideal polity and, to 
a lesser extent, with how such a polity might be 
established' . This is one of the few works that have 
sought to systematically examine the structure of 
utopianism as a body of thought.
8 Trevor Taylor, 'Utopianism', in Steve Smith (ed.) 
International Relations: British and American Approaches
(London, 1985), 92-107.
9 In making this judgement I exclude Hidemi Suganami's 
study of world order proposals even though many of the 
thinkers he discusses are generally perceived as 'utopian'. 
This is because my concern here is to examine how 
utopianism has been delineated as an explicit category of 
thought or phase of thinking. I also exclude David Long and 
Peter Wilson (eds.) Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: 
Inter-War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford, 1995), since many of 
the arguments I make in this volume are a product of the 
research conducted for this thesis.
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Premises (i) Belief in a harmony of interests between 
nations and human society as a whole, actual or potential, 
the foundations of this harmony being variously attributed 
to capitalism, socialism, self-determination, free trade, 
and the discovery that in modern societies self-interest 
lies in co-operation. (ii) Belief in the existence of 
objective justice detectable through reason or experience,
(iii) Belief that people are 'basically rational, 
intelligent creatures, creating their own destiny, capable 
of foolishness and evil, but basically good'. (iv) Ideas 
will be implemented if they are good, rational, ideas.
Hypotheses (i) Morality is not culturally bound but 
absolute and universal. (ii) Wars often result from 
miscalculation. (iii) Wars are often a product of the 
'machinations' of weapons manufacturers. (iv) War can be 
eliminated.
Prescriptions (i) International law should be
strengthened. (ii) Education promoted, (iii) Collective 
security established. (iv) Open diplomacy encouraged, (v) 
Democracy promoted. (vi) A standing conference for the 
resolution of international disputes established.
Assessment As with the previous two accounts Taylor's is 
couched in neutral terms. The 'emotional readiness' of 
Utopians to 'accept world government as a desirable and 
logical outcome of increasing human cooperation' is the
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only significant point of criticism.
Utopians Cited Lowes Dickinson, Norman Angell, Alfred 
Zimmern, Woodrow Wilson, Philip Noel-Baker, S. H. Bailey, 
David Mitrany, James T. Shotwell, Pitman Potter, Parker T. 
Moon.
5. Smith10
The author's main purpose, in this lucid and trenchant 
brief exposition, is to demonstrate how idealism, 'as a 
school of thought', provoked writers dissatisfied with it 
to formulate an opposing approach. His account is 
primarily based on a reading of works by Zimmern> 
Dickinson, Shotwell, and Toynbee, with Carr ever-present in 
the background.
Premises (i) Faith in rational argument, (ii) Belief in 
the primacy of ideas. (iii) Belief in the existence of an 
underlying harmony of interests between nations, (iv) Faith 
in 'the law of progress'.11
Hypotheses (i) War stems not from 'evil human nature' but 
from imperfect political arrangements. (ii) War is a 
barbaric act which 'gradually evolving civilizations, given
10 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to 
Kissinger (Baton Rouge, La., 1986), 54-67.
11 The term is Davies's. Smith describes this premise 
as the unique, and most 'relentlessly criticized', facet of 
inter-war idealist thought. Ibid. 60-1.
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the will to do so, can eradicate.'12 (iii) Human beings
are not by nature bellicose but they are ' frustratingly 
stubborn in their attachment to outmoded ideas.' Most 
people 'follow passion, not reason' and a chief obstacle to 
'genuine internationalism' is 'muddled thinking' .13 (iv) 
The duty of the scholar is 'to educate people of all 
nationalities to a higher notion of internationalism'.14 
(v) Pursuing 'strictly' national interests 'by means of a 
balance of power' is futile. The balance of power always 
ends in war. (vi) The cause of war lies in the 
international anarchy of sovereign states.15 (vii) Peace is 
a common interest and therefore every conflict is amenable 
to 'rational mediation to everyone's benefit'.16 (viii) 
Nationalism and the pursuit of national self-interest are 
'atavisms inhibiting the progress of international 
civilization' .17
Prescriptions (i) Greater education. (ii) Promotion of
public understanding of and broad support for the League 
(and internationalism generally) . (iii) The application of
12 Ibid. 55.
13 Ibid. 55-6, quoting Toynbee and Dickinson.
14 Ibid. 57.
15 This and Hypothesis (v) taken from Dickinson, ibid.
58.
16 According to Smith this conviction 'was basic to all 
idealists; indeed, it was their constant refrain, expressed 
in suitably apocalyptic rhetoric.' Ibid. 59.
17 Ibid. 65, 67.
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'sound academic and scientific principles to the recurring 
problems of national and international society' .18 (iv) An 
end to protectionism. (v) Disarmament. (vi) The 
construction of apparatus for the peaceable settlement of 
disputes. (vii) Putting an end, through the League, to the 
international anarchy. (viii) The creation of an 
international police force. (ix) Promotion of the 
international rule of law.
Assessment The structure of Smith's account consists of a 
relatively dispassionate description and analysis of 
idealism, accompanied by a few paragraphs of less 
dispassionate commentary generally satirical in tone. A 
good example of this is his vivid opening sentence: 'To
move from Weber's world of inexpiable conflicts and tragic 
ethical dilemmas to the progressive universe of the 
interwar Anglo-American idealists is like leaving an 
uninterrupted performance of Wagner's Ring Cycle for a 
civic meeting punctuated by communal singing of hymns by S.
S. Wesley.'19 In several places Smith refers to the 
'idealist hymn to internationalism' and, equally half- 
mockingly, to the 'higher truths' which they claimed to 
have held.20 He also refers to the 'exasperated outbursts' 
of League devotees 'against inexplicably hidebound human 
nature' and the indignation they felt towards their
18 Ibid. 57-8, summarising Shotwell.
19 Ibid. 54.
20 Ibid. 54, 60, 67.
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'perfidious7 governments.21 There is more than a hint of 
disparagement in references to the 'apocalyptic rhetoric' 
employed by idealists (the frequently expressed warning of 
the 1930s, often in theological garb, that mankind faced a 
fateful choice in which the very existence of civilization 
was at stake, was at the time, generally, and not 
unreasonably, held to be real not rhetorical) .31 In 
concluding Smith argues, echoing Bull, that the idealists 
contributed little to the understanding of the moral 
problems of statecraft. Their strong normative beliefs 
rendered every question of policy simple: 'did it promote 
the League and the international rule of law? The only 
areas for discussion lay in devising the most effective 
machinery.#23
On a more positive note, Smith contends that the 
idealists were right to insist that their governments take 
a principled stand over Abyssinia and hold firm on 
sanctions. Certain aspects of Toynbee's reading of events 
in the mid-1930s are held to be 'prescient'.24 It should 
also be noted that Smith is highly critical of many aspects 
of Carr's analysis, particularly the way in which he 
employs the sociology of knowledge ('crudely teleological',
21 Ibid. 55.
22 Ibid. 59-60. Also note (62) Smith's comment that 
idealist writers greeted the Briand-Kellogg pact ('an 
undertaking by sinners no longer to sin') as 'an event just 
short of the Second Coming'.
23 Ibid. 67.
24 Ibid. 65-7.
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'shallow1, 'crudely materialist'), and the way in which he 
conceives and applies his concept of power
('extraordinarily broad and undifferentiated',
'debi1itatingly inclusive', 'deterministic',
'platitudinous').25 Carr's characterization of utopianism, 
however, is accepted largely unquestioned.26
Idealists Cited Alfred Zimmern, Goldsworthy Lowes
Dickinson, James Shotwell, Gilbert Murray, Arnold Toynbee, 
Nicholas Murray Butler (internationalist writer and 
president of Columbia University), David Davies, Raymond D. 
Fosdick (president of the American League of Nations
Association). Also mentioned: the 'liberal' (and therefore 
'idealist'?) founders of the League of Nations Association: 
Charles Beard and Herbert Croly.
6. Keglev and Wittkopf27
Although they do not suggest why, Kegley and Wittkopf begin 
their textbook survey by asserting that, of the various 
perspectives that competed for attention during the inter­
25 Ibid. 69, 72, 97, 94, 93, 76, 94.
26 I say 'largely' because Smith agrees with Hedley 
Bull ('The Twenty Years' Crisis Thirty Years On', 
International Journal. 24/4 (1969), 627) that Carr's series 
of dichotomies - free will:determinism = theory:practice = 
left:right = ethics:politics = utopia:reality - is 
'breathtaking'. He adds that as well as 'artificial' and 
'vastly oversimplified' they are also 'slanted obviously in 
favour of "reality" '. Ibid. 69-70.
27 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, 
World Politics: Trend and Transformation (New York,
1989), 12-15.
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war years, 'political idealism' emerged as dominant. 
Stimulated by the 'advent of a catastrophic global war in 
1914' its main concern was to discover 'sustainable 
generalizations about the conditions under which war might 
be avoided and peace maintained' . They emphasize the 
theoretical nature of this endeavour: 'a theory was needed 
that could predict the outbreak of wars and that could tell 
policymakers what factors could be manipulated or 
controlled to prevent them'.
Premises (i) ' [H]uman nature is essentially "good" or
altruistic and people are therefore capable of mutual aid 
and collaboration', (ii) '[T]he fundamental human concern 
for the welfare of others makes progress possible'; the 
'Enlightenment's faith in the possibility of improving 
civilization' thus being reaffirmed.
Hypotheses (i) '[B]ad behavior is the product not of evil 
people but of evil institutions and structural arrangements 
that motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others - 
including making war'. War can therefore be eliminated by 
eliminating the institutions which encourage it. (ii) The 
balance of power system is 'anarchical' and 'war-prone'.
(iii) War is an international problem requiring collective 
rather than national efforts to eliminate it. (iv) World 
public opinion stands behind peace and diplomacy.
Prescriptions (i) The creation of international
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institutions such as the League ' to replace the anarchical 
and war-prone balance-of-power system composed of 
independent territorial states'. (ii) Increased
international cooperation on social matters. (iii) The
creation of legal institutions and processes, as 
represented by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to settle international 
disputes and inhibit recourse to war. (iv) Disarmament and 
arms control. (v) The promotion of attitudinal change away 
from parochial to more inclusive loyalties. (vi) Free
trade, (vii) The substitution of 'open covenants, openly 
arrived at' for secret diplomacy, (viii) The abolition of 
'interlocking bilateral alliances'. (ix) Self­
diet erminat ion. (x) The spread of democratic domestic
institutions.28
Assessment Kegley and Wittkopf acknowledge that idealists
28 'President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated Fourteen 
Points speech ... expressed the sentiments of the idealist 
image and program perhaps better than did any other 
statement'. Ibid. 14. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 'The 
Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths 
and the New International Realities', International Studies 
Quarterly. 37, 2 (1993), 131-46. Here Kegley argues the
case for a reconstructed realist paradigm inspired by 
'Wilsonian idealism' a term which he uses interchangeably 
with 'liberalism', the 'liberalist approach', the 'idealist 
tradition', and 'neoliberal idealism'. In turn all of 
these things are identified with President Wilson's 
Fourteen Points which he variously, and equally 
confusingly, describes as a 'vision', a 'script', an 
'image', a 'program', a 'philosophy', and a 'theory'. 
There are two significant additions to the earlier, Kegley 
and Wittkopf, inventory: (i) that the interests and goals
of states are not immutable but subject to change with 
changed circumstances; (ii) that international machinery is 
needed to resolve ethnic conflicts and protect human rights 
and the rights of minorities (137-8).
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held widely divergent views of world politics29 and stress 
that not all of them subscribed to each of the tenets they 
list with equal conviction. They also acknowledge, 
remarkably, that their account is 'simplistically worded7. 
Certainly, Premise (i) and Hypothesis (i) make idealists 
sound childlike to say the least. This notwithstanding, 
their treatment of the subject is not on the whole 
pejorative despite the fact that their sympathies clearly 
lie with realism (which, notwithstanding certain 
deficiencies, they describe as 7 compelling7 and 
"insightful7). As far as explicit assessment of idealism 
goes, they describe idealist discourse as "laced with 
overtones of moralism, optimism, and internationalism".
Utopians Cited Woodrow Wilson.
7. Hollis and Smith30
In common with most interpretations Hollis and Smith state 
that idealism arose in the aftermath of the First World War 
and became the dominant mode of thinking until events in 
the 1930s began to challenge its basic assumptions.
Premises (i) Faith in progress grounded in the belief that
29 Though not without ambiguity since idealists are 
united by their 7 shared assumptions about reality" and the 
"homogeneity of their conclusions", which makes one wonder 
about the matters they "widely diverge" on.
30 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and 
Understanding International Relations (Oxford, 1990), 10- 
22, 217.
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[a] human beings have reconcilable goals such as peace, 
health, and prosperity and [b] institutions are human 
constructs which, once created, can extensively influence 
people's thought and actions. (ii) A 'liberal' assumption 
of human nature. Accordingly, good men and women never 
want war. If war breaks out it is consequently due either 
to misunderstanding or 'the dominance of uneducated or 
uncivilized minds in the political process'.
Hypotheses (i) War is no longer able to achieve its 
objectives and has become an unusable form of statecraft, 
(ii) The causes of war are misunderstanding between 
leaders, lack of democratic control, and absence of 
'suitable institutions to encourage cooperation'.
Prescriptions (i) The spread of statehood and democracy,
(ii) The development of mediation processes and 
organizational structures 'within which leaders could 
perceive more accurately the (non-aggressive) aims of their 
potential adversaries' . (iii) The outlawing of war and the 
creation of an international police force.
Assessment Hollis and Smith's account is for the most part 
neutrally explicated. They implicitly accept, however, 
Carr's condemnation of Utopians for privileging wishing 
over thinking, generalisation over observation, ends over 
means, and for adopting an uncritical approach towards 
'existing facts and available means'. They also accept
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Carr's view that utopianism could not explain the harrowing 
events of the 1930s and that it reflected the 
preoccupations and interests of the status quo powers in 
which it originated.
Utopians Cited Woodrow Wilson, Alfred Zimmern (whose The 
League of Nations and the Rule of Law is described as the 
best example of idealist writing).
8. Booth31
Since the end of the Cold War several attempts have been 
made to view utopianism in a more favourable light. 
Foremost among these is Ken Booth's attempt to restore the 
role and reputation of utopianism as a respectable 
intellectual tradition. Booth does not separate inter-war 
utopianism from the wider utopian tradition but a large 
part of his assessment is based on a reading of what 
happened during that period both in the world of ideas and 
in the material world.
Premises (i) Politics is rooted in ethics. (ii) It is 
possible, through reason, to arrive at a 'universal ethical 
standpoint' . (iii) There is a significant voluntarist 
element in international politics ('the world does not have 
to look like the one we are familiar with)'.
31 Ken Booth, 'Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in 
Theory and Practice', International Affairs. 67, 3 (1991), 
527-545.
Hypotheses (i) The setting of goals can be a catalyst for 
purposeful action. (ii) The world of sovereign states is 
not necessarily a 'war system' . (iii) The tendency of 
realists to privilege short-term over long-term problems 
can have disastrous consequences.
Prescriptions (i) The 'study and strengthening of 
international organizations and international law'. (ii) 
An international police force. (iii) Attention in IR to 
'the possible' and 'the desirable' as well as 'the actual',
(iii) More attention to long-term problems. (iii) Change 
through the 'education of desire' - 'the desire for a 
better way of being and living' . (iv) More emphasis on 
ethics, less on power and order.
Assessment Whereas most expositors of utopianism define it 
in terms of its defects, Booth defines it in terms of its 
strengths. He is critical of certain 'brands' of 
utopianism, such as Lord Davies's ideas on the enforcement 
of peace by an international police force based on air 
power. He favours instead reformist and pragmatic 'process 
utopias' over 'end-point utopias' (which 'look towards a 
future blueprint, such as world government, when history 
virtually comes to a stop'). Generally, however, the 
aspects of utopianism he draws to our attention are the 
ones he considers salutary and of relevance for current 
thinking.
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Utopians Cited David Davies. By implication: Leonard
progenitor. Richard Falk as an important contemporary 
practitioner.
9. Olson and Groom32
The idealist tradition, according to Olson and Groom, was 
one of four threads of international political thought that 
emerged in the nineteenth century and would be woven into
the study of diplomacy and international law; realpolitik: 
and Marxism) . The formation of this new discipline was 
"accelerated by the coming of the First World War", and 
idealism, "combined with political activism in the peace 
movement", dominated the 'first period of consensus". This 
lasted from 1916 until the demise of the League system in 
the early 1930s.
Premises (i) Hopeful and optimistic about the future of 
world affairs.
Hypotheses (i) Peace, as opposed to power, is the "main 
currency of IR" .33 (ii) The League constitutes an 
alternative to power politics. (iii) International law and 
organization is efficacious. (iv) The scientific study of
32 William Olson and A. J. R. Groom, International 
Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in 
Interpretation (London, 1991), 46-134.
33 A curious analogy. Ibid. 79.
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Woolf. Kant cited as the principal intellectual
IR in the twentieth. (The other three, being:
international relations will help end war.
Prescriptions (i) Open covenants, openly arrived at. (ii) 
Education for world citizenship, (iii) The scientific study 
of international relations, (iii) Promotion of the League 
and a 'spirit of international cooperation'.
Assessment It is difficult to pin down Olson and Groom's 
opinion of idealism. They say that idealism dominated the 
'first period of consensus'. But they also say that the 
'mainstream literature' of the 1920s did not 'particularly 
reflect' the 'idealist internationalist' paradigm 'however 
much some of those outside the IR professional literature
may have done so' . The firm implication is that by
'mainstream literature' they have in mind those works 
produced chiefly by professional IR scholars, and that 
idealism (used interchangeably with 'liberal 
internationalism', 'idealist internationalism', and 'the 
new internationalism') was primarily an outlook shared and 
promulgated by non-professionals.34 But Sir Alfred 
Zimmern, a 'mainstream' figure by any standard, is
described as 'the consummate idealist'35; and Olson and
34 Ibid. 69-70, 73. See also 79-80 where, in 
discussing the decline of the idealist paradigm in the 
1930s and its replacement by the realist paradigm, the 
authors clearly equate idealism with the work of non­
professional 'popular' writers. The 'emerging professional 
or mainstream literature of international relations', by 
contrast, 'strove for balance between the two perspectives' 
(no evidence provided).
35 Ibid. 94.
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Groom provide no evidence to suggest that he was in any 
way exceptional - a professional scholar but also, 
uncharacteristically, an idealist. Moreover, despite to a 
large extent disassociating the 'mainstream literature', 
and therefore the discipline of International Relations, 
from the obloquy of idealism, they nonetheless describe the 
first period of 'disciplinary consensus' as the 'innocent 
phase', an adjective, following Carr, usually applied to 
idealism. This rather confusing picture is not, 
regrettably, clarified by Olson and Groom's definition of 
'mainstream literature' : 'works dealing systematically with 
the entire world, taking into account insights from several 
disciplines' .36 A number of books by such consummate non­
professionals as Wells, Brailsford, Hobson, and indeed 
Woolf, fit this definition depending on one's
interpretation of 'dealing systematically'. They certainly 
sought to deal with the world as a whole and they utilized 
material from a wide variety of sources both from within 
the academy and without.
The confusion resulting from this lack of rigour in 
defining 'mainstream literature' and the failure to 
adequately distinguish it from 'the discipline' and 
'idealism', makes it difficult to deduce Olson and Groom's 
opinions about the latter. It is difficult to be certain 
whether their criticisms refer to one, two, or all three of
these items. This being said, the following critical
remarks should be noted. (i) In a number of their works,
36 Ibid. 52.
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Zimmern and Ben Charrington (author of Methods of Teaching 
International Attitudes published in 1934) are criticized 
for seeking to 'make a point' rather than advance 
scientific understanding. In their work, ' [a]ttitude 
outweighed analysis'. Furthermore, Zimmern is rebuked for 
'broadened hopelessly the range of what IR should 
encompass' and his 'excessive eclecticism' impeded rather 
than encouraged acceptance of the field as a 'true 
discipline' .37 (ii) The 'new internationalists' are 
reproached for failing to see the 'trees for the wood' . So 
too are various 'cause groups' for allowing 'ends to color 
means' in their 'zeal for international change'.38 (iii) 
The 'literature of the League period' (post-1931?; 
mainstream, non-mainstream, or both?) is accused of 
'naivete'.39 (iv) Carr's view that ' [t]he course of events 
after 1931 clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure 
aspiration as the basis for a science of international 
politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark 
on serious critical and analytical thought about 
international problems' , is quoted approvingly.40 (v) There 
is, arguably, implied criticism in Olson and Groom's 
argument that the first period of (idealist) consensus was
37 Ibid. 73-4. See also 110 where Morgenthau and 
Thompson are cited criticising Zimmern for his 'extreme 
vagueness', 'aimless humanitarianism', and 'unconcern with 
methodological problems'.
38 Ibid. 74.
39 Ibid. 81. See also 124.
40 Ibid. 91-2. See also 109.
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not entirely transcended by the second (realist) period 
since both were state-centric in approach.
On a more positive note it is contended that 'genuine 
idealists' like Zimmern and especially Toynbee were not 
totally out of touch with reality. Toynbee was 'a realist 
ahead of his time in that he clearly foresaw the coming 
impact of ... the "Third World".' Similarly, Zimmern is 
credited with anticipating 'the stress now being placed on 
values by statesman and scholar alike' .41
Idealists Cited Alfred Zimmern, Ben Charrington, Arnold 
Toynbee.42
10. Knutsen43
In his conceptually rich introduction to the history of 
international relations theory, Torbjorn Knutsen states 
that the 'new utopian discipline of International 
Relations', which he also calls the 'new Enlightenment- 
liberal discipline', was dominated by the arguments and 
vision of Woodrow Wilson, and 'preoccupied with finding 
reason-based substitutes for war'.
41 Ibid. 95-6.
42 Numerous other writers are cited, including J. A. 
Hobson, David Davies and Norman Angeli, but it is highly 
uncertain whether or not Olson and Groom consider them 
idealists. See 47, 84.
43 Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International 
Relations Theory; An Introduction (Manchester, 1992), 184- 
207, 268-70.
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Premises (i) Belief in reason, individual liberty, 
individual utility, equality, property, public opinion, 
social openness, enlightened self-interest, human progress. 
(ii) Belief in a natural harmony of interests which holds 
that as long as social actors obey the laws of nature their 
interests will be complimentary. (iii) Presumption that 
'human nature can be understood in terms not of immutable 
facts but of potentialities which are progressively 
actualised in the course of history'.
Hypotheses (i) War is a product of 'ignorant, prejudiced, 
or self-serving autocrats and manipulative politicians'. 
(ii) Ditto the balance of power. (iii) Ditto secret 
diplomacy. (iii) War is incompatible with economic 
progress. Commerce will render war obsolete. (ii) Change 
is 'easy': 'through reason man can understand and control 
his natural and social environment. A rational and moral 
political order can be created through the exercise of 
'mind and will'.
Prescriptions (i) Open diplomacy. (ii) 'Freedom of 
navigation upon the seas'. (iii) Free trade. (iv) 'Free, 
open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims'. (v) Creation of a League of Nations to
guarantee territorial integrity and political independence 
of great nations and small alike. (vi) 'Open debate and 
proper education' (to dispel ignorance). (iii)
International contact and cooperation (to dispel
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prejudice). (iv) Popular democracy (to prevent 'self- 
serving, evil, and egotistical leaders from assuming 
autocratic power'). (v) Recreation at the international
level of the democratic institutions that prevent violence 
within enlightened nations.
Assessment Knutsen's evaluation of idealism is critical 
verging on contemptuous. He says that ' the subj ect 
matters' discussed in the formative years of the idealist 
discipline of IR were 'curiously out of touch with the 
political realities of the age' . Though he does not offer 
supporting evidence he goes on to say that '[m]any of the 
courses taught were theoretically barren; many of the books 
written were ideologically myopic' ,44 Confining themselves 
to the 'Wilsonian vision' idealist writers 'rarely ventured 
to explore the many theories which swept the streets 
outside their ivory towers' . In this and in other matters 
Knutsen rather slavishly follows Carr, whom he cites 
frequently. Thus the 'aloofness' of idealism is accounted 
for by the fact that IR was in its infancy, a phase during 
which wishing - in this case the passionate desire to 
prevent war - prevails over thinking - attention to 
reality. The new discipline is censured for being a
44 Knutsen later says: 'In British universities, the
very first courses tended to discuss the historical roots 
and the diplomatic implications of international events; in 
the United States, these early courses were marked by a 
focus on current events and by a preoccupation with 
International Law.' These courses did not 'beat new paths' 
but they did 'promote some appreciation of the geography 
and understanding of the diversity of the world'.
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reflection, in an American mirror, of early nineteenth 
century liberal thought, the Benthamite assumptions 
underlying which had long been discredited. Carr's 
infamous dichotomies (see n.26) are accepted uncritically 
and used as a basis for further analysis.45
In addition, Knutsen accuses utopianism of reading the 
'rich tradition of political liberalism' in a 'narrow 
economic light' (and, perhaps paradoxically, of 'having a 
narrow, liberal, view of war and peace') .46
Utopians Cited Woodrow Wilson, Norman Angell, Clyde 
Eagleton. By implication: Ernest Satow, L. Oppenheim,
James Brierly, Hersch Lauterpacht, Alfred Zimmern, Pitman 
Potter, C. Delisle Burns, Frederick Schuman. Progenitors: 
the nineteenth century peace movement, Adam Smith and the 
classical liberals, Bentham.
Findings
The above analysis throws into sharp relief the rich 
variety of characteristics have been ascribed to inter-war 
utopianism. Among them, at least nine analytically
45 See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939: 
An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(London, 1939), 3-15, 16-28, 36-8.
46 Knutsen is able to arrive at the former opinion, 
expressed in a section on the resurgence of utopian 
thinking at the end of the Cold War, by equating utopianism 
with laissez-faire liberalism and Benthamite assumptions 
about the pursuit of individual utility and collective 
well-being.
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distinct premises can be discerned (see Table 1) . The most 
commonly cited are belief in progress, faith in reason, and 
belief in a 'natural', 'underlying', or 'immanent' harmony 
of interests. The first of these receives six references 
if Olson and Groom's 'hope and optimism about the future of 
world affairs' is held to be synonymous with it. The other 
two each receive five references. Belief in the primacy of 
ideas47 receives four citations, and the belief that human 
nature is basically 'good', or 'pacific', or 'cooperative', 
three. Confidence in the pacific propensities of public 
opinion receives two, as does belief in the objectivity of 
justice, and the assumption that human beings are 
malleable.48
I say 'at least' for the following reason: Knutsen's 
Premise (i) contains a list of nine beliefs which are in 
principle analytically separable but, because of their 
vagueness as stated (belief in 'property', 'social 
openness', 'enlightened self-interest', etc.), and because 
the author does not go on to clarify what he means by them, 
not all of them are included among the nine 'analytically 
distinct' premises. I have, however, counted separately
47 I include Booth's Premise (iii) since one of the 
things conventionally understood by 'the primacy of ideas' 
is the belief that there is a sizeable voluntarist element 
in history which permits change, inspired by creative 
thought, to take place, despite the existence of prejudice, 
vested interests, and inhospitable structures.
48 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf f' s Premise (ii) and 
Knutsen's Premise (i). Though expressed in different ways 
both encapsulate the same idea: the behaviour of human 
beings is not genetically or otherwise pre-programmed and 
immutable, as it is with (most?) other species, but subject 
to change and improvement.
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those beliefs ('reason', 'public opinion', and 'human 
progress') mentioned by a number of the other authors on 
the presumption that Knutsen means by them much the same 
thing.
Table 1: Summary of premises cited and their frequency
in ten studies of utopianism
1 Belief in progress 6
2 Faith in reason 5
3 Belief in a harmony of interests 5
4 Belief in the primacy of ideas 4
5 Human nature is basically good 3
6 Justice is objective 2
7 Public opinion is pacific 2
8 Human nature is malleable 2
9 Politics is rooted in ethics 1
It is fair to conclude that there is a moderate degree 
of consensus on the premises of utopianism given that at 
least half of the ten studies examined advance three 
premises in common. There is less consensus on the 
hypotheses of utopianism. Twenty-five analytically 
distinct hypotheses can be identified (see Table 2). The 
two most frequently mentioned are that autocracy leads to 
war and democracy to peace, and that the elimination of war 
is an achievable goal. These two hypotheses are cited in 
four of the studies. Three hypotheses are common to three 
of the studies: that the international system can be
transformed through international law and organization;49
49 I include as a single hypothesis Olson and Groom's 
Hypotheses (ii) and (iii).
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war is a product of imperfect or unsuitable political 
institutions; and, the duty of the scholar is to educate 
the masses, or 'public opinion', in internationalism. Five 
hypotheses are common to two of the studies: that human 
beings are often stubborn in their attachment to outmoded 
ideas, ruled by passion, muddled in their thinking; that 
the balance of power is unstable and ends in war; that wars 
result form the international anarchy; that war is 
increasingly becoming obsolete; and, that peace is a common 
interest. The remaining fourteen hypotheses are each 
advanced just once.
Table 2: Summary of hypotheses cited and their frequency 
in ten studies of utopianism_______________
1 The elimination of war is practicable 4
2 Democracy leads to peace 4
3 The state system can be transformed through 
international law and organization
3
4 War is a product of imperfect or unsuitable 
political institutions
3
5 The duty of the scholar is to educate the 
masses in internationalism
3
6 Human beings are often ruled by passion and 
guilty of muddled thinking
2
7 The balance of power is unstable and ends in 
war
2
8 War is caused by international anarchy 2
9 War is becoming obsolete 2
10 Peace is a common interest 2
11 The shape of a new international system is 
deducible from the needs of progress
1
12 Politics can be made to conform to an ethical 
standard
1
13 War never benefits the masses 1
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14 Morality is not culture-bound but universal 1
15 War often results from miscalculation 1
16 War is often a product of the machinations of 
armaments manufacturers
1
17 Nationalism is atavistic 1
18 War is a collective problem requiring a 
collective response
1
19 The setting of goals can be a catalyst for 
purposive action
1
20 The system of sovereign states is not 
necessarily a war-system
1
21 Privileging the short-term over long-term can 
have disastrous consequences
1
22 Peace is the main currency of International 
Relations not power
1
23 The scientific study of international relations 
will help end war
1
24 War is a product of secret diplomacy 1
25 War is incompatible with economic progress 1
A higher degree of consensus returns when we turn our 
attention to prescriptions, of which it is possible to 
identify twenty-one which are analytically distinct (see 
Table 3). Eight of the ten studies refer to promotion of 
the League and the extension or strengthening of 
international organization,50 and six refer to the emphasis
50 I include in this figure two references to the broad 
prescription that institutions effective at preventing 
violence at the domestic level should be replicated at the 
international level. This prescription encompasses a wide 
range of things, from the setting up of courts and 
arbitration tribunals to the promotion of social 
cooperation and the establishment of an international 
police force. I have categorized it under 'the League and 
international organization' as this seems a reasonable 
compromise between not counting it at all, on the grounds 
that it is far too general, and counting it whenever a 
prescription can be fairly said to be based on the domestic 
analogy.
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put on education, especially education in internationalism. 
Half of the studies in one way of another refer to: the 
need to foster the spread of democracy; the importance of 
disarmament; the need to strengthen international law: and 
the hope held out for mediation, arbitration, and the 
judicial settlement of disputes. Four highlight the call 
for an international police force, and three emphasize the 
call for collective security, open diplomacy, and free 
trade. Two refer to peaceful change,51 the need to study 
international questions scientifically,52 self- 
determination, and the legal prohibition of war.
Table 3: Summary of prescriptions cited and their 
_____ frequency in ten studies of utopianism_____
1 The League and international organization 8
2 Education 6
3 Mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement 5
4 Democracy 5
5 Disarmament 5
6 International law 5
7 International police force 4
51 Again, this is a general prescription which could 
encompass a wide variety of other prescriptions including 
strengthening international law, establishing arbitration 
tribunals, facilitating mediation, and promoting peaceable 
means of self-determination. Its claim to analytical 
distinctiveness is arguable. I have put it in a category 
of its own, however, because it was a key concept in 
discussion about international order in the 1930s. By 
contrast, the domestic analogy prescription (see previous 
footnote) is one retroactively imputed to 'utopianism' 
rather than one actually made, in those terms, at the time.
52 I include in this category Vasquez's Prescription 
(v) which I summarise as 'the study, empirical and 
normative, of international organizations'.
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8 Open diplomacy 3
9 Free trade 3
10 Collective security 3
11 Peaceful change 2
12 Scientific study of international relations 2
13 Self-determination 2
14 Legal prohibition of war 2
15 Freedom of the seas 1
16 Impartial readjustment of colonial claims 1
17 The abolition of alliances 1
18 Greater cooperation on social matters 1
19 More attention to long-term problems 1
20 More attention to ethics 1
21 Greater attention to the possible and desirable 1
Less agreement exists on the thinkers deemed to be 
significant or representative members of the utopian school 
(see Table 4) . Only one, Sir Alfred Zimmern, is mentioned 
in half or more of the ten studies, though nine out of a 
total of twenty-two are mentioned in at least three. 
Perhaps remarkably, some of the most prominent writers and 
publicists of the time - W. Arnold-Foster, Sir Robert 
Cecil, J. A. Hobson, Keynes, Harold Laski, Lord Lothian, H. 
G. Wells - are not mentioned at all. This is almost 
certainly due to the fact that they are not classified as 
"utopian7 in the two most influential expositions of the 
subject - The Twenty Years7 Crisis (with the important 
exception of Sir Robert Cecil), and Bull7s essay analyzed 
above. The team of Utopians assembled by Bull, for 
example, is replicated almost exactly in two of the
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accounts, and several of them borrow extensively from it.
Table 4: Thinkers explicitly identified as utopian and 
frequency of citation in ten studies of utopianism
1 Alfred Zimmern 5
2 Woodrow Wilson 4
3 James T. Shotwell 4
4 Norman Angel1 3
5 S. H. Bailey 3
6 David Mitrany 3
7 Philip Noel-Baker 3
8 Parker T. Moon 3
9 Pitman Potter 3
10 David Davies 2
11 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson 2
12 Arnold Toynbee 2
13 James Bryce 1
14 Nicholas Murray Butler 1
.15 H. N. Brailsford 1
16 Ben Charrington 1
17 Clyde Eagleton 1
18 Raymond D. Fosdick 1
19 Gilbert Murray 1
20 Arthur Ponsonby 1
21 Jan Smuts 1
22 Leonard Woolf 1
From this analysis it seems fair to draw the following 
conclusions: that there is a moderate degree of consensus 
on the premises and prescriptions of utopianism; a low 
degree of ancigngias on its hypotheses; and a low to 
moderate degree of consensus on its principal adherents 
(see Table 5).
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Table 5: Number of attributes cited five or more times 
and three or more times in ten studies of utopianism
Category 5 or more 
references
3 or more 
references
Premises (x9) 3 5
Hypotheses (x25) 0 5
Prescriptions (x21) 6 10
Utopians cited (x22) 1 9
Combining the attributes most commonly cited it might be 
said that the 'ideal type' inter-war utopian believed in 
progress, reason, the primacy of ideas, and presumed the 
existence of a natural harmony of interests. He argued 
that war was a product of imperfect political institutions, 
that its elimination was a practicable goal, that the 
spread of democracy would lead to peace, that the anarchic 
state-system could be transformed through international law 
and organization, and that the duty of the scholar was to 
educate the masses in internationalism. He advocated 
disarmament, the strengthening of international law, the 
promotion of democracy, the spread of political education, 
the establishment of procedures for the mediation, 
arbitration, and judicial settlement of disputes, and, most 
importantly, the development of international organization, 
the League in particular.
Finally, to what extent do our authors agree on the 
failings of utopianism? This part of the analysis is 
difficult to summarize in tabular form due to the richness 
of the vocabulary in which criticism of utopianism is 
expressed. Should the accusation that Utopians lack
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intellectual depth be put in the same category as the claim 
that their theories lack explanatory power, or in a 
different category? Ditto the charge of self-
righteousness, on the one hand, and moralism, on the other. 
Ditto the charge of being rhetorical in style, on the one 
hand, and being emotive, on the other. These examples not 
only illustrate the semantic problems involved in an 
attempt to categorize neatly the various criticisms, but 
also the fact that these criticisms are made at different 
levels of generality: some criticisms constitute sub-sets 
and in certain cases sub-sub-sets of others.
Though it is not feasible to summarize the various 
assessments of utopianism in tabular form, the following 
observations can be made. The most commonly accepted 
shortcoming of idealism, mentioned in at least half of the 
studies, is its moralism and/or self-righteousness. A 
number of studies refer to idealism's lack of explanatory 
power and related shortcomings of privileging wishing over 
thinking, ends over means, and generalization over 
observation. These and other criticisms suggest a general 
consensus that idealists failed to give sufficient 
attention to facts and empirical analysis. Several authors 
censure idealists for being overly optimistic, 'innocent', 
or naive. They are also censured more than once for: not 
contributing anything, despite their pretensions, to the 
understanding of international morality; being legalistic 
in approach and rhetorical in style; being emotive and, 
indeed, apocalyptic; and for being unwitting exponents of
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the special ideology of the satisfied powers.
The Legacy of Carr
The above analysis shows that to examine Woolf's thought in 
the light of his reputation as a utopian is not as 
straightforward a matter as it at first might appear. 
Utopianism means different things to different people. The 
level of agreement among students of the subject as to its 
meaning is, at best, low to moderate. To stand accused of 
utopianism is to stand accused of one or more of a wide 
variety of often unspecified sins.
It is not feasible to assess the entire corpus of 
Woolf's thought in the light of all the aspects and 
attributes, crimes and misdemeanours, which have been 
ascribed to utopianism. We need, therefore, to make a 
judgement on what aspects are most important. If these 
aspects are apparent in Woolf's work, it can be fairly 
concluded that his bleak reputation is deserved.
In trying to ascertain the key characteristics of 
utopianism, Bull's analysis might be a useful starting 
point. As mentioned, its impact on conventional
understandings of utopianism has been pronounced. But it 
is slight compared with Carr's. Indeed, Bull's analysis 
itself bears the imprint of Carr. In order to ascertain 
the key characteristics of inter-war utopianism with any 
confidence, therefore, it is necessary to go back to Carr. 
Not to do so would be to run the risk of arbitrariness
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given the sketchy nature of most subsequent accounts and 
the piecemeal way in which they borrow from the original.
So, firstly, what did Carr himself hold to be the main 
features and chief defects of utopianism? Secondly, which 
aspects of his analysis have contributed most to 
contemporary interpretations? In line with the preceding 
analysis I propose to answer these questions by attempting 
to distil from Carr's in many ways highly complex text what 
he took to be the premises, hypotheses, and prescriptions 
of utopianism; whom he considered its leading exponents; 
and what he believed to be its most characteristic defects.
Carr on Utopianism
Carr's account of the emergence of utopianism, or perhaps 
more precisely its re-emergence in the 'special field' of 
international politics, may be summarized as follows. The 
science of international politics, according to Carr, was 
created to serve a specific purpose. In this respect it 
followed the pattern of other sciences. Illustrating his 
case with examples from the early years of Geometry, 
Medical Science, Engineering, Political Science, Sociology, 
Chemistry, Political Economy, and (somewhat incongruently) 
socialism, Carr observed that new fields of enquiry do not 
proceed inductively but are dominated by the desire to 
fulfil certain purposes. Purpose is prior to and a 
condition of thought. 'The initial stage of aspiration 
towards an end is an essential foundation of human 
thinking. The wish is father to the thought. Teleology
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precedes analysis' .53
The field of international politics came into being in 
response to a popular demand that an end be put to war. It 
' took its rise from one of the greatest and most disastrous 
wars of history' . The 'overwhelming purpose which 
dominated and inspired the pioneers of the new science was 
to obviate a recurrence of this disease of the 
international body politic'. This 'passionate desire to 
prevent war determined the whole initial course and 
direction' of study.
This course began to change, however, in 1931. From 
that point onwards events began to clearly reveal the 
'inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science 
of international politics' and it became possible for the 
first time 'to embark on serious analytical thought about 
international problems'. 'Hard ruthless analysis of 
reality' was forced on the student of intentional politics 
as an 'essential ingredient of his study'. This 
development, the impact of thinking upon wishing, marked 
the end of the specifically utopian period of study, and 
the arrival of realism.54
So what, for Carr, were the core features of the 
utopian school which so dominated the early years of the 
'science' of international politics? The answer to this 
question is far from simple. This is because Carr does not 
set out systematically the key features of utopianism but,
53 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 11.
54 Ibid. 13-14.
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rather, builds up an impressionistic picture of it 
sometimes by explicit assertion, but often through 
inference and insinuation. This problem is compounded by 
the fact that it is difficult to separate Carr's 
explication of utopianism from his critique of it. The way 
in which Carr represents a number of utopian propositions 
and assertions is, to say the least, rather loaded.
Two further obstacles lie in the path of an accurate 
synopsis of Carr's analysis of inter-war utopianism. 
Firstly, he uses the term to denote not one but two 
practically connected, but conceptually distinct things - 
one general and abstract, the other more specific and 
concrete. Utopianism in the first sense is a recurrent 
feature of all political thought: it consists of a body of 
ideas which waxes and wanes in influence, but one which is 
always above or just below the surface of political life. 
In the second, narrower, sense utopianism is the particular 
expression of these ideas found in thinking about 
international relations in the 192 0s and 193 0s.
While these two are clearly linked they are far from 
synonymous, and in places it is difficult to determine 
whether the object of Carr's concern is utopianism in the 
first or utopianism in the second sense. Similarly, it is 
sometimes hard to be sure whether Carr's often withering 
criticisms of utopianism in general can always and equally 
be applied, by extension, to utopianism in particular.
Secondly, in Parts III and IV of The Twenty Years' 
Crisis - dealing inter alia with international law and
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morality, the sanctity of treaties, the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, and the concept of peaceful change - it is 
interesting to observe that the frequency with which Carr 
admonishes an idea or view for being 'utopian' begins to 
decline. He continues with undiminished relish to condemn 
ideas for being 'fallacious', 'fictitious', 'hollow', and 
' illusory' - but does this mean they are thereby 
'utopian'?55 This would not be an unreasonable conclusion 
to draw given the spirited way in which the term is 
employed to write-off a wide variety of ideas in Parts I 
and II.
With these provisos in mind an attempt is made in 
Tables 6-8 to summarize the premises, hypotheses, and 
prescriptions of 'inter-war utopianism according to Carr'. 
No claim is made to objectivity. Nonetheless, what follows 
is an attempt to summarize Carr as reasonably as the 
author's powers of comprehension and skill of judgement 
permit.
The Twenty Years' Crisis is more a great work of 
rhetoric - and one of considerable literary merit - than a 
great work of social science. Given this, interpretations 
of its manifold aspects and attributes are bound to vary. 
There is, in addition, some room for debate as to whether 
certain propositions should be categorized as 'premises' or 
'hypotheses'. As with the earlier tables, level of 
generality and, in some cases, consciousness, are taken as 
useful 'rules of thumb' (the assumption being that
55 See, for example, 219, 230, 244, 248, 267, 298.
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premises, being the foundation-stones of thought, are 
generally speaking more general in nature than hypotheses 
which, as well as being more specific, are also things 
which cannot be advanced or maintained unconsciously).
Table 9 lists those thinkers referred to explicitly as 
utopian. It will be noted than even here there is a
problem: on a close inspection it transpires that many of 
Carr's dramatis personae are far from unequivocally 
utopian. Indeed, those whose utopianism is implied, often 
vaguely, exceed in number those whose utopianism is firmly 
and unambiguously proclaimed.
As with the critical judgements made in more recent 
accounts of utopianism, it is difficult to express the wide 
range of criticisms made by Carr in tabular form. There is 
a sense, however, in which it may be profitable, despite 
certain pitfalls, to attempt to do so. Careful scrutiny 
reveals that although the form of Carr's objections varies 
considerably, the substance of most of these objections 
falls into three categories. That is, although Carr 
expresses his reservations and repudiations in various ways 
- often trenchant, often clever, invariably colourful; and 
although he illustrates his case with a wide range of 
historical examples, it is none the less true that Carr, 
for the most part, is essentially making just three claims.
The attempt to reproduce Carr's principal objections 
to utopian thinking is made in Table 10. It consists 
largely of key critical passages. The table is, 
inevitably, several pages long. Only by producing it in
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full, however, can the contention of the preceding 
paragraph be effectively demonstrated.
Table 6: Summary of premises of inter-war utopianism as
designated in The Twenty Years7 Crisis
1 The purpose of the study of international politics is to 
find a cure for war (1st edn., 11)
2 Reality can be radically transformed by an act of will 
('creative spontaneity') (16-17)
3 Political theory is a norm to which political practice 
ought to conform (17)
4 Human conscience is the final court of appeal in moral 
questions ('individualism') (32)
5 Human conscience is the voice of reason ('rationalism') 
(32)
6 Belief in enlightenment and progress through reason (34)
7 Belief in the compelling power of reason expressed 
through the voice of the people ('the Utopian doctrine 
of the efficacy of rational public opinion' ) (43-6)
8 Belief in a fixed and absolute standard 'by which 
policies and actions can be judged' (28, 96)
Table 7: Summary of hypotheses of inter-war utopianism as 
designated in The Twenty Years7 Crisis
1 The task of the student of international relations is 
to convert everyone to his desires (13)
2 War is largely due to the control of foreign affairs by 
professional diplomats (24)
3 Politics can be made to conform to an ethical standard 
(28)
4 Public opinion, if allowed to make itself effective, is 
sufficient to prevent war (34-5)
5 The pursuit of good is a question of right reasoning 
(34-6)
6 The spread of knowledge will soon make it possible for 
everyone to reason rightly (34-6)
7 Everyone who reasons rightly will necessarily act 
rightly (34-6)
8 War results from a failure in understanding; the spread 
of education will lead to international peace (35-6,
67)
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9 National self-determination is the key to world peace 
(60)
10 There is no necessary incompatibility between 
nationalism and internationalism (60)
11 There is no necessary incompatibility between the 
economic good of individual nations and the economic 
good of humanity as a whole ('natural harmony of 
interest in free trade') (56-61)
12 Every nation has an identical interest in peace 
('natural harmony of interest in peace') (67)
13 War is useless, as proven by the experience of 1914- 
1918 (67)
14 'It is possible to eliminate self-assertion from 
politics and to base a political system on morality 
alone' (125)
15 The creation of the League will lead to 'the 
elimination of power from international relations and 
the substitution of discussion for armies and navies' 
(132)
16 The League is an expression of 'the organised opinion 
of mankind' with the power to control 'the military and 
economic power of governments' (177)
17 The personification of the state is meaningless and 
reactionary (189)
18 The same code of morality is applicable to states as to 
individuals (194)
19 International disputes can be 'classified by an 
objective test as ipso facto iusticiable and ipso facto 
non-justiciable' (248)
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Table 8: Summary of prescriptions of inter-war utopianism
as designated in The Twenty Years' Crisis
1 International police force
2 Collective security
3 World government
4 Free trade
5 General disarmament
6 Education
7 Outlawing war
8 United States of Europe
9 National self-determination
10 International government (meaning joint 
administration/shared sovereignty)
11 All-in arbitration (meaning compulsory settlement of 
all disputes by arbitration)
12 World federation
13 A 'more perfect League of Nations'
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Table 9: Thinkers explicitly56 identified as utopian in
The Twenty Years' Crisis
1 Woodrow Wilson
2 Robert Cecil
3 Nicholas Murray Butler
4 Alfred Zimmern
5 Norman Angell
6 Arnold Toynbee
7 Leon Duguit
8 John Dewey
9 Hersch Lauterpact
56 Mention should be made here of some of the men whom 
Carr does not explicitly indict but whose guilt is strongly 
implied: Presidents Taft and Roosevelt, and Secretaries of 
State Stimson and Hull (for believing that public opinion 
will always prevail and can be trusted to come down on the 
right side); David Lloyd George (ditto with respect to the 
issue of disarmament) ; Anthony Eden (for echoing the 
Mazzinian doctrine of a pre-ordained division of a labour 
between nations, each with its special contribution to make 
to the welfare of humanity) ; Winston Churchill (for failing 
to recognise the interested character of his denunciations 
of, first, the Bolsheviks and, later, the Nazis) ; the 
Times, Cecil Rhodes, W. T. Stead, Arthur Balfour, 
Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt (for assuming 
that the national interests of their countries were 
synonymous with the universal good); Bernard Bosanquet (for 
separating politics from economics); Frederick Schuman 
(ditto); Karl Marx (usually quoted approvingly for his 
realism but in one instance (148-9) criticised for being 
dominated by the nineteenth century presupposition that 
economics and politics were separate domains); Gilbert 
Murray (for harbouring the 'illusion' that certain disputes 
are ipso facto judiciable and others ipso facto non- 
just iciable) ; Hans Kelsen (for entertaining the 'dream' of 
a tribunal 'exercising not only the judicial function of 
interpreting the rights of states, but the legislative 
function of changing them'); Lord Davies (ditto).
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Table 10: Summary of criticisms of utopianism in The
Twenty Years7 Crisis
1 During the 'utopian', 'primitive', 'infantile', stage 
of the political sciences 'investigators ... pay little 
attention to existing "facts" or to the analysis of 
cause and effect, but ... devote themselves whole­
heartedly to the elaboration of visionary projects' the 
'simplicity and perfection' of which 'give them an easy 
and universal appeal' (8)
2 'Wish or purpose' is 'incapable by itself of achieving 
the desired end' (8)
3 In the initial stage of the study of international 
politics 'wishing prevails over thinking, 
generalisation over observation, and ... little attempt 
is made at a critical analysis of existing facts or 
available means. In this stage, attention is 
concentrated almost exclusively on the end to be 
achieved. The end has seemed so important that 
analytical criticism of the means proposed has too 
often been branded as destructive or unhelpful.' (11- 
12)
4 'Events which have occurred since 1931 clearly revealed 
the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a 
science of international politics.' (13)
5 'The utopian, purporting to recognise the 
interdependence of purpose and fact, treats purpose as 
if it were the only relevant fact, and constantly 
couches optative propositions in the indicative mood'. 
Utopian propositions 'are items in a political 
programme disguised as statements of fact; and the 
utopian inhabits a dream-world of such "facts", remote 
from the world of reality where quite contrary facts 
may be observed.' Furthermore, these propositions 'are 
not a oriori oroDositions. but are rooted in the world 
of reality in a way which the utopian altogether fails 
to understand.' The exposure of the hidden, 
ideological, foundations of utopian theory is 'a 
necessary preliminary to any serious political 
science'. (16-19)
6 Collective security, general disarmament, and other 
such schemes are 'the product of pure theory divorced 
from practical experience.' (25)
7 'Ethics must be interpreted in terms of politics; and 
the search for an ethical norm outside politics is 
doomed to frustration.' (28)
8 'League circles ... avoid the concrete in favour of 
abstract generalisations.' (40)
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9 'The metaphysicians of Geneva found it difficult to 
believe that an accumulation of ingenious texts 
prohibiting war was not a barrier against war itself' 
(41)
10 The belief that the potency of international public 
opinion renders material sanctions against a 
transgressor unnecessary is an 'outworn creed' and 
those that cling onto it 'gullible' (49)
11 'It seems undeniable that, in international affairs, 
public opinion was [between the wars] almost as often 
wrong-headed as it was impotent' (50-1)
12 'Much comment on international affairs during the past 
ten years has been rendered tedious and sterile by 
incessant girding at a reality which refuses to conform 
to utopian prescriptions. The simplicity of these 
explanations [that the breakdown of world order and the 
failure of the League is due mankind's stupidity or 
wickedness] seems almost ludicrously disproportionate 
to the intensity of the international crisis through 
which we are passing.' (52; see also 72)
13 'The common interest in peace masks the fact that some 
nations desire to maintain the status cruo without 
havina to fiaht for it. and others to chancre the status 
quo without having to fight.in order to do so. The 
statement that it is in the interest of the world as a 
whole either that the status cruo should be maintained, 
or that it should be changed, would be contrary to 
facts. The statement that it is in the interest of the 
world as a whole that the conclusion eventually 
reached, whether maintenance or change, should be 
reached by peaceful means, would command general 
assent, but seems a rather meaningless platitude.' (68- 
9)
14 'The assumption of a fundamental principle of economic 
policy whose application would be equally beneficial to 
all and detrimental to none' is 'economic utopianism in 
its most purblind form.' (73)
15 It is a fallacy to suppose that there is a natural 
harmony of interests in free trade: 'The clash of 
interests is real and inevitable; and the whole nature 
of the problem is distorted by an attempt to disguise 
it.' The idea that 'nobody can benefit from what harms 
another' is a 'hollow' and 'glib platitude'. (77, 80)
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16 The attempt to 'base international morality on an 
alleged harmony of interests which identifies the 
interests of the whole community of nations with the 
interests of each individual member of it' is 
'inadequate and misleading'. 'What confronts us to-day 
is, therefore, nothing less than the complete 
bankruptcy of the conception of morality which has 
dominated political and economic thought for a century 
and a half. Internationally, it is no longer possible 
to deduce virtue from right reasoning, because it is no 
longer seriously possible to believe that every state, 
by pursuing the greatest good of the whole world, is 
pursuinq the qreatest qood of is own citizens, and vice 
versa.' (80)
17 'The outstanding achievement of modern realism ... has 
been to reveal, not merely the determinist aspects of 
the historical process, but the relative and pragmatic 
character of thought itself.' The realist has 
demonstrated 'that the intellectual theories and 
ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the 
expression of absolute and a priori principles, are 
historically conditioned, being both products of 
circumstances and weapons framed for the furtherance of 
interests .... This is by far the most formidable 
attack which utopianism has to face; for here the very 
foundations of its belief are undermined by the realist 
critique.' (87)
18 The conviction that policy is deduced from ethical 
principles, not ethical principles from policy, is 
'hollow' (93)
19 'The utopian, however eager he may be to establish an 
absolute standard, does not argue that it is the duty 
of his country, in conformity with that standard, to 
put the interest of the world at large before its own 
interest; for that would be contrary to his theory that 
the interest of all coincides with the interest of 
each. He argues that what is best for the world is best 
for his country, and then reverses the argument to read 
that what is best for his country is best for the 
world, the two propositions being, from the utopian 
standpoint, identical; and this unconscious cynicism of 
the contemporary utopian has proved a far more 
effective diplomatic weapon than the deliberate and 
self-conscious cynicism of a Walewski or a Bismarck.' 
(96-7)
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20 'It is a familiar tactic of the privileged to throw 
moral discredit on the under-privileged by depicting 
them as disturbers of the peace; and this tactic is as 
readily applied internationally as within the national 
community.' Toynbee's argument that international law 
and order are in the true interests of mankind whereas 
the 'desire to perpetuate the reign of violence in 
international affairs' is 'an anti-social desire' not 
even in the interest of the citizens of those 
'benighted' countries which profess it, is 'compounded 
of platitude and falsehood in equal parts'. (105-6)
21 'The exposure of the real basis of the professedly 
abstract principles commonly invoked in international 
politics is the most damning and most convincing part 
of the realist indictment of utopianism.... The 
bankruptcy of utopianism resides not in its failure to 
live up to its principles, but in the exposure of its 
inability to provide any absolute and disinterested 
standard for the conduct of international affairs.'
The 'supposedly absolute and universal principles [of 
the utopian] were not principles at all, but the 
unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a 
particular interpretation of national interest at a 
particular time'. (110-11)
22 'In international politics, post-War utopianism became 
a hollow and intolerable sham, which served merely as a 
disguise for the interest of the privileged Powers'' . 
(118)
23 'A game of chess between a world-champion and a 
schoolboy would be so rapidly and so effortlessly won 
that the innocent onlooker might be pardoned for 
assuming that little skill was necessary to play chess. 
In the same way, the simpleminded spectator of the game 
of international politics could assume, between 192 0 
and 1931, that power played little part of the game'. 
(132-33)
24 'The post-War assumption of the elimination of power 
from politics could only result from a wholly 
uncritical attitude towards political problems.' (133)
25 'The history of Locarno is a classic instance of power 
politics. It remains incomprehensible to those who seek 
uniform a Driori solutions to the Droblem of security, 
and regard power politics as an abnormal phenomenon 
visible only in periods of crisis... power is an 
essential element of politics' (136-7) .
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26 Foreign policy can never be divorced from strategy. In 
ignoring strategy 'many contemporary books and speeches 
are reminiscent of those ingenious mathematical 
problems which the student is invited to solve by 
ignoring the weight of the elephant. The solutions 
proposed are neat and accurate on the abstract plane, 
but are obtained by leaving out of account the vital 
strategic factor .... If every prospective writer on 
international affairs in the last twenty years had 
taken a compulsory course in elementary strategy, reams 
of nonsense would have remained unwritten.' (141-42)
27 'It is one of the fallacies of the theory of collective 
security that war can be waged for the specific and 
disinterested purpose of "resisting aggression".' (144)
28 The divorce between economics and politics is an 
'illusion'. (147; See also 149, 151)
29 'Attempts to solve international problems by the 
application of economic principles divorced from 
politics are doomed to sterility.' (150)
30 The 'fallacy' of the 'power of international opinion' 
began to be exposed in the 1920s. 'That it survived at 
all was due to the persistent use by League enthusiasts 
of slogans like peace and disarmament which were 
capable of a universal appeal precisely because they 
meant different, and indeed contradictory, things to 
different people.' (178)
31 'The monopoly of international studies in the post-War 
period by the utopian school has resulted in a 
concentration of interest on discussions of the 
question what international morality ought ideally to 
be. There has been little discussion of the moral 
behaviour of states except to pass hasty and sweeping 
condemnation on it in the light of this ideal 
morality.... Moreover, utopia has met its usual fate in 
becoming, unknown to itself, the tool of vested 
interests. International morality, as expounded by 
most contemporary Anglo-Saxon writers, is now little 
more than a convenient weapon belabouring those who 
assail the status cruo.' (187)
32 Students of international morality mistake 
denunciations of conduct for a scientific study of the 
subject, and have 'generally preferred the role of 
missionary to that of the scientist' (187-8)
33 'It is a curious and significant paradox that those 
utopian writers on international affairs who most 
vigorously denounce the personification of the state as 
absurd and sinister none the less persistently allocate 
moral praise and blame (generally the latter) to those 
imaginary entities, "Great Britain", "France" and 
"Italy", whose existence they deny.' (190)
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34 Prior to 1914 the resort to war to change the existing 
order was not illegal. After 1918 such wars became 
increasingly condemned as 'aggressive' and nearly all 
nations signed a pact outlawing them. But no effective 
machinery was devised as a substitute for the 
traditional method of alterincr the status q u o . 'The 
rejection of the traditional method as illegal and the 
failure to provide any effective alternative have made 
contemporary international law a bulwark of the 
existing order to an extent unknown in previous 
international law .... This is the most fundamental 
cause of the recent decline of respect for 
international law; and those who, in deploring the 
phenomenon, fail to recognise its origin, not 
unnaturally expose themselves to the charge of 
hypocrisy or of obtuseness' (244-5)
35 The idea of an international tribunal 'exercising not 
merely the judicial function of interpreting the rights 
of states, but the legislative function of changing 
them' is based on the 'grave fallacy' that politics can 
be 'dissolved' into law, that an essentially political
function can be forced into a legal mould. (259-263)
36 'Power, used, threatened or silently held in reserve, 
is an essential factor in international change; and 
change will, generally speaking, be effected only in 
the interests of those by whom, or on whose behalf, 
power can be invoked. "Yielding to threats of force" 
is a normal part of the process of peaceful change.' 
This is 'ignored in most current writing about 
international politics'. (277)
37 'We can discard as purely utopian and muddle-headed 
plans for a procedure of peaceful change dictated by a 
world legislature or a world court.' (283)
38 'To attempt to ignore power as a decisive factor in 
every political situation is purely utopian.' (301)
39 '[T]he easy hypothesis of a natural harmony of 
interests, which a modicum of good-will and common 
sense would suffice to maintain, should be consigned to 
oblivion'. (303)
Table 10 gives some indication of the brilliance and 
vitality of Carr's argument. Yet careful scrutiny reveals 
that Carr, for the most part, raises just three broad 
objections. Firstly, Utopians pay little attention to 
facts and analysis of cause and effect, devoting their
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energies instead to the 'elaboration of visionary projects 
for the attainment of ends which they have in view' (as set 
out in 1; essentially the same objection is made in 2, 3, 
4, 5, 8, 26, 31, 32, 36; it is strongly implicit in 6, 24) . 
Secondly, Utopians grossly underestimate the role that 
power plays in international politics, and overestimate the 
role, actual and potential, of morality, law, public 
opinion, and other 'non-material' sanctions (this objection 
is made in 10, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 38; it is strongly
implicit in 7, 9, 11, 18, 28, 35, 37, 39) . Thirdly,
Utopians fail to recognize that their espousal of universal 
interests amounts to nothing more than the promotion and 
defence of a particular status quo. Here, as in other 
areas, Utopians fail to appreciate the self-interested 
character of their thought (this objection is made in 5, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31; it is strongly
implicit in 34).
Carr's Influence
Carr's influence is profound. Tables 6-10 demonstrate 
vividly the extent of his influence. All ten of the
accounts analyzed in the first part of this chapter refer 
to his path-breaking work. Virtually every facet of 
utopianism and criticism of it cited twice or more in these 
accounts finds its original expression, in one way or 
another, in Carr.
Carr's analysis of the following has been particularly 
influential: (i) the emergence of 'the science of
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international politics7; (ii) utopian faith in reason and 
the power of public opinion; (iii) the relationship between 
politics and ethics; (iv) the doctrine of the harmony of 
interests; and (v) the utopian belief in absolute standards 
of judgement. Carr does not explicitly stipulate 7belief 
in progress7 as a premise of utopianism; nor does he 
stipulate the claim that "democracy leads to peace7, or the 
contention that "the balance of power is unstable and ends 
in war", as hypotheses. These notions are, however, 
strongly implicit in, respectively, Carr"s account of the 
evolution of the doctrine of a natural harmony of 
interests, his rejection of Zimmern"s distinction between 
"welfare" states and "power" states, and his analysis of 
the utopian desire to eliminate power from international 
relations.57 It should be noted, however, that the 
emphasis given in more recent accounts (Vasquez especially) 
to the "democracy leads to peace" idea, far outstrips the 
emphasis given to it by Carr. It should also be noted that 
while several accounts refer to the utopian desire for, 
simply, "peaceful change", Carr maintained that only 
certain conceptions of peaceful change - those based on 
substituting legal processes for political ones - were 
utopian. Carr himself was an advocate of peaceful change 
conceived as a process of give and take between the "haves" 
and the "have-nots"; and the general notion was not 
something he considered incompatible even with utopianism's
57 Ibid. 54-80, 152-4 (see also 105-6), 131-9.
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polar-opposite, realism.58
Many of Carr's more disparaging remarks are also 
echoed in contemporary accounts. Accordingly, utopianism 
is widely denounced for: its moralism (as opposed to an
understanding of actual moral codes); its legalism (as 
opposed to an understanding of actual legal processes and 
their relation to politics); its ignorance of facts and 
cause and effect (as opposed to its espousal of alternative 
'visions'); its tendency to privilege ends over means, 
generalization over observation; and its innocence and 
facile optimism (in not recognising the pervasive and 
inevitable role of power).
One final observation on Carr's influence should be 
underscored. Although the contention that the 'absolute 
and universal principles [of the utopian] were not 
principles at all, but the unconscious reflexions of 
national policy based on a particular interpretation of 
national interest at a particular time', is one of the 
chief contentions - indeed arguably it is the unifying 
contention - of The Twenty Years' Crisis, it is mentioned 
in only three of the ten accounts examined (Bull, Smith, 
Hollis and Smith) . This is an extraordinary fact for which 
I have no explanation.
Leonard Woolf and Utopianism: A Framework for Analysis
The above analysis suggests that it is questionable whether 
'utopianism' possesses the necessary cohesion to be
58 Ibid. 283-4.
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properly considered a 'doctrine' or 'school of thought'. 
Despite the towering influence of a single text, agreement 
on its core features is limited. There are, in all 
probability, two reasons for this. Firstly, contrary 
conventional wisdom, Carr's account of 'utopianism' is not 
particularly systematic. It is beyond the remit of this 
chapter to properly substantiate this point, but there is 
strong evidence to suggest that the concept of 'utopia' is 
used by Carr, with characteristic ingenuity, as a 
rhetorical device for discrediting the many ideas with 
which he happened to be out of sympathy. One only has to 
look at the range of thinkers explicitly or tacitly charged 
with utopianism to find at least interim confirmation of 
this contention: from President McKinley to President
Wilson, Cecil Rhodes to Norman Angell, Hans Kelsen to Lord 
Davies, the Times to the Union of Democratic Control, from 
Karl Marx to Winston Churchill. To a large extent the 
ideas Carr castigated were liberal ideas. Essentially The 
Twenty Years' Crisis is a critique of liberalism, 
particularly the way in which 'nineteenth century 
liberalism' (meaning classical economics plus 
utilitarianism plus constitutionalism) was applied to the 
emerging, twentieth century, field of international 
relations.
Secondly, subsequent accounts have perhaps relied too 
heavily on Carr. There has been a tendency to select items 
from Carr's big intellectual menu in a rather piecemeal 
fashion. There has been a reluctance to read the actual
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works of putatively utopian writers. Consequently, Carr's 
often sweeping generalisations have, with time, become even 
more swe ep ing.
This leaves a problem for the analyst seeking to 
assess a thinker in light of his reputation as a utopian. 
Of the many premises, and especially hypotheses and 
prescriptions, of utopianism, and the many criticisms made 
of it, which should be held out as truly representative? 
There is no objective answer to this question. The 'ideal- 
type' utopian constructed on page 62 offers a positive way 
forward. But given that the term 'utopian' is first and 
foremost a term of abuse, it is the criticisms most 
commonly directed at those so abused which should, above 
all else, take centre stage. If these criticisms are found 
to be invalid, one of two conclusions follow: either (a) 
the thinker or idea under scrutiny is not utopian; or (b) 
utopianism is not so inadequate a doctrine as generally 
supposed.
Given that virtually all objections to utopianism flow 
from the three broad objections identified in Carr's 
analysis, I propose to use these three objections as my 
framework for analysis. Thus, with respect to the various 
areas of Woolf's concern I shall ask: To what extent, if 
any, did he 'ignore facts' and 'pay little attention to the 
analysis of cause and effect'? (Charge 1). Is it true to 
say that he 'grossly underestimated the role thojtj| power' 
and correspondingly 'overestimated the role, actual and
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potential, of morality, law, public opinion, and other 
"non-material" sanctions7? (Charge 2). Can it be fairly 
said that his 7 espousal of universal interests amounted to 
nothing more than the promotion and defence of a particular 
status quo7 and, following from this, that he 7 failed to 
appreciate the self-interested character of his thought7? 
(Charge 3).
85
Chapter Three
International Government: An Exposition
This chapter explicates Leonard Woolf's thought on 
international government. It describes, by way of preface, 
how Woolf's main book on the subject came to be written and 
provides some information on the Fabian intellectual 
background to his early work.
The Commissioning of International Government
During the Autumn of 1914 Beatrice Webb invited Leonard 
Woolf to become involved in a project on professional 
organizations then being conducted by the Fabian Research 
Bureau.1 Neither Beatrice nor Sidney Webb were particularly 
interested in international affairs - it was 'not their 
subject' - and they did not give much thought to the 
possibility of the Bureau getting involved.2 It was George 
Bernard Shaw who suggested that the Bureau should become 
active in this area, and with this in mind he managed to 
secure £100 from Joseph Rowntree for the purpose of 
producing a study on how future wars might be prevented. 
Shaw persuaded Beatrice Webb of the virtues of such a 
study, who, knowing Woolf possessed considerable knowledge
1 Founded in 1913 originally for the purpose of 
conducting research into the control of industry. Wilson, 
Leonard Woolf, 62.
2 See Woolf's trenchant 'Political Thought and the 
Webbs', in Margaret Cole (ed.), The Webbs and Their Work 
(London, 1949), esp. 259-62.
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of colonial affairs, asked him to shelve his current work
and get involved in the Shaw-Rowntree project. The
original plan was that the work would be undertaken by a
small committee with Woolf as secretary. But early in 1915
a decision was made to allow Woolf to write the report
himself, with complete freedom to proceed as he saw fit.3
Woolf set to work 'like a fanatical or dedicated mole'
and within four months had produced the first draft.4 Part
One of the report, 'Suggestions for the Prevention of War'
was published as a special supplement to the New Statesman
on 10 July 1915. Part Two, 'Articles Suggested for
Adoption by an International Conference at the Termination
of the War' (the 'Fabian Draft Treaty'), was published in
the same form one week later. This was written by Woolf
with Sidney Webb and was one of the first detailed plans
for a league of nations to be published.
While working on these two projects Woolf became
convinced that the prevention of war was part of a wider
problem - the development of international government. At
the time, as he later recorded,
It was commonly said or assumed that international 
government did not exist and could not exist among 
sovereign independent states; but a very little 
investigation convinced me that this was not true and 
that a considerable field of human relations had been 
subjected to various forms of international 
government. But practically no books existed on the 
subject and no attention had been given to it.5
3 Leonard Woolf, Beginning Again: An Autobiography of 
the Years 1911 to 1918 (London, 1964), 183-84.
4 Ibid. 185.
5 Ibid. 187-88.
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Woolf consequently impressed upon Webb that it would be 
'well worth while doing some serious work' on this subject 
since it would throw important light not only on the 
prevention of war but 'on the whole field of international 
relations'.6 Woolf was given a further £100 to write a 
second report. This report was published, together with 
the first report and the Fabian Draft Treaty, as 
International Government in 1916.7
The Fabian Background
The neglect by the Fabian Society of the world beyond 
Britain (some might say, indeed, London) meant that Woolf 
had little to build on by way of a Fabian 'tradition' or 
'approach' to international questions. For well over a 
decade after the founding of the Society the existence of 
an international realm was barely acknowledged. During 
these years the Society, and more specifically its most 
senior members - the 'Old Gang' of Webb, Shaw, Pease, Bland 
and Olivier - concentrated their efforts on the development 
and propagation of ideas concerning domestic society, 
meaning first and foremost Britain. The early work of 
Fabians covered a wide range of economic, social and
6 Ibid. 187.
7 A second, American, edition with an introduction by 
Shaw also appeared in 1916. A third edition with an 
additional chapter on the Danube Commission was published 
in 1923. French and Swedish editions, and a German 
language Swiss edition, were published during the Paris 
peace negotiations.
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political questions; some being general and theoretical, 
others being highly specific and practical. Questions such 
as the nature of Fabian socialism, the workings and effects 
of capitalism, the causes of mass poverty, and the role of 
women in society, are examples of the more general issues 
addressed; public health in London, the municipalization of 
tramways, the municipal drink traffic and liquor licensing, 
and the need for an 'Eight Hours Bill', are examples of the 
more specific.
Thought on the important international aspects of 
these issues is almost entirely absent. During this period 
Fabians clearly believed that events in the outside world 
held little relevance. As Bernard Porter has pointed out, 
apart from William Pember Reeves's The State and its 
Functions in New Zealand (Tract No. 74) , the object of 
which was to provide Fabians with a model of working 
socialism, 'none of the first hundred or so Fabian Tracts 
was on external affairs; and the First series of Fabian 
Essays scarcely touched them'.8 A recent historian of the 
Society has reiterated this observation in an account of 
its involvement in socialist internationalism.9 Fabians 
were far from enthusiastic participants in the proceedings 
of the Second International and paid little more than lip- 
service to its proclamations. The British views expressed
8 Bernard Porter, 'Fabians, Imperialists and the 
International Order', in Ben Pimlott (ed.), Fabian Essays 
in Socialist Thought (London, 1984), 54.
9 Patricia Pugh, Educate. Agitate, Organize: 100 Years 
of Fabian Socialism (London, 1984), 72.
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at international socialist gatherings immediately prior to 
the outbreak of war in 1914 were mainly those of Keir Hardy 
and the Independent Labour Party.10
Three crises of widely varying magnitude jolted the 
Fabian Society out of its parochial frame of mind: the war 
in South Africa, tariff reform and, most importantly, the 
outbreak of the First World War.
South Africa and Imperialism
The Boer War provoked a crisis within the Fabian Society of 
such magnitude that it almost led to its dissolution. 
Eighteen members resigned including prominent men like 
Ramsay MacDonald and Walter Crane. The wide-ranging and 
bitter debates demonstrate how intellectually ill-equipped 
Fabians were to tackle international issues. The diversity 
of opinion about the war can be categorized in terms of 
three broad positions: the equivocal anti-imperialist, the 
paternalist imperialist, and the quietist.
The principal advocate of quietism was the secretary 
of the Society, Edward Pease. His position, commanding 
much support, was that the entire subject fell outside the 
remit of the Society. The Fabian Society was concerned 
with the development and propagation of a particular brand 
of reformist socialism: particular in the sense of being 
designed to address the peculiar nature of British social,
10 Whose attitude to the war contrasted sharply with 
the majority of Fabians. See A. M. McBriar, Fabian 
Socialism and English Politics. 1884-1918 (Cambridge, 
1966), 136-8.
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economic, and political institutions. Phenomena such as 
imperialism and war did not give rise to questions of 
principle for socialists.
This position was based on the questionable assumption 
of domestic independence, as opposed to interdependence, 
and the consequent uniqueness of British society. The most 
likely explanation of the support it received is 
pragmatism. The quietism of Pease and others was based 
less on a coherent set of arguments than on the realisation 
that ' [e]very shade of opinion in relation to the war is 
represented among the members'11 and, therefore, that the 
Society as a matter of prudence ought not to commit itself 
to a definite policy since to do so would be dangerously 
divisive.12
The protagonists in the substantive debate were the 
equivocal anti-imperialists, represented most notably by S. 
G. Hobson, and the paternalist imperialists, represented 
most notably by Shaw. The position of the equivocal 
imperialists at first sight does not seem to be 
particularly equivocal. Hobson believed that it was 
morally imperative for the Society to articulate a policy 
on the war: after all, the war had been provoked by ideas 
and forces 'antagonistic to industrial democracy', and, 
given this, a 'settlement acceptable to socialists' was
11 Pease quoted in Pugh, Educate. Agitate. Organize.
81.
12 Pease later abandoned his view. See E. Pease, The 
History of the Fabian Society. 3rd ed. , (London, 1963), 
131-6.
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highly improbable.13 The Government had announced that 
military action was taken in order to secure the political 
rights of the Uitlanders. Hobson refuted this. He argued 
that the most important factor was 7 the aim of establishing 
British supremacy from the Cape to the Zambesi7 . Since the 
Boer republics were determined to preserve their 
independence (and rightly so according to Hobson) , a war 
had inevitably ensued. He attributed the direct cause of 
the war to 7 the phase of imperialist passion that has 
overrun this country in recent years7 ; and he feared for 
the decline of democracy in the consciousness and spirit of 
the English people, the growing cooperation between 
financiers and the military, and the rise to predominance 
of militarism and other anti-socialistic tendencies.
Hobson clearly saw imperialism as an undesirable 
phenomenon, strongly linked to capitalism, 7vainglorious 
nationalism7, and militarism. However, this seemingly 
unequivocal position is considerably weakened by a further 
statement on 7 the expansion of Empire7. In the final 
paragraph to his resolution to the Society, Hobson asks the 
Society to pledge itself 7 to support the expansion of the 
Empire only in so far as that may be compatible with the 
expansion of that higher social organization which this 
society was founded to promote7 . Thus what prime facie 
appears to be an outright condemnation of imperialism as 
immoral and undesirable turns out to be much more
13 This and the quotations from Hobson that follow are 
from E. D. McBriar, Fabian Socialism. (Cambridge, 1966), 
121. This work remains unsurpassed.
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ambiguous. Hobson did not clarify what he meant by 
'imperialism' and 'expansion of Empire'. But unless we 
assume that he meant to draw a distinction between them, 
his position is clearly contradictory.
The paternalist imperialist position, as advocated by 
Shaw, shares some common ground with the anti-imperialist 
position. For example, the sincerity of the British 
Government's justification for involvement in the conflict 
is doubted. Whereas the presupposition of Hobson's 
position seems to be the undesirability of imperialism per 
se, however, the presupposition of Shaw's position is the 
general desirability of imperialism. Shaw's view was that 
imperialism was perfectly legitimate as long as it brought 
along with it the good habits and practices of advanced or 
'higher' civilizations to the 'backward' and 'unexploited' 
parts of the world. He maintained, with typical self- 
assurance, that Fabian Socialism and imperialism were both 
based on 'a sense of the supreme importance of the Duties 
of the Community, with State Organization, Efficient 
Government, Industrial Civil Service, Regulation of all 
private enterprise in the common interest, and dissolution 
of Frontiers through international industrial 
organization'. It should be realized, furthermore, that the 
Boer War was now being waged and regardless of whether it 
could have been avoided the important point for Fabians was 
to insist on a desirable outcome. This meant a British 
victory, the implementation of progressive legislation 
protecting workers' economic and political rights, their
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health and safety, and a guarantee that the profits of 
industry would be -are used for the benefit of the whole of 
South Africa. To this end, mines should, if necessary, be 
taken into public ownership.14
These views are not noteworthy for their analytical 
depth. There is no attempt to define 'imperialism' or to 
distinguish it from other terms frequently used in the 
debate: ' vainglorious nationalism', 'jingoism', 'aggressive 
patriotism', 'foreign domination'. There is no examination 
of the moral bases of 'imperialism' except for simplistic 
references to 'higher civilizations' . Also, a discussion 
of the matter of agency is absent. Both Hobson and Shaw 
failed to declare who or what they considered to be the 
agents or instigators of imperialism. Agency could be 
attributed generally to 'capitalism', 'militarism' or 'the 
state'. Or it could be attributed specifically to the 
British State, the British Government, British financiers, 
or particular companies such as the South Africa Company. 
The participants in the debate failed to adequately clarify 
their views. Indeed, recognition of the need for such
clarification is entirely absent.
Several important votes were taken by the Fabian 
Society, including a crucial ballot of the whole membership 
as to whether an official pronouncement should be made. On 
all these occasions the voting was close - the membership 
being marginally in favour of a non-committal policy. 
However, a tract on imperialism and the War was published
14 Ibid. 121-22.
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by the Society as part of its general election propaganda 
in 1900. The sense in which the Society believed this 
tract to be separate from an "official pronouncement" is 
far from certain. A letter from Pease to the press on 
behalf of the Executive exemplifies this uncertainty. In 
it he said that the tract is "an authorative expression of 
its views" which 'represents the general view of the 
society as a whole, but is not binding on any individual 
members' . But it was in this letter that Pease stated that 
every shade of opinion on the War could be found within 
Fabian ranks.15 Therefore the possibility of constructing 
"a general view" can, to say the least, be doubted.
The tract, Fabianism and the Empire, was drafted by 
Shaw.16 Following established Fabian practice, the draft 
was considered by a committee, but few of the suggestions 
subsequently made were incorporated into the final text. 
Significantly, the decision to produce the tract was made 
after those members most vehement in their opposition to 
both imperialism and the war had resigned. Nevertheless, 
there still remained a great deal of disagreement over the 
Boer War among Fabians, and Pease is full of praise for 
Shaw's literary skills in putting together a document which 
most members felt they could support. McBriar, not without 
a hint of irony, describes it as "a supreme feat of Fabian
15 Ibid. 126.
16 The Fabian Society, Fabianism and the Empire: A 
Manifesto (London, 1900).
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compromise' .17
The general tone and the principal arguments of 
Fabianism and the Empire can be illustrated with reference 
to four areas. First, much emphasis is given to the fact 
of Great Power partition of 'the greater part of the 
globe'.18 The tract is unclear, however, on whether this 
process is inevitable and, also, on whether such a process 
is desirable. Regarding the latter, the tone of the 
pamphlet is positive, though not unconditionally. For 
example, the Tract suggests that an ideal form of world 
political organisation would be the division of the world 
into a small number of large-scale empires each permitting 
extensive degrees of autonomy for those national groups 
'sufficiently advanced'.19
Secondly, Pease in his letter to the press argued that 
it was incorrect to suppose that the Fabian Society was in 
favour of imperialism. Fabianism and the Empire suggests 
otherwise. In conformity with the Zeitgeist of late 
nineteenth century Britain, the matter was discussed in 
terms of the notion of 'civilization' . Accordingly, states 
which obstruct 'international civilization' have no right, 
it seems, to exist. 'The State which obstructs
international civilization will have to go, be it big or 
little', it is boldly, though not unambiguously declared. 
Countries of 'higher' civilization are entitled to dominate
17 McBriar, Fabian Socialism. 125-30.
18 Fabian Society, Fabianism and the Empire. 3.
19 Ibid. 17-21.
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and even take control of countries of 'lower7 civilization. 
As the Tract argues, the seizure of Switzerland by Czarist 
Russia would not be justified, since right is not 
predicated on right, but 7 if Switzerland were to annex 
Russia and liberalise her institutions the rest of Europe 
would breathe more freely7 .20
A third area of importance concerns what are nowadays 
called 'global interests' . The Fabians recognized that the 
way of viewing the world just outlined is not without its 
difficulties - specifically with respect to China. The 
Chinese had an ancient and highly sophisticated 
civilization. Was Western civilization 'higher7? Probably 
not. Intervention and control, however, would still be 
legitimate in the 'international interest'. Echoing a long 
line of radical thought on foreign policy21, trade, the 
establishment of modern communications (railway, postal and 
telegraph routes) , and travel, were held by the Fabians to 
be 'international interests'. Baulking these interests 
meant baulking the interests of the world as a whole. 
Moreover, these interests had hardened into rights and it 
followed that foreign trading powers had a right (and 
perhaps even a duty) to enforce them. The West could, 
therefore, legitimately intervene in China in order to
20 Ibid. 46. During this period the term 
'international' was often used to mean all states and all 
nations or peoples - what we would now call 'world' or 
'global'.
21 On which see A. J. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: 
Dissent over British Foreign Policy 1789-1939 
(Harmondsworth, 1976).
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establish a 7 settled government' which would facilitate the 
free operation of the international interests of free trade 
and communication.22
Finally, whilst many Fabians unashamedly regarded 
themselves as imperialists, they took a great deal of care 
to point out that they were not ' j ingoes' . They abhorred 
the 'theatrical' and 'hysterical' patriotism of those who 
believed it to be corrupt or worse to criticize one's 
country or government.23 While most of them felt that 
since the war was now a fact it was vital that the British 
prevailed, they also felt that the conflict could only be 
ultimately justified if, as Shaw argued, the administration 
of the Colony was radically reformed. Domination and 
control could be a legitimate means of advancement, but 
unlike jingoes, they conceived progress in universal terms, 
and identified 'Western civilization' as the contemporary 
source of progress rather than any particular nation. They 
were explicitly opposed to national egoism and 
aggrandizement. This is exemplified inter alia in their 
belief that empires should concede considerable degrees of 
national autonomy.
Fabianism and the Empire is unambiguous in its 
condemnation of jingoism but little else. It failed to 
tackle the central questions, both practical and 
theoretical, raised by the war in South Africa: What is
22 Fabian Society, Fabianism and the Empire. 44-5.
23 The former term is Shaw's, the latter McBriar's. 
McBriar, Fabian Socialism. 122, 127.
98
imperialism? How can it be defined? What are its forms? 
What are its causes? The Tract simply exploited the 
equivocal element of what has been termed the 'equivocal 
anti-imperialist' position. In doing so it in effect 
allowed the Society to agree to disagree: among Fabians
there were still those who were opposed to ' imperialism' 
but believed that 'expansion of empire' was not necessarily 
a bad thing; and there were those who unashamedly called 
themselves imperialists, while at the same time being 
critical of many aspects of expansion.
Tariffs and Trade
The controversy over the Boer War did not stimulate lasting 
interest in the international realm. With the exception of 
one brief episode, the Fabian Society happily returned to 
the exclusively domestic agenda it had pursued during its 
'golden years' ,24 This episode was disagreement over Joseph 
Chamberlain's proposals for tariff reform.
For most of the nineteenth century the pursuit and 
maintenance of free trade was considered by radicals and 
progressives (mainly liberals, but latterly socialists too) 
to be an incontrovertible tenet of their faith. This was 
certainly true of the majority of Fabians. Indeed, as late 
as 1900, in Fabianism and the Empire, the virtues of free 
trade were largely taken for granted. A certain degree of 
uneasiness with this orthodoxy had, however, begun to
24 Generally deemed by historians of the Society as 
1884-1900.
emerge in the 1880s during the 'long depression'. By the 
turn of the century more than a few liberals and socialists 
were moving towards qualified acceptance of a fair trade 
position.
The debate over tariffs never reached the ferocity of 
the debate over imperialism and South Africa. As with the 
South African controversy, however, opinion within the 
Society was deeply divided. Again, the drafting skills of 
Shaw were called upon to produce a document capable of 
mustering general approval. Following the incorporation of 
a number of amendments, none of them inconsistent with his 
main lines of argument, the draft tract was accepted by the 
membership and published as Fabianism and the Fiscal 
Question: An Alternative Policy.25 Rather than a manifesto 
supporting either free trade or fair trade, the tract is a 
critique of both. As McBriar has noted, it is debatable 
whether one side or the other gets the better of the
argument.26 The 'alternative policy' proposed does not
come down clearly on one side or the other. It involved 
nationalization (or 'imperialization') of merchant shipping 
and railways in order to reduce transportation costs; the
expansion of the consular service in trade matters; the
improvement of technical education; the conduct of more 
research into the British economy; and, perhaps most 
importantly, the establishment of a minimum wage for all 
workers. Discussion of principles was tactfully avoided
25 Tract no. 116, (London, 1904) .
26 McBriar, Fabian Socialism, 133.
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(or perhaps, more accurately, 'skilfully dodged'). The
commitment to free trade implicit in Fabianism and the 
Empire was thus covertly abandoned.
The most vocal opposition to the draft tract came from 
those critical of the Society's earlier attachment to free 
trade - though the only resignation on this occasion came 
from a confirmed free trader, Graham Wallas. The
spokesperson of those in favour of tariff reform was Robert 
Dell. Significantly, his case was made in terms of the 
national rather than the international interest. Dell's 
argument was as follows. First, free trade was based on 
the principle of laissez faire - the doctrine that the 
economic system functions most efficiently when allowed to 
operate 'naturally' - and therefore socialists, who of 
course reject this principle, should therefore reject free 
trade. Second, much English capital was being invested in 
newly-developing industries abroad, the products of which 
were largely protected, whilst traditional sectors of the 
home economy, notably agriculture, were in decline.
Thirdly, England was in danger of becoming 'the pleasure 
ground of English-speaking peoples, living on tourists and 
rich men whose fortunes were made and invested in other
countries and producing little or nothing'. Other
countries were unlikely to dismantle their barriers to
trade, and this, allied to the fact of British industrial 
decline, suggested to Dell that a system of protection, 
judiciously constructed and employed, was essential. A 
permanent body should be created for the purpose of giving
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expert advice to the government on the scale of duties and 
"what trades to encourage and what not" ,27
As with the South African conflict the issue of tariff 
reform raised a number of questions, conceptual and 
theoretical, which were not adequately addressed. The two 
tracts were considerably ambiguous both in their analysis 
and their recommendations. They demonstrate that the 
Fabian Society was deeply uncertain about how to conceive 
the outside world and the principles which should guide 
foreign policy.
World War and its Impact
The outbreak of the First World War had a profound effect 
on the Fabian Society. Not only did it bring into sharp 
relief the extent of the Society's neglect of the 
international realm, it also served to impress on it that 
domestic reform could not be achieved in the absence of 
international reform. Little Englanders Fabians could no 
longer be. An understanding of international relations 
would now have to form a much greater part of their work. 
Woolf's International Government was the first product of 
this new attitude.
The increased international tension evident for a 
decade or more prior to the outbreak of war does not seem 
to have much concerned the Fabian Society. The first 
lecture to consider the possibility of a war between 
Britain and Germany was not delivered until December 1911.
27 Ibid. 132.
102
In this lecture W. S. Sanders argued that tension between 
these two countries was largely due to Germany's 
'remarkable political, commercial, and industrial 
development' during the past 40 years, and England's (in 
part due to 'jealousy') not insignificant opposition to it. 
Sanders suggested that British foreign policy should be 
less motivated by fear and hostility and more by the desire 
to reach common understandings. Such understandings could 
be achieved given that (i) the 'German people in the mass 
were a sober, peace-loving people who had no great love of 
military glory'; (ii) the 'jingoists' were losing support 
because of the rising tax-burden resulting from increasing 
militarisation; and (iii) the pacifically-orientated Social 
Democrats were growing in influence.28
An important debate on the matter between two leading 
members of the Society - the Australian historian, Dr 
Marion Phillips and the Oxford historian, R. C. K. Ensor - 
took place during 1913.29 Phillips argued along the lines 
of, what Ensor called in his more precise address, 
'cosmopolitanism'. She argued that nationalism and 
patriotism were absurd, nations unreal, and that capitalism 
was the cause of war. The only way to avoid the war was 
through direct action, a general strike. Such direct 
action was immediately needed in order to awaken the Labour 
Movement from its current state of apathy and to prevent it
28 Ibid. 135.
29 Like a number of other Fabian Society debates this 
one took place over several months: Phillips spoke in May, 
Ensor replied in October. See ibid. 135-38.
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from being swept along in a tide of war hysteria.
Ensor's position was more conservative. He argued 
that cosmopolitanism was unsound since it was based on a 
narrow ideological identification of the institutions of 
the state with capitalism. These institutions, Ensor 
claimed, have to be operated regardless of the type of 
social system pertaining. He advocated a 'wise
internationalism'. Nationalism was real and genuine 
conflicts of national interests existed, war often being a 
consequence. The 'pugnacious' or the 'sentimental' pursuit 
of foreign policy was inadvisable. England, for example, 
should not set out to be aggressive or provocative, and she 
should not make treaties on the basis of a like or dislike 
of another nation's social system. Armed crusades were 
unnecessary and dangerous. Instead, England, and indeed 
all nations, should blend 'pacifism' with 'official 
policy' .30 War should not be fought if it could be justly 
avoided. There should be no 'unnecessary' expenditure on 
armaments. Arbitration should be utilized whenever 
possible. Ensor did see some merit in open and 
democratically controlled diplomacy. However, a note of 
caution was sounded: the British public were demonstrably 
capable of both indifference and bellicosity, both of which 
would hinder rather than help the formulation of sound
30 By 'pacifism' Ensor meant what Ceadel has called 
'pacific-ism' , i.e. the belief that wars should not be 
waged except in extreme circumstances. See Martin Ceadel, 
Thinking About Peace and War (Oxford, 1987), 101-34. By
'official policy' Ensor had in mind respect for other 
states' sovereignty, the doctrine pacta sunt servanda, and 
the pursuit of a balance of power.
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foreign policy. Ensor's principal recommendation,
presciently, was the formation of a House of Commons' 
foreign relations committee.
Between these contrasting views rested a number of 
intermediate positions. Shaw, for example, supported 
' official policy' though he vehemently condemned the 
foreign policy of Sir Edward Grey; he advocated a tough 
minded collective security, but not involving Russia; and 
he disapproved of such 'ideologically' motivated 
suggestions as a general strike against war, whilst 
staunchly believing that England had a right and probably 
a duty to promote, and if necessary impose, 'higher 
civilization' .31
Enter L. S. Woolf
It was against this background of considerable diversity of 
opinion that Woolf was commissioned to write International 
Government. The Fabian Society had produced little, if 
anything, of theoretical significance that he could use as 
a starting point for his study. There were fundamental 
disagreements about imperialism and empire, about free 
trade and tariff reform, about whether the national 
interest should come before the 'international interest', 
about the causes of war, about the legitimacy of war, and 
about the appropriate response of socialists to the 
outbreak of war.
The influence of these early debates on Woolf's
31 McBriar, Fabian Socialism. 121-2, 138-9.
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thought is piecemeal. One might point to: (i) acceptance
of the primacy of the Great Powers as an international fact 
of life, and not necessarily an undesirable one; (ii) 
belief in the need for greater expertise in foreign policy­
making and wider 'democratic' discussion of foreign policy 
goals; and (iii) recognition of the existence of 
'.international interests' and an overriding duty on 
socialists to promote them. But apart from these three 
assertions, few of the ideas and opinions in previous 
Fabian discussions are reiterated in International 
Government. Bernard Porter's claim that International 
Government was 'built to a great extent on the foundations 
that had been laid in 1900' and that it is, in essence, an 
up-dated version of Fabianism and the Empire is, therefore, 
a large exaggeration.32 It is true that Woolf was critical 
of the nineteenth century 'principle of nationality'; and 
he certainly felt that the British Empire provided a good 
example of the kind of 'international authority' he wanted 
to see further developed. But, as will be seen, he was not 
as convinced that the long-term future of mankind lay in 
'world government' as Porter implies. Nor did he see the 
British Empire as something which 'closely approximated' an 
'ideal international authority'. For Woolf, it was more of 
an 'instructive case' of working internationalism than an
32 Porter, 'Fabians, Imperialists and the International 
Order', 59-60.
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' ideal example' .33 Woolf had far more to say about 
international relations and government than Porter 
suggests. As will be seen, International Government covers 
an astonishingly wide terrain. It is both diverse in the 
issues it examines and eclectic in the ideas it utilizes. 
To make a comparison on the basis of just two or three of 
its aspects, as Porter does, is to distort a highly complex 
picture.
Although Woolf was not greatly influenced by 
specifics he was, however, significantly influenced by more 
general aspects of Fabian doctrine and method. Fabianism 
is not so much a creed, as an approach or a general 
disposition towards social affairs. It is notoriously 
difficult to define. This notwithstanding, a number of for 
the most part interconnected attributes are commonly 
ascribed to Fabianism. Many of them find expression in 
Woolf's work. The following are particularly salient: (i)
devotion to detailed empirical investigation; (ii) 
suspicion of abstract theories and political rhetoric; 
(iii) strong attachment to sociological as opposed to 
philosophical modes of enquiry; (iv) belief in permeative 
and gradualist methods of social change as opposed to 
militant and revolutionary methods; (v) commitment to
33 See Woolf, International Government. 230. Note that 
by 'British Empire' Woolf meant Britain and the white 
Dominions - something Porter does not point out. Also see 
Woolf, The Future of Constantinople (London, 1917), 36-80, 
where Woolf proposes an International Administrative 
Commission 'modelled upon such [Legislative and Executive] 
Councils which have existed for many years in India and our 
Crown Colonies'.
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'rational' and 'scientific' as opposed to 'romantic' 
socialism; (vi) concern with social efficiency as well as 
social injustice; (vii) belief in 'scientific
administration', 'institution-building', and the importance 
of the highly trained 'expert'; (viii) profound respect for 
the rule of law; (ix) dedication to public service and the 
pursuit of collective well-being.34
A Practicable Proposal
Given the absence of a systematic Fabian analysis of 
international affairs it is not surprising that in Part One 
of his study Woolf drew not on Fabian writers, or on the 
work of other radicals, but on the work of diplomatic 
historians and international lawyers. For Part Two there 
was very little work of any description to draw on. As 
Woolf later recalled:
You could not become an authority on international
34 See Gorden K. Lewis, 'Fabian Socialism: Some Aspects 
of Theory and Practice' , Journal of Politics. XIV, 3 
(1952), 442-70. This is an important paper. Note Porter's 
neat description: 'Fabian socialism was fundamentally a
statist, interventionist kind. Its main enemy was Liberal 
individualism . . . and its highest ideal was the more 
efficient organisation of society to everyone's benefit, 
from above'. Porter, 'Fabians, Imperialists and the 
International Order', 56. Note also Woolf's summation of 
the Webbs' social philosophy: 'They were convinced that if 
the machinery of society was properly constructed and 
controlled efficiently by intelligent people, if the 
functions of the various parts of the organisation were 
scientifically determined and the structure scientifically 
adapted to the functions, if the round pegs were then 
fitted into the round holes and the square pegs into the 
square holes, then we should get an adequately civilised 
society in which we should all be healthy, wealthy, and 
wise'. Woolf, 'Political Thought and the Webbs', 263.
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government in 1915 by reading books, because the books 
did not exist35. ... I had therefore to read Blue Books 
and White Books and annual reports dealing with such 
vast organisations as the Universal Postal Union or 
the International Institute of Agriculture, and I had 
many interviews with civil servants and others who 
attended the conferences or congresses of these unions 
or associations as national representatives.36
A large part of Woolf's study, then, was original research.
It is important to note that Woolf conceived his work
in the most practical terms. The brief given to Woolf by
Sidney Webb for the investigation which later became Part
One of International Government was as follows:
What is needed is to arrive at a strictly practical 
suggestion, or rather alternative suggestions,
explained and supported by accounts of what has been 
tried with useful results; and of past experiments and 
analyses suggestive of any new expedients we can 
devise . . ,37
More specifically Woolf's job was to enquire into the 
evolution of international law, institutions, and 
agreements and to suggest ways in which these could be 
developed in order to make war less likely.
Woolf was well aware that plans for radical
international reform were often regarded as 'utopian'. 
Long before Carr's critique he denounced 'this terrifying 
adjective' as a conservative device for discrediting any 
new idea or proposal. He also claimed with characteristic
35 At this point Woolf noted two exceptions which he 
used quite extensively: Paul S. Reinsch, Public 
International Unions, their Work and Organization: A Study 
in International Administrative Law (Boston, 1911) ; and 
L'Union des Associations Internationales, Annuaires se la 
Vie Internationale (Paris, 1909 and 1911).
36 Woolf, Beginning Again. 187-88.
37 Letter from Webb to Woolf quoted in Wilson, Leonard 
Woolf, 63. Emphasis in original.
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irony that "everything is utopian until it is tried". It 
is important to note that in a sense the dichotomy between 
'realism' and "utopianism" was part of the vocabulary of 
international relations well before the publication of The 
Twenty Years" Crisis. Woolf contrasted 'so-called' 
idealists, Utopians, "amiable cranks', and "idealistic 
dreamers", with "the "plain and practical men" school of 
writers', and those who upheld 'the dogma of anti­
internationalism" ,38 His denunciation of the term 
notwithstanding, Woolf shared the general Fabian fear of 
being labelled "utopian" and consequently steered clear of 
suggestions he felt states would not accept. This is 
clearly evident in the Fabian plan, drawn up by Woolf and 
Sidney Webb, for 'A Supernational Authority that will 
Prevent War' .39 Despite the bold title, the plan does not 
advocate the merging of independent national units in a 
'world state" or the creation of a 'world government' or a 
'world parliament'. Woolf maintained that such ideas were 
impracticable since they did not have the slightest chance 
of being accepted by the world's statesmen. The carnage of 
the War had made change a matter of great urgency: the
38 See Woolf's introduction to his edited book, The 
Framework of a Lasting Peace (London, 1917), 57-8 (sub­
titled "The Bogey of Utopia"). Woolf also had a term for 
the billiard ball model of international relations: 'the
rigid theory of the independence and sovereignty of 
states". See Woolf, International Government, 89-91, 96, 
216.
39 Published as the second part to the New Statesman 
Special Supplement, and included in the first two editions 
but not the third, 1923, edition of International 
Government.
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system could not be left as it currently stood. But new 
schemes for world political organization would have to take 
into account the structure and processes of the old. 
Reform, perhaps radical, was needed, but revolution in its 
fullest sense, or a 'sudden, large mutation'40 was not 
realistic. Nor did he seek to outlaw war. Rather, he
recommended the establishment of machinery and procedures
whereby states could settle their differences short of war. 
Similarly, he did not, at this stage at any rate, advocate 
disarmament arguing instead that this would come about by 
itself, 'just as the individual carrying of arms falls 
silently into desuetude as and when fears of aggression die 
down before the rule of law' .41
Woolf's Conception of International Government
For Woolf 'government' was essentially a regulatory
activity. Whether local, national, or international,
government involved
the regulation of relations according to general 
rules, which to a greater or less extent are 
understood vaguely to embody the idea in the community 
of what the right relations ought to be.42
Or alternatively it was a question of
making rules which will regulate the relations between
40 J. A. Hobson, The Nation, August 15, 1915, 639. See 
also the debate between Hobson and Woolf in The Nation. 
August 7,14,21, 1915; and the debate between Hobson and a 
reviewer, New Statesman. July 24, August 7, 1915.
41 Woolf, International Government. 231.
42 Woolf, The Framework of a Lasting Peace, 13.
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the individuals or the groups, of establishing 
organisation which will make it easy for them to co­
operate for common purposes, and of devising models of 
settling disputes and differences when they arise.43
These rules included customs, morality, the rules and
regulations of voluntary associations, and law.
Woolf defined international government broadly: it
meant ' the regulation of relations between states, nations
or peoples by international agreement.'44 International
government was not necessarily, therefore, a centralized
activity involving a set of central institutions. Nor was
it the exclusive domain of states. Nor was it something
completely new. On the contrary it was something that
already existed and was evolving. In this respect the
nineteenth century had been highly significant:
. . .a profound change in international relations has 
taken place since the beginning of the Nineteenth 
Century, and . . . the people who repeat and repeat 
again that International Government is Utopian, and 
international agreement must betray national 
interests, simply shut their eyes to the fact that in 
every department of life the beginnings, and more than 
the beginnings of International Government already 
exist. . .45
Throughout the nineteenth century, Woolf contended, 
international interests had been gathering strength at the 
expense of traditionally conceived national interests. By 
this he meant that the interests of individuals and groups 
within the state increasingly corresponded to the interests 
of similar individuals and groups in other states. The
43 Woolf, The Future of International Government. 
(London, 1940), 3.
44 Woolf, International Government. 90.
45 Ibid. 95.
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corollary of this was that real national interests, the 
interests of the mass of people, had become international 
interests. Indeed, he claimed that '[t]he recognition of 
international interests, and that national interests are 
international interests, and vice versa, was the great 
social discovery of the last 100 years.'46
Given such a broad definition of 'international 
government' the possibility arises that it takes a number 
of different forms. Two can be inferred from the way Woolf 
organized his material in International Government. Part
I of the book examines the ways in which, from 1815 to 
1914, the Great Powers acted in concert. In contrast, Part
II is concerned with what Woolf called 'cosmopolitan' 
(meaning primarily 'non-state') organization. But a third 
kind of international government, which might be called 
'international government through adjudication', can also 
be discerned sandwiched between them. One of the 
weaknesses of Woolf's analysis, to be discussed in Chapter 
4, is a failure to adequately distinguish between these 
different forms. Arguably there is a tension between them. 
Rather than in harness, as Woolf assumed, it might be the 
case that they pull in different directions.
1. Great Power International Government
Woolf observed that during the nineteenth century the Great 
Powers had gathered together in concerts, conventions, and 
congresses in order to discuss and settle matters which
46 Ibid. 96.
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threatened to disrupt the peace. A 'new, if rudimentary, 
international system' had come into being, the most 
significant attribute of which was the tendency of the 
various congresses and conferences to behave as if they 
were 'rudimentary international legislative organs'. The 
central principle of this new system was the negation of 
the right of any one Power and the assertion of the right 
of the Powers collectively to make decisions on matters 
affecting the peace of Europe.47
Woolf felt that his interpretation of nineteenth 
century international relations could be verified by 
reference to a number of international events, but four in 
particular. It may be helpful to briefly summarize Woolf's 
account of these events. The first event was the Greek 
revolt of 1821. The Great Powers agreed that the revolt 
posed a serious threat to the peace of Europe. Russia 
proposed collective intervention and an international 
conference to resolve the conflict. Turkey protested, not 
without good reason, that the matter fell within her 
domestic affairs. Russia, France, and Britain, however, 
'under cover of the specious term "mediation" . . . formed 
themselves into a kind of legislative committee',48 Over 
the next ten years, through a series of conferences, they 
proceeded to settle the conflict between Turkey and Greece, 
and they were prepared to enforce their decisions when 
necessary. The most dramatic example of this was the
47 Ibid. 3 0-33; Framework of a Lasting Peace. 51.
48 Ibid. 30.
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'pacific blockade' and the destruction of the Turkish fleet 
at Navarino in 1827. This kind of activity on the part of 
the Great Powers continued throughout the century. Woolf 
cites a number of examples in support of the claim that the 
Great Powers had arrogated to themselves the right to
collectively 'arrange' the affairs of Greece.49 According 
to Woolf, 'The relations of Greece and Turkey were ... 
continually regulated by quasi-legislative conferences'.50
The second example concerns the Balkans. In 1876 the 
insurrection of Bosnia-Herzegovina was supported by
Montenegro and Serbia against Turkey. The six Great Powers 
came forward as 'mediators' and two conferences were held 
at Constantinople. Various proposals were made with 
respect to the nature of the administrative system to be 
applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a commitment was made to 
establish an international force, to be composed of between 
3,000 and 6,000 Belgian troops, to police the agreement. 
But these proposals were rejected by Turkey. Woolf points 
out that this would have been the end of the matter if the
Great Powers were genuinely acting as mediators. But
Russia sent a circular to the other Powers asking what 
measures they were prepared to take ' to enforce the 
decisions of Europe'. When the other Powers proved 
reluctant to take action, Russia went to war and attempted
to make her own terms with Turkey by the Treaty of San
Stefano. This, however, proved unacceptable to the other
49 Ibid. 31.
50 Ibid. 32.
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Great Powers and they subsequently 'insisted upon a 
European settlement at the international Congress of 
Berlin'. Woolf asserted that the conference at
Constantinople 'clearly ... regarded itself as an 
international legislative organ' though the Powers lacked 
the courage of their convictions when it came to enforcing 
their agreement. Yet, by repudiating the Treaty of San 
Stefano they once again affirmed the principle that the 
Eastern question could only be settled by the collective 
decision of the Powers.51
The final two examples are dealt with by Woolf much 
more briefly. In 1867 Holland proposed to sell the 
strategically important Duchy of Luxembourg to France. 
There were fears that this may result in war between France 
and Germany. Even though the transaction would have been 
perfectly legitimate under international law, the Great 
Powers intervened and an international conference in London 
sealed an agreement whereby the eight Powers represented 
'collectively guaranteed' Luxembourg's neutrality. 
Finally, in 1905 the Moroccan Crisis threatened to disturb 
the peace of Europe. France was determined to settle the 
matter unilaterally, but under pressure from the other 
Powers she acceded to Germany's wish that an international 
conference be charged with resolving the dispute. A 
conference was subsequently held at Algeciras, and its 
Final Act once again confirmed the principle of
51 Ibid. 34-6.
7 international regulation7.52
Woolf believed that this new 7quasi-legislative7 role 
the Great Powers had assumed for themselves could be 
extended and refined. Such a development, he felt, was 
essential if the dragon of war was to be slain. Two 
obstacles, however, lay in the path of any such 
development. The first was the tendency for the concert to 
be conceive itself in various, not necessarily consistent, 
ways. This was especially the case during the years of the 
Congress system, 1815-22. At times it saw itself as a 
"Parliament of Nations7, or a kind of European 
confederation. At other times it saw itself as merely a 
"hegemony of four great powers, bound by alliance to 
preserve the status cruo7 .53 Constant uncertainty as to the 
nature of the new system in the minds of its participants 
contributed to the Congress system's premature demise.
The second obstacle was that the Great Powers 
consistently failed to specify the area of competence of 
the quasi-legislature. Czar Alexander and his continental 
Allies were of the opinion that it should be allowed to 
deal not only with questions pertaining to the relations 
between states but also their internal affairs. 
Castlereagh, and later Canning, would have none of this. 
They were of the view that "our engagements have reference
52 Ibid. 36-7. Interestingly, the Act obliged France 
and Spain to respect the independence of the Sultan of 
Morocco but entrusted the policing of the country to France 
and Spain under the auspices of a Swiss Inspector-General.
53 Ibid. 23-4.
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wholly to the state of the territorial possessions settled 
at the peace; to the state of affairs between nation and 
nation, not ... to the affairs of any nation within 
itself7.54 Woolf believed that this ' common-sense' method 
of delineating the competence of the quasi-legislature had 
merit in a large number of cases. But it lacked merit when 
it came to 'problems of nationality' . It was extremely 
difficult to say whether cases such as the Greek rebellion 
and the Bosnian insurrection were national or 
international. Consequently there was bound to be 
disagreement over whether such disputes should be resolved 
'nationally' or through an international conference. One 
of the problems this gave rise to was as follows: if the 
Greek and Bosnian . cases were considered to be
international, then logically so should the question of 
Irish Home Rule, the 'position of India within the British 
Empire', and 'the position of Finns within the Russian 
Empire'. There was little prospect, however, of the
British or Russian governments accepting a right of 
collective intervention in these matters. Therefore, the 
permissive principle advocated by Alexander was not
practicable, at least not in a consistent way. If the non­
interventionist position of Castlereagh and Canning had 
been adopted, however, the Powers would have been 
prohibited from settling Turkey's conflicts with Greek, 
Bosnian, and other minorities. Yet the Powers had in fact 
done this, and they had successfully avoided war between
54 Canning quoted in ibid. 24.
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themselves in doing so.
Woolf was undecided on what position to take on this 
question. On the one hand, the chances of getting 
agreement between the powers along the lines of the 
permissive principle were remote. There was no prospect, 
for example, of Britain giving Russia any say in what she 
regarded as her domestic affairs, especially given the 
enormous differences between them with regard to 
administrative, economic, and political organization. On 
the other hand, if a strictly non-interventionist position 
were adopted the Great Powers would be prohibited from 
dealing collectively with one of the most potent sources of 
contemporary international tension - nationalism. Woolf 
eventually settled for what might be called a pragmatic 
compromise. During the nineteenth century the practice 
evolved of treating a question as an international question 
if there was a consensus among the Powers that it posed a 
threat to the peace of Europe. Anticipating the underlying 
logic of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Woolf accepted this 
as the only satisfactory way of resolving the matter until 
the domestic constitutions of states had become more 
uniform in character.55
2. International Government through Adjudication
Woolf attached great importance to rules of international
55 Ibid. 24-9. Woolf's analysis suggested to him that 
a 'certain degree of unanimity as to the domestic 
organisation of states' might be 'an absolutely necessary 
antecedent to any highly developed international 
organisation'. Ibid. 28.
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law. Although sometimes vague and uncertain and
incomprehensive in scope (charges, he pointed out, that 
equally applied to domestic law) there was no denying the 
fact that 'a vast body of well-established international 
law7 had been developed 'covering a great extent of 
international relations, and certainly the fundamental 
relations upon which international society rests to-day.' 
The foreign offices of the world were continually engaged 
in applying such rules. Hundreds of thousands of Britons 
had laid down their lives in defence of them. Nine-tenths 
of international intercourse and nine-tenths of 
international commerce depended on their daily recognition 
and application.56
One of the products of the emerging quasi-legislative 
role of the Great Powers was the quantative and qualitative 
development of international law. International
conferences had become involved in making new rules of law; 
they also become involved in the codification of existing 
customary rules. As a result, international law was 
becoming less 'vague and uncertain', and rights and duties 
were being created that were 'clearly capable of being the 
subjects of judicial decisions' ,57 This was significant 
for Woolf since, in true Webbian fashion, he believed that 
progress in social affairs depended on transforming 'vague' 
political relations into 'definite' legal rights and
56 Woolf, Framework of a Lasting Peace. 15-22.
57 Woolf, International Government. 11-13, 81-82, 17. 
Emphasis in original.
120
obligations. In the past international society provided 
only two methods of settling disputes: negotiation and war. 
Woolf argued that a third method was essential: 
international adjudication.
In his wide-ranging discussion of adjudication Woolf 
essentially makes three points. The first concerns 
arbitration. During the first two decades of the twentieth 
century arbitration was widely seen as the solution to the 
problem of war. The success of arbitration in the Alabama 
case and the Dogger Bank incident convinced many observers 
of the need for a general system of arbitration. Woolf, 
however, felt that the arguments in favour of arbitration 
were incoherent. In his view, generic use of the term 
'arbitration' concealed two kinds of judicial process that 
needed to be distinguished. With the first kind, the judge 
or arbiter makes a decision on the basis of law. With the 
second, a decision is made on the basis of what is 
considered 'fair and reasonable'. Supporters of
arbitration assumed that the cases they enthusiastically 
cited were examples of the latter form of judicial 
decision. In fact, Woolf maintained, they were examples of 
the former. States had only been willing to accept 
'arbitration' when the dispute clearly hinged on a question 
of law. This was true not only of the vast majority of 
cases but also of the most famous arbitration case of all. 
The tribunal in the Alabama case made its judgement on the 
basis of previously agreed rules of international law - 
not, as many believed, on the basis of what was 'fair and
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reasonable'. The main difference between Britain and the 
U.S. concerned the rights of neutrals during war. It was 
this question which had brought the two countries to the 
brink of war. It was resolved, however, contrary to 
popular belief, not by arbitration but by diplomatic 
negotiation. 'Arbitration' only occurred with respect to 
the level of damages due. In fact what had happened was 
that the disputing parties had sought a judicial settlement 
not on the primary bone of contention, but on a series of 
subsidiary questions all of which fell within the remit of 
existing rules of international law.
Woolf's examination of this and other cases led him to 
the conclusion that a general system of obligatory 
arbitration was no panacea for war since states were 
willing to submit only certain kinds of disputes to a 
judicial body. This was as true of relations between 
states as it was of relations between individuals. Not all 
disputes within states were settled by judicial decisions. 
The range of disputes settled by such means was, in fact, 
'strictly limited'. Political, and what Woolf ambiguously 
called 'administrative' differences, were 'never within 
States referred to judicial tribunals'. It was hopeless, 
for example, to expect the 'Home Rule question' to be 
resolved by such means. It was similarly hopeless to 
expect the judicial method to settle all disputes at the 
international level. The type of disputes that could be 
resolved by judicial methods were, in Woolf's words, 'legal 
disputes': that is, those involving the interpretation of
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a legal document, the existence of a legal right or 
obligation, or a question of fact.58
In an attempt to define this type of dispute more 
precisely Woolf challenged the view that judicial 
settlement is impossible in questions which affect 
'national honour and vital interests' . This is the second 
main point he makes in his discussion of adjudication. 
According to Woolf the attempts made to devise a system of 
obligatory adjudication at the Hague conferences had 
foundered because diplomatists had insisted on ruling out 
adjudication in disputes involving honour and vital 
interests. An attempt to draw up a list of disputes which 
did not impinge on such matters resulted, unremarkably, in 
a brief list of disputes of no importance. The central 
problem was that 'honour and vital interests' could not be 
objectively defined. In principle any question might 
affect the honour and vital interest of a nation. It 
followed that giving individual states the right to decide 
whether or not such matters were involved was not a step 
forward since adjudication would in effect be optional not 
obligatory. If they wished to avoid adjudication on a 
particular question they merely had to deem that it 
involved a question of honour.59
Woolf contended that such an approach, as well as 
being flawed, was also unnecessary. The historical record 
showed that in fact states had been prepared to submit
58 Ibid. 46-7; Framework of a Lasting Peace. 20-51.
59 Woolf, I n t e r na t i ona 1 Gove r nme n t. 48-51.
123
their differences to a judicial tribunal when honour and 
vital interests were involved provided that: '(1) A
rational and suitable judicial procedure exists; and (2) 
the question can be put to the tribunal in a legal form' 
The Dogger Bank incident, for instance, had been 
successfully resolved by an International Commission of 
Inquiry even though one of the issues at stake was the 
honour of the Russian Fleet. Other cases resolved by 
judicial settlement, for instance the Alaskan and 
Venezuelan Boundary questions, had also involved either 
national honour or vital interests.61 These cases 
demonstrated, in Woolf's view, that there were five 
categories of disputes that could be put to a tribunal in 
legal form: (i) disputes that could be reduced to questions 
of fact; (ii) questions of title to territory and 
boundaries; (iii) questions as to the interpretation of 
law; (iv) questions concerning the responsibility of 
national agents for the results of their actions; and (v) 
questions concerning certain kinds of pecuniary claims'.62
In Woolf's view it was 'both practicable and 
reasonable' for states to bind themselves to submit these 
five categories of questions to judicial decision. He also 
maintained, however, that 'in the present state of affairs'
60 Ibid. 49.
61 Regrettably Woolf does not examine these cases in 
any detail but instead relies on the opinion of Sir Thomas 
Barclay in Problems of International Practice and 
Diplomacy (London, 1907).
62 Woolf, International Government, 52-5.
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the prospect of states actually doing so would be increased 
'if an additional safeguard to national interests could be 
introduced'.63 This is Woolf's third point. In effect he 
proposed two safeguards. Firstly, he proposed that states 
should not be bound absolutely to submit such disputes to 
a judicial tribunal. Rather they should be given the 
option to bring them before an International Conference 
which would make a decision not only on the basis of law, 
but also on the basis of equity. This provision was 
necessary because of the conservative nature of law. 
Strongly anticipating Carr's analysis of law and peaceful 
change, Woolf argued that states whose interests were not 
invested in the status quo would not accept compulsory 
adjudication. This was the case even with respect to the 
'limited' range of questions he had identified since a 
judicial tribunal, by its nature, inevitably upholds the 
existing order.64 What was required was a method by which 
the status quo could, in certain circumstances, be upset in 
an orderly manner. Woolf vested this function in his 
International Conference.
The second safeguard proposed by Woolf involved giving 
states some say on the tvoe of tribunal before which their 
unresolved disputes would ultimately have to be brought. 
'The art of administering and interpreting International 
Law', according to Woolf, 'has only just been born, and we
63 Ibid. 55.
64 I go into greater detail on this matter in Chapter
4.
know so little about it that, by trying to confine it to 
rigid lines, we may easily kill it in infancy' ,65 Thus 
although referring 'legal disputes' to a tribunal should be 
obligatory (notwithstanding the first safeguard), the type 
of tribunal should be optional. Woolf saw no reason why a 
number of tribunals, variously constituted, could not exist 
side by side. The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
established at the first Hague Conference could thus exist 
alongside the 'Judicial Arbitration Court' proposed at the 
second Conference, and alongside other courts, commissions, 
and tribunals established by specific treaties. In the 
event of a disagreement between the disputing parties over 
which tribunal was most suitable, states would be bound to 
submit the dispute to a Conference or to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration.
In summary, Woolf's proposals for compulsory 
adjudication, firmly based on his interpretation of the 
recent past, were as follows. It was possible to identify 
a class of disputes - 'legal disputes' - which could always 
be settled by the decision of a judicial tribunal. 
However, because of the uncertainty and incompleteness of 
certain points of international law, and because deciding 
matters within the existing framework of law was an 
inherently conservative method, states would be reluctant 
to fully subscribe to it. Woolf proposed, therefore, that 
they be permitted, in certain circumstances, to submit the 
dispute for decision by an international legislative
65 Woolf, International Government, 59.
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conference. There was no reason why a plurality of 
judicial bodies could not co-exist with each other. The 
need for a single, central, judicial organ had been much 
exaggerated. Reference to a tribunal should be obligatory 
but the choice of tribunal voluntary.
3. Cosmopolitan International Government
Woolf's principal analytical contention on this aspect of 
international government was that during the nineteenth 
century the economic, social, and to a much lesser extent, 
political structure of the world had become more 
cosmopolitan than it had ever been before. His main 
prescription was that organization along cosmopolitan lines 
should be extended, especially in the political sphere. 
Indeed, an extension of such organization was necessary to 
fill the gap - which had become a breeding-ground for 
international tension - between the organization of social 
and economic life of the world and the organization of its 
political life.
The growth of cosmopolitan organization was a product 
of the revolution in communications. This led to a massive 
increase in international intercourse between economic, 
social, cultural, educational, scientific, and political 
bodies and groups. Increased intercourse led to increased 
interdependence and to the 'discovery', referred to above, 
that true national interests were in fact international 
interests. The practical manifestation of this discovery 
was the 'spontaneous creation and evolution' of a new and
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multifarious range of international and cosmopolitan bodies 
and actors.66
In Woolf's view this range of new actors consisted of 
four basic types. Firstly, there were those bodies and 
associations composed exclusively of states. Primary among 
these were the public international unions such as the UPU 
ITU. Unlike the conferences and congresses of Woolf's 
first conception of international government, these were 
intended to be permanent bodies which operated on a day to 
day basis through a bureau or secretariat. They came into 
being, starting with the Riverian Commissions established 
at Vienna, as a result of a growing awareness among states 
that certain important common interests could not be 
protected in an extemporary fashion.
Woolf's second category of international bodies had 
grown side by side with the public international unions. 
These were the 'unofficial' congresses and associations 
consisting of individuals and groups other than states. 
Starting with the World Anti-Slavery Convention held in 
London in 1840, a plethora of such bodies had come into 
existence. As with the first category, the impetus for the 
creation of such bodies was the realization that there was 
'an interest to serve or an object to attain which was 
international rather than national.'67 Woolf calculated 
that by 1914 over 500 international associations of this 
kind had been created, and over 400 of these had a
66 Ibid. 96.
67 Ibid. 105.
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permanent existence. This meant that
there is hardly a sphere of life in which a 
consciousness of international interests has not 
penetrated, and led to men of every tongue or race 
joining together in order to promote those interests. 
Practically every profession, from engineers and 
architects to nurses and commercial travellers, is 
represented. Industry and commerce, from Chambers of 
Commerce to bird-fanciers and cinematographic film 
makers; labour in some forty separate International 
Federations; Science, from the powerful Electro­
technical Commission to the International Society of 
Psychical Research; Medicine, with as many as thirty- 
nine distinct associations; Art, Literature, Learning, 
and Religion have all entered the field of 
international organisation.68
Along with these were 7 innumerable' associations dedicated
to the achievement of particular social or political ends
such as women's suffrage, temperance, or the eradication of
prostitution.69
A third, less common, kind of international 
association were those comprising a heterogeneous 
membership. The Association Internationale pour la Lutte 
contra le Chomage, for example, had among its membership, 
states, provinces, municipalities, employers, trade unions, 
professional associations, and individual economists. Such 
bodies came into existence when a number of individuals and 
groups, often representing different interests, realized 
that they had a common interest in solving a particular 
problem. In Woolf's opinion they represented a 'new type
68 Ibid. 106.
69 To further illustrate the 'Catholicism of 
internationalism' Woolf also alludes to the intriguing 
'International Association for the Rational Destruction of 
Rats' , and to a body whose revival is perhaps long overdue, 
the 'International Association for the Suppression of 
Useless Noises'. Ibid. 106.
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and experiment in human co-operation7 .70
The fourth and final kind of international association 
was concerned exclusively with commerce. Producers and 
suppliers had increasingly gathered together in order to 
regulate international trade. In its simplest form such 
regulation consisted of the agreements as to price and 
market share. More sophisticated forms of regulation 
included the formation of "rings', cartels, and 
international companies.
Woolf not only identified these new international 
bodies, he also had a lot to say about their broader 
significance. Their birth was part cause, part effect of 
three highly important developments. Firstly,
administration was being internationalized. During the 
nineteenth century the functions of the state had gradually 
expanded to satisfy the needs of a changing society. But 
with increasing internationalization of society there came 
a point when national administration was no longer 
adequate. One of two things had to occur: either the
emerging fabric of that society had to break down; or the 
independence of states had to be compromised. Woolf 
contended that, in fact, the latter had begun to occur, and 
administration on international lines had firmly taken 
root. The UPU, for example, established a single postal 
territory for the exchange of correspondence. The day to 
day running of the UPU was entrusted to a permanent
70 Ibid. 108. These bodies paved the way for the most 
striking example of this type of cooperation: the
International Labour Organization.
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International Bureau which undertook research, supplied 
information, provided machinery for the resolution of 
disputes, and acted as a clearing house for the settlement 
of accounts. Similar administrative functions had been 
invested in the Bureau of the ITU, the Danube Commission, 
an International Administration for the suppression of 
slavery in Africa, and the various international sanitary 
councils.71
Secondly, law-making was becoming increasingly 
cosmopolitan. Social progress not only necessitated the 
internationalization of administration but also the 
harmonisation of national laws. Woolf called the process 
whereby national laws are harmonized 'cosmopolitan law- 
making' , and the most striking example of it could be found 
in the field of maritime law. An international voluntary 
association, the International Maritime Committee, had been 
founded in 1898 for the purpose of putting pressure on 
states to progressively unify divergent maritime codes. As 
a result of such pressure a convention was signed unifying 
laws relating to salvage and collisions at sea. A draft 
convention had also been drawn up covering safety at sea 
and the carriage of freight. A similar, though less 
successful, process had also begun to take root in the area 
of labour law. The International Association for Labour 
Legislation, had been set up in 1900. As a result of its 
efforts a large number of industrial countries agreed to
71 Ibid. 116-67. These bodies were all established 
between the years 1865-1900.
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adopt laws proscribing night work for women and prohibiting 
the manufacture, import and sale of matches made from white 
phosphorus. The Association also had some success in 
impressing on states the need for wage boards and minimum 
rates of pay in certain industries.72
Thirdly, standardization was occurring on an 
increasingly international scale. International scientific 
associations had taken the lead in the standardization of 
scientific nomenclature. Before 1880 there existed a 
plethora of standards with respect to heat, colour, time, 
electrical current, etc.. In the decades that followed, 
however, agreement was reached on single international 
standards for all these phenomena. This pattern of 
standardization was repeated with respect to, among other 
things, medical nomenclature, actuarial methods, chemical 
analysis, food analysis, and the testing of materials. 
Woolf believed that this process of standardization was 
immensely important. It signalled not only the
7 internationalisation of society', but the growth of an 
'international social tissue'. Peculiar national habits 
and customs were being broken down. And this was highly 
significant since, in Woolf's words, 'it is where nations 
represent different levels of "culture" and are yet in 
intimate and continual relationship, that the difficulties 
of applying government to their relations are most
72 Other examples cited by Woolf include the partial 
unification of industrial property laws following a 
convention of 1883; and the partial unification of 
copyright laws following a convention of 1908. Ibid. 168- 
95.
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formidable' .73
Finally, Woolf contended that commerce and industry 
were also becoming highly internationalized. Indeed, Woolf 
claimed that ' In no department of life has International 
Government been more firmly or widely established' .74 He 
also claimed that '[t]he business man in every country is 
a confirmed internationalist' . This was demonstrated by 
resolutions of the International Congress of the Chambers 
of Commerce. These resolutions were 'almost entirely 
occupied with pressing the governments to take steps to 
internationalize administration, legislation, etc.'75 
Furthermore, capitalists increasingly sought to regulate 
competition and substitute for it some form of cooperation. 
An array of trusts, 'kartels', 'combinations', and other 
arrangements had come into being to maximize economies of 
scale, divide up markets, and 'regulate' output and 
prices.76 The apparatus of international government had 
also been erected in the world of labour, although Woolf 
acknowledged that the international trade union movement 
was stronger on paper than in practice. Trade unionists 
had organized themselves into various international 
federations in order to more effectively combat the forces 
of international capital. These federations performed a
73 Ibid. 200.
74 Ibid. 206.
75 This and previous quotation in ibid. 155.
76 Woolf cites a large number of examples. See ibid. 
206-11.
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variety of functions ranging from dramatic attempts to 
organize international strikes, to less sensational 
activities such as research into labour conditions.77
International Government in the 1920s and 1930s
The preceding account is based largely on Woolf's wartime 
writings, International Government in particular. He had 
little to say about international government as such in the 
192 0s. He wrote widely on such matters as mandates and 
international co-operative trade - matters which 
unquestionably fall within his initial definition of 
international government. But he did not discuss these 
matters from what might be called an international 
government perspective: he did not consider them explicitly 
in terms of his network of inter-governmental rules and 
regulations.
The same could be generally said about the 193 0s. 
During this period Woolf had many interesting and prescient 
things to say about the rise of Fascism and Hitlerism78, 
about Soviet Russia and communism79, about the World 
Disarmament Conference80, the Abyssinian crisis81, the
77 Ibid. 211-16.
78 See for example, 'Labour's Foreign Policy', 
Political Quarterly. 4, 4 (October-December 1933), 507,
515; Quack. Quack1 (London, 1935), 42-88, 137-45.
79 See for example, Quack. Quack I . 22-4, 41-2.
80 See for example, 'From Geneva to the Next War', 
Political Quarterly. 4, 1 (January-March 1933), 35-40.
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League82, Labour83, the foreign policy of the National 
government84, pacifism85 and so on. But he did not add 
anything substantial to his theory of international 
government.
It would be unfair, however, to say that he did not 
add anything at all. Woolf made a number of interesting 
points and observations about international government 
during this period, three of which are particularly worthy 
of mention.
Firstly, he put forward a novel theory about how it 
was possible, despite the 'quiet growth' of a 'vast system' 
of international government in the nineteenth century, for 
war to break out so suddenly and ferociously in 1914. He 
contended that there were essentially two for the most part 
conflicting methods of political organization - nationalism 
and internationalism - which, in turn, were always to some 
extent the effect or expression of two for the most part
81 See for example, 'Meditation on Abyssinia' , 
Political Quarterly/ 7, 1 (January-March 1936), 16-32; The 
League and Abyssinia (London, 1936), esp. 22-27.
82 See for example, 'From Serajevo to Geneva', 
Political Quarterly. 1, 2 (April 1930), 186-206;
'Meditation on Abyssinia', 22-23, 28-30; 'The Ideal of the 
League Remains', Political Quarterly. 7, 3 (July-September, 
1936), 331-9; 'Arms and Peace', Political Quarterly. 8, 1 
(January-March 1937), 23-4.
83 See for example, 'Labour's Foreign Policy', 509-19; 
The League and Abyssinia. 31-35.
84 See for example, The League and Abyssinia. 12-27; 
'The Ideal of the League Remains', 341-45; 'Arms and 
Peace', 25-27.
85 See for example 'From Geneva to the Next War', 41-2; 
'Meditation on Abyssinia', 31-2; The League and Abyssinia, 
28-31; 'Arms and Peace', 27-31, 34-5.
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conflicting currents of 'communal political psychology' - 
'communal nationalist psychology' and 'communal 
internationalist psychology'. The former was rooted in 
patriotism:
The nationalist thinks of a world of completely 
independent States or nations, and regards 
himself as an individual belonging to and owing 
loyalty to only one unit in that world. He 
identifies his own interests passionately with 
those of his own nation, and he is rarely, if 
ever, conscious of any common bond of interests 
between nations.86
Nationalist psychology reached its peak in Europe during
the first decade of the twentieth century. During that
time
[e]verything calculated to influence a man's 
political beliefs or emotions combined to make 
him think and feel nationally and imperially, the 
schools, the press, the churches, literature and 
painting, sculpture in our streets, and the 
military bands in our parks.87
Such was the potency of nationalist psychology that most
people believed that government and society was organized
entirely on national lines. Few realized that this was no
longer the case and that, in fact, international government
had either modified or taken the place of national
government 'in almost every department of life'.
But unlike organization on national lines
international organization 'was not so much the result or
reflection of conscious political psychology as the
inevitable result of changes in the structure of human
society.' The industrial revolution of the eighteenth
86 Woolf, 'From Serajevo to Geneva', 187.
87 Ibid. 188.
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century and the scientific revolution of the nineteenth had 
knit the world so closely together that the national 
frontier had rapidly become a social, economic, and 
political anachronism. Modern commerce, industry, and 
finance had been internationalized. So too had the post, 
the telegraph, the railway, and the prevention of disease. 
In these areas and many others frontiers were being 
increasingly ignored and 'international government 
silently substituted for national7 .88
But although the scope of international government had 
by 1914 become very extensive it 'had behind it little or 
no international psychology'. Few people 'thought or felt 
internationally' . In consequence internationalism had made 
few inroads into the 'strictly political' relations between 
states. These relations were still determined by 'a 
fantastic system of diplomacy and war based on the 
anachronistic myth that every State was a sovereign, 
independent unit.'
By the turn of the century the world was thus faced 
with two competing systems and two competing types of 
communal psychology. A choice had to be made between one 
and the other. In the Triple Alliance and the Entente and 
at Sarajevo it chose nationalism and war.
Secondly, he put forward an interesting interpretation 
of the Versailles settlement. The horror of the war 
provoked widespread revulsion against nationalism, the 
glamour of which had for many people ' evaporated ... in the
88 Ibid. 188.
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mud of Flanders or during a London air raid7 . A patriot 
declared that "patriotism was not enough7 and the speeches 
of President Wilson began to diffuse a "thin film of 
international psychology over hundreds of thousands of 
people who had also found that patriotism was not 
enough.7 89
Yet in some places the temperature of nationalist 
psychology had been heated as much as in other places it 
had been cooled, and international psychology, though real, 
was for the most part "vague" and "uneducated" . As a 
result the framework for the new Europe was arrived at 
largely as if the international civilization of the 
nineteenth century "had never been heard of and we were 
living in the time of Frederick the Great." Territorially 
the Balkanization of Europe was carried to lengths which 
"in the milder days before the war, the most optimistic 
statesman in Sofia or Belgrade or in the mountains of 
Montenegro and Albania could never have dreamed of."
But the architects of the settlement were not of one 
mind. The desire for vengeance jostled with the desire for 
peace. The nationalists at the conference were forced to 
listen to the President and "the masses crying for peace at 
the door". Compromise was the result. A building that had 
begun as an Arc de Triumphe was hastily finished off with 
"the stucco cupola of a Temple of Peace": "The Wilsonian
League was superimposed upon the territorial, military, 
naval, and economic settlement, and Geneva was created as
89 Ibid. 189-90.
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an antidote to Serajevo and Versailles.'90
Thirdly, he provided a suggestive account of the state 
of the League and international government 'ten years on'. 
'The outstanding fact', Woolf asserted, 'is the unexpected 
strength and position developed by the League in the short 
time of its existence.' In the every-day international 
government of commerce-, industry, culture, and science, the 
League had assumed a particularly important role. Geneva 
had become the nucleus of a new system of international 
government dealing with a vast array of questions and 
problems: from the arms trade to the ray treatment of
cancer, from the administration of the Saar to the 
standardization of economic statistics, from the treatment 
of minorities to the relief of refugees.91 The architects 
of the peace had not altogether intended this. But in 
unloading a. string of practical problems from their own 
shoulders onto those of the League they had enabled it 'at 
once to become a real entity in the society of nations'.
Yet the importance of the League was both 
overestimated and underestimated. The nationalist
underestimated the importance of the League in not 
appreciating the 'immense' development of international 
government that was taking place under its auspices. He 
viewed the League as a 'foreign body' which on no account 
should be allowed to meddle with matters of high politics.
90 Ibid. 190-91.
91 Ibid. 190-4. Woolf lists a further 23 activities 
which according to its Monthly Summary the League dealt 
with in a single month, April 1929.
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The League, on the contrary, should stick to the 
performance of tasks the unimportance of which was in 
keeping with its inferior status. But in taking this view 
the nationalist had unwittingly strengthened not weakened 
the League. It was through the performance of these 
'unimportant7, 'every-day7, tasks that the League had been 
able to attain 'a position of importance and stability 
which it could not possibly have won in ten years if it had 
merely remained an instrument to be used in emergencies for 
preventing war and for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes.'
But the importance of the League was also
overestimated. The internationalist, for his part, failed 
to appreciate that 'nationalist passions' still persisted 
and that 'nationalist psychology' was still dominant. It 
was true that if the world were allowed to enjoy a century 
of unbroken peace, the bonds of common interests might 
become 'so closely and intricately bound' by the growth of 
international government that both national psychology and 
the structure of the society of nations would be
'completely altered' and a second Serajavo made 
'impossible'. It was also true that the League had 
succeeded in training its secretariat in international 
psychology and had even had some success in encouraging its 
wider growth. But the danger of nationalist war remained. 
It was a cold fact international psychology was still for
the most part weak, vacillating, uninstructed; and where
vital interests were thought to be involved the dominant
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psychology was nationalist not internationalist. This was 
demonstrated inter alia by the 'persistent refusal of the 
Conservative Government to sign the Optional Clause' ; by 
the outcry in The Times when it eventually was signed; by 
the prejudice against^contempt for the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (whose judges were considered either 
not learned in law or learned in an inferior, Latin, school 
of law) ; and by the attitude of The Times. Lord Salisbury, 
and Sir Austin Chamberlain and others, who saw the League 
as merely an 'ideal' or something 'good enough for France 
and Germany and other foreigners, but ... unnecessary for 
the British Empire' . This mental condition, Woolf 
concluded, was a perpetual obstruction to the development 
of a 'sane and stable system of international politics'.92
★ * * * *
Apart from these three points Woolf had little of 
significance to say about international government in the 
1930s. Why?
Stephen Spender once said that 'Leonard and Virginia 
were among the very few people in England who had a 
profound understanding of the state of the world in the 
1930's'.93 There is something in this. Leonard Woolf 
began to warn his readers about the growth of 'barbarism' - 
the growth of hatred, unreason, violence, and 
intimidation and acceptance of them as normal methods of
92 Ibid. 196-203.
93 Stephen Spender, World Within World (London, 1953) ,
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conducting political affairs - even before the rise of 
Hitler. In a prescient article written in 1932 he argued 
that unless this savage phenomenon was vigorously resisted 
it would inevitably land Europe in another world war.94
But although often insightful, Woolf's work during 
this period was far from systematic. One finds
observations of genuine insight and prescience buried 
beneath mountains of turgid political rhetoric. As the 
tragic years of the 1930s unfolded, and the international 
political scene progressively darkened, the balance in 
Woolf's work between careful argument and angry polemic 
shifted markedly in the direction of the latter. The Woolf 
we encounter is mostly Woolf the radical pamphleteer not 
Woolf the Fabian social investigator. This combination of 
events, temperament, and overriding purpose accounts for 
his failure to develop the concept he had devoted so much 
time and energy to a decade or so earlier.
International Government in the 1940s
The same could be said about his quite extensive writings 
on post-War reconstruction in the 1940s. In these writings 
the term 'international government' appears more frequently 
than it did in the 1930s but there is no attempt to further 
refine the concept or develop the theory. In a pamphlet 
written for the Labour party containing the term in its
94 Woolf, 'From Geneva to the Next War', Political 
Quarterly, 4, 1 (January-March 1933), 30-43.
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title, for example, Woolf covers much the same ground as 
before. He talks, among other things, of the growth of 
interdependence, the obsolescence of (and the need to 
'drastically limit') sovereignty, the need for rules and 
'organs of government' to make, amend, and interpret these 
rules, the growth of international administration, and the 
need for 'organisation and procedure for controlling and 
preventing the use of force or violence'. But all this is 
done in a highly simplistic manner. He says, for example, 
that
There is nothing essentially different in the 
government of a football club, a village, a town, a 
country, of Europe, or of the world, except that the 
scale is bigger and the organisation more complicated.
In every case it is a question of making rules 
which will regulate the relations between the 
individuals or the groups, of establishing 
organisation which will make it easy for them to co­
operate for common purposes, and of devising methods 
of settling disputes and differences when they 
arise.95
The problems with this passage are legion. First, even if 
one accepts the initial premise - which makes no allowance, 
of course, for ethnic, cultural, religious, ideological, 
and socio-economic diversity - the qualification is 
potentially so large as to cast serious doubt on the whole 
proposition. Questions of scale and complexity are no 
where near as trivial as Woolf rather complacently implies.
95 Woolf, Future of International Government. 3. There 
are plenty more examples in this vein. See esp. ibid. 5 
('The problem of international government and organisation 
is not really a difficult one if people behaved sensibly 
and stopped talking nonsense about nations, States, 
governments, nationality, and patriotism...'); and 10 
('International society will never get rid of war until it 
is firmly based on law and order ...').
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Second, the issue is put in the form of an axiom or a 
conclusion when in fact it is at best no more than a 
starting point for analysis. Third, the general tone of 
the passage is acutely at odds with the difficulty of the 
problem.
But one should perhaps not make too much of this since 
the point of the pamphlet is not to advance scientific 
knowledge but to 'educate, agitate, organise'. It is 
nonetheless important to note that in the process Woolf 
irons out the complexity and much of the subtlety of his 
previous work and presents us in effect with a set of 
assertions based on a simple analogy between individuals 
and states. The problems with this kind of analogy will be 
examined in the next chapter.
Other works of the period though less obviously 
didactic in purpose offer substantially the same fare of 
repetition,96 oversimplification,97 platitude,98 invective,99
96 ' . . . throughout the last 100 years there has been 
continual and spontaneous growth of international 
administration in all kinds of spheres and places, from 
post offices to prisons.' Woolf, The International Post-War 
Settlement (London, 1944), 11. See also 19-21, and 'Britain 
in the Atomic Age', Political Quarterly. 18, 1 (January- 
March 1946), 15-16.
97 'It was not lack of force, but the lack of the will 
to use it to resist aggression, which made the collective 
security system of the League ineffective.' Ibid. 9. See 
also 8, 10, and Foreign Policy; The Labour Party's Dilemma 
(London, 1947), 7.
98 'In the relations between states and governments, 
cooperation must take the place of competitive hostility as 
the assumed basis of the relationship...' Ibid. 4. See also 
5, 8, 14, 18, and Foreign Policy. 8, 15, 18, 19-20.
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and the occasional quite dazzling insight.100 Woolf's ideas 
for post-War international economic reconstruction will be 
discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Here it is important to 
note that during this period his ideas turned decidedly - 
though not in name - in the direction of world
government. He called for 'drastic national disarmament', 
the 'abolition of national air-forces', and 'real 
international control of national armament' as requisites 
for a new system of collective security.101 In response to 
both federalists and functionalists he asserted the need 
for a 'central world authority' to 'coordinate the 
activities of regional or functional international organs 
and to deal promptly and authoritatively with any action or 
situation which may threaten the world's peace or 
prosperity.' Such an authority would have to have 
'effective control of international force adequate to meet
99 'Tory capitalism led in the years between the wars 
to economic bankruptcy and the international anarchy which 
gave Fascism and Nazism their opportunity to unloose upon 
defenceless peoples the most horrible war in human 
history.' Ibid. 3. See also 4, 8.
100 ' It is a delusion to believe that states or nations 
or governments (or even individuals) can remain united and 
act together generally or in the abstract. They can only do 
so if they consciously co-operate for a particular and 
defined common purpose. The reason why Russia, the USA, and 
ourselves have remained united in the war, despite 
divergent interests and profound differences in our 
institutions, traditions, and even some of our aims, is 
that we have had a clearly defined common purpose which 
transcends all our differences... Unless after the war we 
have as clear and compelling a common purpose there is 
little chance of us remaining united.' Ibid. 12. See also 
16-17, and Woolf, 'The Future of the Small State', 14, 3 
(July-September 1943), 221-2.
101 Woolf, Future of International Government. 12.
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the threat of national force' and/or 'control of sufficient 
armed forces to maintain international law and order under 
all circumstances'.102 Though broadly welcoming the 
foundation of the UN (he particularly welcomed Chapter VII 
of the Charter and the creation of the ECOSOC) he condemned 
(as emasculatory) the power of veto granted to the 
permanent members of the Security Council and called for 
compulsory settlement of all disputes through adjudication, 
arbitration, or conciliation.103
Most radically of all, he advocated, with the advent 
of the atomic bomb, centralization of the production of 
atomic energy under a 'world authority' and the 
concentration of all armaments other than those required 
for purely internal police purposes in the hands of the UN. 
The invention of the atomic bomb, he argued, had turned the 
balance of international power upside down, and made
collective security, and especially the system of
collective security as devised at Dumbarton Oaks and San 
Francisco, out-of-date. Great Powers were no longer
invulnerable to small Powers. Armed with atomic bombs a 
small Power could 'completely paralyse' a Great Power or at 
least 'inflict appalling and irreparable damage before
102 Woolf, 'Future of the Small State', 209-24; 
International Post-War Settlement. 7-11.
103 Woolf, 'The United Nations', Political Quarterly. 
14, 1 (January-March 1945), 19-20. In 1947 he described the 
UN as a 'dangerous farce' as far as law, order, peace, and 
collective security were concerned (the 'hostile' and
'divisive' Soviet Union being mainly to blame). He
continued, however, to insist that 'in the long run there 
is hardly any chance of preventing war unless the UNO is 
made to work'. Woolf, 'Foreign Policy', 12-19.
146
being wiped off the map itself' . The UN placed no 
restrictions on the acquisition of atomic weapons. It was 
therefore highly likely that within a comparatively short 
time a large number of states would own them. The whole 
collective security system of the UN was thereby 
undermined. Would-be aggressors were now in a position to 
threaten their victims and the Security Council as much as 
they could threaten them. Collective resistance to 
aggression was now as much of a threat to civilization as 
aggression itself. It followed that nothing could save 
civilization as long as the sovereign state was free to 
manufacture, arm, and use the atomic bomb.
But by what means could this freedom be denied? 
President Truman and Mr Attlee proposed 'international 
control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure 
its use only for peaceful purposes' and 'elimination from 
national armaments of atomic weapons'. This answer, 
however, did not, in Woolf's view, amount to much. 
Military exploitation of atomic energy depended on almost 
exactly the same methods and processes as those required 
for industrial uses. This meant that international control 
as previously envisaged was no longer adequate: 
international inspection could not possibly ensure that the 
uses to which atomic energy was being put were always and 
everywhere purely industrial. Some state somewhere was 
bound, sooner or later, to give in to temptation and 'the 
mere fact that there was good ground for fearing this would 
cause the whole system to break down and lead to general
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atomic armament "for defensive purposes".7
It followed that if atomic disaster was to be avoided, 
and the "elimination from national armaments of atomic 
weapons7 achieved, production of atomic energy had to be 
concentrated in the hands of a world authority. It was 
difficult to say whether this would be permanently, even 
temporarily, feasible. But more than a ray of hope existed 
in the fact that the production of atomic energy on any 
considerable scale was currently a gigantic operation 
requiring enormous plant, labour force, and expenditure. 
If the USA, USSR, and Britain could reach agreement it 
would be possible to restrict such production exclusively 
to "plants directly controlled by an international 
authority under the United Nations". The authority would 
then distribute the energy for industrial uses to other 
Countries. This, at least, would provide some breathing 
space until a more effective system could be devised.
But things could not stop there. It was not possible, 
in Woolf's view, to prevent by international control the 
use of atomic weapons unless the same kind of control was 
applied to other weapons. The alternative was a world in 
which the production of atomic energy was controlled but 
states remained perfectly free to arm themselves with every 
other kind of armament that modern science provided. In 
such a world the threat of war and the competition to 
produce more and more destructive weapons would clearly 
remain and the UN would have no alternative but to
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manufacture atomic bombs in order 'to prevent aggression'.104 
But the use of atomic weapons by the UN to 'prevent 
aggression' and thereby 'keep the peace' was neither 
feasible nor logical.105 This meant that the only solution 
was to put all armaments except for those needed for 
domestic purposes under the control of 'the world authority 
of the United Nations'. The implications for national 
sovereignty were necessarily profound. Such a solution 
required states not only to surrender control over their 
armaments but also to partially surrender control over 
their industrial production. Realists, of course, would 
condemn this as utopian. But if this were true, Woolf 
bleakly concluded, the strange pass had been reached at 
which humanity had to choose between utopia and 
annihilation.106
104 Woolf's quotes.
105 Ditto.
106 Woolf, 'Britain in the Atomic Age', passim.
Chapter Four
International Government: An Analysis and Assessment
In this chapter I assess Woolf's thought on international 
government in the light of his reputation as a utopian. In 
doing so I enquire into the stature of Woolf's thought 
during the interwar period, its practical impact, and its 
broader significance in the history of thought. I identify 
some important analytical, conceptual, and methodological 
weaknesses which, more than any other factor, account for 
the failure of Woolf's ideas to be taken seriously much 
beyond 1945. I enquire into the extent to which it is fair 
to describe Woolf as a pioneer of international 
functionalism (a doctrine commonly associated with 
utopianism) . I also enquire into the extent to which
Woolf's ideas are based on the 'domestic analogy' (a mode 
of reasoning commonly associated with utopianism). I 
conclude by offering some reflections on Hedley Bull's 
damning judgement that International Government is 'not at 
all profound' and not worth reading now 'except for the 
light it throws on the preoccupations and presuppositions 
of its time and place'.
The Stature of Woolf's Thought During the Inter-War Period
There can be little doubt that International Government was 
one of the most important international relations texts of 
its time. The prominent Independent Labour Party
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intellectual/ Henry Noel Brailsford, considered it 'a 
brilliant book7.1 An American reviewer described it as 'a 
remarkable contribution to the literature of constructive 
internationalism . . . that ought to be commended to ... all 
those statesmen of vision who hope for new international 
relationships after this war7.2 Woolf7s research was 
extensively utilized in one of the first textbooks on 
international organization.3 Another American writer, C. 
Howard-Ellis, described International Government as a piece 
of 7 striking analysis7 and a 7 remarkable study7.4
Woolf7s work continued to be highly regarded in the 
1930s and 1940s. Edmund Mower described International 
Government as "suggestive7, "valuable7, and "prophetic7.5 
According to A. C. F. Beales, International Government and 
The Framework of a Lasting Peace were the most important 
contributions to thinking on peace of the 1914-1918 period, 
and he acknowledged the former book as "an invaluable 
source of guidance" for his own work on international peace
1 Henry Noel Brailsford, A League of Nations (London, 
1917), 317.
2 Edwin D. Dickinson, "An International Program", The 
New Republic. IX, 112, 23 December, 1916, 219.
3 Pitman B. Potter, An Introduction to the Study of 
International Organization (New York, 1922), esp. Part V.
4 C. Howard-Ellis, The Origin. Structure and Working of 
the League of Nations (London. 1928), 85, 301.
5 Edmund C. Mower, International Government (New York, 
1931), 3.
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and cooperation.6 Similarly, Sir Alfred Zimmern described 
Woolf's analysis as 'masterly' and drew extensively from it 
in his account of international administration in the 'pre­
war system'.7 The distinguished international lawyer J. L. 
Brierly recommended Woolf's account of the evolution of 
'quasi-legislation by conference' for its 'admirable 
combination of scholarship and humour' .8 As late as 1945, 
as mentioned in Chapter One, a team of Oxbridge historians 
praised Woolf's study in no uncertain terms. In their view 
it was 'a pioneer work on the problems of building 
international government and administration' and 'a 
brilliant examination of the technique of peacemaking'. It 
was also 'a prophetic book' in that, although called 
utopian at the time, it made proposals 'of the very kind 
which were attempted in 1919.'9
Even critics of the book acknowledged it as an 
important contribution to the war and peace debate. A 
reviewer in the New York Nation decried it as 'aggressively 
Fabian' but conceded that it was 'suggestive in general 
framework' and contained 'evidence of careful study'.10 J.
6 A. C. F. Beales, The History of Peace: A Short 
Account of the Organised Movements for International Peace 
(London, 1931), 289.
7 Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of 
Law 1918-1935 (London, 1936), 171-72, 40-60.
8 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to 
the International Law of Peace, 3rd edn., (London, 1943), 
67.
9 Thomson et al., Patterns of Peacemaking. 162-63.
10 'The Week', The Nation. 16 August 1917, 182.
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A. Hobson criticized Woolf's scheme for putting too much 
power in the hands of the Great Powers, but nonetheless 
regarded it as 'very able'.11
Practical Impact
It is impossible to determine precisely the influence of 
Woolf's ideas on the creation of the League. The Woolf- 
Webb draft convention for a 'Supernational Authority that 
will Prevent War', was one among many plans debated both 
officially and unofficially at the time. No single plan or 
blue-print proved decisive. Several of them, however, 
provided the intellectual raw material out of which the 
Covenant was constructed. One of these was Woolf's book 
and the Woolf-Webb plan based on it.
It is certainly the case that the Woolf-Webb plan 
bears a close resemblance to the League Covenant. The 
similarities are striking, especially with respect to the 
following: the outlawing of aggression; the notion of
making 'common cause' against any state in breach of its 
fundamental obligations; the emphasis placed on economic 
and social sanctions; the distinction between justiciable 
and non-justiciable disputes (and the definition of 
justiciable disputes); the obligation to submit all 
justiciable disputes to an international tribunal; the 
obligation to refer all other unresolved disputes to an
11 J. A. Hobson, A League of Nations (London, 1915) ,
19.
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International Council; the idea of a 'cooling-off period' 
(twelve months in the Woolf-Webb plan, 3 months in the 
Covenant); the obligation to submit all treaties to a 
League Secretariat for registration and publication; and 
the obligation to promote cooperation in the economic and 
social spheres. There were some important differences 
between the two documents - most notably with regard to the 
composition of the Council and the commitment to disarm - 
but the similarities are sufficient to suggest that some 
filtering through of ideas must have occurred.
There is evidence, however, that at least in respect 
of the technical, social, and economic functions of the 
League, Woolf's influence was more direct. Late in 1918, 
Sydney Waterlow, a member of the newly formed League of 
Nations Section of the Foreign Office, was asked to write 
a paper on 'International Government under the League of 
Nations'. Waterlow had recently read Woolf's book on the 
subject and was greatly impressed. He drew extensively 
from it when writing his paper and, indeed, 'lifted almost 
verbatim'12 the sections dealing with international 
cooperation on labour conditions, public health, transport, 
and economic and social policy. The paper was well 
received by Lord Cecil, the head of the section, and the 
bulk of it was subsequently incorporated into the British 
Draft Covenant. This later formed the basis of discussions
12 Waterlow, quoted in Wilson, Leonard Woolf. 89.
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between the British and US delegations at Versailles.13
Significance in the History of International Thought
The significance of Woolf's work on international 
government in the history of international thought is 
fourfold. Firstly, and most generally, Woolf helped to 
establish the belief that international organization was 
both a feasible and an efficacious way of promoting common 
interests and reducing international friction. This belief 
is nowadays so firmly entrenched that it is easy to forget 
that there was a time when such thoughts were considered to 
be those of an eccentric and rather suspect minority.14 In 
the decades immediately prior to World War One, thinking on 
war and peace, to the extent that it existed, was dominated 
by two views. Conservatives saw international relations as 
realm of competition, struggle, and conflict. War was seen 
as an almost natural phenomenon which inevitably broke out
13 Woolf's ideas on these aspects of international 
cooperation were also included in another important Foreign 
Office document, the Zimmern Memorandum of November 1918. 
See Wilson, Leonard Woolf. 82-91; and Philip Noel-Baker's 
obituary of Woolf, The Times. 21 August, 1969. There are 
also significant similarities between the Woolf-Webb plan 
and Jan Smuts' The League of Nations: A Practical 
Suggestion published in 1918. See F. S. Northedge, The 
League of Nations: Its Life and Times (Leicester, 1986), 
33-8.
14 Note Woolf's comment: 'Nobody is thought to be
absurd if he suggests modification in the political 
institutions of a village or State, giving reasons for 
believing that the result will react upon the lives of the 
inhabitants. There is no ground for denying to
international political organisation the same kind of power 
and function'. Woolf, The Framework of a Lasting Peace. 11.
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from time to time as nations struggled against each other 
for power, influence, and prestige. Progressives, on the 
other hand, whilst not dismissing the conflictual side of 
international relations, tended to see the world in terms 
of growing economic, social, and cultural intercourse
between individuals and nations. These relations were seen 
as inherently pacific and the principal method for
transmitting civilization and it benefits around the globe. 
War was far from an intractable problem. Benthamites, for 
instance, maintained that the achievement of international 
harmony depended on just three things: arms limitation,
arbitration, and a free press.15 By the late nineteenth 
century, faith in the healing powers of arbitration had 
become one of the hallmarks of progressive opinion.16
Woolf was one of a number of writers who showed that
war was not a natural, inevitable, phenomenon, but a human
artefact and therefore potentially controllable.17 He 
demonstrated that a system of arbitration, though
15 See John Pinder, 'Federalism and the British Liberal 
Tradition', in Andrea Bosco (ed.), The Federal Idea: The 
History of Federalism from the Enlightenment to 1945 
(London, 1991), 104.
16 See Northedge, League of Nations. 12-16, for a 
useful summary.
17 'War is not a "natural" catastrophe like a tidal 
wave or an earthquake. It is not inevitable; it is 
preventable in Europe like cannibalism, cholera, or witch- 
burning, all of which, though once common in this 
continent, have been abolished by civilisation. War depends 
upon the human will, upon what goes on inside the heads of 
human beings, upon how they decide to order their society 
and to arrange their relations with their fellows.' 
'Introduction' to Woolf (ed.), The Intelligent Man's Wav to 
Prevent War (London, 1933), 9.
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desirable, was not in itself sufficient to prevent war. 
Perhaps most importantly, he demonstrated that 
international organization was not only viable, but that a 
good deal of it already existed.18
Secondly, and allied to this, Woolf was one of the 
first political analysts to recognize the importance of the 
nineteenth century concert system from a theoretical point 
of view. From the standpoint of historical scholarship, 
Woolf's analysis is in a number of respects unsatisfactory. 
He underestimated, for example, the extent to which the 
'new, rudimentary, system' or 'quasi-legislature' did not 
replace the old balance of power system, but was grafted on 
to it. As K. J. Holsti has recently demonstrated, the 
nineteenth century 'system of governance' was a mixed 
system where ' [b] alance and concert went hand in hand'.19 
The territorial balance of power established at Vienna and 
intended to be permanent, was a necessary precondition for 
the creation of the concert. When, due to the growth of 
nationalism and the increasing infirmity of two of the 
Great Powers, the permanence of the compact could no longer 
be guaranteed, the existence of the concert facilitated
18 International Government was one of the first books 
the late Professor Joseph Frankel read when he arrived in 
Britain in the 1930s. He later said that he found it 
'astonishing' since he had not previously realised the 
extent to which government had already been applied to the 
relations between states. Conversation with author December 
1989.
19 K. J. Holsti, 'Governance without Government: 
Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century European International 
Politics', in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel 
(eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in
World Politics (Cambridge, 1992), 50.
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adjustment of the balance short of all-out war. Woolf 
also, to give a further example, failed to identify the 
different phases in the operation of the concert system - 
he speaks of it is if it constituted an undifferentiated 
whole. To do this is misleading. Robert Jervis has 
argued, for instance, that the concert system operated from 
1815 to 1854, and in its strongest form only from 1815 to 
1822. In his view the system cannot be said to have 
operated in the late nineteenth century because great power 
pursuit of self-interest was not sufficiently 
constrained.20 Holsti, by contrast, has identified for 
relatively distinct periods 1815-22, 1823-56, 1857-75, and 
1876-1914. In terms of agreement on common objectives, use 
of common institutions, and the degree to which decisions 
had authority, the efficacy of the concert varied 
considerably from one period to the next, with the concert 
operating highly effectively on all three counts in the 
first period, and highly ineffectively on all three counts 
in the third.21
20 Robert Jervis, 'From Balance to Concert: A Study of 
International Security Cooperation', World Politics, 38, 1, 
(October 1985), 58-9.
21 Holsti, 'Governance without Government', 50-51. Cf. 
Martin Ceadel's view that the concert was not 'an embryonic 
form of supranationalism' but 'merely a self-selecting 
group of major states which took action only when it was 
their particular interest to do so' (Ceadel, 
'Supranationalism in the British Peace Movement during the 
Early Twentieth Century', in Bosco, The Federal Idea, 170) ; 
and also Northedge's view that at least until the first 
Hague conference, the concert, 'even if dignified with the 
name "system"', could not be described as a legislative 
body since its meetings were 'all highly intermittent and 
ad hoc' (Northedge, League of Nations, 9-10).
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But from the standpoint of theory, Woolf's analysis of 
the concert system is highly significant. His main concern 
was not the system itself but what could be learned from 
its experience. He attached great importance to the fact 
that the peacemakers of 1814-15 had attempted to build a 
new international system which went beyond eighteenth 
century 'laissez-faire' balance of power politics. They 
wanted to put international relations on a more organized 
footing. Writing during the next great European 
conflagration, Woolf felt that this was still the most 
urgent task facing mankind. A large part of his enquiry 
was an attempt to discern 'where we are now', to discover 
the strengths and weaknesses, the limits and the potential, 
of the nineteenth century order, for the explicit purpose 
of determining 'how we should go forward'. Woolf's 
importance in this regard resides in his identification of 
and the weight he attached to the profusion of rules, 
regulations, procedures, and institutions which had emerged 
in a world which fell well short of possessing a single, 
centralized, government. This interest in the nature of 
^potential for cooperation or 'governance' within an 
essentially 'anarchical' setting has come to occupy a 
central place in international relations' scholarship. 
Indeed, the kind of enquiry Woolf initiated into the 
lessons of the concert system is one that has been the 
subject of considerable recent attention.22
22 See esp. Holsti, 'Governance without Government', 
30-57.
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Thirdly, Woolf was an early and far from insignificant 
contributor to modern interdependence theory - 'modern' 
because not only did he show, as Cobden and others had done 
in the nineteenth century, that interdependence between 
nations was growing, but also that it had profound 
implications for state sovereignty and therefore for the 
future organization of international relations. Woolf's 
view, as we have seen, was that the communications 
revolution had set in motion a train of events the end 
result of which was to make the interests of individuals, 
firms, and other groups, increasingly international in 
scope. In many areas of life the state has ceased to be 
independent in any meaningful sense. Sovereignty had been 
eroded. This process, however, was not an inevitable one. 
People had a choice before them. Either they could
continue to develop their present 'modern' patterns of 
life, the logic of which was greater international
government, or they could revert back to a simpler, more 
localized, mode of life the logic of which was a greater 
degree of autarchy, independence, and sovereignty.23
Woolf was by no means the first person to propound 
this thesis on interdependence. Others, notably Angell and 
Hobson, had done so before him. In his account of the 
growth of official and unofficial international
organizations, however, Woolf provided new evidence of the
phenomenon, which proved invaluable to later, more
23 For Woolf's clearest statements on interdependence 
see International Government. 82-3, 115-6, 140-44, 157-8.
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sophisticated, analysts of interdependence like David 
Mitrany.24
Fourthly, Woolf was a pioneer of international 
functionalism. All of the standard accounts of
functionalist doctrine acknowledge the important role Woolf 
played in laying the foundations of functional theory.25 
Arguably, however, his importance has been only partly 
recognized. In building his theory of functionalism 
Mitrany drew on Woolf's ideas on international government 
perhaps more than he himself realized.26 As a consequence 
of their close working relationship in such bodies as the 
League of Nations Society and the Labour Party Advisory 
Committee on International Questions, Mitrany had an in^ 
depth knowledge of Woolf's ideas. Many of these ideas were 
strongly functionalist in flavour. It is perhaps no 
accident that Mitrany's first attempt to develop a 
functional theory of international relations was entitled 
The Progress of International Government. It should also
24 Few post-war scholars have acknowledged Woolf's 
importance in this respect. Three notable exceptions, two 
American, one British, are: George Modelski, Principles of 
World Politics (New York, 1972), 320; Craig Murphy,
International Organization. 17, 25, 285; Clive Archer,
International Organizations (London, 1983), 83.
25 See Ernst Haas, Bevond the Nation State: 
Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 
1964), 8; Paul Taylor, International Co-operation Today
(London, 1972), 50-1; Paul Taylor, 'Functionalism: The
Theory of David Mitrany' , in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom 
(eds.), International Organization: A Conceptual Approach 
(London, 1978), 237.
26 In his 'Memoir' Mitrany mentions but does not stress 
Woolf's contribution to the evolution of his thought. See 
David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 
1975), 3-82.
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be noted that whereas other writers who influenced Mitrany
took the domestic scene as their field of study, Woolf took
the international scene. Woolf was the first thinker to
show how a functionalist-type analysis could be applied to
international relations. This is not to say that he put
together the coherent and systematic functionalist theory
Mitrany was later to do. And it is true that Mitrany
became a severe critic of the statism and the legalism
which underlie Woolf's first two conceptions of
international government. But Woolf did provide the
skeleton of a functional theory and some of the flesh in
the form of the numerous examples of practical cooperation
he furnished.27
The following examples illustrate the functionalist
aspect of Woolf's work. First, the pluralism that
underpins Mitrany's work28 is strongly present in Woolf's.
He contended that
... State government is everywhere . . . insufficient 
for the manifold relations of the manifold groups into 
which our society divides and subdivides itself. This 
is well recognised in individual states, where the 
development and working of voluntary associations, 
such as churches, trade unions, associations of 
employers, joint stock companies, clubs, etc., have
27 For example, in many of his writings Mitrany cites 
the Danubian Commission as a highly significant early case 
of functionalist cooperation. The importance of the 
Commission was first highlighted by Woolf in his The Future 
of Constantinople (London, 1917), 36-80.
28 Analyzed in Cornelia Navari, 'David Mitrany and 
International Functionalism', in David Long and Peter 
Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter- 
War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford, 1995), 214-46; and David 
Long, 'International Functionalism and the Politics of 
Forgetting', International Journal. XLVIII, 2 (1993), 355- 
79.
162
been studied and traced. All these bodies are organs 
of government, and therefore combine with the State 
organs to regulate the relations of citizens. The 
whole problem of international government, and 
therefore of the prevention of war, consists in the 
elaboration of a similar organised regulation of 
international relations.29
A large part of International Government is devoted to
identifying such 'manifold groups' and 'organs of
government' as exist internationally, and analysing them in
terms of structure and function. He felt there was no
reason why such groups could not be 'combined' with states
in a complex governmental framework. Only by such means
could 'the organisation of government and the organs of
government follow strictly the complication of group
interests in the world of facts.'30
Secondly, like Mitrany, Woolf was convinced that the
ability of the sovereign state to fulfil the needs of its
citizens had been called into question by the developments
of the modern world. Complete independence of legislation
and administration, for instance, had become 'incompatible'
with the 'complex material world' and contemporary 'aims
and desires and modes of life'. It was the recognition of
this incompatibility which had led to the first tentative
advances towards cosmopolitan law-making and international
legislation.31 More generally, the conception of state as
29 Woolf, International Government. 196.
30 Ibid. 65, 220-4. See also 107-8 where Woolf 
envisages ' a new type of human association and a new method 
of human government' based on international associations 
composed of a variety of different types of member.
31 Ibid. 168-9.
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'an isolated entity' and 'absolutely independent' did not 
'mirror the realities of life and the world'. Much misery 
resulted from trying to apply 'these obsolete conceptions 
and beliefs to a world which they no longer fit' ,32
Thirdly, Woolf described the growth of international 
associations and organs of government in terms which 
presage the functionalist principle of technical self- 
determination. These bodies had, Woolf insisted, had not 
been the invention of political idealists but had grown 
'spontaneously' in order to 'meet international needs'. 
Woolf also spoke of there being 'a natural tendency of the 
world towards International Government' ,33
Fourthly, Woolf argued, as did Mitrany, that social 
change had also brought about 'the breakdown of 
representative political g o v e r n m e n t ' T h e  organs of 
government had failed to keep up with the increased 
complexity of social life. As a result a 'serious gap' had 
opened up 'between the organisation of our life and the 
organisation of our government' .35 In particular, the 
geographical basis of representation had been called into 
question. The primary interests of individuals and groups 
within society no longer coincided with geography:
32 Ibid. 113-5. Woolf later described the state as an 
'hopeless anachronism' which had 'broken down as an 
instrument for regulating the relations of government and 
people'. See The War for Peace (London, 1940), 70-1.
33 Ibid. 92, 99. See also 96, 120, 222.
34 Ibid. 221.
35 Ibid. 109.
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A man's chief interests are no longer determined by 
the place he lives in, and group interests, instead of 
following geographical lines, follow those of capital, 
labour, professions, etc. But government and 
organisation of government have not kept pace with 
this change of social organisation. . . .36
Both domestically and internationally new institutions were
needed to provide for 'due representation' of 'vital group
interests'. Indeed, the international association had
emerged precisely to meet this need.
Finally, Woolf emphasized, as did Mitrany, the effect
that international associations could have on the attitudes
of individual officials. As well as helping to forge an
international public opinion on any given matter,
participation in such associations also led to the
'internationalisation of the mind'. The degree to which
states had been successful in harmonising their labour
laws, for example, was a product not so much of formal
international agreements, but the informal influence of the
' internationalised official. '37
Analytical Weaknesses
There are many weaknesses in Woolf's analysis and it is 
this fact rather than the putative utopianism of his work 
that accounts for its failure to be taken seriously,
36 Ibid. 221.
37 See Woolf's account of the effect on state 
representatives of participation in the proceedings of the 
International Labour Association, ibid. 190-2. In true 
Fabian fashion Woolf also put much emphasis on the role of 
the 'expert'. See for example, International Co-operative 
Trade, Fabian Tract No. 201, (London, 1922), 16.
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especially by an increasingly professionalized discipline, 
much beyond 1945. It is important to register, first of 
all, the sloppiness of which Woolf was sometimes guilty. 
Etherington, as mentioned in Chapter One, noted this with 
respect to Woolf's writing on imperialism.38 Evidence of 
it is plentiful in his writing on international government. 
Shortly after taking great pains, for example, to 
distinguish arbitration from other kinds of judicial 
settlement he inexplicably abandons the distinction and 
proceeds to use the term 'arbitration' in a generic way. 
The confusion of the reader is not spared by a footnote 
explaining: 'By arbitration in this and the following
paragraphs I mean the decision of international disputes by 
a judicial body'.39 Similarly, Woolf asserts that 
(cosmopolitan) international government began in 1838 with 
the creation of Conseil Superieur de Sante in 
Constantinople. On realising, however, that he had 
previously stated that it began several decades before with 
the formation of the Riverian Commissions, he adds a 
footnote: 'The new Internationalism really began with the
Congress of Vienna in 1815./4° Much of this sloppiness is 
accounted for by the fact that Woolf wrote very quickly and 
he rarely revised the his first drafts in any substantial 
way.
But there is another element of clumsiness in Woolf's
38 Etherington, Theories of Imperialism. 182-3.
39 Woolf, International Government. 60.
40 Ibid. 104. Emphasis added.
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writing. Woolf the serious social investigator was always 
the servant of Woolf the political publicist. There is a 
propagandist element in all Woolf's writings on 
international government: as well as contributing to our 
understanding of international cooperation Woolf was also 
seeking to promote an ideology. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, he tried to- discredit the groups and ideologies 
he was opposed to. Along with Conservatives and 
conservatism these included, in true dissenting fashion, 
the Foreign Office, the aristocracy, diplomatists and 
secret diplomacy, generals, and the balance of power.41
But in doing so Woolf unwittingly makes a number of clumsy 
analytical errors.
Woolf's interpretation of the nineteenth century 
provides an interesting example. As social investigator, 
and also as Fabian socialist, Woolf argues that the 
nineteenth century is a century of steady progress towards 
international government. But Woolf the Labour
propagandist and dissenter argues that the nineteenth
century is a century of war, reaction, repressiveness, and 
stupidity. The reason for this is that Woolf the
propagandist does not want to give any credit for the
progress that was made in that century to his conservative 
(and to a lesser extent, liberal) enemies who were, of 
course, by and large running the international show. He 
also wanted to lay the blame for World War One squarely on
41 There are numerous purple passages of dissent in 
Woolf's work. See for example, International Government. 
22, 50, 70, 81; and War for Peace. 17-27.
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their shoulders without at the same time incriminating the 
attempt, in part their attempt, to put international 
society on a more organized footing. This schizophrenic 
tendency resulted in some astonishing contradictions. For 
instance, Woolf castigates the world for giving plenty of 
opportunity to militarists, imperialists, and nationalists 
whilst 'refusing to give even a trial' to international 
government. But the bulk of his work up to this point had 
been dedicated to showing that international government had 
already become an important part of the fabric of 
international society.42
Some striking analytical shortcomings of a similar 
kind can be found in his writings of the 1940s. In 
response to Clarence Streit's argument for a federation of 
democracies, for example, Woolf contended that although 
world federation should be the 'ultimate aim of 
international organisation', and that there was little 
doubt that a federation of 'France, the British Empire, the 
U.S.A., a democratised Germany, a democratised Italy, and 
the smaller democracies would go a long way to rid the 
world of the threat and fear of war', it was none the less 
extremely doubtful whether 'national and international 
psychology' made such a 'revolution' immediately possible. 
This was because federation required ' a very high degree of 
political co-operation and a common attitude towards the
42 Woolf, The Future of Constantinople (London, 1917), 
82-3. See also International Government. 65; 'Meditation on 
Abyssinia', Political Quarterly. 7, 1 (January-March 1936), 
18-19.
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bases of government and perhaps of society' .43 Few would 
doubt the wisdom of this proposition. It does not, 
however, sit easily with Woolf's assertions about 'real 
international control of national armament', nor his call 
for a 'central world authority' to 'deal promptly and 
authoritatively with any action or situation which may 
threaten the world's peace or prosperity' , nor his argument 
for the centralization of the production of atomic energy 
under a 'world authority', and the concentration of all 
armaments other than those required for purely internal 
police purposes in the hands of the UN. If the current 
state of 'national and international psychology', 
'political cooperation', and 'common attitudes towards 
government and society', made a worldwide federation of 
democracies infeasible, then surely it made extensive (to 
say the least!) international control of national armaments 
infeasible too. While rejecting, on the grounds of 
feasibility, the limited idea of a limited federation, he 
for all intents and purposes advocated (without discussing 
its feasibility) something much more far-reaching - world 
government.
It is also worth adding that these assertions, along
with his strictures about the need to 'drastically limit'
national sovereignty, also do not sit easily with such
statements as:
Sooner or later, the German state must take its 
permanent place in the world of states and the German 
people re-enter the comity of nations, if the world is
43 Woolf, Future of International Government. 9-10.
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to have peace and prosperity . . . The problem which 
faces Allied statesmen is to discover what concrete 
steps can be taken to encourage the rise of a 
democratic and pacific Germany which can be trusted to 
cooperate as a free nation with free nations.44
Again, the wisdom of extending the hand of friendship and
peace to a defeated (or about to be defeated) Germany
cannot be doubted. But Woolf's terminology throws his
vision of a post-war world order in which national
sovereignty is, at a minimum, severely limited, into much
confusion.
Before moving on to the conceptual and methodological 
weaknesses in Woolf's work, another kind of analytical 
shortcoming should be briefly mentioned: assertions and
arguments made by Woolf that subsequent, more rigorous, 
analysis has shown to be flawed. The following four 
examples are illustrative. First and foremost, in trying 
to identify the causes of war, Woolf puts far too much 
emphasis on 'disputes and differences'. More specifically, 
he puts far too much emphasis on war being due to lack of 
machinery for the resolution of disputes. There are 
various problems with this approach. One is reminded of 
Carr's distinction between 'underlying and significant' 
causes and 'immediate and personal' causes.45 Woolf often 
seems only concerned with the latter. He failed to analyze 
the sources of international tension in any depth, and 
consequently tended to neglect the role of power, ideology,
44 Woolf, The International Post-War Settlement 
(london, 1944), 17. Emphasis added.
45 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, ix.
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and domestic factors. He also failed to recognise that 
'disputes and differences' are sometimes used by statesman 
merely as pretexts. In such cases 'disputes and 
differences' are not the real causes of war but simply 
circumstances which statesmen find it convenient to 
exploit .46
Secondly, Woolf had far too much faith in the 
possibility of selecting a panel of 'the good and the true' 
to hear and settle disputes 'fairly and reasonably'. He 
underestimated the reluctance of states to grant authority 
to such bodies in advance of any particular dispute 
breaking out, not only for reasons of 'sovereignty' and 
'national interest', but also for ideological and cultural 
reasons. With respect to the latter Woolf did not take 
into account the problems that cultural relativism, or 
belief in cultural relativism, present for such notions as 
'fairness' and 'reasonableness'. In his defence, of 
course, it might be said that he was writing at a time when 
the world was dominated by seven or eight for the most part 
European Powers. For men like Woolf the world seemed much 
more culturally uniform than it actually was. The 
uncritical way in which he presents his case is,
46 On which see Hans Morgenthau's penetrating analysis 
of 'pure disputes', 'disputes with the substance of a 
tension', and 'disputes representing a tension', in 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
5th edn., Revised (New York, 1978), 430-39.
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nonetheless, a considerable analytical weakness.47
Thirdly, Woolf had a tendency to brush aside certain
important questions. For example, after delineating the
kinds of disputes that would be suitable for compulsory
adjudication he asks the question: how is it to be decided
whether a particular dispute falls into one of the
categories of 7 suitable disputes7? Given the generality of
each of the categories (e.g. "questions of fact7), and
especially given that all disputes have aspects which fall
into one or more of them, this question is obviously a
crucial one. However, Woolf casually dismisses it with the
following words:
This, of course, is an example of a question as to the 
competency or jurisdiction of a court which 
continually arises wherever there is a judiciary. 
Municipal courts frequently have to decide questions 
as to their own competency, and there seems no reason 
why an International Court should not be given the 
power to do the same.48
End of story. The answer is woefully inadequate. Not only
does it ignore any difficulties there may be in
transplanting a domestic procedure onto the international
stage, it also underestimates the complexities involved -
with respect to precedent, the right of appeal, and the
role of public prosecuting authorities - in making such
47 See Framework of a Lasting Peace. 3 0-40, where Woolf 
expresses his faith in the ability of the 7 sane and sober7 
arbiter to apply the law in and unprejudiced way, and in 
the ability of "honest men" of "weight and distinction and 
unimpeachable impartiality" to arrive at an "unbiased" 
opinion on any given dispute. See also Woolf's proposal 
that mandated territories should be governed by 
disinterested experts and administrators (Imperialism and 
Civilisation (London, 1928), 115-35) .
48 Woolf, International Government. 57.
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decisions in domestic legal systems.
Woolf similarly brushes aside the vital question of 
how the various obligations to submit justiciable disputes 
to an international court are to be enforced. While he 
shrewdly rejects the idea of a permanent international 
police force, he does not offer much by why of an
alternative. He asserts that '[t]he whole question of 
sanctions is of theoretical rather than practical 
interest'; and blandly adds that, 'If the International 
Authority, the Society of Nations, has the power to compel 
a member to comply with its obligations, and if it has the 
will to do so, a way in which to exercise the power will be 
found.'49 There is no discussion of the problems and 
prospects of collective enforcement in any of its forms. 
Subsequent practice and theory has, of course, shown that 
questions as to the collective power and collective will of 
the society of states are nowhere near as straight-forward 
as Woolf supposed.50
Finally, Woolf's thought on the nature of 
international law has been wholly superseded by later
scholarship. As described in Chapter 3, Woolf took
international law very seriously indeed. In writing
International Government he made use of a number of books 
on international law, especially Oppenheim's well known
49 Ibid. 75-6.
50 For an excellent recent analysis see Andrew Hurrell, 
'Collective Security and International Order Revisited', 
International Relations. XI, 1 (1992), 37-55.
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treatise.51 Not surprisingly therefore Woolf's discussion 
of international law is often astute. Woolf never quite 
managed, however, to liberate himself from the view that 
international law was a primitive form of domestic law; 
that is, he never quite managed to see international law as 
a distinct body of law, with its own unique 
characteristics. For instance, he notes that much 
international law is 'vague and uncertain', and implies 
that a more advanced body of law could only be successful 
in a 'highly organised society of nations'. Woolf 
tantalisingly suggests, therefore, that the quality of 
international law is related to the degree of solidarity 
that pertains in international society. But in the final 
analysis Woolf abandons this sociological approach to law 
and insists, limply, that international law is vague and 
uncertain 'largely due to two facts: there is no recognised 
international organ for making International Law, and no 
judicial organ for interpreting it' .52 The work of Kelsen 
and Manning, among others, has subsequently shown this to 
be a highly superficial answer.53
51 L. Oppenheim, International Law. 2nd edn., (London, 
1912) . Oppenheim read the manuscript of International 
Government and made 'several valuable suggestions'. See 
Woolf, 'Preface' and 'Select Bibliography', International 
Government. 3 , 256.
52 Woolf, International Government. 12-13, 16-17. See 
also Framework of a Lasting Peace. 20-23.
53 See C. A. W. Manning, 'The Legal Framework in a 
World of Change', in Porter, Aberystwyth Papers, 301-35; 
Hedley Bull, 'Hans Kelsen and International Law', in 
Richard Tur and William Twining (eds.), Essays on Kelsen 
(Oxford, 1986), 321-36.
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Conceptual Weaknesses
Woolf's theory of international government also contains a 
number of conceptual weaknesses. Conceptual clarity was
not one of Woolf's strong suits. It is difficult to pin 
down, for example, what he means by an 'international 
authority'. The term suggests the creation of a single 
actor over and above states which has the right and perhaps 
the power to determine the shape of at least some of their 
relations. The fact that the term 'supernational 
authority' is used in the Webb-Woolf plan, further suggests 
that Woolf's 'international authority' should be conceived 
in this way. But sometimes Woolf uses 'international 
authority' as simply a collective noun for his proposed 
international conference and judicial tribunals: he speaks, 
for instance, of an international authority 'consisting of' 
these bodies.54 The picture, however, is far from clear: 
he occasionally suggests that an international authority is 
something much more specific and separate from other 
bodies .55
Given this, and given his pluralist rejection of the 
more far reaching kinds of central control that the term 
implies, one has to conclude that Woolf's 'international 
authority' is largely devoid of content. Why then did he 
use the term? One answer is that it enabled him to hedge 
his bets. He could answer critics who accused him of
54 Woolf, International Government. 64.
55 See ibid. 74, 91.
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advocating a world government by saying that, on the 
contrary, he advocated something much more modest: 
international government defined as process (Woolf hardly 
ever speaks of an international government vis a vis an 
international authority) .56 Similarly, he could answer 
critics who accused him of being too conservative by saying 
that, on the contrary, he was proposing something very 
radical: an international authority.
The blame lies as much with Woolf's conception of 
international government as it does other concepts. The 
first point to note here is that Woolf's usage of the 
concept is far from consistent. Although he initially 
defines it in very broad terms he sometimes unwittingly 
adopts a more restricted definition. He withheld the title 
of 'international government' from the Automobile 
Conference and Convention of 1909, for example, on the 
grounds that it did not create permanent organs of 
international government.57 The problem with this, of 
course, is that according to his initial definition - to 
recapitulate, 'the regulation of relations between States, 
Nations, or Peoples by international agreement' 
conventions and other agreements are acts of international 
government regardless of whether they provide for the 
creation of 'permanent organs'.
Woolf's use of the concept in the 1930s provides
56 I know of only one instance: International Post-War 
Settlement. 5.
57 Woolf, International Government. 101.
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another interesting example. Firstly, although he 
characterizes the nineteenth century, in line with his 
original thesis, as a struggle between nationalism and 
internationalism, he effectively abandons his first two 
conceptions of international government by restricting the 
meaning of internationalism to 'cosmopolitan international 
government' or, as he called it in the 1930s, 'every-day 
international government' .58 When he speaks of the growth 
of internationalism in the nineteenth century he thus has 
in mind only 'cosmopolitan'/'every-day' international 
government. This is a departure from his original thesis 
according to which all three types of international 
government are types or aspects of internationalism.
He puts in the place of this thesis a rather crude 
dichotomy between the 'pre-War system' - of competitive 
nationalism, patriotism, diplomacy, security through 
national armaments, hostile alliances, and the balance of 
power - and the 'system of internationalism' - meaning 'an 
association of disarmed states, pledged by treaty under no 
circumstances to resort to war, to settle their differences 
and disputes by a process of law or international 
conciliation, and to promote and regulate their common 
interests by common action.'59 Little intimation is given 
of the fact that in his major work on the subject he
58 Woolf, 'From Serajevo to Geneva', Political 
Quarterly. 1, 2 (April 1930), 188-94.
59 Woolf, 'From Geneva to the Next War', Political 
Quarterly. 4, 1 (January-March 1933), 3 0-35; 'Meditation on 
Abyssinia', Political Quarterly. 7, 1 (January-March 1936), 
18-19, 22-23, 27.
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rejected such a crude dichotomy - in International 
Government the 'pre-War system' is a 'system of 
internationalism' - at least in embryo.60
Secondly, Woolf's 'system of internationalism' of the 
1930s clearly contains elements of what, in the 1910s, he 
had termed 'international government'. But he now uses 
'international government' exclusively to mean the 'every­
day', 'semi-public and private' international government of 
commerce, finance, agriculture, navigation, the telegraph, 
science, public health, the drugs traffic, and so on. It 
becomes, in other words, a descriptive term for, to 
paraphrase his original definition, 'the regulation of the 
relations of States, Nations, and Peoples by organs of 
international administration' - international associations, 
international bureaux, permanent international commissions, 
and the like. And it is worth briefly adding that these 
rather muddy conceptual waters are not clarified by Woolf's 
habit of using a number of other terms as synonyms for his 
'system of internationalism'. Examples include 'pacific 
international system', 'system of international co­
operation and pacific settlement', 'system of pacific 
internationalism', and in one instance 'international 
government and peace' !61
One can only conclude that the descriptive and
60 Woolf drops the occasional hint (for example, 'From 
Serajevo to Geneva', 189; 'The Resurrection of the League', 
Political Quarterly, 8, 3 (July-September 1937), 340, fn. 
1) .
61 Woolf, 'From Geneva to the Next War', passim.
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analytical value of the concept he deemed so important is 
significantly diminished by his inconsistent, indeed quite 
reckless, use of it. It would not be unfair to say that 
ultimately it becomes a hindrance to understanding rather 
than a help.
Doubts about the term's descriptive and analytical 
value are paralleled by doubts about its prescriptive 
value. International government in the broad sense is an 
amalgam of not necessarily compatible things - from 
arbitration treaties to the growth of organized 
international crime,62 from economic combination to
gatherings of scientists. It may be questioned whether the 
emergence and growth of these phenomena were part of the 
same sociological process, though Woolf was correct to 
highlight the precipitative role of the communications' 
revolution. To describe these things, however, as acts of 
international government is to conflate several
international developments, different not only in
character, but also in their respective ramifications. To 
be an advocate of international government may not at the 
end of the day amount to much. The capitalist can be an 
advocate as much as the socialist, the conservative as much 
as the radical, the feminist as much as the white slave 
trafficker. An undifferentiated concept of international
62 Woolf sees no problem in regarding crime organised 
across boundaries as a form of international government, 
though there is more than a hint of irony in the way he 
discusses the issue. See his account of a 'congress' of 
white slave traffickers held in Warsaw in 1913, in 
International Government, 166-7.
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government becomes as useful as, say, an undifferentiated 
concept of 'justice'. Virtually everyone can safely become 
a true believer. What we need to know is what kind of 
international government being advocated. There is, after 
all, a major difference between an 'international 
capitalist system of government'63 and a system of 
international government run along socialist lines.
Woolf appears to have been unaware of the pitfalls of 
defining his key concept in such a broad way. Confusion 
and contradiction inevitably follow. Indeed, one such 
contradiction can be found at the very heart of Woolf's 
thesis. It might be argued that two of his strands of 
international government - great power concert and 
cosmopolitan organization - pull in opposite directions. 
Law-making in international conferences and collective 
enforcement of law pulls the world in a statist direction, 
whereas unofficial, cosmopolitan, organization pulls the 
world in a non-statist direction. The implication of the 
former is that states tighten their grip on the world, 
whereas the implication of the latter is that their grip is 
weakened. It follows that while it makes sense to 
prescribe one or the other, it does not make sense to 
prescribe both.
When one moves from the prescriptive level, however, 
to the analytical level, Woolf's ground may be firmer. 
After all, this contradiction may be one that exists in the 
real world. There is much evidence to suggest that the
63 The term is Woolf's. See ibid. 2 07.
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power and authority of the state, vis a vis other actors, 
may be increasing in some respects though diminishing in 
others. One manifestation of this is that although 
sovereignty is as popular as ever, the ability to maximise 
the benefits of possessing it is constantly diminishing.
It also might be said in Woolf's defence that the 
reason why he advanced such a broad conception of 
international government is understandable. Woolf's 
introduction to politics came not only from the Fabian 
Society but also from the Co-operative Movement. He 
inherited Robert Owen's vision of a new society 'in which 
all would work together in a rational manner for the common 
good, without need of violent revolution' .M He also 
inherited, from Graham Wallas, the belief that the way to 
achieve this end was to substitute co-operation for 
competition as the fundamental principle of social 
organization.65 Nineteenth century laissez-faire
liberalism was moribund: the task for the future was to 
replace it with regulation, coordination, and organization. 
Woolf's International Government was an attempt to apply 
this belief to the field of international relations. Its 
flaws can be attributed not only to the way in which he 
went about his task, but also to the belief itself. It is,
64 Margaret Cole's 'Preface' to Beatrice Potter, The 
Co-operative Movement in Great Britain (Aldershot, 1987), 
xxxiii.
65 M. J. Weiner, 'Graham Wallas (1858-1932) : Fabian 
Socialist and Political Psychologist' , in J. M. Bellamy and 
J. Saville (eds.), Dictionary of Labour Biography (London, 
1979), 227.
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however, not unreasonable that Woolf sought to build his 
theory out of materials which were familiar and, as far as 
he knew, reliable.
Methodological Inconsistency?
It might be contended that Woolf's analysis of 
international government is methodologically inconsistent. 
His work contains a mixture of Fabian empiricism, 
interpretivism, and structural analysis, and he tended to 
shift 'mid-analysis' from one to another.
The methodological problems in Woolf's work are 
clearly apparent in his account of 'great power 
international government' . The question may be asked: how 
do we know whether or not the system of conferences and 
concerts of the nineteenth century constituted a 
rudimentary international legislature? Originally, Woolf 
claims, the Congress of Vienna was 'conceived' (though he 
does not tell us by whom) as 'in a sense, a Parliament of 
Nations settling the Constitution of Europe'. The Congress 
System was 'considered' to be either 'a kind of European 
Confederation' or 'a hegemony of the four great powers'.66 
When the Greek coast was blockaded in 1827 Woolf tells us 
that the Great Powers were 'half-conscious' of acting as a 
European police.67 He also says with respect to the 
Conference of Constantinople of 1878 that ' [c] learly the
66 Woolf, International Government. 23-4.
67 Ibid. 31.
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Conference . .. regarded itself as an international 
legislative organ' .68
But Woolf also says that the Great Powers 
'unconsciously' regarded their conferences as legislative 
bodies; and he further contends that they were anxious to 
be seen as 'mediators' rather than 'legislators' in order 
to conceal their real intentions 69.
Finally, he claims that 'clearly ... there was the 
spirit of a new system' if one looks 'beneath the verbiage 
of protocols and treaties'; and that the international 
conferences 'in fact' formed a rudimentary legislature.70 
Here Woolf seems to abandon interpretivism and boldly 
asserts what is the case regardless of the intentions and 
perceptions of the relevant actors. What was actually, in 
fact, happening had not yet 'penetrated the consciousness' 
of 'naturally conservative' statesmen and diplomatists.71
From this it can be seen that Woolf employs three 
methods of analysis: empiricism ('the facts tell us that 
...); interpretivism (what do the actors themselves think 
they are doing?) ; and a kind of structural mode of analysis 
('what the Powers were really doing . . .) . To return to the 
opening contention: does such eclecticism amount to
methodological inconsistency? Not necessarily. In social 
science it might be said that we need all the evidence we
68 Ibid. 34.
69 Ibid. 30.
70 Ibid. 32.
71 Ibid. 33.
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can get. There is no a priori reason why these three 
methods cannot be combined. The problem with Woolf's use 
of them is that he does so in an unsystematic way. This 
creates the impression that the method adopted is the one 
most convenient for conclusions already reached.
Utopianism
Having set the scene historically, historiographically, 
conceptually, and methodologically it is now possible to 
tackle head-on the central concern of this chapter.
Although not specifically targeted in The Twenty 
Years' Crisis, it is important to note that Woolf viewed 
the book as an attack on his own position. He took 
particular objection to what he felt was Carr's arbitrary 
and irresponsible use of the word utopian, and he 
attempted, with mixed results, to refute some of his 
assertions in an article, 'Utopian and Reality', published 
in Political Quarterly and in a book, The War for Peace, 
published shortly afterwards. Woolf's response to Carr is 
examined in detail in Chapter 8.
The question whether Woolf, or indeed any of the other 
'thinkers of the twenty years' crisis', deserves to be 
labelled 'utopian' is an extremely complex one. This is
because the term, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, has no 
settled meaning. If by 'utopian' is meant the belief that 
radical reform of the international system is both 
desirable and possible, then Woolf's ideas about
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international government are without doubt a utopian. 
There is, however, a problem here: if this definition is 
accepted Carr himself becomes a utopian given his 
endorsement of functionalism and certain forms of 
international collectivism.72 If, on the other hand, it is 
taken to mean a complete rejection of the existing system 
in favour of some blue-print for an entirely new world 
order, Woolf is not a utopian. He did not completely 
reject the existing order, and although he was never 
reticent in putting forward quite radical proposals for 
change, he rarely engaged in the drawing up of blue-prints 
- not, that is, if we mean by 'blue-print' a comprehensive 
and detailed plan of what a new world would look like and 
how it would work. The only example of such a scheme is 
the Woolf-Webb plan.73 Similarly, if by 'utopian' we mean 
the refusal to acknowledge the existence of, or tendency to 
understate, the unseemly aspects of international politics, 
then Woolf is not a utopian since his estimation of the 
quality of international life was just as grim as later 
'realists' . Indeed, that is precisely the reason why he so
72 The more radical aspects of Carr's thought on 
international relations are discussed in Hidemi Suganami, 
The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge, 
1989), 101-5; and Peter Wilson, 'The New Europe Debate in 
Wartime Britain', in Philomena Murray and Paul Rich (eds.) 
Visions of European Unity (Boulder, CO, 1996).
73 Woolf's wartime International Post-War Settlement 
made a number of more or less detailed proposals for a new 
international order, but it is no more of a blue-print than 
Carr's Conditions of Peace. Woolf explicitly rejects the 
drawing up of blueCTprints in his proposals for the 
expansion of Co-operative trade. See International Co­
operative Trade. 5, 21.
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much wanted to change it.
With respect to the three broad charges against 
utopianism identified as 'key' in Chapter 2, the following 
points can be made.
Charge 1: Facts and Analysis of Cause and Effect 
Much of Woolf's work is polemical in purpose, rhetorical in 
style, and lacking in detailed empirical analysis. He had 
a tendency to see the world in sweeping, Manichean terms 
such as 'civilization' and 'barbarism'. This tendency is 
particularly pronounced in his articles and books of the 
1930s. His controversial tract published by the Left Book 
Club in 1939, Barbarians at the Gate, provides a good 
example.74 In this book Woolf analyzed the intensifying 
European crisis in terms of the forces on the side of 
'civilization' and the forces of 'barbarism'. A keen 
supporter of the Popular Front, Woolf managed to squeeze 
Stalin's Russia into the former camp, but not without 
difficulty. The result is a contorted, procrustean, and 
ultimately simplistic account which fails to convey any of 
the complexities that characterized the diplomatic scene of 
the 1930s. Woolf condemned the ruthless suppression of 
personal and intellectual freedom in Soviet Russia but 
nonetheless argued that she would sooner or later align 
herself with Britain against the fascists not for power
74 Other striking examples include his introduction to 
Intelligent Man's Wav to Prevent War, and Quack. Quack! 
(London, 1935), 108-17 (and 22-7, where he conceives
history, equally sweepingly, as a struggle between 
'minorities' and 'majorities').
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political reasons but because their 'ultimate social aims' 
were those of 'freedom and civilization'. The book came 
out shortly after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.75
Woolf's writings of the 1930s are especially 
propagandist and exhibit few traces of the kind of factual 
analysis called for by Carr. It will be recalled from 
Chapter 2 that Carr denounced collective security, general 
disarmament, and other such schemes as 'product [s] of pure 
theory divorced from practical experience'. It will also 
be recalled that he denounced many of the writers of the 
time for their ignorance of strategy. The solutions they 
proposed were 'neat and accurate on the abstract plane' but 
were obtained only 'by leaving out of account the vital
75 An extended footnote is perhaps justified here. 
Victor Gollancz and his fellow directors of the Club, John 
Strachey and Harold Laski, whose sentiments were much more 
pro-Soviet than Woolf's, refused initially to publish the 
book. Although it reads today like a Soviet apologia, to 
them it was disturbingly anti-Soviet and they feared it 
would be used as propaganda by 'reactionaries and 
fascists'. They also feared it would prompt the resignation 
of 10,000 Club members and jeopardise the Anglo-Soviet 
negotiations then under way. Woolf replied that to prohibit 
all criticism of the Soviet Union was in itself a more 
pernicious, if unconscious, form of anti-Sovietism; that it 
was a wild exaggeration to suggest that publication would 
result in mass resignations (as it turned out, it wasn't); 
and that it was fanciful to think that the book would have 
any effect whatsoever on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations (as 
it turned out, it was). See Luedeking and Edmonds, Leonard 
Woolf, 49-51; Wilson, Leonard Woolf, 197-8; Woolf, Letters, 
415-22 [and my review in Millennium, 20, 3 (1991)] .
Throughout his political career Woolf was bitterly critical 
of but not entirely unsympathetic to the Soviet experiment. 
He felt, for example, that the Soviet Union had had much 
success in building 'economic democracy' but that its 
record on 'political democracy' was nothing short of 
disastrous. See Woolf, 'Democracy in the Soviet Union - 
II', Anglo Soviet Public Relations Association, Leaflet 3 
(n.d. 1942?), 5-8; and also Foreign Policy: The Labour
Party's Dilemma (London, 1947), 10-16.
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strategic factor'. He concluded with the damning words: 
'If every prospective writer on international affairs in 
the last twenty years had taken a compulsory course in 
elementary strategy, reams of nonsense would have remained 
unwritten.'
There can be no doubt that Woolf's ignorance of 
strategy was lamentable. He was a staunch believer in a 
system of collective or 'pooled' security. This required 
states to renounce their right to use force as an 
instrument of national policy and to entrust their security 
instead 'to the machinery of pacific settlement and a 
common obligation to resist an aggressor'. But such a 
system of pacific internationalism (as he also called it) 
could not possibly work in a world of heavily armed Great 
Powers. A precondition of collective security or pacific 
internationalism was, therefore, national disarmament.76 
But although he castigated pacifists for refusing to accept 
the full implications of the 'common obligation to resist 
an aggressor',77 he never himself explained how such an
obligation would be met in a disarmed world. If by
'disarmament' he did not have in mind what has since become
known as 'general and complete disarmament', it is
similarly unclear what he considered to be the optimum 
level of disarmament: that is, the lowest level of national 
armament consistent with the effective performance of
76 Woolf, 'From Geneva to the Next War', 32-40.
77 See for example ibid, 42; Woolf, The League and 
Abyssinia (London, 1936), 28-31.
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common obligations.78
In this connection it is a curious fact that by 1937 
Woolf was suggesting that "collective7 as opposed to 
"national7 defence necessitated "a very high measure of 
rearmament7 (emphasis mine) . It would not be unfair to say 
that in Woolf"s outlook 7 things collective" seem to possess 
certain magical qualities. It does not seem to have 
occurred to him that collective rearmament might upset the 
balance of power and trigger a pre-emptive war, or a lethal 
arms race, in exactly the same way as national rearmament 
tended, so he believed, to do.79
78 This is a matter Woolf never got to grips with. In 
his outline for an 7 independent7 and "impartial" foreign 
policy for Britain of 1947, for example, he boldly asserts 
that 7 [w] e should reduce our military commitments to a 
minimum consistent with any obligations which might become 
necessary for real collective security if UNO should become 
an effective instrument of peace." But he makes no attempt 
to spell out what these obligations might be nor specify 
the nature and level of the armaments that would be needed 
to fulfil them. The drastic reductions in armaments he 
recommends as an interim measure suggests that he did not 
expect the requisite level to be high. This expectation is 
so dubious that one wonders whether Woolf ever gave the 
matter serious attention. One also wonders whether he ever 
considered the possibility that a high level of armaments 
might be needed to transform the UN into an "effective 
instrument of peace" in the first place. Woolf, Foreign 
Policy. 16-25.
79 Woolf, "Arms and Peace", Political Quarterly. 8, 1 
(January-March 1937), 22-3, 26-7, 33. Again this feature is 
also apparent in Woolf's 1940s writings. Although he 
repeatedly dismissed the possibility of deterring 
aggression through "power political" methods he maintained 
complete confidence in the efficacy of "collective" 
methods. Not once does he question whether the shortcomings 
attributed to the former (the generation of a climate of 
fear and hostility leading to an arms race and a 
"preventive" war) might also apply to the latter. Indeed 
there is a sense in which Woolf's argument is tautological: 
"real" collective security through a "real" international 
authority would, it seems, present a front so united, so 
powerful, and so imbued with moral authority, that it could
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It is also a curious but important fact that the 
allegations of muddle-headedness and pusillanimity that 
Woolf levelled at the pacifists might equally be levelled 
at Woolf himself. Woolf was adamant in the early part of 
the decade that the 'central object' of British foreign 
policy should be to 'prevent the outbreak of a European 
war' .80 But he also wanted the British government to pursue 
a 'more militant policy' of using the League as an 
'instrument against Fascist militarism'. The League, he 
argued, should be used to 'force' Fascist states like Italy 
and Germany to 'show their hand'. If they were not 
prepared to comply with their obligations under the 
Covenant they should be made ' openly to repudiate them' 
and, in light of this, 'forced out of the League'. 'A 
League,' he continued, 'purged of militarist and Fascist 
states, composed of democratic and socialist governments, 
determined by every means in their power to prevent war, 
would be a much stronger instrument for peace and 
civilisation than the half-sham League which we have 
today. '81
not possibly fail. Anything falling short of such a front 
could not, in Woolf's confusing scheme of things, be 
considered a 'real' system of collective security. Woolf, 
International Post-War Settlement, 2-3, 8-10; and Foreign 
Policy. 7, 10, 15, 18.
80 A position that he also adopted, despite his formal 
denunciations of 'Tory appeasement', in the late 1940s ('At 
the present moment in framing a foreign policy everything 
should be subordinated to an attempt to secure peace.') 
Woolf, Foreign Policy. 15.
81 Woolf, 'Labour's Foreign Policy', Political 
Quarterly. 4, 4 (October-December 1933), 510-12, 523-4.
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Yet Woolf stopped short of calling this new League an
alliance, a notion which, in typical dissenting fashion, he
continued to denounce.82 He also stopped short of
admitting that such a 'militant policy' could result in, or
bring nearer, the very thing it was designed to avoid -
war. The anodyne, some would say evasive, phraseology of
the following sentence is illustrative:
What exactly that common action [against aggression] 
should be may be a subject of argument, but that an 
alternative to armed nationalism requires that every 
state should assume some obligations to stand by the 
side of the victim of aggression and to resist the 
aggressor is indisputable.83
The employment of euphemisms such as 'stand by the side of'
(or 'support' or 'come to the assistance of' or 'fulfil its
obligations to'84) is almost exactly the kind of weak-
mindedness for which he arraigned the pacifists. Woolf
rarely admits that 'sanctions' might involve 'military
82 At least until 1937. At this point, for the first 
time in his career, Woolf began to cautiously lend his 
support to the idea of a 'peace front' of non-fascist 
states to 'resist' (he was short on specifics) fascist 
aggression. Although such a 'front' ran the risk of 
precipitating war - by tempting Germany and Italy to strike 
their first blow before the balance of power would turned 
against them - he none the less saw it as the best out of 
a set of undesirable alternatives - aimless rearmament, 
imperial isolation, pacific isolation, defensive/non- 
offensive isolation, appeasement - none of which offered 
any real hope of peace. See 'Arms and Peace', passim; 'The 
Resurrection of the League', 342-52. For denunciations of 
alliances see 'Labour's Foreign Policy', 510, 521-2; 'From 
Serajevo to Geneva', 203-4.
83 Woolf, 'From Geneva to the Next War', 42. See also 
'The Resurrection of the League' (342-3, 348-9) where Woolf 
talks toughly about 'actively resisting' fascist 'bullying 
and violence' and 'asserting rights to order and peace' but 
avoids the key question: How?
84 Woolf, 'Meditation on Abyssinia', 19, 23, 26.
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sanctions' and that 'military sanctions' meant war. 
Indeed, in characterising the 'pre-War' or 'Balance of 
Power' system as a 'system of war' and the 'League system' 
as a 'system of peace' he occasionally implies that 
collective security, though involving 'sanctions', did not 
involve war.85
There are in fact two dimensions to this problem in 
Woolf's thought. The first is the one stated in the 
previous paragraph: Woolf is at least partly guilty of the 
weak-mindedness of which he accused the pacifists, because, 
like them, he shies away from a full and frank disclosure 
of the implications of collective security. The second is 
more complicated. On the few occasions he does come close 
to a full and frank disclosure, he purposefully stops short 
of using the word 'war'. He talks quite stoically of the 
'risks' of collective security.86 He strongly implies on 
one occasion that 'the application of sanctions' 
necessarily entails 'the use of force'.87 He even suggests 
that collective security could, in principle, produce more 
violence than it prevents.88 None the less he refuses to 
call this 'violence' 'war'.
The reason for this is, I think, at root 
psychological. Woolf was so badly scarred by the horrors
85 Ibid. 29-32.
86 Woolf, 'Meditation on Abyssinia', 26; League and 
Abyssinia. 18, 26.
87 Woolf, 'Meditation on Abyssinia', 31.
88 Woolf, League and Abyssinia, 30.
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of the Great War - a war in which one of his younger 
brothers, Cecil, was killed and another, Philip, was 
seriously wounded by the same shell - that he could not see 
war in anything but the blackest terms. One of the 
ramifications of this was that he could not accept that the 
new system of international relations built around the 
League might ultimately depend on such an 'evil', 'vile', 
'bestial', 'barbarous', 'stupid', and 'senseless' thing as 
war for its survival.89 He consequently called it 
something else. He maintained that '[t]he use of force to 
resist aggression by states organized in a League to 
eliminate war is not war unless the use of force to resist 
violence by a state organized to eliminate crime is 
crime.'90 Some of the pitfalls of this form of analogical 
reasoning will be discussed in the next section. At this 
stage the important point to note is that such reasoning 
simply obscures even further the price that may ultimately 
have to be paid by law-abiding states to 'maintain' peace 
and 'preserve' collective security. War is a grave word. 
But collective security may require grave action. In 
choosing words the gravity of which did not correspond to 
the gravity of the action, Woolf is, I think, guilty of 
being less than sincere and ipso facto of undermining, 
albeit unwittingly, the very foundations - resolve and 
preparedness - upon which the success of such action almost
89 Ibid. 29-31; Woolf, 'The Ideal of the League 
Remains', Political Quarterly. 7, 3 (July-September 1936), 
333-4 .
90 Woolf, League and Abyssinia. 30.
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by definition depends.91
A further puzzling and ultimately deficient feature of 
Woolf's position on collective security concerns his 
conception of the League. He insisted that the League was 
not a 'foreign body in the comity of nations and endowed 
. . . with a personality transcending or even outside the 
States of which it was . . . composed. ' It could not 'act by 
itself or ... be a force for good or evil in international 
affairs apart from the Governments which are represented 
upon its organs' . On the contrary it was simply a 
'political organisation' or 'pacific machinery' the 
efficacy of which contingent on the sincerity and 
determination of its members.92 When discussing this matter 
in the abstract, therefore, Woolf's position could hardly 
be clearer.
But the logic of his rather sketchy thoughts on the 
practical dimensions of 'pooled security through the 
League' suggest a quite different conclusion. Woolf was 
against 'armed nationalism' and in favour of 'disarmed 
internationalism'. Collective security meant 'collective, 
not national defence, by collective instead of national 
armament'. Security would be provided not by national
91 It should be noted here that Woolf sometimes speaks 
as if resolve alone would be enough to deter aggression, 
thereby rendering graver action unnecessary. He is silent, 
however, on how such resolve can be continually 
demonstrated in the absence of such action. See ibid. 16, 
19; 'Meditation on Abyssinia', 27.
92 'From Serajevo to Geneva', 195; 'From Geneva to the 
Next War', 40-2; 'Meditation on Abyssinia', 17-19, 22-3.
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armies and navies but 'collectively7 by 'the League'.93 Is 
the implication of such statements that the League could or 
should have armed forces of 'its own'? Or is it the case 
that Woolf had in mind the secondment of national forces, 
as part of the process of national disarmament, to the 
League? In either case, who is in control of these 'no 
longer national' forces? And if they are no longer
national doesn't this mean that the League has, inevitably, 
acquired a personality of its own?
While worrying in themselves, such disregard of key 
practical and conceptual strategic considerations also gave 
rise to some highly superficial judgements on contemporary 
events. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, to give one 
example, occurred, quite simply, because Japan rightly 
calculated that France and Britain would not comply with 
their obligations under the Covenant. This was a product 
partly of 'muddled ignorance' on the part of the French and 
British governments, and partly of their manifest lack of 
the 'will to peace'. Woolf does not stop and ask why Japan 
felt that the League Powers would not comply with their 
obligations, nor why. except for these two sweeping 
assertions, the League Powers, meaning of course Britain 
and France, steered clear of any action that might get them 
involved in the conflict. The complex strategic equation 
in Asia and its potential impact on the strategic equation
93 Woolf, 'The Ideal of the League Remains', 335; 'From 
Geneva to the Next War', 39; 'Arms and Peace', 23.
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in Europe is not even considered.94
Strategy, armaments, and collective security is 
undoubtedly an issue-area within which Woolf's 'attention 
to facts and analysis of cause and effect' is far from 
adequate. I have spent some dealing with it precisely 
because it is one area in which Carr's pronouncements are, 
I believe, accurate and fair (as well as provocative and 
scintillating) .95
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that Woolf's 
inattentiveness to the 'facts' and 'cause and effect' with 
regard to collective security is representative of the 
normal pattern. A good deal of Woolf's work was written 
for the heavily empiricist Fabian Research Department. His 
statement of purpose in International Government is 
typically Fabian empiricist: 'The object of this inquiry is 
to give data which may, if possible, enable people to
94 Woolf, 'From Geneva to the Next War', 35-43. He 
later argued that it was 'not true that the League of 
Nations or the Allied nations had not adequate armed forces 
... to resist the preparations for aggression and the 
actual aggressions by Japan, Mussolini, and Hitler.' He 
went on to provide some justification for this contention 
with respect to Mussolini and Hitler but remained ominously 
silent on Japan. Woolf, International Post-War Settlement. 
9.
95 Indeed, Woolf's argument for a working system of 
collective security in 'The Ideal of the League Remains' 
(the title is ironic) is a model example of one of Carr's 
'abstractly neat and accurate solutions obtained by leaving 
out of account the vital strategic factor'. Woolf's 
argument is lucid and logical but no account is taken of 
British or French preparedness for war either in the Far 
East, the Mediterranean, Africa, or in Europe (nor, indeed, 
of the tremendous financial difficulties which constrained 
them). His radical proposals for British foreign policy in 
Foreign Policy: The Labour Party's Dilemma provide another 
good example.
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transform the vague "some sort of [international 
organization]" into a more definite object of their 
hopes.'96 Throughout his career he was deeply wedded to 
the Webbian belief that the truth of socialism, and by 
extension internationalism, could be rationally 
demonstrated by 'the facts'. The task of the investigator 
was to gather enough facts to prove these Fabian truths 
both in their positive and normative aspect. It is not 
surprising therefore that several of Woolf's works contain 
a wealth of empirical data97 - though not necessarily the 
kind of data considered important by later 'realists'. 
Indeed, as mentioned, the importance of Woolf's work to a 
large degree resides in the mass of information he 
collected on official and unofficial international 
associations.
Charge 2: Power in International Politics
Woolf generally viewed power, or at least its unilateral 
exercise, as a defect of the international system. He was 
consequently more inclined to censure it than to analyze 
it. He frequently asserted that the opposite of power was 
law and did not investigate in any detail the degree to 
which law is underpinned by a particular distribution or 
pattern of power.
But although Woolf failed to give the role of power
96 Woolf, International Government, 7.
97 Especially International Government. Empire and 
Commerce in Africa. International Co-operative Trade, and 
his articles for the Contemporary Review. 1922.
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the attention it deserves, he did not entirely ignore it.
This is evident, for example, in his acknowledgement that
nationalism, patriotism, and the sovereign state could not
be wished away and that any proposal for a new
international order had to take account of them.98 It is
evident in his rejection of 'any such revolution as world-
parliaments and world federation' ." It is evident in his
rejection of the idea of a world state:
For however attractive a world-State may be to our
imaginations, a little reflection, aided by the
sobering study of protocols, blue-books, and white 
papers, will show that in the world of actual facts 
there if no ground prepared for the reception of so 
strange a plant.100
It is evident in the special position he granted to the
Great Powers in his proposal for an International Council,
and in his recognition of the probable permanence
international inequality:
If ... the world is ever to organise itself for the 
peaceful regulation of international affairs, that 
organisation must provide for the essential inequality 
of States. If such inequality is not reflected in the 
pacific machinery, it will make itself felt in war, 
while the machinery will be left to rust unused.101
To the extent that Woolf saw the growth of international
government as an inexorable process, there is an implicit
endorsement of the positive role of power - social power -
98 Woolf, International Government. 219.
99 Woolf, Framework of a Lasting Peace. 51.
100 Woolf, International Government. 68-9.
101 Ibid. 78. See also 61-2, 236-45.
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at the heart of his thesis.102 And in common with other 
supporters of the League, Woolf believed that power also 
had a positive role to play in providing collective 
security and upholding the international rule of law.
Finally, it would be incorrect to assume that Woolf 
was entirely dismissive of the 'power of power politics'. 
He often utilized the conceptual and explanatory tools of 
power politics in analysing particular episodes and events. 
His analysis of the early Cold War international context, 
for example, focuses on such impeccably 'power political' 
factors as: the relative power position - economic,
political, and military - of the three former allies; the 
dangers of widespread misperception ('erroneous beliefs') 
of this power position for Russian and American policy; the 
fear and suspicion among the Russian leadership of Anglo- 
American collusion; the fear and suspicion in America and 
Britain of the spread of Communism and Russian territorial 
ambitions; the self-fulfilling nature of policies based on 
such fears and suspicions; the growing tendency in the 
policies of the US and the USSR to treat issues not on 
their merits but in terms of their effect upon their 
relative economic and military power; the deleterious 
effect of wide economic and ideological differences; the 
dangers inherent in exclusive US possession of the atomic 
bomb; and the impact of Britain's disengagement from empire 
on her power and status and on the relative power position
102 He often implies that the growth of 'cosmopolitan' 
international government has a momentum of all its own. See 
ibid. 92, 229, 120.
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of the US and the USSR.103
The point to be emphasized here, however, is that 
although Woolf sometimes analyzed particular events in 
terms of power politics he did not believe that such a 
undesirable state of affairs was endemic or immutable. He 
never abandoned faith in the possibility that power 
politics could be transcended through international 
government and a 7 real' system of collective security. To 
continue with the same example, although Woolf's estimation 
of the Cold War international situation was bleak (due to 
inter alia the 'hostility and power politics of the USA and 
USSR', the 'consistent hostility' of Russia towards 
Britain, the abuse by Russia of its power and status within 
the UN, the opportunistic nature of Soviet foreign policy 
and the unscrupulous methods employed in its efforts to 
spread communism and totalitarianism abroad, the dangers of 
domination by 'the powerful and militant capitalism of the 
USA', and 'the terrible vulnerability of ... [Britain's] 
geographic and economic position in a war fought with ... 
[atomic] weapons'), he did not concede any ground to the 
realist view on how to deal with it. He continued to 
condemn national deterrence, armed alliances, and the 
balance of power. He continued to argue for collective 
security through the UN ('... a socialist government must 
make the UNO the keystone of its long-term policy. . . For in 
the long-run there will be hardly any chance of peace 
unless UNO is made to work') . And he continued to call for
103 Woolf, Foreign Policy, 8-10.
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an end to and immediate dissociation from power politics 
('... we cannot afford to take part in any way, either on 
one side or on the other, in the preliminary game of power 
politics which assumes and creates the probability of 
another war ... [we should] refuse absolutely to take part 
in the wrangles and recriminations of the Security Council 
and the Assembly . . . our policy should be complete 
impartiality and dissociation from all strategic manoeuvres 
of the USA and USSR') .104
Charge 3: Universal Interests and the Status Quo 
Woolf uncritically assumed that peace was a universal 
interest, justice a universal value, and that both of them 
could be determined, if needs be, by a majority vote in a 
conference of Powers. Following Cobden and Angell, he felt 
that war benefitted no one except perhaps a small and 
exploitative clique. War was a barbaric act parallel to 
cannibalism and slavery. It was also an act that, because 
of the increasing destructiveness of modern weaponry, 
threatened not only this or that nation, but civilization 
itself.
But Woolf's convictions about war and his single- 
minded pursuit of peace did not blind him to the fact that 
the preservation of peace might have as its corollary the 
solidification of a particular, and perhaps unjust, status 
quo. His radical liberal belief in the need to uphold the 
rule of international law, for instance, was tempered by
104 Ibid. 8-26.
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his socialist understanding of law as an instrument for
maintaining the existing order of things. The following
passage on the question of compulsory adjudication
succinctly sums up Woolf's view on what he called 'the
problem of the status cruo' . It is worth quoting at length
not only because it reveals the extent to which Woolf was
aware of the hypocrisy and the ' inner falsehood and
cant'105 that often accompanies uncompromising belief in
the sanctity of international law, but also because it
anticipates in important respects the argument that Carr
was to make more than two decades later. According to
Woolf, it was not advisable for any state to bind itself
absolutely to refer disputes to a judicial tribunal because
such a tribunal
... would be compelled to decide every issue strictly 
in accordance with the existing law.... It would be 
essentially that conservative element . . . necessary in 
every society and which maintains the existing order 
of things. Nor must we forget that it so happens that
it is always our particular interest as a nation to
preserve the existing order of things. In the 
international system Great Britain is naturally in the 
position which the rich capitalist employer holds in 
the industrial system. She has usually nothing to 
gain by a change .... She is always conservative and 
therefore in favour of arbitration and a rigid 
adherence to existing treaties. But ... it may be in 
the interests of other nations and of the world 
generally that changes should take place, and that, if 
an arrangement which maintains the existing order of 
things is essential, an arrangement which makes it 
possible to upset it in an orderly manner is no less 
essential.
At the present moment there are only two methods 
by which the existing order of things can be upset - 
negotiation and war. It is only obtuseness and lack 
of imagination on our part if we do not see that no 
nation, whose interests are not in preserving the
105 Meinecke quoted by Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 111-
12 .
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status quo, will give up the power of going to war . . . 
unless some other possible method of varying the 
status quo is assured to it. The fact that Germany 
opposed and Britain supported obligatory arbitration 
at the Hague Conference does not prove the wickedness 
of Germany and the pureness of Britain, any more than 
the refusal of wage-earners to accept the employers' 
proposals - namely, to give up their weapon, the 
strike, and bind themselves to arbitrate - proves a 
moral superiority of the employing over the employed 
class.106
There are of course considerable differences between Woolf 
and Carr on the question of compulsory adjudication. Carr 
rejected as illusory the distinction between justiciable 
and non-justiciable disputes.107 He condemned as
fallacious Woolf's notion that political relations could be 
converted into legal relations.108 He also had grave doubts 
about the thrust of Woolf's argument, namely, that what was 
required was a 'rational' non-coercive method of peaceful 
change.109 The quotation is significant, however, because 
it shows that Woolf was not 'utopian' in the sense of being
106 Woolf, International Government, 55-6. See also 14- 
15 where Woolf criticises treaties 'designed to be eternal' 
and calls for a procedure whereby they can be altered 'in 
accordance with altering circumstances'; 2 6-7 where Woolf 
trenchantly observes the different perspectives of 
challengers and defenders of the status cruo with respect to 
questions of 'nationality' (i.e. self-determination); and 
Framework of a Lasting Peace, 48-51, where he argues that 
'government by existing rules' with no means of changing 
them would amount to 'over the living a tyranny of the 
dead'.
107 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 247-54.
108 In Carr's words 'dissolving politics into law'. 
Ibid. 260-61.
109 Compare Woolf's international conference, deciding 
disputes in accordance with 'equity' (International 
Government. 56-7), with Carr's process of 'give and take' 
in which both morality and power are indispensable 
components (Twenty Years' Crisis. 2 64-84) .
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an unthinking defender of the status quo. It also shows 
that Woolf's thought is considerably more complex and 
sophisticated than certain critics have contended.
The Domestic Analogy
It could be argued that one of the main weaknesses of
Woolf's thought on international government is his reliance
on the 'domestic analogy'. In his incisive study of the
role that the domestic analogy has played in proposals
about world order, Hidemi Suganami defines it as a form of
presumptive reasoning which holds there are certain 
similarities between domestic and international 
phenomena; that, in particular, the conditions of 
order within states are similar to those of order 
between them; and that therefore those institutions 
which sustain order domestically should be reproduced 
at the international level.110
Suganami proceeds to show that the domestic analogy
manifests itself in a range of ways and takes a number of
different forms. These forms differ according to the
similarities that are held by users of the domestic analogy
to be significant (for example, between treaties and
contracts, or between conferences and legislatures); the
domestic institutions which are held to be relevant (for
example, police forces or the welfare state); and the
prescriptions for change that logically follow (for
example, reform of the society of states or the creation of
a single world state). Not surprisingly given this
variety, some forms of the domestic analogy are more cogent
110 Suganami, Domestic Analogy. 1.
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than others. Suganami, to some extent justifiably, cites 
Woolf as an example of someone who uses the analogy in a 
straightforward, highly problematical, way.111 
7 Straightforward' in the sense that the state is
personified and it is presumed that the bases of order 
between states in international society are essentially the 
same (and not merely 'similar') as the bases of order 
between individuals within the state. 'Problematical' 
because, inter alia, this approach assumes that enforcement 
of law against miscreant individuals is the central task of 
government when in fact it is the management and 
conciliation of conflict between large and powerful 
groups.112
Reliance on this type of domestic analogy is
particularly evident in Woolf's later writings. He
contended, as mentioned in Chapter 3, that
There is nothing essentially different in the 
government of a football club, a village, a town, a 
country, of Europe, or of the world, except that the 
scale is bigger and the organisation more 
complicated.113
Similarly,
To prevent war is a problem of politics and 
government, not essentially different from the problem 
of preventing duelling or cock-fighting or of
regulating the relations between the inhabitants of 
Middlesex and those of Surrey. It may be easier to 
prevent cock-fighting than war or to regulate the 
relations between Middlesex and Surrey or England and 
Scotland than those between France and Germany. But
111 Ibid. 95-6, 179-81.
112 Ibid. 165-96.
113 Woolf, The Future of International Government 
(London, 1940), 3.
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there is nothing in the last problem which suggests it 
is essentially different from the others.114
Thus Woolf did not see the problem of war and the
maintenance of peace as sui generis. The experiences of
domestic societies in dealing with ills such as robbery and
murder were directly relevant for thinking about how to
deal with international ills such as war. The common
answer to such ills was government. All civilized life,
Woolf claimed, depended on the effective functioning of six
'essentials of government7: the existence of 'recognised
and accepted' rules; a legislative body for making and
modifying these rules; judicial bodies for interpreting
them; organs and procedures through which changes could be
made to the constitution or principles of the society;
administrative bodies to promote common interests; and some
means of controlling or preventing the unilateral use of
force. These essentials of government applied no less to
international society than they did to domestic society.115
Evidence of this straight-forward reliance on the
domestic analogy can also be found in Woolf's more
sophisticated earlier work. He criticized what he felt was
an imbalance in the laws of war in favour of ius en bello
by asking: 'What should we think of a State in which there
were no laws to prevent riot and murder and violence, and
no police to enforce the law, but yet there were very
detailed and complicated laws governing the conduct of
114 Woolf, The War for Peace. 79-80. See also 105, 156- 
7; and The Intelligent Man's Wav to Prevent War. 11-12.
115 Woolf, Future of International Government. 5-6.
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persons engaged in riots, murder, and violence?' And he 
maintained that the difference between 'a nation enforcing 
its own will by violence' and 'a nation enforcing the will 
of an international authority by violence' was 'the 
difference between a hooligan and a policeman'.116
Although illuminating there is, however, no need to 
reproduce further specific examples. This is because the 
very form and structure of much of what Woolf has to say is 
based on an uncomplicated domestic analogy. By advocating 
judicial settlement, the further development of an 
international legislature, the founding of a stable 
international constitution, and, of course, the importance 
of international government. Woolf was clearly suggesting 
that hopes for a more orderly international society resided 
in making it more like domestic society.
There are, however, several aspects of Woolf's work 
which suggest that the overall picture is not as clear-cut 
as it at first seems. This can be illustrated by following 
f our examp1e s.
Firstly, in earlier writings Woolf rejected the idea 
of an international police force as 'hardly practical in 
the present condition of the world'. His position on this 
question was far more ambivalent in later writings.117 
Secondly, he explicitly rejected the straightforward
116 Woolf, International Government, 22, 31. See also 
25, 40, 100, 232.
117 Compare International Government. 75-6, with The 
Future of International Government. 6, 12, and The 
International Post-War Settlement, 10.
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analogy between individuals and states in his analysis of 
arbitration and judicial settlement. As we have seen, 
Woolf rejected general obligatory arbitration as neither 
practicable nor reasonable. Those who advocated this 
assumed that since judicial decisions had been substituted 
for private war between individuals, international judicial 
decisions could be substituted for war between states. 
Woolf pointed out, however, that only a limited range of 
disputes within states were in fact settled by judicial 
decisions. It was ridiculous, for example, to suppose that 
the Irish Home Rule question could be solved in this way. 
The reason for this was that this kind of dispute concerned 
what the law ought to be, not it interpretation. To 
suggest that it could be settled by judicial means was to 
confuse two different processes: the judicial and the
legislative. Significantly, Woolf added that disputes like 
the Irish Question were the kind of disputes that most 
closely resembled international disputes. This was because 
they involved groups of individuals and not individuals per 
se.118
Thus Woolf was aware of some of the problems inherent 
in a direct analogy between states and individuals. This 
awareness led him to incorporate the aforementioned measure 
of flexibility in his proposals for judicial settlement. 
Although still reliant on the domestic analogy in the sense 
that his proposals for international order are informed by 
a reading of domestic experience, the type of analogy he
118 Woolf, International Government. 46-8.
208
employs is, in this instance, more subtle than the one 
often found in later writings.
Thirdly, Woolf sometimes employed a more subtle 
version of the analogy by virtue of his pluralistic 
understanding of domestic society. Accordingly, government 
did not only consist of the 'Houses of Parliament, the 
Courts of Justice, the policeman, and the Borough Council', 
but also the church, the guild, professional associations, 
joint stock companies, clubs, associations of workers, 
consumers, employers, scientists, sportsmen, and the like. 
Woolf argued that the prevalence of the 'narrow vision of 
government and the functions of government as limited to 
State or Municipal organisation' led to 'much 
misunderstanding of the history and the future of 
International Government' ,119 As has been seen, Woolf 
advocated not only the reproduction of 'State or Municipal 
organisations' at the international level, but also the 
elaboration and development internationally of non-state 
organizations. Thus, his pluralistic conception of 
international government was at least in part informed by 
his pluralistic conception of domestic government.120
119 Ibid. 98. See also 196-200.
120 In this respect Woolf adopted, in Suganami's terms, 
the 'cosmopolitanist' version of the domestic analogy and 
argued on very similar lines to 'welfare 
internationalists' . See Suganami, Domestic Analogy. 35-9, 
100-11, 191-4. For two further examples of Woolf's more 
subtle and cogent use of the analogy see The Framework of 
a Lasting Peace, 30-38, in which he compares industrial 
with international disputes; and International Co-operative 
Trade, 17, in which he conceives a non-statist, non­
capitalist trading order based on an analogy with domestic 
Co-operative organization.
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Finally there are two senses in which Woolf's theory 
of international government rests only to a small degree, 
if at all, on the domestic analogy. Firstly, he claimed, 
and not without reason, that his proposals for 
international reform were based, at least partly, on 
international processes and institutions that were already 
firmly rooted in the international system. His
recommendations for the development of 'cosmopolitanist7 
international government in particular were based on a 
reading of recent international experience as much as they 
were on a reading of domestic experience. Secondly, and 
following on from this, to the extent that law-making had 
been cosmoplitanized, administration internationalized, 
sovereignty eroded, and an international social tissue 
created, the distinction between the 'domestic' and the 
'international' in Woolf's view been blurred. A single 
society was emerging out of the collectivity of societies. 
To the extent that this had occurred there was, strictly 
speaking, no 'domestic' or 'international' upon which 
analogies could be drawn.
These examples indicate that although Woolf often 
employed the domestic analogy in a straightforward and 
highly simplistic way, he also used it in a more subtle 
way, and in some respects he hardly used it at all. Again, 
the picture of Woolf's thought that emerges is a complex 
one. The crude publicist was also in some respects a 
subtle and prescient analyst. Once again this suggests 
that the prevalent image of interwar 'idealists' as
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simplistic, one-dimensional, wishful-thinkers is in need of 
revision.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by offering a few thoughts on 
Bull's contention that Woolf's work on international 
government is 'not at all profound' and not worth reading 
now 'except for the light it throws on the preoccupations 
and presuppositions of its time and place' . It should 
first be noted that this contention rests, for good or for 
ill, on a conservative premise. Bull held the view that 
the international system was characterized by certain 
enduring features: anarchy (meaning 'absence of
government'); society (meaning at least some agreement on 
common norms, rules, and institutions); war; alliances; the 
balance of power; and the primacy of the sovereign 
state.121 Profundity for Bull meant recognition of the 
central role these enduring features played in 
international life. This is the conservative premise: 
continuity is assumed to be more fundamental than change. 
Writers like Woolf, in Bull's view, had little of 
significance to say about the elements of continuity in 
international politics, and this meant that their relevance
121 See especially Hedley Bull, 'Society and Anarchy in 
International Relations' in H. Butterfield and M. Wight 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
International Politics (London, 1966), 35-50; The
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics
(London, 1977); and 'The State's Positive Role in World 
Affairs', Daedalus, 108, 4 (1979), 111-23.
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to their own age was limited let alone their relevance to 
ours. Hence his damning judgement.
In some respects it is a fair one. Many of Woolf's 
presuppositions and preoccupations are outmoded in that 
they have subsequently been shown to be either naive, 
spurious, inaccurate, or inconsequential. Some of the most 
striking examples have been commented on: his belief that 
conflict was largely due to 'lack of machinery'; his belief 
in the possibility of identifying an objective category of 
'legal disputes' by their nature capable of judicial 
resolution; his assumption of extensive cultural 
homogeneity - an assumption symptomatic of the imperial 
mind-set shared at the time by even some of the most anti- 
imperialist thinkers; his habit of thinking in terms of a 
simplistic domestic analogy; and his tendency to 
underestimate the problems involved in the collective 
enforcement of international law. To these may be added 
Woolf's unswerving belief in the efficacy of reason. 
Reason, as one critic once suggested, was Woolf's panacea. 
'A little more reason would have saved us all' was his 
leitmotif.122 More than anything else it is his undiluted 
rationalism that separates Woolf from modern analysts of 
the subject. It never occurred to him that there is a 
tragic element in international politics which reason alone 
is powerless to resolve.
However, although Woolf may not have been a profound
122 'W. H. F.', review of Woolf's Principia Politica: A 
Study of Communal Psychology, in International Affairs. 
XXX, 2 (1954), 196-7.
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thinker according to Bull's criteria, it would be wrong to 
conclude that his thought is entirely bound by time and 
place. Many of Woolf's ideas and observations, especially 
those concerning the processes of and prospects for change, 
continue to have relevance in the contemporary world. His 
view that technological change not only has major 
implications for the economic and social structure of the 
world, but also for its political structure, is one that is 
now widely accepted. His analysis of the
'internationalisation of administration' and the growth of 
an 'international social tissue' is one that continues to 
find expression in modernization theory and analyses of 
'globalization'. His observation that when the 'national 
question' is involved it is often extremely difficult to 
determine whether the scope of a dispute is 'national' or 
'international', is one which has acquired new relevance 
with the end of the Cold War and the re-emergence of ethnic 
conflict. The same can be said of his misgivings about 
relaxing the rules on non-intervention in the absence of a 
much wider consensus on domestic political values and 
organization. Finally, Woolf's starting point for thinking 
about world affairs is one which continues to offer a 
provocative alternative to the one advanced by 'realists' . 
Woolf did not see the world as an unmitigated anarchy. On 
the contrary, he believed the world was characterized not 
by the absence of government but by its gradual evolution. 
There is room for debate about the usefulness of Woolf's 
broad conception of 'government'. It is, however,
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interesting to observe the recent resuscitation of the 
notion, under the slightly different designation, 
"governance7. The revival of interest by scholars and 
statesmen alike in the complex network of international 
rules, organizations, and regimes which lie at the heart of 
the process of governance, suggest that Leonard Woolf7s 
vision of international order is one that is still very 
much alive.
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Chapter Five
Imperialism: An Exposition
Imperialism - its nature, cause, and cure - ranks alongside
international government as one of Leonard Woolf's chief
political concerns. In his autobiography he wrote:
There were in fact two vast, oecumenical problems 
which threatened and still threaten, mankind and are 
interrelated: first, the prevention of war and the 
development of international government; secondly, the 
dissolution of the empires of European states in Asia 
and Africa which seemed to me inevitable and which 
would cause as much misery to the world as war unless 
the Governments of the great imperial powers 
recognised the inevitability, and deliberately worked 
for an orderly transference of power to their native 
populations, educated for self-government by their 
rulers -1
As this passage indicates, by imperialism Woolf primarily 
had in mind the formal control by 7 advanced' nations of 
'backward' and 'less advanced' areas of the globe and the 
type of relationships between the rulers and the ruled that 
ensued.
In this chapter I explicate Woolf's thought on this 
large and complex subject. First of all I outline the
nature and significance of his work. I then give an
account of the four principal areas into which his thought 
can be divided: the theory of economic imperialism;
mandates; the problem of white settlers; and the education 
and political advancement of 'backward peoples' . This sets 
the scene for the next chapter where I estimate the extent 
to which it is accurate to characterize Woolf's thought on
1 Woolf, Downhill All The Wav (London, 1967), 195-6.
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imperialism as 'utopian7 .
Woolf on Imperialism: An Outline
In the 1920s Woolf became one of the foremost British 
critics of imperialism. Like J. A. Hobson, he wrote about 
the subject in broad theoretical terms combining the 
detailed empirical analysis of the Fabian social 
investigator with the causticity and moral passion of the 
radical pamphleteer. Woolf's importance lies largely in 
his continuation of the Hobsonian tradition. In many ways 
he assumed Hobson's mantle as Britain's foremost anti­
imperialist theorist.2
Many of his ideas developed pari passu with his work 
as secretary of the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on 
Imperial Questions and his work, in various capacities, for 
the New Fabian Research Bureau (founded in 1931), and the 
influential Fabian Colonial Bureau (founded in 1940). In 
the 1920s Woolf was the Labour Movement's leading anti- 
imperialist thinker, and the authority of his opinions 
continued well into the 1930s.3 His work influenced many
2 See Lewis S. Feuer, Imperialism and the Anti- 
Imperialist Mind (New Brunswick, 1989), 154. Feuer 
describes Woolf as 'the author of a series of thoughtful, 
critical books on imperialism' and an 'unrelenting and 
sophisticated critic of British imperialism'. See also L. 
H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire? An Appraisal 
of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara 
(London, 1968), 76.
3 Feuer, Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind. 
157; Etherington, Theories of Imperialism. 177; Richard 
Koebner, 'The Concept of Economic Imperialism', Economic 
History Review. 2nd Series, 2, 1 (1949), 4.
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other prominent radical anti-imperialist thinkers including 
Sydney (later Lord) Olivier, Norman Leys, Leonard Barnes, 
George Padmore, and Rita Hinden.4 In 1920 he drafted, with 
E. D. Morel, the first policy document committing the 
Labour party to the "ultimate aim" of a "political system 
of self-government" in Africa.5
Woolf was one of several prominent men - Olivier and 
George Orwell among them - whose anti-imperial ideas were 
informed by direct experience of empire. His experiences 
as a colonial administrator in Ceylon had a profound effect 
on his thought on the subject. Indeed, he later claimed 
that it was Ceylon that had turned him into a 'political 
animal" . His first published work was a novel based on 
these experiences, The Village in the Jungle.6 In this 
work Woolf explores the complex relationship between 
traditional village society (charming but brutal), its 
natural jungle environment (beautiful but cruel), and 
British colonial rule (necessary but perverse). One 
imperial historian has described it as
... one of the finest pieces of social analysis which
British Ceylon produced. Its understanding of
4 See Francis Lee, Fabianism and Colonialism: The Life 
and Political Thought of Lord Svdnev Olivier (London, 
1988) .
5 The Labour Party, The Empire in Africa: Labour's 
Policy (London, 1920). The document was not adopted until 
1926 when it was republished with minor revisions (by Woolf 
and Norman Leys) as Labour and the Empire: Africa (London, 
1926). See Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism and 
Africa. 1920-1940 (London, 1978), 16; Luedeking and 
Edmonds, Leonard Woolf. 73, 76.
6 Woolf, The Village in the Jungle (Oxford, 1981; first 
pub. 1913) .
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traditional peasant society is astonishing, its 
delineation of the process whereby that society 
succumbs to economic pressure, masterly. All 
subsequent historical research on the problem in 
Ceylon has merely endorsed what Woolf asserts.7
Though its praises go largely unsung, The Village in the
Jungle ranks alongside Heart of Darkness and Burmese Days
as one of the great fictional explorations of the impact of
the West upon the non-Western world. Unlike these works,
however, The Village of the Jungle looks at its subject
from the inside, out rather than the outside, in. In this
respect it is a unique work.
The publication of The Village in the Jungle was
followed a decade later by the publication of a collection
of shorter fictional works in which the same themes are
further explored.8 During the intervening period Woolf
wrote his major work on imperialism, Empire and Commerce in
Africa, the more popular orientated Economic Imperialism.
and a number of articles along similar lines.9
Above all it was Woolf's voluminous Empire and
Commerce in Africa, written for the newly formed Labour
Research Department, that established his reputation as a
leading anti-imperialist theorist. The book, which
stretches, according to Woolf's own calculation, to 166,604
7 T. J. Barron, 'Before the Deluge: Leonard Woolf in 
Ceylon', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vi 
(1977), 57-8.
8 Woolf, Stories from the East (London, 1924), later 
reprinted in his Diaries in Cevlon (London, 1962).
9 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study of 
Economic Imperialism (London, 1920); Economic Imperialism 
(London, 1920).
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words10, started out its life, in the Autumn of 1916, as a 
study of international commerce parallel to International 
Government. Over the next twelve months, however, he 
narrowed it down, on the advice of Sidney Webb, to a study 
of "imperial trade and exploitation" in Africa.
The incorporation of a vast amount of statistical data 
- gathered largely from the library of the London School of 
Economics and Political Science - made the book an 
invaluable work of reference for anti-colonial publicists 
and campaigners. It soon joined Hobson"s forceful but 
empirically-thin study as a standard work on the subject.11
Shortly after the publication of Empire and Commerce 
in Africa. Woolf turned his attention away from economic 
imperialism towards the question of mandates under the 
League of Nations. This change in focus was accompanied by 
certain modifications in outlook. The predominantly mono- 
causal thesis of Empire and Commerce in Africa gave way to 
the more pluralistic perspective of Economic Imperialism 
and Imperialism and Civilization. The latter book is 
Woolf"s most considered and mature work on the subject. 
Its central theme, in contrast to earlier works, is that 
imperialism can be most accurately viewed as a " clash of 
civilizations": as a tremendous conflict between disparate
10 Woolf meticulously recorded his daily literary 
output. He began Empire and Commerce in Africa on 23 
November 1917 and finished it on 26 February 1919. He wrote 
between 300 and 500 words every day except on exceptionally 
good or bad days. Leonard Woolf Papers, IL6.
11 Luedeking and Edwards, Leonard Woolf. 22-3; 
Etherington, Theories of Imperialism. 182.
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and contending values, ideas, and beliefs. In the kind of 
questions it asks it can be seen as a forerunner, albeit in 
a more populist and radical vein, of Bull and Watson's 
Expansion of International Society.12
It was in the 1920s that Woolf also began to view the 
white settler rather than the European state as the chief 
villain of economic imperialism. Far from being too 
imperialistic, Woolf now began to attack the state for not 
being imperialistic enough. He strongly urged European 
governments to resist the selfish and duplicitous demands 
of the white settlers for self-government. The real reason 
behind these demands was not 'freedom' or 'democracy' but 
the desire of a small self-selecting white clique to 
further extend their autocratic power. The logic of such 
demands was not only the further enslavement of native 
peoples but bloodshed and war as the white minority applied 
evermore desperate measures to curb their growing political 
awareness and appetite for self-rule. The answer lay in 
enlightened colonial administration from the centre 
involving a genuine commitment to prepare 'backward 
peoples' for self-government.
Woolf wrote little on imperialism in the 193 0s despite 
being in close contact, through his Labour and Fabian 
activities, with many leading African and Asian 
nationalists. The rise of Nazism, the failure of 
collective security, and the terrifying prospect of another
12 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization (London, 1928); 
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of 
International Society (Oxford, 1984) .
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world war, dominated his thoughts during this period. But 
Woolf returned to imperial and colonial questions in the 
1940s, and wrote several articles on colonial 
responsibilities and the preparation of African peoples for 
self-government. Woolf's interest in these more practical 
aspects of imperialism reflects the fact that by the mid- 
1940s the anti-imperialists had by and large won the day. 
The key political agendum was now not the ends of colonial 
rule but the most appropriate means of bringing its end 
about.
Woolf continued to write on imperialism and 
colonialism well into old age. The detailed diaries he 
kept as Assistant Government Agent in the Hambantota 
district of Ceylon, 1909-11, were published in 1962; he 
continued to review books on the subject (which, he 
claimed, repeatedly confirmed his views of the 1920s); and 
he gave in his autobiography a fascinating account of the 
development of the anti-imperialism in Britain.
For the student of imperialism Woolf is, therefore, an 
important figure. His involvement with the subject spanned 
over half a century; he wrote extensively; he was concerned 
with both theory and practice; he had a considerable impact 
on progressive opinion; and he was one of the few critics 
of empire who was at one stage actually involved in running 
one. He was, moreover, the only major critic of Western 
imperialism of the early twentieth century - among whom I 
include Hobson, Brailsford, Luxemburg, Morel, Olivier, and 
Lenin - who lived to taste the fruits of victory with the
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dissolution of the British and French colonial empires in 
the 1950s and 1960s.
The Theory of Economic Imperialism
Woolf's analysis of economic imperialism is divided into 
two parts. The first is an enquiry into the nature and 
causes of late nineteenth century imperialism. The second 
is an examination of its effects.
(i) Nature and Causes
Woolf's thesis was that the imperialism of the late 
nineteenth century, unlike previous imperialisms, was 
motivated purely by economic factors. The cause of this 
was the profound change that had occurred in the ' structure 
and sphere of the State' , the most immediate symptom of 
which was the 'immense and almost overwhelming importance' 
that the state had assumed in economic affairs. This 
development was of relatively recent origin: 'The state, as 
we know it to-day, is a growth of very recent years: in its 
present form and with its present attributes it did not 
exist even in 1820' .13 But the pace of change had been 
rapid: by the first decade of the twentieth century there 
was hardly a single department of ' individual life and 
activity' which had not been 'subjected to State control or 
interference' .14
13 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 4-5.
14 Ibid. 8-9.
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Woolf attributed this change in the structure and 
sphere of the state to three phenomena which had begun to 
emerge in the late eighteenth century: democracy,
nationalism, and industrialism. Democracy and nationalism 
ensured that the state conceived as the personal property 
and preserve of kings, was replaced by the nation-state 
organized for the pursuit of national interests conceived 
as 'the greatest good of the greatest number', 'the 
realization of the best life', or 'the materialization of 
the mysterious and sacred general will'. 'Interacting' 
with democracy and nationalism, the growth of industrialism 
ensured that the state became increasingly preoccupied with 
economic efficiency and commercial well-being. 'Nobody in 
the eighteenth century thought of asking whether the state 
was efficient, for the main functions of the state were not 
economic: to-day, despite the enormous increase of
patriotic nationalism, we instinctively regard the state as 
a kind of super-joint-stock-company.'15
The changing role of the state was part and parcel of 
a general shift in ideas and beliefs. Industrialism and 
commercialism had begun to permeate every walk of life. In 
this respect the Manchester capitalists were no different 
to the Mercantilists of an earlier era or the imperialists 
of a later: all assumed that material profit was the main 
standard of value and that the chief duty of the state was 
to promote, or at least not impede, its maximization. 
During the mid-Victorian era the policies of free-trade,
15 Ibid. 6.
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non-interference, and anti-imperialism were held to be the
best means of attaining this end. But with the 'intensive
growth of industrial and commercial organization' in the
late nineteenth century things began to change. 'Vast and
complicated organizations' - the big factory, the trust,
the cartel, the syndicate, and the multiple shop - came
into being and were increasingly seen as essential for
industrial and commercial efficiency. The possibility of
using the power and organization of the state for economic
ends was not for long overlooked:
If trade and industry were the ultimate goals of 
national policy, the golden goal might surely be 
attained more effectively by an active and aggressive 
use of national power and organization than by a 
policy of passivism and pacificism.16
This chain of cause and effect - from the emergence of
nationalism, democracy, and industrialism, through the
change in the state, to the 'active and aggressive' use of
the 'power and organization of the state' for the economic
purposes of its citizens - culminated, around the year
1880, in economic imperialism.
Woolf's definition of economic imperialism was clear:
Under this term I include the international economic 
policy of the European States, of the U.S.A., and 
latterly of Japan, in the unexploited and non- 
Europeanized territories of the world. The policy of 
Economic Imperialism includes colonial policy and the 
acquisition by the Europeanized State of exploitable 
territory, the policy of spheres of influence, and the 
policy of obtaining economic control through other 
political means. These various kinds of policy are all 
distinguished by one important characteristic; they 
all aim at using the power and organisation of the 
European form of State in the economic interests of 
its inhabitants in lands where the European form of
16 Ibid. 15.
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state has not developed. I call it imperialism because 
the policy always implies either the extension of the 
state's territory by conquest or occupation, or the 
application of its dominion or some form of political 
control to people who are not its citizens. I qualify 
it with the word economic because the motives of this 
imperialism are not defence or prestige nor conquest 
nor the ' spread of civilization' , but the profit of 
the citizens, or of some citizens, of the European 
state.17
The method adopted by Woolf was verstehen.18 He sought to
prove his thesis by examining the writings and speeches of
those statesmen, soldiers, and businessmen to whom the
formulation of state policy and the control of state action
was entrusted.
The following quotations and passages are indicative
of the kind of evidence Woolf brought to bear.
Lord Rosebery famously stated in the 1890s that
imperialism meant 'pegging out claims for posterity' .19
M. Etienne, the French colonial under-secretary, 1887-92,
declared in 1898 that:
We have built up and we intend to preserve and develop 
a colonial empire in order to assure the future of our 
country in the new continents, in order to reserve 
there an outlet for our products and to find there raw 
material for our industries.20
Earlier, in what were for Woolf the formative years of
economic imperialism, Clemenceau defended the use of French
troops in Tunis on the ground that Tunis was necessary as
17 Ibid. 19.
18 Max Weber's term, of course, for what he held to be 
the characteristic method of social science: interpretive 
understanding of actor behaviour. I have not come across 
any evidence suggesting that Woolf ever read Weber.
19 Ibid. 25.
20 Woolf, Economic Imperialism. 44.
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'an outlet for our manufactures' and 'a lucrative means of
investing capital' .21 Bismarck emphasized the economic
factor when he told the Reichstag in 1884, at the point of
his 'conversion' to the imperialist cause, that beyond
Europe Germany wanted 'not provinces, but commercial
enterprises' J32
Woolf places most store by the statements of two
British spokesmen: Joseph Chamberlain and Captain, later
Sir Frederick, later Lord, Lugard. In the theoretical part
of his study he repeatedly refers to the claims of these
men and it is therefore desirable to reproduce Woolf's key
quotations from them more fully. Chamberlain claimed in
1894 that it was the government's job to ensure that 'new
markets shall be created and old markets ... effectively
developed'. There consequently existed ' a necessity as
well as a duty for us to uphold the dominion and empire
which we now possess' and 'a necessity for using every
legitimate opportunity to extend our influence and control
in that African continent which is now being opened up to
civilization and commerce'
Chamberlain explicated this view in more detail in a
speech to the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce in 1896:
Our most important duty . . . [is] not the party 
legislation which occupies probably the largest part 
of our public discussions, but the development and 
maintenance of that vast agricultural, manufacturing,
21 Ibid. 43. The speech was made in the Chamber of 
Deputies in 1881. Clemenceau was at that time a Deputy.
22 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 36.
23 Ibid. 18.
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and commercial enterprise upon which the welfare and 
even the existence of our great population depends.... 
All the great offices of state are occupied with 
commercial affairs. The Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office are chiefly engaged in finding new 
markets and defending old ones. The War Office and the 
Admiralty are mostly occupied in preparation for the 
defence of those markets and for the protection of our 
commerce . . . Commerce is the greatest of all political 
interests
Speaking about his recent expedition to Uganda for the
British East Africa Company, Woolf's second 'key'
imperialist, Sir Frederick Lugard, claimed that:
The scramble for Africa . . . was due to the growing 
commercial rivalry, which brought home to civilized 
nations the vital necessity of securing the only 
remaining fields for industrial enterprise and 
expansion. It is well to realise that it is for our 
advantage - and not alone at the dictates of duty - 
that we have undertaken responsibilities in East 
Africa. It is in order to foster the growth of the 
trade of this country, and to find an outlet for our 
manufactures and our surplus energy, that our far- 
seeing statesmen and our commercial men advocate 
colonial expansion ... I do not believe that in these 
days our national policy is based on motives of 
philanthropy only.25
Through such statements Woolf was able to show that
economic considerations were of considerable importance in
motivating the nineteenth century imperialism. He was also
able to show that these considerations assumed greater and
greater importance as the century unfolded.26 The era of
Ferry, Rhodes, and Chamberlain differed markedly from the
24 Ibid. 7.
25 Ibid. 26.
26 Woolf cites the Opium War and the subsequent Treaty 
of Nanking of 1842 as evidence of the fact that by the 
middle of the nineteenth century economics had already 
become very important. Ibid. 22-24.
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era of Metternich, Wellington, and Talleyrand.27 For the 
latter group, imperialism was primarily about the balance 
of power, alliances, the Eastern Question, and maintaining 
or disturbing the status cruo. Even Disraeli's conception 
of empire was in the main 'sentimental': 'pomp and
circumstance and titles, dominion and war, ships and men 
and money too': 'a policy conceived in terms of Power and 
Prestige rather than of money-making and markets' . But 'in 
the ninth decade of the nineteenth century' economic 
imperialism 'fully and finally established itself'. 'In 
the great States of Europe, now completely industrialized, 
political power passed from the hands of birth into the 
hands of wealth, and the political ideals of rule and power 
and prestige gave way to those of commerce, industry, and 
finance.' European policy became 'dominated by rival 
imperialisms, colonial policies, spheres of influence, 
commercial treaties, markets, and tariffs.'28
Woolf's evidence, however, is not entirely consistent. 
He is unable to sustain his initial contention that 
imperialism was motivated purely by economic factors. 
Bismarck may have become more interested in economics in 
the 1880s, and he may have been much influenced, as Woolf 
claimed, by 'traders, shippers and financiers' - men like 
Godeffroy, Woermann, Luderitz, and Hansing. But, as his 
own account shows, questions of strategy and great power 
competition were never far from the front of his mind, and
27 Ibid. 57-8.
28 Ibid. 24.
although Bismarck eventually complied with the wishes of
German trading and financial interests and thus initiated
Germany's imperial policy, Woolf does not prove that he did
so for their reasons. The German chancellor was clearly
perturbed by the expansion of British power in Africa and
was eager to check it - as revealed by his involvement in
the Congo controversy of the early 1880s culminating in his
convening of the 1884 Congo Conference at Berlin.29 But
why exactly did he abandon his earlier indifference to
colonialism? The arguments of those representing economic
interests may have been an important factor but they were
not the only nor necessarily the most important one. The
quotations Woolf selects from Bismarck's speeches do not
clinch the matter in quite the decisive way that he
supposes. The following statement taken from Bismarck's
public announcement of his new policy could be interpreted
as testimony to his concern for 'Power and Prestige' as
much as his desire for 'money-making and markets' :
It is not possible to conquer oversea territories by 
men of war or to take possession of them without 
further ceremony. Nevertheless the German trader 
wherever he has settled will be protected, and 
wherever he has assumed possession of territory there 
the Administration will follow him, as England has 
continually done.30
This statement contains a tacit acknowledgement of both
Britain's naval mastery and, arguably, the importance
Bismarck attached to great power rivalry.
29 He sought, successfully, to get Britain to abandon 
the proposed Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. See ibid. 38-45.
30 ibid. 36.
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Similarly, although the statements of Etienne and 
Clemenceau suggest the dominance of economics, a lengthy 
statement by Jules Ferry, also quoted by Woolf, interjects 
a degree of uncertainty. Jules Ferry, it should be noted, 
was one of the principal architects of French colonial 
policy during the crucial first decade of the era of 
economic imperialism in the 1880s. Ferry claimed that 
empire was necessary in order to secure outlets for French 
exports and capital. But he also gave other reasons: the 
need for an outlet for emigration; the need for strategic 
ports; and the need to maintain the power and prestige of 
France.31
It is also significant that Woolf makes a distinction
between North and Tropical Africa. After 1880 European
statesmen began to 'deal' with the latter in terms of the
new policy of economic imperialism. But with respect to
the former, the 'older policy of Wellington and de
Polignac' never entirely lost its hold:
The statesmen who played for and won and lost Egypt, 
Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco all believed that commerce 
was the greatest of all political interests, and on 
the Niger, the Congo, and the Zambezi they put their 
beliefs into practice: but in Egypt, Tunis, Tripoli, 
and Morocco their economic imperialism was never pure; 
it was always mixed with considerations of European 
strategy and alliances and the balance of power.32
Even more evocatively
... although economic forces played strongly upon the 
chief actors at Algeciras and in the Agadir incident, 
the spirit of the dead statesmanship of Metternich 
Wellington, and de Polignac seemed to haunt and
31 Ibid. Appendix to ch.3, 46-7.
32 Ibid. 58.
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'possess' Prince Billow and Declasse, Herr Kiderlen- 
Wachter and Sir Edward Grey.33
If not the spirit of Metternich et al. the spirit of the
church missionary societies of Victorian Britain might be
said to have haunted the statesmanship of Chamberlain and
Lugard. Lugard's references to the 'dictates of duty' and
to 'motives of philanthropy' indicate that the idea of the
' civilizing mission' was not entirely absent in his
explanation of empire. The same could be said of
Chamberlain's references to 'duty' and 'civilization'. In
addition, although it may have been correct to say that
'all the great offices of state are occupied with
commercial affairs' this does not mean that the promotion
of commerce was their sole function.
Along with these specific problems with Woolf's
analysis, there are problems of a more general nature.
When using public statements in order to confirm or refute
an argument it is usually necessary to take into account
the context of the statement. Chamberlain in his speech to
the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce was probably
exaggerating for his own political purposes rather than
giving an 'objective' account of what he felt to be the
raison d'etre of empire. Such statements, of course, often
contain as much 'ought' as 'is' . Similarly, the fact that
Lugard was writing in defence of a much criticized campaign
cannot be ignored. He was at pains to point out to
reluctant British ministers the considerable material
33 Ibid. 58.
rewards that could be reaped in East Africa. He wanted to 
convince them that official British involvement would not 
become the financial albatross that many feared. In a 
sense Lugard was not only seeking to explain and justify 
past acts of imperialism but to make a case for its 
extension and reinvigoration.
Another general problem concerns selection of 
evidence. Woolf does supply a large number of quotations, 
but he tends to attach most weight to those that most 
clearly corroborate his thesis. Significantly, Woolf does 
not cite or attempt to account for evidence contrary to his 
thesis, nor does he address or respond to differing 
interpretations. It also might be said that relative to 
all the speeches, declarations, and statements made at the 
time, those cited by Woolf are, at the end of the day, 
rather few in number.
There is no evidence to suggest that Woolf was aware 
of these shortcomings except for the fact that as Empire 
and Commerce in Africa unfolds, Woolf's determination to 
uphold his mono-causal thesis becomes progressively weaker. 
Claims to the effect that late nineteenth century 
imperialism was notable for 7 the singleness and purity of 
[economic] motive7 become less frequent, and claims to the 
effect that economic factors were the 'main7 motive or 
'impulse7 or the 'ultimate7 end of policy, more so.34
A distinct trend away from mono-causalism is clearly 
evident in later writings. In Economic Imperialism Woolf
34 Ibid. 18, 22, 44, 58, 323-4.
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explicitly says that there was no single and simple cause
of the "complex' phenomenon of imperialism, and he proceeds
to examine some of the explanations commonly advanced. The
"moral" explanation that colonial expansion was motivated
by the "white man's burden" - the duty to spread
Christianity, law and order, and other "blessings" of
Western civilization35 - is dismissed by Woolf as a
secondary cause. This view was frequently used as an
argument against withdrawing from a conquest once it had
been made, or abandoning control once it had been acquired.
Thus in Woolf's view:
...the connection between imperialism and moral ideas 
appears to be this: Europeans have acquired their
Empires for selfish motives; they, or many of them, 
believe that they retain and maintain their Empires 
for altruistic motives. The white man's burden becomes 
a duty only after ... he has placed it upon his own 
shoulders.
The same could be said of "sentimental" reasons i.e. the 
belief that "the acquisition and retention of imperial 
possessions and dependencies outside Europe reflects great 
glory on the European State'. This explanation, according 
to Woolf, may have been valid as far as the retention of 
empire went, but belief in the glory of empire had done
35 A term frequently and ironically used by Woolf to 
characterize the false professions of the European Powers. 
It is a reference to the Final Act of the Congress of 
Berlin, 1884-85, in which the Powers pledged to "watch over 
the preservation of the native tribes . . . care for the 
improvement of the conditions of their moral and material 
well-being .. . instructing the natives and bringing home to 
them the blessings of civilization'. The subsequent history 
of imperialism was the history of how the pledge was 
broken. Ibid. 43-5; Imperialism and Civilization. 78-9 
[check quote].
36 Woolf, Economic Imperialism. 18.
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little to set the policy in motion.37
Military and strategic reasons had more weight, 
especially with regard to French and Italian imperialism in 
North Africa. There was also a sense in which imperialism 
had a strategic logic of its own. Britain sought to 
control Egypt not because such control afforded any 
strategic value for Britain itself, but in order to protect 
India. Accordingly, 'Military reasons are ... not to any 
great extent a cause of imperialism, but they are a reason 
for making an empire large, and a large empire larger' .38
In a pamphlet published in the same year as Economic 
Imperialism Woolf dropped the 'economic' from 'imperialism' 
altogether:
By imperialism is meant that world movement which led 
in 20 years to the partition of practically the whole 
of Africa and large areas of Asia and all the islands 
of the. Pacific among the four Great Powers, Britain, 
France, Russia, and Germany, and the smaller Powers, 
Italy and Belgium. This partition did not mean simply 
that the territory was conquered and the government of 
the territories subjected to the direct or indirect 
control of the imperial Powers; it meant, too, that 
Europe imposed upon the Asiatic and African peoples 
the ideal and institutions of Western civilization, 
her military, legal, administrative, and economic 
system.39
A reader unacquainted with Woolf's writings could be 
forgiven for not realising that the author of this 
definition was one of the principal architects of the 
radical theory of the 'new' imperialism. It contains few 
traces of his earlier radicalism. Indeed, but for the
37 Ibid. 20-23.
38 Ibid. 24.
39 Woolf, Mandates and Empire (London, 1920), 5.
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slightly pejorative verb 'impose' and the structural
connotations of 'world movement', the definition is a
rather conservative one.
Woolf's radicalism returned with Imperialism and
Civilization. He began the book by pointing out that the
relations between civilizations prior to the nineteenth
century were largely tolerant and indifferent. 'But the
new European civilization of the nineteenth century changed
all that. It was a belligerent, crusading, conquering,
exploiting, proselytizing civilization.' Vastly superior
technology made this aggressive expansion of Western
civilization possible. The need for new markets and new
sources of raw materials made it necessary. The picture
was as follows:
Behind the capitalist, the trader, the manufacturer, 
and the financier, who had emerged from the industrial 
revolution and were now led by blind economic forces 
to stretch out their hands to the markets and produce 
of Asia and Africa, stood the highly organised, 
efficient, powerfully armed, acutely nationalist 
modern State which had emerged from the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Sometimes 
deliberately and sometimes haphazardly and 
unconsciously, the power of this terrific engine of 
force and government was invoked by the capitalist to 
aid him in developing or exploiting the other 
continents. The effect was stupendous.40
This return after a brief absence of Woolf's radicalism was
not matched, however, by a restoration of his earlier mono-
causalism. Thus the 'inevitability' of the 'stretching
out' and 'imposition' of European civilization on the rest
of the world was 'especially' due to economic impulses.
Though these impulses were a primary cause of imperialism,
40 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization. 9-11.
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strategic impulses were a 'secondary' cause.41 The 
conquests of Greece, Rome, and the Renaissance were about 
glory and domination. In contrast nineteenth century 
imperialism was 'primarily' about economic exploitation.42 
The forceful control of the economic life of China by the 
imperial Powers of Europe, the United States, and later 
Japan was ' exercised primarily in the interests of the 
commercial, industrial, and financial classes of the 
controlling Power.'43 Similarly, the evils caused by 
imperialism were ' mainly due to the habit of European 
civilization of subordinating everything to economic 
ends.'44
The phrasing of these arguments amounts to a 
significant modification of Woolf's initial hypothesis. It 
is important to stress, however, that although he abandoned 
the notion that late nineteenth century imperialism was 
motivated purely by economic factors, he continued to 
insist on their primacy. His label 'economic imperialism' 
remains therefore a valid one.
41 Ibid. 32-8.
42 Ibid. 40-7.
43 Ibid. 63. Emphasis added.
44 Ibid. 71. Emphasis added.
(ii) Effects
Woolf contended that the effects of late nineteenth century
imperialism were 'almost wholly evil'.45 Economic
imperialism was not only bad for the colonized, it was also
bad for the colonizers - except for a small band of
traders, financiers, mine owners, and planters who in many
cases accumulated considerable wealth.
The proponents of economic imperialism genuinely
believed that great riches were to be won in the 'opening
up' of Asia and Africa. For Woolf this was pure delusion.
The colonial parties in France and Germany, for example,
held 'vague and erroneous ideas' about the nature of the
empire they wished to conquer:
This was particularly true of Africa, the mystery of 
whose forests and lakes and rivers was only just been 
revealed to Europeans. Undoubtedly a vision of 'many 
goodly states and kingdoms' swam before the eyes of 
the patriots, who dreamed dreams of German or French 
Australias and Canadas rising by the side of great 
rivers, or in the tropical forests of Asia and 
Africa.46
The Congo, to give a one example, was seen as an 'Eldorado' 
of rubber, precious metals, and - contradicting Woolf's 
original thesis - 'savage souls'.47
Such views were delusory because the historical record 
showed that the benefits of economic imperialism had been 
derisory. Woolf provided a wealth of data to substantiate
45 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 352. Except 
where otherwise stated the following account is abstracted 
from ibid. 315-51 and Economic Imperialism. 40-73, 92-99.
46 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 30.
47 Ibid. 38.
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this claim. In 1913, for instance, all of Britain's
tropical possessions in Africa accounted for only 1.04% of
UK imports and 1.4% of UK exports. This meant that
tropical Africa was of no more importance economically to
the UK than Chile. In terms of UK exports Argentina was
three times more important and six times more important in
terms of imports. The average value of food and raw
materials imported from British East Africa between 1909
and 1913 amounted to 0.15% of the UK's total imports of
these commodities, and British East Africa imported only
0.19% of total UK exports. It had been claimed in the
early 1890s, by Chamberlain, Lugard, MacKinnon, The Times.
and others that Britain should colonize Uganda because it
would provide a vital market for British exports and vital
jobs for British workers. In classic dissenting fashion
Woolf's responded as follows*.
Uganda, that country which was to secure the British 
workman from unemployment, actually takes no more than 
.006% of the total exports of British industries. It 
is clear that the incorporation of Uganda in the 
British Empire has had no more and no less effect upon 
British trade, industry, and employment, than if it 
had been sunk in the Indian Ocean and blotted off the 
map of the world.48
Woolf also pointed out that imperialists assumed that
colonial markets would be closed to foreign competition.
But this was not the case. For the period 18 98-1913, for
example, the increase in value of raw materials imported by
British industries from German East Africa was far greater
than the increase of value of those imported from British
48 The figure is an annual average for the period 1909- 
13. Ibid. 334.
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East Africa. Similarly, the rate of increase of British
exports to German East Africa was far greater than the rate
of increase of British exports to British East Africa.
Woolf continued:
The significance of this fact is obvious when it is 
remembered that Mr. Chamberlain and the economic 
imperialists of the British East Africa Company argued 
that the main reason why Britain should seize and 
retain Uganda and British East Africa was in order to 
keep the Germans out and prevent them from closing 
these territories to the products of British 
industry.49
Woolf concluded that even at the height of the Empire the 
importance of Britain's tropical possessions in Africa to 
the British economy was at best marginal. The belief that 
they provided an important market for British manufactures 
was a delusion. 'The few score inhabitants of Park Lane', 
he exclaimed, 'have a far higher purchasing power and are 
a far better market for British industries than the 
millions of Africans in these British possessions.'50
The importance of British Africa as a source of raw 
materials was similarly delusory. British imports from 
East Africa were negligible. Her imports from West Africa 
were greater but still relatively modest: palm oil, the 
major export of the region, was a commodity of minor 
importance when set against cotton, wool, copper, and iron
49 Ibid. 333. Woolf failed to mention in his text that 
the absolute value of trade between Britain and British 
East Africa was much greater than that between Britain and 
German East Africa [the relevant figures are recorded in 
one of his Tables (p.322)]. Between the years 1909-13, 
British imports from the former were 8.8 times greater than 
from the latter. British exports were 7.9 times greater.
50 Woolf, Economic Imperialism. 59.
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ore; so too was Nigerian tin when set against the much 
greater amounts of tin taken from Bolivia.
Although not identical, what was true of British 
possessions was also generally true of French and German. 
The trade between France and her Algerian and Tunisian 
colonies was not insignificant, these colonies accounting 
for 5.5% of French exports in 1912. However, this figure 
was only marginally greater after France established a 
system of colonial preference, in 1885, than before. 
Colonization had thus resulted in only a marginal increase 
in trade. Moreover, the value of French exports to Algeria 
and Tunisia was two and a half times greater than the value 
of the exports to all other French colonial possessions. 
In 1910 the French Empire accounted for 8% of French 
exports and 7% of imports. This meant that, as trading 
partners, Germany and especially Britain were far more 
important to France than her colonies: British imports of 
French goods were twice the value of French goods bought by 
the entire French colonial empire, and Germany imported 15% 
more. Together Britain and Germany exported to France 
three times the total exports of the whole French Empire. 
'Nothing could show more clearly', Woolf concluded, 'that 
the economic beliefs behind economic imperialism are dreams 
and delusions .'51
The German experience stood even more roundly 
condemned. In 1909 Germany's entire colonial empire took 
just 0.5% of German exports and accounted for just 0.4% of
51 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 330.
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German imports. In terms of German imports, British West 
Africa was nine times more important to Germany than German 
East Africa (figures from 1912) , and as a market for German 
exports German East Africa was only marginally more 
important (figures from 1910). These figures led Woolf to 
conclude:
It is a curious commentary upon the doctrines and 
policy which we have been examining in these pages, 
and in which the Germans were the most fervent 
believers, that in 1909 the trade of Germany with her 
colonies was just equal to her trade with the British 
possession of the Malay States: it was one twelfth of 
her trade with British India!52
* * * * *
If the European side of the colonial balance sheet was a 
bleak picture the African side was even more so. The so 
called 'blessings' of European colonialism amounted to very 
little. 'Law and order' had to some extent been 
established but only in the wake of 'persistent and 
ruthless slaughter of the inhabitants in wars and through 
"punitive expeditions".'53 Brutal systems of
administration existed in many colonies and especially in 
the Belgian Congo, the French Congo, and German South West 
Africa. Christianity had been spread to some extent but 
its adoption was more apparent than real. Many of the nine 
million Africans (out of a total population of 170 million) 
who had been converted by 1920 were Christian only 
nominally. The spread of education had fared little
52 Ibid. 336-7.
53 Woolf, Economic Imperialism. 65.
241
better. Even in British colonies, which tended to have a
better record on education than the others, the provision
of education in any of its forms was dismal. Local
taxation far outstripped expenditure. In 1917, for
example, the expenditure on schools in Nigeria amounted to
only 1.7% of taxation raised. In British East Africa the
total expenditure on education for the year 1909-10 was a
meagre £1,835 while the expenditure on the post office,
which served only the interests of white settlers, was
£26,7 00 i.e. 1400% more. The colonial authorities, indeed,
spent little of the revenue they raised on schemes designed
to benefit 'the native':
Though the native is heavily taxed, the revenue 
derived from such taxation is devoted by Government 
not to native requirements, but mainly to European 
interests, e.g., the Chief Native Commissioner of 
Kenya stated that the Kitui Akamba tribe paid £207,749 
in taxes in ten years, and that the only Government 
expenditure in the Kitui Reserve during this time had 
been on collecting the taxes.54
Similarly, the attempt to establish the 'Europeans'
economic system' and the 'principle of economic efficiency'
had produced few benefits for Africans. The colonial
record in East Africa was particularly appalling. Local
economic systems had been ruthlessly destroyed rather than
adapted. No attempt had been made to improve traditional
agricultural techniques. The best land had been
expropriated to white settlers and local populations forced
into inadequate 'native reserves'. By various means, some
direct others indirect, the native had been compelled to
54 Labour Party, Labour and the Empire. 15.
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work for poor wages. In many cases the exploitation of 
African labour by white capitalists was indistinguishable 
from slavery.55
In Asia, although the pattern of economic imperialism 
had been different the results were equally grave. 
Economic imperialism brought corruption, civil war, 
indebtedness, and foreign intervention in its wake. China, 
for example, had been reduced to 'anarchy and economic 
chaos'.
Thus the phenomenon of economic imperialism stood 
indicted on all sides: neither Africans, Asians, nor
Europeans benefited from it except for a tiny minority of 
exploitative European financiers, traders, and planters.
Mandates
Woolf believed that the mandates system 'honestly applied' 
held out the best hope for resolving the immense problems 
caused by economic imperialism. From the outset he 
maintained that complete independence must be the ultimate 
goal, though movement towards it, especially with regard to 
'tropical Africa', would have to be gradual. Woolf's 
position on this will be described in a moment.
55 Woolf, 'The League and the Tropics', The Covenant. 
1/1 (1919), 28-32; Mandates and Empire. 8-11; Labour Party, 
Labour and the Empire. 12-16.
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Early Doubts
In his first work on the subject Woolf's faith in the 
efficacy of mandates was far from absolute. It is worth 
spending some time spelling out the reasons for this.
Those committed to the 'honest' application of the 
mandates principle, especially in Africa, were confronted 
with a serious dilemma. The modern European state was an 
instrument of exploitation, and would remain so as long as 
the 'ideas and beliefs of economic imperialism' prevailed. 
More specifically, as long as it was considered the 'first 
duty' of the European state to promote the economic 
development of Africa in the interests its own citizens, 
colonial offices and governments, regardless of their 
nobler professions, would be subject to the 'irresistible 
pressure of the handful of white men who have economic 
interests in Africa' .56 If these interests dictated that 
the native should not be educated, he would not be. If 
they dictated that he work for the white man for a penny a 
day, 'taxation or starvation' would 'furnish the necessary 
inducement' . If they dictated that his land should be sold 
to Europeans, then it would be, and the native forced into 
reserves. And so on. Any attempt by the government to 
strengthen the position of the native through education was 
bound to fail since 'any real education' would 'unfit the 
native to take his place as a docile labourer on a penny a 
day in the scheme of economic imperialism' ,57
56 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 356.
57 Ibid. 357.
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It was in this somewhat vague, semi-structural sense 
that the European state was 'necessarily an instrument of 
exploitation7. Woolf seemed to be suggesting that the 
ideas and beliefs of economic imperialism were so 
compelling that the state had no choice but to comply with 
the dictates of the its white standard-bearers in Africa.
But the immediate withdrawal of the European state 
from Africa would not necessarily make things better. 
Withdrawal, in effect, would mean handing over of the fate 
of the native from the exploitative European state to 7 the 
more cruel exploitation of irresponsible white men.758 
Moreover, economic imperialism was itself responsible, 
paradoxically, for creating conditions which made some form 
of continued control by Europeans inevitable. 7 Primitive 
peoples7 had suddenly been confronted with a 'highly 
complex, alien civilisation7 and there had been little 
attempt to equip the native with the knowledge and skills 
necessary to 'control7 this civilization. They were 
unable, as a consequence, of managing their own affairs 
and, in the language of the League Covenant, 7 standing by 
themselves in the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world7 .59
This was the dilemma. Economic imperialism had 
created the conditions which made an immediate transfer of 
power in Africa impossible. A period of transition was
58 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 358.
59 A favourite phrase of Woolf's, from Article 22 of 
the Covenant.
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needed during which the European state would have to 
honestly carry out its professions. But how could an 
instrument of exploitation be transformed into 7 an 
instrument of good government and progress, not for a few 
hundred white men, but for the millions of Africans7?60 
This was the key question.
Those who provided answers to it, Woolf suggested, 
fell into two camps. On the one hand there were those 
whose diagnosis of the problem was political. Imperialism 
was a disease of the inter-state system. The competition 
of state against state caused 7international hostility in 
Europe7 and 7 the expropriation, exploitation, and 
extermination of the natives in Africa.7 The answer lay in 
substituting cooperation for hostility through a League of 
Nations. States would renounce the right to use Africa as 
a means to their selfish ends and accept President Wilson7 s 
principle of 7 the removal ... of all economic barriers and 
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among 
all nations.7 The 7 ultimate vision7 in this line of 
thought was the substitution of 7 some form of international 
control and administration7 for 7 national possession, 
ownership, or exploitation7 .61
On the other hand there were those whose diagnosis of 
the problem was social and economic. 7The imperialist 
policies of Germany, France, and Britain, the hostility and 
competition of these States, the seizure of territory, the
60 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 358.
61 Ibid. 358.
246
ruthless conquest and massacres of natives' were for these 
thinkers 'merely symptoms'. The relations between Europe 
and Africa were not political or moral but social and 
economic. Africa was viewed 'only in the light of a 
potentially profitable estate'. There was therefore little 
value in a political remedy such as international 
administration. This was because social behaviour, from 
this more 'scientific' perspective, was not a product of 
conscious reason, but an automatic and instinctual by­
product of ' that system . . . which we call for short the 
capitalist system' . The answer to the problem thus took 
the form not of ' a change from imperialism to 
internationalism, but of a change of the social and 
economic relations between the African and the European.' 
The doctrine that all men, regardless of race or colour, 
possessed equal human dignity and were entitled to rights 
to life, land, and education, would have to replace the 
doctrine that the 'native' was merely 'live-stock' on 
'Europe's African estate', a source of 'cheap labour', and 
'the market for the shoddy of our factories and our cheap 
gin' .62
'Burning his boats' and 'laying himself open to 
attack, on both flanks from the rear, by friend and foe 
alike', Woolf confessed to belonging to both camps. Many 
of the criticisms of the international solution were, he 
felt, justified. The 'ultimate beliefs and desires' which 
created the problem were part of the capitalist system. In
62 Ibid. 359.
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this system economic ideals dominated. Its essence was the 
profit motive: 'the passion of buying cheap and selling
dear'. As long as Africa was seen simply as something to 
make profits out of, the economic struggle, the hostility, 
the exploitation, would continue. International control 
could be substituted for national imperialism, but if the 
ideas and beliefs of the European remained the same, the 
result would merely be the substitution of exploitation by 
international groups for the exploitation by national 
groups ,63
Woolf was thus 'forced to the conclusion that if the 
European State is to become an instrument of good rather 
than of evil in Africa, the economic beliefs and desires of 
Europeans must suffer a change.' But he did not hold out 
much hope of such change taking place. A revolution would 
be required. The state would have to abandon the practice 
of using its power in the interests of Europeans and accept 
in its place the role of a trustee whose only duty would be 
to promote the interests of Africans. In practice this 
would entail a 'definite political programme' involving 
such measures as: reservation of the land for the natives;
'systematic education' to enable the natives to use it 
effectively; 'deliberate discouragement of the European 
wage- and labour-system in Africa and of the exploitation 
of the country [sic] by private planters, capitalists, and 
joint-stock companies'; 'gradual expropriation of all
63 Ibid. 360-1. Woolf's 'international imperialism' 
closely resembles Kautsky's notion of 'ultra imperialism' 
and Hobson's 'inter-imperialism'.
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Europeans and their capitalist enterprises'; ' [a]bsolute 
prohibition of alcohol' (!) ; the 'application of all revenue 
raised in Africa to the development of the country and the 
education, health, etc., of the native inhabitants'; and a 
'return to the ['natural and native'] communal system, 
developed, improved, and organized by the European 
States'.M
Where did this leave 'internationalism' (or 
' internationalization') ? Writing at the very time the Paris 
Peace Conference was discussing the issue of mandates, 
Woolf's answer was bleak. By itself it was no solution to 
the 'African problem'. Yet the 'substitution of the idea 
of trusteeship for that of ownership and exploitation' was 
an essential part of that solution. Economic imperialism, 
Woolf seemed to be suggesting, could only be destroyed by 
a social revolution i.e., 'a revolution in men's beliefs 
and desires'. But the revolution itself required for its 
success rejection of the absolute right of ownership and 
acceptance of the idea of international trusteeship.65
This idea had always been the basis of 
internationalist proposals. But the most effective method 
by which it could be implemented - ' administration by the 
League itself' - was commonly dismissed as 'impossible and 
Utopian'. Woolf repeated the claim made in International
64 The ' real test of whether Africa is going to be 
administered in the interests of its own peoples or in the 
interests of Europeans'. Ibid. 362-3. See also Lee, 
Fabianism and Colonialism. 184-5.
65 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 364.
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Government that the supposed failure of international 
government was deduced from examples - ' the New Hebrides 
and Samoa' - not of international government but of its 
opposite. International government, Woolf asserted, had 
never been tried in Africa, 'partly because people do not 
wish to try it - for it might succeed - and partly because 
those who do not wish it to be tried or to succeed, have 
induced the rest of the world to believe that it had been 
tried and has failed.' Genuine international government 
would involve vesting the sovereignty over Africa in the 
League 'which would delegate its powers of administration 
under a written constitution [embodying the 'definite 
political programme' outlined above] to International 
Commissions in precisely the same way as the European 
Powers, with marked success, delegated their powers of 
administration over the Danube and its navigation to the 
Danube Commission'. Such a system, Woolf believed, would 
work; but it would not, he despaired, be tried: not because 
it was a failure, or impossible, or utopian, but because 
' the Western world has no belief in or desire for . . . 
trusteeship.'66
There remained one other method. The League could 
'formally declare its trusteeship of non-adult races' and 
then hand over the administration 'to particular States as 
its mandataries' . Woolf was deeply suspicious of this 
idea. 'The great advantage of this proposal', he mockingly 
declared, 'lies in the fact that it will enable the world
66 Ibid. 365-6.
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to introduce a new and noble system, and in reality to
leave everything exactly as it was before.' The Times. in
a leader on the proposals emanating from Paris, had
recommended that
the system ought to mean nothing more hampering than 
the imposition upon the trustee of an obligation to 
give the beneficiary good government. It should bind 
them to the civilized world to administer subject 
peoples in the interests of the governed; in fact, it 
should bind them in formal fashion to do exactly what,
of their own accord, just nations do already.
Woolf feared that, given the facts about economic
imperialism, such a conception of the mandates system might
easily be used to ' throw a cloak of pseudo-
internationalism' over the unjust acts of so called 'just
nations'. It would be one more method of 'soothing to
sleep the unquiet conscience of just nations and just
men.'68
For these reasons Woolf found it 'difficult to feel 
any great enthusiasm for this new mandatory system of the 
League of Nations'. But it was arguable that it might at 
least be an improvement on the old system. Much depended 
on the League becoming 'an effective force', and this, in 
turn, depended on: (i) precise definition of the
obligations of the mandatory in a treaty; (ii) the creation 
of a permanent commission with 'very considerable powers of 
enquiry and inspection'; (iii) the guarantee of 'absolute 
equality of commercial opportunity, by means of free trade 
and the open door'; and (iv) the ability of the League to
67 Ibid. 366.
68 Ibid. 366-7.
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revoke a mandate if the mandatory was found to be in breach 
of its obligations. Fine sentiments, as the Final Act of 
the Congo Conference all too clearly demonstrated, were 
easily embodied in international declarations. The real 
test of the world7 s sincerity was whether or not it was 
willing to provide the means whereby these fine sentiments 
could be translated into actual deeds.
Later Confidence
This uncharacteristic equivocation on Woolf's part soon
gave way to a more confident position. In the steady
stream of writings which followed, Woolf firmly pins
himself to the mast of 'internationalism7. The other,
vaguely Marxist, camp hardly receives a mention. Soul-
searching about the efficacy of internationalism in
general, gives way to concern over the details of
particular mandates - though his concern about the
trustworthiness of the mandatory Powers persisted.
Within eighteen months of the completion of Empire and
Commerce in Africa. Woolf was boldly claiming that the
mandates system was the 'antithesis' of imperialism.69 The
core issue was sovereignty. According to Woolf:
The whole system of imperialism is based on the claim 
of the imperial powers that, when they seized 
territory in Asia and Africa, they acquired sovereign 
rights over the territory and its inhabitants.
And this meant that they had
. . . absolute power to do what they pleased with the
69 See Woolf, Mandates and Empire. 7; Imperialism and 
Civilization. 115-34.
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lives and property of millions of the ' subject
races7 .70
Both Western civilization and international law, much to 
their discredit, upheld this claim. Consequently there was 
no right of interference, either by a national or an 
international agency, even in the face of persecution and 
repression.
Woolf argued that those who had devised the League's 
mandate system deliberately denied sovereign rights to the 
mandatory power. This was the clear implication of the 
principle underlying the whole system: that the 'well-being 
and development' of subject peoples formed a 'sacred trust 
of civilisation'. Sovereignty ultimately rested with the 
League. Any authority the mandatory Powers possessed they 
possessed by virtue of the League and were always subject 
to conditions laid down by the League. In contrast to the 
doctrine of economic imperialism, therefore, the mandatory 
Powers had no right to exploit, only a duty to ensure the 
well-being and development of indigenous peoples.71
Woolf reiterated some of his earlier proposals for 
making the system effective. The League Council, he 
insisted, should have: (i) 'full and adequate powers' of
'control, inspection, and supervision'; (ii) the power to 
determine the form of government and type of constitution 
to be applied in each mandated territory; and (iii) the 
power to 'revoke' as well as amend a mandate. The scope of
70 Woolf, Mandates and Empire. 15.
71 Woolf, Scope of the Mandates under the League of 
Nations (London, 1921), 5-16.
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the Permanent Mandates Commission needed to be widened to 
carry out these functions. Perhaps most importantly, Woolf 
advocated the extension of the mandates system to all 
subject peoples regardless of whether their colonial 
overlords happened to be the vanquished or the victors in 
1918. The current arrangements were 7 illogical and morally 
indefensible7 since - some territories were to be 
administered in the interests of its inhabitants while 
adjoining territories were 7 administered autocratically in 
the interest of imperialist European Powers7 .72
It should be noted at this point that Woolf accepted 
the distinction made in Article 22 between those peoples 
ready for self-government and those not. He agreed with 
the Covenant that African peoples fell into the latter 
camp. He felt, however, that as a step towards the
eventual realization of this goal, local self-government 
should be everywhere immediately established. Woolf
generally accepted prevailing assumptions about 7 the 
African7 being 'backward7, 'savage7, and 'primitive7. Such 
things as war, slavery, mysticism, and cannibalism were, 
for Woolf, evidence, of this. But he firmly rejected the 
view that the 'backwardness7 of African peoples had
anything to do with race or colour. Indeed, Europeans were 
partly responsible for their condition since they had 
failed to introduce a proper system of education.
72 Woolf, Mandates and Empire. 15-17 (where Woolf also 
repeats his call for the prohibition of the alienation of 
native land to Europeans and the compulsory repurchase of 
land already alienated).
254
Nevertheless, 'backwardness7 was a social fact and 
consequently full independence was not yet possible.
According to Article 22, the independence of 
'communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire' 
could be 'provisionally recognised' subject to 'advice and 
assistance from the more advanced nations'. It further 
decreed that ' the wishes of these communities must be a 
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory'. 
Woolf not only approved of this article but gave it a bold 
interpretation. In Woolf's opinion it granted an immediate 
right of self-government to the various peoples of the 
Middle East. The European Powers had no rights, only an 
obligation to provide, if requested, 'advice and 
assistance'. It is also the case, however, that Woolf felt 
such 'advice and assistance' was vital if independence was 
to have real meaning. This was necessary because these 
peoples had been long subject to 'the paralysing government 
of the Turk' and faced the prospect of fierce religious and 
racial dissent. They were also vulnerable to political the 
disruption and economic destruction caused by the war and 
needed, like African peoples, time to 'adjust their Eastern 
to our Western civilisation' It is a curious fact that 
Woolf completely ignored the word 'provisionally' . I will 
discuss this in the next chapter.
Since the vanquished Powers did not possess an empire 
in Asia, the Covenant lay silent on the stage of
73 Ibid. 5-10; 'Article XXII', The New Statesman. 1 May 
1920, 94-5.
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development and therefore readiness for self-government of 
Asian peoples. Woolf categorized them alongside the
'communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire'. 
This is an additional aspect of his bold interpretation of 
Article 22 - the extension the logic of paragraphs 3 and 4 
to Asia. Woolf held that the ancient civilizations of 
India, China, Persia, and Japan possessed their own
elaborate social, economic, and political systems which 
differed from but were not necessarily inferior to those of 
the West. It was because of this that resistance to 
European penetration had been far more robust in Asia than 
in Africa. The development of various and increasingly 
powerful Asian nationalisms further reinforced the respect 
in the West for the civilizations of the Orient. Writing 
in 1928 Woolf asserted that it was unlikely that the
European Powers would be able to hang onto their Asian 
colonies for much longer. The price of trying to do so 
would be violent confrontation, the intensity of which 
would grow as independence was postponed further and
further into the future.74
These two factors meant that, as with the Middle 
East, complete independence should immediately be granted 
to the Asian colonies. But, as with the Middle East and 
Africa, Asia still had the problem of adapting to Western 
civilization and the 'modern world' of technology, 
industry, commerce, and finance. China especially would 
have to do this in the face of 'economic chaos' caused by
74 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization. 66-70.
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economic imperialism and foreign intervention. It was in 
this respect that the mandates system could help by 
providing expert advice and assistance. Given the history 
of Western subterfuge and exploitation, no 7independent7 
Asian state would accept an individual or even a consortium 
of European states as a mandatory. But this role could be 
performed by 'the League itself7. This is significant for 
two reasons. Firstly, it represents a departure from his 
earlier gloominess about the prospects for international 
administration. Secondly, it demonstrates that Woolf 
conceived the League as more than merely a 7 consortium of 
states7, having, perhaps, a life of its own independent 
from its member states. The League could provide its 7 own7 
experts, administrators, advisers, and advisory 
commissions. These would be 7disinterested7 and therefore 
7 free from the suspicion which naturally attached to 
similar "advisers" provided by the great imperialist 
Powers7 .75
Norman Etherington has claimed that Woolf advocated 
either complete independence for colonial peoples or the 
transfer of power to 7 a truly international body which 
could look after their interests until they were "ready for 
independence". 7 76 This is misleading in two ways. It is 
true that Woolf's overriding goal was complete independence 
for all subject peoples. But only in respect of Asia did 
Woolf unequivocally advocate direct international
75 Ibid. 121-6.
76 Etherington, Theories of Imperialism. 183.
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administration. His recipe for Africa was 'the mandates 
system honestly applied'. Secondly, the Oriental
dependencies, according to Woolf's interpretation of the 
Covenant, were already 'independent', and the provision of 
administrative assistance was a right to be claimed rather 
than an duty imposed.
The Problem of White Settlers
When Woolf warned that in Africa immediate independence 
meant handing power from one exploitative group to one even 
more exploitative, the group he principally had in mind 
were the white settlers. In his earliest writings Woolf 
identified white settlers in Southern and East Africa as, 
collectively, one of the foremost villains of economic 
imperialism. He gave increasing emphasis to their 
treachery, vis-a-vis the treachery of joint-stock companies 
and/or the European state, as his work progressed. Indeed 
as early as 1922 Woolf was attacking the government for 
'abandoning the path of a sound and moral colonial policy'. 
This is a curious claim since the strong implication of his 
earlier writings is that such a policy had never existed, 
and perhaps could never exist given the nature of the 
imperialism and the European state.77 Increasingly Woolf 
called on the European state, the British state in 
particular, to thwart the dangerous ambitions of white
77 See 'Lenin and Kenya', The New Statesman. 10 
September 1922, 615-6.
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settlers.
White settlers created a problem in four interrelated 
ways. Firstly, they deceived and exploited indigenous 
peoples with no regard for their welfare. Native land had 
been seized by various methods, none of them legitimate, 
and taxes imposed in order to force 'native labour' to work 
it.78 Wages barely reached subsistence level and attempts 
were consistently made to reduce them even further.79
Secondly, white settlers regularly managed to enlist 
the support of the British colonial administration in 
pursuit of their selfish ends. By exaggerating certain 
traditional festivals and ceremonies, for instance, 
settlers had been able to create the general impression 
that certain tribes were brutish and morally degenerate. 
This greatly assisted their campaign to induce the 
government to alienate the best native land to them. The 
alliance between the white settlers and certain colonial 
administrators was sometimes so close that the latter 
relied exclusively on information provided by the former in 
forming their conception of 'native interests'. For 
example, a British Commissioner in East Africa, Sir Charles
78 See Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 340-3; 
Economic Imperialism. 71; 'Native Labour in Africa', The 
New Statesman. 10 April 1920, 7-8; Imperialism and 
Civilization. 90-91.
79 Currency manipulation, for example, in Kenya Colony:
'Surely there cannot be a more contemptible episode in all 
the history of the rule of subject races by white men. And 
the disquieting feature of the incident is that it is only 
part of the persistent campaign in East Africa for the 
white settler to obtain cheap black labour with the help of 
the Administration'. Woolf, 'Sacred Trust', 151.
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Eliot, recorded in his dispatches:
The Masai and many other tribes must go under. It is 
a prospect which I view with equanimity and a clear 
conscience... Maisdom ... is a beastly, bloody system, 
founded on raiding and immorality.
According to Woolf this view was largely a product of
exaggerated reports drawn up by white settlers.80
Thirdly, during the inter-war period white settlers in
East and Central Africa intensified their efforts to win
self-government. This claim was based on the belief that
such territories were 'white man's country', and that
consequently self-government should be granted just as it
had been in Australia, Canada, and South Africa. Given
that the non-white population far outnumbered the white
population, such a claim, according to Woolf, was utterly
absurd. The white settlers, as Woolf unambiguously put it,
are a menace not only to themselves but to the whole 
Empire. The notion is fantastic that a few thousand 
white men, possessed of the crude and narrow ideas 
which they openly display at what their papers call 
their 'People's Parliament' , can govern autocratically 
and exploit economically an African population which 
outnumbers them by hundreds to one, and also an Indian 
population which outnumbers them by four to one.81
The demands of this 'gallant band of white democrats' must,
Woolf insisted, be seen for what they really were: part of
an attempt to gain complete control of the territories they
inhabited in order to obtain absolute freedom to exploit
80 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 340, 347-9.
81 Woolf, 'Lenin and Kenya', 615-16. The intriguing 
title of this article refers to the propaganda efforts of 
white groups campaigning for greater autonomy in Kenya 
Colony. They maintained that Indian opposition to their 
plans, and growing unrest generally, was instigated from 
Moscow.
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the land and the native as they saw fit.
Finally, and from the perspective of international 
relations most importantly, the foundations had been laid 
for an immense conflagration. In his earliest writings on 
the subject Woolf suggested that continued white 
exploitation and intransigence would exacerbate the already 
tense relations between the white overlords and their non­
white vassals. This would inevitably lead to unrest and 
civil strife. A 'tremendous catastrophe' involving a 
revolt of the 'beneficiaries against their guardians and 
benefactors' was in the making.82 In the late 1920s, noting 
the growth of African political consciousness, Woolf argued 
that although minority rule may continue for a short while 
due to superior power, 'it is certain to end in a terrible 
catastrophe. The revolt against the European's political 
domination and economic exploitation, which we have already 
seen in Asia, will inevitably be repeated in Africa' .83
Writing in 1952, Woolf applied the same logic to South 
Africa. Apartheid was a policy of 'suicide', 'despair' and 
'political nonsense'. 'Separate development' was an 
absurdity when the white economy depended so heavily on 
black labour. Moreover, the type of labour increasingly 
demanded was skilled, industrial labour, which presupposed 
a certain degree educational attainment. Economic forces 
were creating a 'an economic class of African' which would
82 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 367; 'Lenin 
and Africa', 615.
83 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization. 90-2.
261
inevitably claim political and social rights. The National 
policy of white South Africa thus contained within it the 
seeds of its own violent destruction.
In East and Central Africa these treacherous 
conditions had not yet been fully established. Such an 
eventuality, however, was certain unless the British 
Government took firm action to thwart white ambitions. In 
particular, white demands for the creation of a Central 
African Federation, so bitterly opposed by all African 
groups, needed to be unequivocally rejected.84
Although it is true that Woolf gave greater emphasis 
to metropolitan than to peripheral developments, this 
synopsis shows that it is not entirely true to say that 
' [i]n an era before the emergence of radical black 
nationalism, Woolf envisaged the transformation of 
imperialism solely through political action in the European 
heartland and failed to imagine this occurring through 
initiatives within the colonies themselves' .85
The Education and Political Advance of 7Backward Peoples'
Woolf, as mentioned, argued that education had a vital role 
to play in preparing colonial peoples for self-government. 
In its absence these peoples would be unable to understand 
and deal effectively with the forces of the modern world.
84 Woolf, 'Something New Out of Africa', Political 
Quarterly. 23, 4 (October-December 1952), 322-31.
85 Paul Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics 
(Cambridge, 1986), 77-8.
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This was particularly the case with the 7non-adult' , 
'primitive7, or 'backward7 peoples of Africa.
From the early 1920s through to the 1940s Woolf's view 
on education hardly changed. He envisaged education on 
Western lines - primary, secondary, and higher; academic 
and vocational - and unswervingly maintained that colonial 
governments had a duty to provide it. The implementation 
of a 'deliberate and detailed educational scheme7 was, 
indeed, their 7 first duty7, though it was one which they 
had nowhere been adequately fulfilled.86 Some facts 
regarding the 'dismal7 and inequitable record of the 
colonial authorities on native education have been cited in 
the section 'Economic Imperialism: Consequences'. It may 
be added that in 1926 Woolf claimed that in many cases 
Europeans had
. . . deliberately kept the natives uneducated and 
ignorant in the hope that they may be more docile 
under economic exploitation. In Nigeria the revenue 
for 1923-24 was £6,260,561, the expenditure on 
education was £135,866 [i.e. 2.17%]. In Kenya the
revenue was £1,839,447, and the expenditure on 
education £44,946 [i.e. 2.44%]87
In 1943 he pointed to the 7 extraordinary position7 in Kenya
where, after fifty years of British rule, only two out of
eighteen members of the Legislative Council represented
African interests, and these were Europeans nominated by
the Governor. The reason given for this was that there
were no Africans sufficiently educated to speak for their
people. This in a country where the native population
86 Labour Party, Labour and the Empire. 26.
87 Ibid. 25.
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measured three million compared with twenty thousand
Europeans (electing eleven members to the Council) and
thirty thousand Asians (electing five). Woolf condemned
this as an appalling state of affairs.88 For many years he
had been advocating, in classic Fabian style, periodic
reform of administration ' so that as the natives are
educated, they may progressively be given a larger and
larger share in the government of their country' .89 In the
1940s he added a sense of urgency:
I suggest that after the war we must change our whole 
policy with regard to self-government in our African 
colonies. We must insist that the colonial 
administrations go all out deliberately to develop 
self-government and to train the Africans in it. This 
will require an enormous extension of elementary and 
secondary education. But side by side with ordinary 
education there should be a continuous extension of 
self-government and self-governing institutions.90
The goal, both locally and at the centre, should be the
introduction of democratic self-government 'at the earliest
possible moment' .91
Though Woolf's position on these matters did not
significantly change over the years he did, later on,
become more aware of the objections to his 'Western'
approach to education and political advancement, and sought
88 Woolf, 'A Challenge to All of Us: Two Views on the 
Responsibilities of Colonial Empire', Part I, The Listener. 
12 August 1943, 180; Woolf, 'The Political Advance of
Backward Peoples', in Rita Hinden (ed.), Fabian Colonial 
Essays (London, 1945), 94-5.
89 Woolf, Mandates and Empire. 14.
90 Woolf, 'Challenge to All of Us', 18 0.
91 Woolf, 'Political Advance of Backward Peoples', 94-
8.
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to address them. To the modern-day reader these objections 
could be classified under the broad heading of 7cultural 
relativism7. Woolf's chosen nomenclature was the 
7 anthropological view7, the 'scientific view7, or the 
7Africanizing attitude7.
According to Woolf this view challenged the central 
liberal assumption about colonial policy: that 7 the
African7 was 'ultimately ... as capable as the European 
. . . [in] managing his own affairs and of enjoying the 
blessings of freedom and democracy7 and that, consequently, 
African peoples 'no matter how primitive7 should be 
prepared, stage by stage, for eventual self-government.92 
The anthropological view held that it was a mistake to try 
to turn Africans, or Asians, into Europeans. Rather, 
native culture and ways of life should be preserved and 
'progress' encouraged 'only so far as it is compatible with 
the social customs and institutions' of the particular 
'tribe, people or race7.93
Woolf regarded this approach as impractical. The 
preservation of such customs and institutions 7 in tact like 
a museum piece7 was bound to fail given the 7 disturbing and 
disintegrating influences of western or European 
civilization7. The following passage accurately sums up 
Woolf's position, and it is worth quoting at length:
92 Ibid. 87-8.
93 Ibid. 89-90. The inverted commas around the word 
'progress' are Woolf's, indicating that he did not share 
the misgivings of proponents of the anthropological view 
towards Western conceptions of progress.
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It is extremely doubtful whether such an attempt to 
isolate and mummify African society in the closely 
integrated and explosive world of the twentieth 
century can possibly be successful; it might have been 
possible to keep savage Africa virgin and savage - if 
that be a reasonable object of government - if the 
governments had not let in the copper mining 
companies, the soap makers, the gold diggers, the 
cocoa buyers, and the white planters, but those who 
think that in an Africa which has already been moulded 
for half a century by the apostles of civilization 
that Africans can be forced or cajoled into leading 
the life of noble savages - in the eighteenth century 
sense - are making the same mistake as those well- 
meaning medievalist enthusiasts who think that by 
exhorting English villagers to use spinning wheels and 
do poker work an oasis of arts and crafts can be 
preserved in the desert of the machine age.94
Moreover, not only would such a policy fail in its objects,
it would also, to the horror of its well-meaning
proponents, produce results much the same as those desired
by the white supremacists. In the sphere of education
policy the advocates of the Africanizing approach
maintained that education on Western lines was unsuitable
for Africans. They favoured a policy which gave primacy to
elementary education, made vernacular rather than English
the main language of instruction, and concentrated on
vocational rather than academic training. Higher education
would be strictly limited. In Woolf's view such a policy
would inevitably condemn the African to an 'inferior' and
'subordinate' economic, social, and political status -
precisely the object of the self-proclaimed white
'Herrenvolk' of Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
Similar dangers awaited the application of a new,
highly fashionable, approach to indirect rule. The habit
94 Ibid. 90.
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of using native institutions as organs of government had 
been an important feature of British colonial policy for 
many years. But in the past this policy had been 
opportunistic rather than systematic. The new approach was 
informed by the latest findings in the scientific field of 
Anthropology. It involved not only the use, if it was 
sensible to do so, of existing native institutions, but 
also the 'deliberate preservation' of such institutions and 
the creation of new ones. Woolf had grave reservations 
about this approach. As with the Africanizing policy in 
education it could 'very easily become a powerful 
instrument of policy for those who hold that the African is 
incapable of democratic self-government of the western type 
and must be content indefinitely with an inferior political 
and economic status'. Under the guise of an 'advanced', 
'up-to-date', and 'scientific' theory, such a policy could 
be easily used by Europeans to permanently frustrate 
African aspirations for self-rule. Whether indirect rule 
was used as an 'instrument of progress' or 'social 
fossilization and mummification' depended on the 
satisfaction of a number of conditions. The native 
authorities, for example, needed to be accountable to the 
people and fully integrated with the main organs of 
government at the centre. If these conditions were not met 
the result would not be self-government but pseudo-self- 
government .95
At this point it should be noted that Woolf's position
95 Ibid. 91-2, 97-8.
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was not entirely free of ambiguity. As well as advocating 
education on Western lines he also asserted that ' our 
object in Africa should be to produce good Africans, not 
tenth rate imitations of fifth-rate Europeans'. Similarly 
he maintained that the purpose of self-government should be 
to enable Africans ' to manage their own affairs in their 
own way'.96 'Good Africans'? 'Own affairs'? 'Own way'? 
Woolf gave no indication as to what he understood by these 
terms. He also asserted that the universal value of 
political freedom could not be realized except by ' some 
form' of democratic government. Yet he later insists that 
African political institutions 'must be fundamentally 
democratic in the western sense' .97
It seems, that Woolf's rejection of relativism was 
practical rather than principled. He did not claim that 
the Africanizing attitude or the anthropological view was 
illogical or intrinsically unethical, but rather that its 
implementation would be either impossible or harmful. That 
Woolf refrained from challenging the relativist position on 
theoretical grounds is perhaps indicative of the fact that 
he had some sympathy for it. A subtle appreciation of and 
admiration for the naturalistic qualities of 'traditional 
societies' is certainly a hallmark of his fictional works 
The Village in the Jungle and Stories of the East. Indeed 
there is evidence to suggest that his dislike of 
imperialism was, at root, aesthetic rather than political.
96 Ibid. 92-3.
97 Ibid. 93-4, 97. Emphasis added.
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This is a complex question which, because it concerns Woolf 
the man - his character, temperament, psyche, and the 
effect of his experiences upon these things - rather than 
Woolf the political writer, I do not propose to examine in 
detail.98 But in his diaries and letters, and especially 
in his autobiography, there are strong indications that an 
aesthetic distaste for imperialism began to emerge and take 
form long before he began to work out his moral and 
political objections. His starkly contrasting descriptions 
of Sinhalese society and the society kept by the 'white 
ruling caste' are particularly revealing. Woolf saw in the 
Kandian villages, for example, 'a satisfying depth, 
harmony, beauty' which he felt the Western world 'was 
losing or had lost' ." He described his dealings with the 
Europeans in Kandy as 'dull and irritating' . By way of 
contrast
... everything to do with the Sinhalese seemed to me 
enchanting. The Kandyans, both the Ratemahatmayas, 
the feudal chiefs and headmen, and the villagers, were 
the most charming people I have ever come across. They 
were typically mountain people, independent, fine 
mannered, lively, laughing, in their enchanting 
villages hidden away in the mountains, and isolated, 
unchanged and unchanging.100
This enchantment extended to their religion. Woolf was not
a religious man. His characteristic attitude towards it
was one of hostility and contempt. But he found in
98 The beginnings of such an examination can be found 
in Barron's helpful and provocative 'Before the Deluge', 
52-4.
99 Woolf, Growing, 158.
100 Ibid. 156-7.
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Buddhism a lot to admire: simplicity, gentleness, quietude, 
tolerance, reverence for solitude and contemplation. Like 
all religions it was ultimately a dream. But it was, none 
the less, 'a civilized and humane dream of considerable 
beauty' .101
The beauty of the Sinhalese stemmed from their
closeness to nature:
The people on the verandah of the Jaffna and
Hambantota kachcheries . . . are - or at least were in 
1905 - nearer than we are to primitive man and there 
are many nasty things about primitive man. It is not 
their primitiveness that appeals to me. It is partly 
their earthiness, their strange mixture of 
tortuousness and directness, of cunning and stupidity, 
of cruelty and kindness. They live so close to the 
jungle ... that they retain something of the litheness 
and beauty of jungle animals. The Sinhalese especially 
have subtle and supple minds . . . [and] when you get to
know them, you find beneath the surface in almost
everyone a profound melancholy and fatalism which I 
find beautiful and sympathetic - just as something 
like it pervades the scenery and characters of a Hardy 
novel.102
Nothing provided more of a contrast than the life of the 
of the 'white sahibs' whose assumed grandeur and constant 
refrain of 'shop, sport, or gossip' Woolf found 'strange 
and disconcerting'. Whereas the Sinhalese lived in harmony 
with their natural environment, the Europeans in Ceylon 
lived in a social climate that was 'unreal' and 
'theatrical'.103 It was his growing appreciation of the 
qualities of Sinhalese society allied to an awareness of 
the disruptive effects of European society, and a disdain
101 Ibid. 159-63.
102 Ibid. 54.
103 Ibid. 24-5.
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for the form that that society took in Ceylon, that first 
made Woolf suspect that the ' Europeanizing of the non- 
Europeans7 might be 7a mistake7.104
104 Ibid. 157.
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Chapter Six
Imperialism: An Analysis and Assessment
In this chapter I enquire into the ways and extent to which 
Leonard Woolfs thought on imperialism can be described as 
utopian. I propose, first of all, to briefly examine how 
Woolf's work was viewed by contemporary opinion.
Woolf's Thought in Contemporary Opinion
Woolf's books on imperialism were published to widespread
critical acclaim. A reviewer of Empire and Commerce in
Africa opined that
... the labours Mr Woolf has undertaken ... put all 
students of politics and economics under a great debt. 
His analysis is thorough, impartial and convincing, 
and if his book is painful reading - the record of all 
the Great Powers in Africa is a shameful and a 
terrible one - the pain is of the kind that moves not 
to hopelessness but to action.1
A further review in a later issue of the journal came to an
even more favourable conclusion: 'A clearer exposition of
the relations between imperialism and finance has never
been penned, and the whole book rests on a masterly
marshalling of indisputable fact.'2 In the same vein, a
reviewer in the Commonwealth remarked: 'Great credit is due
to the Labour Research Department and Mr Woolf for the
1 Common Sense (the official journal of the Union of 
Democratic Control), 31 January 1920.
2 Common Sense. 27 March 1920.
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issue of such a well-balanced and exhaustive work' .3 The
founder of the Union of Democratic Control and fellow anti-
imperialist, E. D. Morel, described the book as 'a piece of
historical research of great value ... [which should] be
widely read and deeply pondered.'4
One might expect such enthusiasm from such eminently
Left or Left-leaning publications. But Empire and Commerce
in Africa was also enthusiastically greeted by publications
without any obvious Left or radical bent. A Canadian
academic journal described it as 'a contribution to the
literature of international relations of cardinal
importance ... [one] which all students should familiarize
themselves and which statesmen must reckon.5 The Nation
considered it 'masterly', 'thorough', 'painstaking',
'powerful', 'courageous', and 'conspicuously honest in the
handling of facts'.6 The Glasgow Herald declared:
Whatever one may think of the political standpoint of 
Mr Woolf, there is no doubt that he has given us a 
most fascinating book, packed full of information, 
brilliantly written, and sound alike in statistics and 
judgement ... we question whether the whole field has 
ever been surveyed more boldly or with more advantage 
to the reader.7
Even the staunchly imperialist Daily Mail described it as
' a penetrating study which no student of politics or
3 Commonwealth. August 1921.
4 Daily Herald. 4 February 1920.
5 H. E. Barnes in Journal of International Relations. 
July 1921.
6 Nation. 6 March 1920.
7 Glasgow Herald. 3 February 1920.
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history can afford to leave unread.'8
No doubt because of their nature - Economic 
Imperialism is essentially a popular condensation of Empire 
and Commerce in Africa, and Imperialism and Civilization is 
a 'bringing together' of a number of related themes within 
a single, easily accessible, conceptual framework - Woolf's 
subsequent works met with less critical attention. Such 
attention that they did receive, however, was generally 
favourable. A reviewer in the New Statesman described 
Economic Imperialism as an 'extremely useful little book 
. . . admirably written . .. [and one which] ought to be in 
the hands of everyone who wants to understand the 
underlying causes of the foreign policy of the Great 
Powers.'9 A German reviewer similarly concluded: 'Any
person who wishes to have in a brief compass the facts 
about imperialism should consult this cheap and masterly 
summary.'10 Of Imperialism and Civilization the weekly 
newspaper of the Independent Labour Party, the New Leader, 
said: 'Few wiser or more thoughtful books have been written 
on this problem' ; a view echoed by an American reviewer who 
declared: 'I know no clearer analysis of the nature of
nineteenth century imperialism and its difference from
8 Daily Mail. 16 January 1920. For further favourable 
reviews see Cambridge Magazine. 17 January 1920; Co­
operative News. 24 January 192 0; Freeman's Journal 
(Dublin), 14 February 1920; Saturday Westminster Gazette. 
14 February 1920; Cevlon Daily News. 21 July 1920; W. E. 
Burghardt Du Bois, 'Eternal Africa', Nation (New York), 
111, 2882, 25 September 1920; Challenge. 2 November 1920.
9 New Statesman. 15 January 1921.
10 European Press (Breman) , 16 December 1920.
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previous movements of conquest than is contained in this 
little book.'11
But the judgement of contemporary critics was not 
uniformly favourable. Morel, in the review cited above, 
criticized Woolf for accepting at face value the 
explanations given by capitalists and imperialists of their 
own actions. In Morel's view 'sheer individual will-to- 
power' as much as greed for gain accounted for a good deal 
of what went on in modern Africa. The Economist 
congratulated Woolf for 'brilliantly exposing' the mistakes 
and iniquities of empire, but questioned his method of 
quotation without reference to context. In the Economist's 
view Chamberlain, his clever rationalizations 
notwithstanding, was essentially no different to Disraeli: 
both regarded commerce not as an end in itself but as a 
means to national greatness, power, and prestige.12 The 
Manchester Guardian, while considering the work 'really 
valuable' , nonetheless felt that its author had been 
arbitrary in his choice of cases - little had been said on 
Nigeria, Liberia, Nyasaland, and South Africa, but a great 
deal, inexplicably, on Abyssinia - and selective in his 
choice of quotations - those emphasizing the motivating 
force of new investment opportunities were clearly 
significant, but passages of equal significance could be
11 New Leader. 16 May 1928; Lewis S. Gannett, 'Analysis 
and Mush', Nation (New York), 25 April 1928. See also 
Japanese Weekly Chronicle. 5 April 1928; Economist. 21 
April 1928; New Statesman. 21 April 1928; Oxford Magazine. 
7 June 1928; Natsopa Journal. July 1933.
12 Economist. 31 January 1920.
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found emphasizing native welfare.13 A reviewer for the TLS
reached the same verdict. The book clearly contained
evidence of much research, but it was
. . . always on one side and directed to proving what 
the author wants to prove .... The facts and figures 
may be accurate, as far as they go, but only one side 
is given or emphasized .... Authorities are regarded 
only so far as they square with preconceived 
opinions.14
Even the New Statesman had some critical words to say about 
the volume. In a lengthy review it praised Woolf for 
having produced a 'very remarkable', 'detailed', 
'thoroughly documented', and 'fascinatingly readable' book. 
It also praised him for his 'intense intellectual honesty' 
which not only prevented him fpace the TLS] ' from 
distorting the facts to suit his thesis' , but saved him 
'even from any suspicion of having overlooked facts which 
might be inconvenient' . It concluded that it was 'far the 
ablest and most stimulating book that has been written 
about the subject from the democratic point of view.'
But it also criticized the book for being 'too black' . 
This was not because the facts were 'wrongly or unfairly 
presented' , but because the standpoint from which they were 
presented was 'impossibly Utopian'. It was impossible to 
question on general principles Woolf's moral indictment of 
European imperialism. But a 'purely ethical judgement' of 
so great an episode seemed 'curiously irrelevant': it was 
'as if one were to write a book showing that Julius Caesar
13 Manchester Guardian. 27 January 1920.
14 Times Literary Supplement. 9 February 1920.
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had no moral right to invade Gaul or Britain.'
Superior civilizations, the New Statesman claimed, 
would always dominate inferior ones when they came into 
contact with them. It was wrong therefore to put the new 
imperialism down to economic motives. Such motives were 
'for the most part merely camouflage' . The key factor was 
' the development of transport which brought Europe in close 
contact with great areas over which an immensely lower 
civilisation prevailed' .15
Finally, along with criticism of his method and his 
moral standpoint, more than one sceptical eyebrow was 
raised at Woolf's prescriptions. The Nation questioned his 
call for a change in men's beliefs and desires, from 
economic imperialism to humanitarianism. Such a change - 
'so simple, so reasonable, so commonplace' - was difficult 
enough for an individual to accomplish let alone a nation. 
To ask for such a change was to ask for nothing short of a 
miracle. Indeed, Woolf was in effect requesting 'the old 
change of heart of the evangelist' ; to be saved the world 
had to 'find salvation'.16
The Manchester Guardian found Woolf's proposals for 
reform of the mandate system 'suggestive' and 'valid' but 
cautiously concluded that the system envisaged was a long
15 'The Ethics of Imperialism', New Statesman. 19 June
1920.
16 Review of Economic Imperialism. Nation. 1 January
1921.
way removed from current reality.17
Far less cautiously, Lewis S. Gannett, in the review 
cited above, condemned Woolf's suggestions for extending 
the role of the League as 'sheer mush'. It was true that 
Article XXII had publicly recognized that the welfare of 
the backward peoples was a sacred trust of the stronger 
powers. But so had the Treaty of Berlin forty years 
before. Woolf, of course, was aware of the fact that the 
Allies had begun to break their pledges no sooner had they 
made them. But he concluded that to expect anything else, 
'to paint a sweet vista of a League of Nations, led by 
France and Great Britain, resolutely fighting imperialism, ' 
was 'arrant romanticizing'.
From this analysis two conclusions can be reached. 
First, the acclaim which Woolf's work on imperialism 
received was considerable but far from universal. Second, 
few of Woolf's critics felt that his shortcomings amounted 
to some kind of 'utopianism', and those that did, levelled 
this charge not at his analysis but at his 'purely moral
standpoint' and his prescriptions.
* * * * *
I will now analyze Woolf's thought on imperialism in terms 
of the three key characteristics of utopianism identified 
in Chapter 2. I will proceed on the basis of the four 
divisions identified in Chapter 5. Without wishing to 
anticipate the argument it will be seen, in line with some
17 Review of Imperialism and Civilization. Manchester 
Guardian. 30 May 1928.
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of Woolf's early critics, that the aspect of his thought 
most vulnerable to the charge of utopianism is his overtly 
'moral7 prescription that the mandates system be 'honestly' 
applied.
The Theory of Economic Imperialism
The enduring value of a number of aspects of Woolf's theory 
- his clear definition, his interpretive method, his 
empirical analysis of certain events, his analysis of the 
'benefits' of empire - has been reaffirmed by a number of 
writers in the post-war historical literature.18 But the 
cumulative effect of this literature has been to cast doubt 
on rather than corroborate the validity of Woolf's theory 
as a whole.
At the most general level, numerous detailed 
historical studies, based on documentary evidence not 
available until the 1940s, have demonstrated that what 
Woolf and others called the 'new imperialism' was in fact 
an immensely complicated historical phenomenon - perhaps 
more accurately, set of phenomena - which cannot be reduced 
to a single set of factors whether 'economic', 'political', 
'strategic', or 'technological'. The issue is still highly 
controversial. The weight of opinion suggests, however,
18 See D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914 
(London, 1984), 30-2, 63-76, 365 ff; R. J. Hammond, 
'Economic Imperialism: Sidelights on a Stereotype', Journal 
of Economic History. 22, 4 (1961), 582-98; Anver Offer,
'The British Empire, 1870-1914: A Waste of Money?', 
Economic History Review. 46, 2 (1993), 215-38.
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that the causal matrix of late nineteenth century 
imperialism differed from one colonial Power to another and 
from one part of the world to another.19
The weight of historical opinion also suggests that 
both 'peripheral' and 'Eurocentric' explanations have their 
place in any general theory of why the pace and temper of 
colonial acquisition changed so suddenly in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century. The absolute 
superiority of one approach over the other, on which debate 
raged in the 1960s and 1970s, is now generally rejected in 
favour of a hybrid approach which postulates that crises 
erupting on the outer reaches of empire, requiring some 
kind of metropolitan response, interacted in various 
complex ways with internal socio-economic and political 
changes that were simultaneously occurring in the 
metropolitan heartlands. Woolf's explanation - like 
Hobson's, Lenin's, and all the classical theorists' - was 
exclusively Eurocentric. To that extent, in the eyes of 
modern scholars, it is flawed.20
Along with these general points a number of more 
specific points can be made. Woolf contended that the
19 See D. K. Fieldhouse (ed.), The Theory of Capitalist 
Imperialism; Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914. 
esp. Part III; C. C. Eldridge (ed.), British Imperialism in 
the Nineteenth Century (London, 1984).
20 See R. E. Robinson and J. A. Gallagher, 'The
Imperialism of Free Trade', Economic History Review. 2nd
Series, 6, 1 (1953), 1-15; R. E. Robinson and J. A.
Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961); D. K.
Fieldhouse, '1 Imperialism" : An Historiographical Revision' , 
Economic History Review. 2nd Series, 14, 2 (1961), 187-209; 
Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire. 3-84.
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growth of monopoly - the big factory, the trust, the 
cartel, the syndicate, the multiple shop - was an important 
factor in generating, 'around the year 1880', the new, 
'economic' imperialism. It has been shown, however, that 
this could only have been an important factor in two 
countries - Germany and the United States - and even in 
these countries the industrial and financial combines which 
were undoubtedly rising at this time did not reach the 
level of dominance suggested by Woolf until the final 
decade of the century i.e., at least ten years after the 
events which they allegedly caused had begun to occur. The 
countries with the largest empires - Britain and France - 
were the countries where the growth of monopoly was least 
advanced.21
Secondly, it has been shown that references to the 
commercial benefits of the extension of empire - especially 
into the tropical zones - in the speeches of leading 
statesmen and politicians, only became pronounced in the 
final years of the century. Fieldhouse has shown that 
references to these benefits by Ferry and Chamberlain in 
particular were rationalizations of events that had already 
taken place or justifications for keeping hold of 
territories that were already under imperial control and 
had been acquired for quite different reasons. The issue 
at stake here was escalating administrative costs, and the 
feeling that newly acquired colonies were placing an 
intolerable strain on the public finances. If they were to
21 Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire. 3-38.
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be retained they must, it was felt, be made to pay. Hence 
the appeal by imperialists to their untapped economic 
potential.22
Thirdly, as Etherington has shown, Woolf played fast 
and loose with chronology. What is flagged as a more or 
less discreet historical phenomenon - the new imperialism - 
soon becomes indistinguishable, as Woolf's analysis 
unfolds, from European colonizing activity in the 
nineteenth century as a whole. Woolf gives at least five 
dates for the beginning of the new imperialism ranging from 
1839 to 1890 .23 Ironically, this implicit recognition that 
the so called 'new' imperialism perhaps did not represent 
such a sharp break with the past as many at the time 
believed - Woolf included - is one that finds confirmation
22 Ibid. 3-87, 459-77.
23 See Empire and Commerce in Africa. 21, 24, 27, 37, 
55; Etherington, Theories of Imperialism. 180; and Chapter 
1 above. Although it is not strictly relevant to the 
argument, I should perhaps briefly note here that I do not 
agree with Etherington's claim, mentioned in Chapter 1, 
that Woolf set in motion a 'monumental misunderstanding' of 
the meaning and significance of imperialism as a socio­
political phenomenon. Etherington is clearly right to argue 
that Hobson, Lenin, and other classical theorists were 
looking to the future rather than trying to explain the 
past, and that therefore to test their theories of 
imperialism exclusively against the colonial experience of 
the late nineteenth century is to commit an error of 
anachronism. But he underestimates the extent to which 
these writers employed 'imperialism' as a convenient term 
of rhetoric which enabled them to castigate all sorts of 
things - protectionism, monopoly, capitalism, militarism, 
war, as well as colonialism - which they disliked. In other 
words I do not think it is as gross a misreading as 
Etherington suggests to assume that by 'imperialism' 
Hobson, Lenin, et al ♦ by and large meant the acquisition of 
colonial territories. In any event it is dogmatic of 
Etherington to imply that Woolf's narrow definition was 
somehow an 'incorrect' or misleading one. It at least has 
the merit of clarity.
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in one of the most important academic papers in the post­
war literature.24
There are of course other problems with Woolf's, and 
similar theories of 'economic' or 'capitalist' imperialism, 
which professional historians have unearthed in what has 
been one of the most intensely excavated fields of 
historical scholarship of the post-war period. The 
problems outlined above and in the last chapter are some of 
the more salient.
One of the striking things from the point of view of 
this thesis, however, is that none of these problems - 
perhaps with one exception - have any bearing on the 
accusation of utopianism. Of all the sins Woolf can be 
accused of regarding this aspect of his thought, utopianism 
is not one of them. He cannot be accused of ignoring 
facts: Woolf's contribution to theorizing about late
nineteenth century imperialism largely resides in the vast 
amount of statistical data he marshalled to the cause. He 
cannot be accused of ignoring analysis of cause and effect: 
though his theory has clear normative underpinnings (the 
desire to discredit both commercialism and imperialism by 
linking them inextricably together), and though Woolf drew 
strong moral conclusions from it (that imperialism was an 
unqualified evil for both the colonized and the 
colonizers), the theory is a causal theory par excellence: 
it stands or falls not on its normative underpinnings, its
24 Robinson and Gallagher, 'The Imperialism of Free 
Trade', 1-15.
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normative implications, or its practical usefulness, but on 
its empirical accuracy, its conceptual clarity, and its 
internal coherence. Nor can it be said that Woolf was 
guilty, in Carr's quasi-Marxist sense, of peddling some 
kind of bourgeois ideology, the hidden but real purpose of 
which was to promote and defend a particular status quo: 
the whole thrust of Woolf's analysis was that the status 
quo was corrupt and dangerous and needed to be replaced as 
a matter of the first importance.
The only sense in which the charge of utopianism might 
be applied is that in exaggerating the importance of 
economic factors he underestimated the role of power; 
'power', that is, in the 'realist' sense of political and 
military power. The problem with this assertion is that it 
comes close to suggesting that Woolf was utopian simply 
because he was not realist. It should also be pointed out 
that Woolf did not ignore realoolitik and the strategic 
factor; he emphasized, for example, that it continued to 
exercise a powerful influence in North Africa long after 
economic factors had become the dominant motive elsewhere 
on the continent. In sum therefore, although it is 
probably true - and key works by Langer and Fieldhouse 
certainly suggest it is25 - that the power- 
political/strategic factor was more important in 
determining the European division of the African continent 
in the late nineteenth century than Woolf conceded, it
25 W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New 
York, 1935); Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire. 63-9, 459- 
77.
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would be unreasonable to cite this as evidence of 
utopianism: Woolf did not ignore the power factor in
general; nor did he entirely ignore the influence of the 
power factor conceived in this particular way.
Mandates
The charge has greater weight, however, when we come to 
Woolf's thought on mandates. In his bold interpretation of 
Article 22 can be seen: (i) a tendency to 'ignore facts and 
pay little attention to analysis of cause and effect'; and 
(ii) a tendency to 'grossly underestimate the role of power 
and overestimate the role of law, morality, and public 
opinion in international politics'. Woolf speaks of 
Article 22 as if President Wilson's views had been shared 
by the other delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers 
at Paris. But Article 22 was a product not of gentlemanly 
discussion, but of hard diplomatic bargaining - as was the 
actual distribution of the mandated territories. The 
following points are salient:
(a) President Wilson wanted the peace conference to reject 
the practice of annexation in principle. A number of 
delegations - Australia, New Zealand, Italy, and South 
Africa - strongly opposed this having already staked 
out claims for various territories of the German 
empire in Africa and the Pacific. The Smuts Plan, on 
which a large part of President Wilson's important
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second draft of the Covenant was based, did not 
include what later became known as the 'B' and 'C' 
mandates in its proposals for a mandates system. It 
recommended instead that these territories be dealt 
with in accordance with the fifth of President 
Wilson's Fourteen Points, which called for an 'open, 
fair-minded and just settlement of colonial claims'. 
It was only through the insistence of the President 
that these territories were eventually included in the 
system. Article 22 was thus a compromise - a 
'residual alternative' in the words of one authority - 
the main elements of which clearly reflected these 
substantial differences of opinion.26 The approach to 
colonialism embodied in the mandates system was, in 
the words of another authority, 'determined by 
compromises among statesmen of the continental and 
extra-continental European world, including those who 
had troubled consciences or troublesome constituents 
with troubled consciences, those who had unsatisfied 
colonial ambitions, and those who had peace preserving 
aspirations.'27
(b) Another important fact is that those Powers desirous 
of adding to their stock of colonies became,
unwittingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric. In
26 Northedge, League of Nations. 37-8.
27 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The
Problems and Progress of International Organization. 3rd
edn. (London, 1964), 329.
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their wartime propaganda the Allies continually 
contrasted the cruel and exploitative colonial record 
of the Central Powers with their more humane and 
altruistic record. They pledged not to engage, at the 
end of the war, in old-style annexation and made 
promises about self-government which turned out to be 
less than entirely sincere. William Rappard, the 
first secretary of the mandates system, commented that 
'[i]t was impossible ... once the peace was signed to 
return to the status cruo ante. Such a solution could 
not be adopted for practical reasons, while annexation 
pure and simple would have been in contradiction with 
the principles which secured the victory of the 
Allies'
(c) The compromises made during the negotiations are 
clearly reflected in the ambiguous language of Article 
22 (4) which stipulates that the independence of 'A' 
mandates 'can be provisionally recognised subject to 
the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance' . Such phrasing enabled all sides to claim 
at least partial victory for their particular vision 
of the colonial future. In particular, it enabled the 
mandatory Powers to justify holding on to their 
possessions, which, of course, they for the most part 
did until the 1940s. Woolf was strangely blind to the 
euphemistic character of these phrases. He nowhere
28 Quoted in Northedge, League of Nations. 193.
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concedes that they were expressly designed to enable 
the Powers to retain their spheres of influence and 
continue to assert their hegemonic rights if they 
wished to do so.29
(d) The distribution of the mandates was conducted not by 
the League but by the Supreme Allied Council. Some of 
the most important territories - Palestine, Iraq, 
Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, - were shared out along 
the lines of the unashamedly imperialist Sykes-Picot 
agreement of 1916. The stipulation that 7 the wishes 
of these communities must be a principal consideration 
in the selection of the Mandatory7 was not respected. 
In substance what took place was a division of the 
spoils of war in the interests of the victorious 
European and extra-European colonial Powers.30
It might be said that Woolf7s recommendations made in 1920 
for extending the scope of the system were utopian in the 
same senses. The mandatory Powers showed no willingness 
for granting a right of 7 control and inspection7 to the 
PMC. Even petitions could only be considered by the PMC 
with the approval of the relevant governing authorities. 
A proposal that petitioners should be granted a hearing
29 Although, as we saw in Chapter 5, he was deeply 
suspicious of the Allies7 intentions before the article was 
coined.
30 Northedge, League of Nations. 64; Claude, Swords 
into Plowshares. 328-9.
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before the PMC de jure was balked at an early stage of its 
proceedings.31 The principle established was accountability 
not control.32 More generally, the mandatory Powers showed 
no inclination to give any outside bodies or Powers a say 
in the form of government or type of constitution to be 
applied in the mandataries. They did not express any 
desire for all colonial possessions to be brought within 
the remit of the system. Nor did they indicate any 
willingness to give the League Council the power to 
" revoke' a mandate.
Yet the picture is not entirely clear-cut. The 
principle of international accountability was conceded 
with: (i) acceptance of the " sacred trust" idea (para. 1); 
(ii) the commitment to guarantee certain freedoms and erect 
safeguards against certain abuses (para. 5) ; (iii) the 
obligation to furnish annual reports (para. 7); (iv) the 
creation of the PMC to examine these reports and advise the 
Council (para. 9) ; and (v) the inclusion of the, admittedly 
vague, "just treatment" clause (Article 23 (c)). In
addition, the mandates system, and the sensitive way in 
which the PMC discharged its duties in particular, 
contributed to the general climate of opinion which enabled 
a much wider-ranging regime to be created under Chapters 
XI-XI11 of the UN Charter. This new regime contained many
31 In 1926. See Northedge, Leacrue of Nations. 201.
32 Woolf frequently, and emphatically, claimed it was 
the latter. See for example 'The League and the Tropics", 
29; The Scone of Mandates. 6. Claude uses the word 
"influence" (Swords into Plowshares. 328). "Accountability" 
seems more precise.
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of the ideas championed by Woolf twenty-five years earlier. 
The Trusteeship Council, unlike its predecessor, was given 
powers of inspection (Article 87). The system was extended 
to cover potentially all colonial territories (Article 75). 
Provision was made, in certain circumstances, for direct 
international administration (Article 81). The 'positive' 
duty to promote the political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement of colonial peoples was grafted 
onto the 'negative' duty to guarantee certain freedoms 
(conscience, religion) and prevent certain abuses (the 
slave trade, the arms and liquor traffic) (cf. Articles 73 
and 76 of the Charter, Article 22 (5) of the Covenant) .
The obligation was established that all trust territories, 
not merely 'A' mandates, must be prepared, by their 
respective 'administering authorities' (see Article 81), 
for self-government (Article 76 (b)). In addition, the
weaker obligation to 'develop self-government' was 
established for all dependent territories whether trust 
territories or not (Article 73 (b)).
Significantly, however, the Trusteeship Council was 
not given the right to revoke a Trusteeship, nor powers of 
'control' (Woolf never stipulated what he meant by this), 
nor the right to determine the form of government within a 
trust territory or its type of constitution.33 'The
33 Perhaps with the exception of the Trusteeship 
Agreement for Italian Somaliland which, as well as 
appointing an International Advisory Council to assist in 
its administration, also required the administering 
authority, Italy, to adhere to a Declaration of 
Constitutional Principles. See Claude, Swords into 
Plowshares. 340-1.
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Trusteeship System represent[ed] , as did its predecessor, 
the very limited willingness of the colonial Powers to 
superimpose a formal trusteeship structure upon their 
administration of dependent areas.'34
The evidence suggests that although some of Woolf's 
ideas were in some respects 'utopian', others were astute 
and prescient. In general, his belief that absolute 
sovereignty over colonial territories was no longer 
tolerable was one that soon became widely accepted. But he 
vastly overestimated the degree to which the imperial 
Powers would be prepared to set aside the principle of non­
intervention in their colonial relations. For a number of 
complex reasons the imperial Powers created, for the first 
time, two international organs, the League Council and the 
PMC, charged with the responsibility of supervising a 
carefully and narrowly circumscribed sphere of colonial 
activity. But, the United States apart, they did not do so 
with any great enthusiasm. The structures erected had 
their foundations in a complex configuration of power 
between, within, and across states, which Woolf signally 
failed to analyze. Moreover, the nature and purpose of 
these structures was always highly contested.35 The 
revolution in the relationship between the colonizers and 
the colonized would have to await further shifts in the 
configuration of power before its scope would become fully 
realized.
34 Ibid. 327.
35 See ibid. 322-3.
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Two further points throw light on the degree to which 
Woolf's ideas on mandates were utopian. Firstly, it is 
important to note that the bulk of Woolf's extensive, 
though repetitive, work on mandates is exhortatory in tone 
and purpose. His overriding concern was to get the 
colonial Powers, especially Britain, to take their 
obligations under Article 22 seriously. He frequently 
stated that until 'translated into hard and unpleasant 
facts', inevitably involving self-sacrifice, these 
obligations would remain but 'pious aspirations' and 'noble 
gestures'.
But Woolf was under no illusions as to the likelihood 
of success. He recognized from the outset that the 
behaviour of the mandatory Powers was far from consistent 
with a literal interpretation of their obligations. In 
1920 he castigated the British and French governments for 
behaving as if the 'imperialist' Sykes-Picot agreement had 
greater authority than the League Covenant. A year later 
he reported on how the British were increasingly acting 
contrary to the spirit of the Covenant in Kenya Colony. By 
1928 he felt compelled to accept that the application of 
the system had been accompanied by 'subterfuge' and 
'hypocrisy' . In effect, the mandates system had become 
merely a cloak to conceal the 'nakedness of the older 
imperialism' .36
But the fact that he spent so much time and energy
36 Woolf, 'Article XXII', 94-95; 'A Sacred Trust', The 
New Statesman. 14 May 1921, 151-2; Scope of Mandates. 9-10; 
Imperialism and Civilization. 115-35.
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trying to cajole the mandatory Powers into acting 
'honestly' suggests that he genuinely felt that this goal 
was practicable. Indeed, Woolf's increasing cynicism did 
not lead to a corresponding decline in his enthusiasm for 
the mandates system, but rather to further restatements of 
its core principles and additional proposals for 
strengthening the executive power of the League Council and 
the PMC.
Woolf's verdict twenty years later is illuminating:
The mandate system was very far from perfect, but it 
did for the first time establish some very important 
principles of colonial policy regarding the rights and 
interests of African peoples. Though governments and 
statesmen did a good deal to nullify the principles in 
practice, they did not succeed entirely and I think it 
is incontestable that the administration of the 
mandate territories was on the whole better than that 
of non-mandated territories (from the African's point 
of view) in colonial policy and government. It also 
established the important and to many people 
inconvenient principle that the exploitation of 
African territories and peoples by imperial Powers was 
a matter of interest to the other nations of the world 
and might even be subjected to international 
supervision.37
This is a fair verdict and one broadly in line with current 
historical opinion.38 It also shows that Woolf's 
exhortatory and propagandist efforts to promote the 
principle of international accountability were far from 
unrealistic. This is especially so if the radical shift in 
attitudes that occurred during the inter-war period is 
taken into account. In the 1920s the view that the primary
37 Woolf in Lord Perth et al. 'The Future of the 
Mandates: A Symposium', African Affairs. 43 (October 1944), 
168.
38 See Northedge, Leacrue of Nations. 65, 219-20/ 
Claude, Swords into Plowshares. 341-3.
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objective of British colonial policy should be to
systematically promote the social, economic, and political
development of dependent peoples, and prepare them for
self-government, was one held by only a small minority. By
the late 1930s this view had become widely accepted. In an
address on changing attitudes to empire to the Royal
African Society in 1939, Lord Hailey, distinguished Indian
civil servant and successor to Lord Lugard as the British
member of the PMC, declared:
I think we no longer look on overseas possessions in 
the light of their material advantages to us. We are 
fully prepared to accept all the humanitarian 
principles that are embodied in the mandatory 
system...
It needed men like Lord Hailey to distil the radical ideas 
of the 1920s into respectable form. But these ideas were 
pioneered by men like Woolf, Barnes, Morel, and Leys, and 
the change in attitudes which led to the opening of a new, 
more enlightened, chapter in British colonial history in 
the 1940s, was in large part brought about through their 
efforts.39
Secondly, there is some evidence to suggest that 
Woolf's view on the question of the status of the mandated 
territories was not entirely incorrect. Even as sober an 
observer as F. S. Northedge does not refute the claim that 
the so called 'A' mandates were, by virtue of Article 22, 
already sovereign. Moreover, although Woolf's claim that
39 Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism and 
Africa. 1920-1940 (London, 1978), 19-20, 90-104, 154-8;
Ronald Robinson, 'The Moral Disarmament of African Empire, 
1919-1947', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. 
8, 1 (1979), 86-104.
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sovereignty for 'B' and 7C7 mandates resided with the 
League can be doubted - after all, it was not the League 
which had distributed the mandates but the Supreme Allied 
Council, and the League was. to a large extent, the 
mandatory Powers - it can also be doubted whether 
sovereignty resided unambiguously with the mandatory 
Powers. The juridical status of the mandates was highly 
uncertain - a fact largely due to the revolutionary nature 
of the system the Allied and Associated Powers had created. 
Certain states, notably South Africa, argued that they 
7possessed7 sovereignty over their mandates. The PMC in 
response argued that they 7 exercised7 but did not 7 possess7 
7 sovereign powers7.40 Woolf, of course, did not clear up 
this matter. But he did play a decisive role in nudging 
public opinion in the direction of the latter. In this, as 
in his wider goal of de-legitimising colonial rule in toto. 
he achieved much.41
White Settlers
The charge of utopianism carries little weight with respect 
to this aspect of Woolf7s thought. Much of Woolf7s 
analysis of the white settler problem was both accurate and 
prescient. He was one of the first commentators to point
40 Northedge, League of Nations. 196-8, 217-8.
41 Claude lists 7 gnawing doubts about the legitimacy of 
colonialism7 within the colonial powers themselves as a key 
reason for the crucial innovations of the Charter. Claude, 
Swords into Plowshares. 329.
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out that Government policy in British East Africa, under 
pressure from the white minority, was leading, however 
unintentionally, to even greater exploitation of the 
indigenous population. He skilfully and unequivocally 
exposed the democratic pretensions of the white minorities 
in Kenya, the Rhodesias, and Nyasaland. The 'illusion' 
that these territories were 'white man's country' was still 
widely entertained in Britain up until the Hola Camp 
incidents in Kenya and Harold Macmillan's subsequent 'winds 
of change' speech. In the 1920s the dream, to use Ronald 
Robinson's words, of a great white commonwealth in tropical 
Africa stretching from Salisbury (and perhaps the Cape) to 
Nairobi, was one entertained not only by 'unofficial' 
colonial opinion but by colonial governors and even some 
colonial secretaries.42 Woolf demonstrated on simple 
demographic lines that it was absurd to regard these 
colonies as comparable to Australia, Canada, or New 
Zealand.43 It was an absurdity that unless checked was 
bound to lead to violent conflict. In vigorously putting 
forward these views Woolf contributed to what Robinson has 
described as the ' spectacular advance of the new moral 
order' in African colonial relations. For complex reasons
42 Notably Kenya Colony governor, Edward Grigg, the 
governor of Northern Rhodesia, Herbert Stanley, and 
colonial secretaries, Churchill and Amery. See Robinson, 
'Moral Disarmament', 92-7.
43 Though it should be noted that the numbers which 
qualified Natal and Southern Rhodesia for self-government 
in 1894 and 1923 (23,000 and 30,000) were not that much 
greater than the ever rising number of white settlers in 
Kenya (17,000 by the late 1920s). Ibid. 92-3.
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of practical politics - bureaucratic, parliamentary, and 
international - this new order - summed up by the notion of 
'native paramountcy' - brought few immediate, practical 
benefits to the indigenous population. It did, however, 
play a vital role in 'holding the front' against white 
separatism until the time came, two decades later, when 
African (and immigrant Indian) political consciousness was 
sufficiently well developed to hold these separatist 
ambitions in check. In doing so it prevented the emergence 
in east-central Africa of another Southern Rhodesia or even 
another Congo.44
It is true that Woolf was prone to exaggeration. In 
the 1920s, for instance, he argued that a storm of 
nationalism and conflict was gathering in Africa by 
comparison with which the Great War was ' the mildest of 
evils' .45 This is undoubtedly Woolf the propagandist 
getting the better of Woolf the political analyst. But 
rhetoric aside, it is clearly the case that much of what 
Woolf predicted with regard to Kenya and Rhodesia did 
subsequently happen, and what he predicted with regard to 
South Africa was only narrowly avoided. As Noel Annan has 
observed, Woolf had been making the winds of change speech 
since the 1920s.46
Far from underestimating power, the role of power in
44 Ibid. 98-102.
45 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization. 70.
46 Noel Annan, Our Acre: The Generation that made Post- 
War Britain (London, 1991), 482.
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his analysis of the white settler problem was central. But 
Woolf's conception of power was a broad one encompassing 
'ideational' as well as material and instrumental 
conceptions. He was impressed by the strength which a 
group attains when it is convinced of its own legitimacy. 
Such strength could not be reduced to power over public 
opinion, to cite Carr's formulation, since the power 
resided in the ideas themselves rather than the skilful way 
in which they could be utilized or manipulated. Ideas like 
liberty and equality possessed a contagious quality which 
made them immune to control. They always transformed the 
political consciousness of those infected, with profound 
consequences for the prevailing configuration of social 
power and the structure of communal political organization 
based upon it. As early as the 1920s Woolf noted the 
rapidity with which African political consciousness was 
growing. He drew the conclusion that imperialism, at least 
as it was known in the nineteenth century, was dead. The 
only question that remained was whether it would be 'buried 
peacefully' or in 'blood and ruins' .47
In Woolf's view the notion that a small band of white 
men could rule autocratically in countries where the 
African and even the immigrant Asian population far 
outnumbered them, was one that simply went against the 
grain of the modern world: it was one, to use a favourite 
notion of his, that contradicted 'the logic of modern ideas
47 Ibid. 17. See also Woolf, 'Something New Out of 
Africa', 322-26.
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and beliefs' .48 Only through the use of force could true
self-determination be resisted and then only temporarily.
This was clearly a prescient observation and one
rooted not only in his belief in the power of ideas but
also in his empirical observation that the new imperialism
contained within it the seeds of its own destruction:
European civilisation, with its ideas of economic 
competition, energy, practical efficiency, 
exploitation, patriotism, power and nationalism 
descended upon Asia and Africa. But with it also 
carried, involuntarily perhaps, another set of ideas 
which it had inherited from the French Revolution and 
the eighteenth-century forerunners of the French 
Revolution. These were the ideas of democracy, 
liberty, fraternity, equality, humanitarianism. They 
have had a profound effect upon the later history of 
Imperialism, for they have led to the revolt of the 
subject peoples against it.49
This was one of the central conclusions of Woolf's analysis
of imperialism. It is true that he failed to point out
that the influence was not entirely one way.50 It is also
true that he tended to give the impression that Africans
and Asians were passive recipients rather than active
seekers of Western ideas.51 But this does not diminish the
48 Woolf maintained in Empire and Commerce in Africa 
(p.8) that 'in history there is no logic of events and no 
logic of facts, there is only a logic of men's beliefs and 
ideals.'
49 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization. 34-5.
50 As pointed out by James Joll, Europe Since 1870 
(London, 1973), 78-9.
51 Though not always. Amanullah Khan and Kemal 
Attaturk, for instance, 'deliberately westernized the 
organization and framework' of their governments and 
societies. 'They ... used Western civilization in order to 
be strong enough to throw off the economic and political 
domination of Western civilization.' Woolf, Imperialism and 
Civilization. 67.
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clarity and precision with which he expressed what is now 
an almost axiomatic proposition: that the Asian and African 
revolt against Western imperialism was itself largely a 
product of the impact of Western imperialism.
Education and Political Advance of 'Backward Peoples'
As the tide of war began to turn in 1942-43, and attention 
began to turn to what the post-war world might look like, 
the BBC Home Service invited Woolf to give a talk on the 
future of colonial empire.52 The talk elicited a highly 
critical response from Elspeth Huxley who accused him of 
being harsh, especially on the system of indirect rule, and 
'rather out of date.'53 She disputed Woolf's assessment of 
the record of the colonial administrations in the field of 
education and training for self-government. Far from being 
dismal, the record was a creditable one. In some 
provinces, Northern Nigeria for example, training in self- 
government was far advanced. The native authorities were 
now responsible for the performance of all but a few of the 
essential functions of government. Even in Kenya, pace 
Woolf, much had been achieved. When the British government 
took over in East Africa 'they saw nothing but wilderness' . 
There were no roads, or railways, or communications of any 
sort. Economic conditions were primitive. There was no 
money and no trade but the slave trade. The indigenous
52 Woolf, 'Challenge to All of Us', Part I, 179-80.
53 Huxley, 'Challenge to All of Us', Part II, 180-1.
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peoples were ravaged by disease. Warfare between them was 
endemic. It would have been impossible to set up schools 
in these conditions. First of all the 'bare bones of 
civilization7 had to be created: law and order established; 
the slave trade abolished; disease combatted; railways, 
roads, and bridges built. Only then was it possible to 
think of education - and before teaching could take place 
in earnest all the different native languages and dialects 
had to be 'put down on paper' , schools had to be built, 
teachers trained, and so on. Given these facts, and the 
fact that the war put things back ten years, the record of 
the British government was far from the disgrace that 
Leonard Woolf made it out to be.
Huxley made two further points. First, she criticized 
Woolf for speaking of 'Africans' as if they were part of an 
undifferentiated whole. This widely held but erroneous 
assumption failed to take into account the vast differences 
in language, custom, and religion between the many races 
and countless tribes of Africa. It was as accurate to 
assume that Africans constituted an undifferentiated whole 
as it was to assume that Europeans did. Second, such vast 
differences meant that one tribe would not necessarily 
agree to be represented politically by a member of another. 
It followed that 'a very high degree of national unity and 
like-mindedness' needed to be attained before self- 
government had any chance of succeeding. But in the 
colonies lack of unity was rife. In Ceylon, for example, 
the key question was not, as Woolf supposed, whether or not
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the indigenous people were to be granted self-government, 
but 'whether the Sinhalese majority are going to govern the 
very big minority of alien Tamils - or rather, how the very- 
different ideas and customs of the Buddhist Sinhalese and 
Hindu Tamils are going to be reconciled.' The key problem 
was to devise a democratic system that had some chance of 
working in a country divided on racial and religious lines. 
In Huxley's view, the striking thing was not so much that 
these problems had not been solved but that ' often a 
solution barely seems in sight.'
Huxley did not call Woolf utopian. It might be 
contended, however, that an implication of the first and 
third criticisms is that certain aspects of his thought in 
this area are utopian in the sense that they pay 
'insufficient attention to existing facts and to analysis 
of cause and effect' . More precisely, it might be 
contended that in his desire to accelerate the pace of 
change he conveniently overlooked some important facts and 
failed to analyze with sufficient rigour the conditions 
under which meaningful self-government could be achieved.
These contentions are valid up to a point. Woolf was 
not an imperial historian. Nor was he a social 
anthropologist. He did not contribute to the detailed 
empirical work on African societies and the impact of the 
European world upon them that began in the 1920s and 1930s. 
He was, however, one of the first analysts to investigate 
the general nature of this impact and he kept abreast, 
through his work as a reviewer, of the latest developments
302
in these new, highly specialized academic fields.
It is probably true that Woolf underestimated the 
difficulties involved in providing education and 
establishing the conditions for self-government in many 
parts of Britain's colonial empire. This is a curious fact 
given his radical conviction that the history of European 
penetration in Africa, particularly of private capital, was 
one of cruelty, exploitation, ruthlessness, and 
destruction. One would have expected someone with such a 
bleak view of the colonial past to have had a pessimistic 
rather than optimistic view of the tasks facing the reform- 
minded colonial administrator.
Yet Woolf's view of the colonial past was not an 
entirely negative one. Along with other radical thinkers 
he frequently held up West Africa as a model of what could 
be achieved. In one article, indeed, he speaks of the 
'relative excellence' of British policy and administration 
in the region.54 In a later article he speaks of the 
conclusive evidence West Africa furnished of the ability of 
'the African' to 'understand' Western civilization and 
'master the arts of government' .55 Huxley seems to have 
overlooked the sharp distinction Woolf made between 
colonial practice in East vis a vis West Africa. Her claim 
that Woolf's account was out of date is based on a skewed 
reading which equates his position on East Africa with his
54 Labour Party, Labour and the Empire. 8.
55 'Challenge to All of Us', 18 0. See also Imperialism 
and Civilization. 85; 'Political Advance of Backward 
Peoples', 93-5.
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position on Africa as a whole. Woolf did not believe that 
the colonial record was uniformly discreditable and, pace 
Huxley, he too felt that big strides had been made in 
extending self-rule in the West Coast colonies. Similarly, 
Huxley failed to appreciate that Woolf's reservations about 
indirect rule were not directed at the idea per se but the 
particular form it had taken in practice.
But Woolf did overlook some important facts which one 
would have expected a man of his knowledge and experience 
to have recognized. He did not discuss at any length the 
lack of social cohesion and the lack of a sense of 
nationhood in the colonies. He did not seriously consider 
the possibility of post-independence inter-ethnic violence. 
Such facts, as Huxley demonstrated, were of critical 
importance. The only kind of communal violence he 
predicted was inter-racial violence resulting from white 
minority rule. Other comments of a prognostic kind were 
limited to warnings about the dangers of premature 
independence: Africans, he repeatedly warned, would be at 
the mercy of exploitative white men until they had been 
educated to understand and control the economic and 
political forces that had been unleashed upon them by the 
Western world.
Woolf's failure to consider these facts is perhaps one 
of the things Huxley had in mind when she described him as 
'rather out of date'. By 1943, the year of his BBC talk, 
the belief that the primary objective of British colonial 
policy should be to systematically promote the social,
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economic, and political development of dependent peoples, 
and prepare them for self-government was, as mentioned, 
widely accepted. Indeed, this belief had already received 
official sanction, at least partially, with the passing of 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940. Under 
this act a substantial sum of public money was, for the 
first time, made available for colonial development. 
Although it did not formally commit the British government 
to complete self-government, the passage of the act clearly 
signalled the readiness of the official classes to 
contemplate an end to colonial rule.56
In certain respects, therefore, the debate had moved 
on. Concern had shifted away from principles and 
objectives towards procedures, programmes, and schedules. 
But even as late as 1945 Woolf was asking questions such 
as: 'What is to be the political future of these [African] 
peoples? Is it our intention to keep them permanently in 
a state of complete tutelage or eventually to give them 
self-government?'57 He was, in other words, asking 
questions which, in the opinion of Huxley and others, had 
long since been answered.
Yet there is another side to the story. Firstly, 
Woolf was not exclusively concerned with questions of this 
kind. Most of what he had to say in the 1940s concerned 
means rather than ends, though his analysis, it is true, 
tended to be rather general in nature. Secondly,
56 Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa. 104.
57 Woolf, 'Political Advance of Backward Peoples', 85.
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Woolf was perhaps right in thinking that the battle over 
objectives had not been completely won. Notwithstanding 
the arrival on the statute-books of a second Colonial 
Development Act in 1945, and the handing back to its people 
of the jewel in the imperial crown a few years later, the 
absence of a clear position on the future of the Empire 
remained for some time a conspicuous feature of British 
colonial policy. No official 'considered long-term 
assessment' was ever made of the likely course of 
decolonization.58 Winston Churchill, among others, 
remained steadfastly committed to the continuance of 
'Britain's heritage'.59 The political and strategic 
expediency of acquiescing to the demands of the white 
colonists in east-central Africa continued hold appeal for 
Colonial Office ministers and even some secretaries of 
state.60 Many men in and around the centres of power - not 
all of them 'Tory diehards, aged Milnerites, or eccentric 
press lords' - remained firmly attached to the integrity of 
the Empire: though they were prepared to accept on balance 
the wisdom of granting independence to India, they found it 
less easy to accept that Uganda or Borneo or Cyprus should
58 Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy 
(London, 1981), 333.
59 Though his position was considerably more pragmatic 
and less romantic and than the received wisdom suggests. 
See Ronald Hyam, 'Churchill and the British Empire', in 
Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis, Churchill (Oxford, 1993), 
167-85.
60 At least until the Creech Jones era, and not, 
interestingly, for their officials, who by this time had 
firmly embraced the 'new morality'. Robinson, 'Moral 
Disarmament', 100-101.
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go the same way.61 As late as 1959, Lionel Robbins, hardly
a reactionary figure, wrote in a letter to The Times:
The predominance of the white man . . . must continue 
for at least another generation. Few black Africans of 
the central African tribes have yet developed the 
qualities of leadership or the education and 
experience to act without control.62
Even such a progressively-minded observer as David Mitrany
did not feel that the days of Empire were so firmly
numbered as they now, with hindsight, appear to have been.
Reflecting on his failure to consider nationalist pressures
in the first edition of A Working Peace System, he wrote:
... no one felt that 'decolonization' was smouldering 
so near below the surface, least of all in tribal 
Africa, the Africa which now asserts the liveliest 
temper and presents the most awkward problems for the 
international system.63
Clearly, Mitrany had not read Woolf on the subject.
These statements illustrate that for well over a
decade after the War unconditional acceptance of self-
government as the immediate and primary goal of colonial
policy was far from a foregone conclusion.
But there is a sense in which Woolf did fail to keep
pace with the debate in the 1940s, and some of his views,
once radical and progressive, did begin to look rather
dated. P. S. Gupta has noted that Woolf's paternalism
towards 'backward peoples' long outlived its usefulness and
61 Kennedy, Realities, 332-3.
62 Quoted in Annan, Our Age. 482.
63 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System. 2nd edn., 
(Chicago, 1966; first edn. pub. 1943), 13.
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never entirely lost a certain racial tinge.64 This is a 
complex issue, especially given that Woolf, along with 
Barnes, Leys, and others, often went to great lengths to 
dispel the idea of racial superiority.65 But it is true 
that Woolf never entirely kicked the habit of thinking in 
racial categories - a habit deeply engrained in men of his 
class and time and an intrinsic part of the imperial 
bureaucratic outlook that a product of St. Paul's, Trinity, 
and Colonial Ceylon would find it difficult not to share.66
This habit was both cause and effect of Woolf's 
tendency to stereotype 'the African'. This, it will be 
remembered, was the brunt of Huxley's second criticism. 
Simplistic beliefs about African society were widely shared 
in Britain during the period. The dichotomy between 
'civilized' Europe and 'primitive' Africa, and the 
concomitant assumption that African societies were all more 
or less alike, enjoyed almost universal acceptance. Woolf 
was no exception. He made no attempt to examine in detail 
the social structures, habits, myths, and customs of 
specific African communities - a remarkable fact given his 
sophisticated understanding of Ceylonese society. He 
tended, instead, to see them as uniformly undeveloped and
64 Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement. 
126, 276-8.
65 See Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization, 104-5; 
Woolf, 'Challenge to All of Us', 180; 'Political Advance of 
Backward Peoples', 89-94; Hetherington, British Paternalism 
and Africa. 76-89.
66 The essence of which - a strict dichotomy between a 
superior 'us' and an inferior 'them' - is discussed by 
Baron, 'Before the Deluge', 49.
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'backward7. This amounts to nothing less than acceptance 
of the easy nineteenth century assumption that African 
societies occupied an earlier stage in a simple, linear 
process of social evolution. The robust rejection of this 
assumption as conjectural and biased by the new, 
functionalist school of Social Anthropology seems to have 
entirely passed Woolf by.67
The evolution of Woolf's nomenclature regarding 
African peoples and societies provides an interesting 
footnote to this question. Throughout his writings Woolf 
unblushingly speaks of 'the native' and 'the African', 
although, significantly, the terms are rarely used in his 
last work, his autobiography, published in the 1960s. Here 
Woolf generally opts for the less condescending 'Africans' 
and 'African peoples'. In his earliest works written 
around 1920, Woolf used the terms 'non-adult races', 
'primitive peoples', even 'African savages'.68 Later in 
the 192 0s his preferred term was 'backward peoples' and, 
significantly, he sometimes enclosed it in inverted commas
67 The leading lights in the functionalist school were 
Bronislaw Malinowski, A. R. Radcliffe-Browne, and Lucy 
Mair. They stressed the importance of detailed field-work 
and replaced the heavily teleological search for 
universally valid 'stages' of development with a search for 
universal characteristics of all societies regardless of 
their geographical or historical location. See 
Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa. 62-75.
68 See for example, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 337, 
352, 354, 356-7, 360, 365-7.
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or qualified it with 7 so called7.69 When he returned to 
the subject in the 1940s his preferred term was "backward 
peoples" (with "primitive peoples' coming a close second) 
but, contrary to what one would expect, it is rarely used 
in inverted commas or in qualified form, though "the 
African' is softened in places to "the Africans".70 I have 
no explanation for this curious linguistic pattern.
Conclusion: Radical Dissent and Fabian Paternalism
The above assessment shows that there are certain aspects 
of Woolf's thought on imperialism that can not unfairly be 
described as utopian in the senses identified as "key" in 
Chapter 2. But on the whole the term is strangely 
inappropriate. Subsequent research has shown that Woolf's 
theory of economic imperialism greatly exaggerates the role 
of the economic factor and in the process oversimplifies an 
complex phenomenon. But he could not be accused of 
"ignoring facts and analysis of cause and effect" nor 
"underestimating the role of power and overestimating the 
role of law, morality, and public opinion" nor "espousing 
universal interests that amount to promotion and defence of 
a particular status cruo" . The same could be said of his
69 See "Empire, Subject Peoples', in H. B. Lees-Smith 
(ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Labour Movement. Vol. I, 
(London, 1928), 258, 261; Imperialism and Civilization. 72. 
In 'Scope of the Mandates" he uses the term "less 
"advanced" peoples" (p.16).
70 'Challenge to All of Us", 179-80; "Political Advance 
of Backward Peoples", passim.
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analysis of the white settler problem though this was, in 
relation to economic imperialism, a subsidiary concern and 
one, consequently, where one finds little empirical 
analysis of a highly detailed kind.
His work on mandates and the political education of 
backward peoples is more contentious in this regard. But 
even here one finds that the label utopian can be applied 
only at a high Procrustean price.
Woolf's work on mandates was for the most part 
exhortatory and admonitory but it was not bereft of factual 
analysis nor did it entirely discount the factor of power. 
Woolf may have underestimated the extent to which the 
Article 22 was a product of raison d'itat. and also the 
extent to which the colonial Powers were prepared to set 
aside the principle of non-intervention in their colonial 
relations. As a consequence his exhortations to the 
mandatory powers that they act 'honestly' do seem utopian 
in the sense implied by the New Statesman cited above. The 
statesmen of Paris did not have the slightest intention of 
complying with their vague and ambiguous professions. That 
is precisely the reason why they were vague and ambiguous. 
In not appreciating this fact Woolf was at least to some 
extent guilty of mistaking rhetoric for reality. After 
saying this, however, it should be emphasized that Woolf's 
assertions about the far reaching implications of the 
mandates system with respect to sovereignty and 
international accountability were in the main both accurate 
and prescient.
311
The same is broadly true of Woolf's work on the 
political education of backward peoples. He may have 
underestimated the difficulties involved in providing such 
education and establishing the conditions for meaningful 
self-government in many parts of Britain's colonial empire. 
He also may have held some simplistic beliefs about ' the 
African' which he clung on to long after they had been 
refuted. But his assessment of the current position of 
native education in the colonies and their unpreparedness 
for self-government was supported by extensive empirical 
evidence; his constant warnings of the need for such 
education and preparation if colonial peoples were to have 
any chance of 'standing by themselves' was informed by a 
highly pessimistic account of the motives of the white man 
in Africa and an acute appreciation of the extent of his 
power; and he was probably right to assume in the mid- 
1940s, pace Huxley, that the battle over the ultimate 
objectives of colonial policy had not yet been completely 
won.
Rather than the unhelpful and largely inaccurate 
'utopian', Woolf's thought is perhaps best seen in terms of 
two categories rarely seen in the IR literature: 'radical 
dissent' and 'Fabian paternalism' . The tone and purpose as 
well as the substance of Woolf's thought on imperialism is 
largely a product of these two strands of political 
thought.
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1. Radical Dissent
By ' radical dissent" I have in mind that body of British 
opinion described by A. J. P. Taylor in his outstanding The 
Troublemakers .71 It is united by what it is against more 
than what it is for. Dissenters are vehemently critical of 
British foreign policy orthodoxy. They oppose the use of 
force, intervention, and power politics. They are deeply 
sceptical of the balance of power. They argue that war is 
little more than the sport of kings in which the vast
majority of people have everything to lose but nothing to 
gain. They see diplomacy and the Foreign Office as
elitist, undemocratic, and distant to the needs and
interests of ordinary people. They deplore the 
unprincipled conduct of international affairs and demand 
greater attention to morality. They view the military as 
militaristic and advocate either complete (or very
substantial) disarmament or the concentration of armaments 
in the hands of a world authority.
The term "dissent" must be qualified by the term 
"radical" for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, 
orthodox foreign policy is not only rejected but rejected 
root and branch. Secondly, the cause of international ills 
is located not at the international level but at the 
domestic level. War and other forms of "dysfunctional" 
political behaviour are seen, at root, as products of 
corrupt or unjust or obsolete or irrational domestic
71 A. J. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: Dissent over 
Foreign Policy. 1792-1939 (Harmondsworth, 1985 [first pub. 
1957]) .
313
political structures. Thirdly, the alternative policies 
prescribed by dissenters represent a fundamental challenge 
to the status cruo. Cobden, for example, advocated a policy 
of pure non-intervention; Morel recommended open diplomacy 
and the democratization of the foreign policy; Wells 
proposed the abolition of the wasteful system of inter­
state competition and its replacement by a world society 
based on rational scientific organization.
Taylor rightly cites Woolf as a prominent dissenting 
voice in early twentieth century British history. The 
purpose of much of Woolfs work was to discredit orthodox 
or conservative policies, principles, ideas, and 
prescriptions. Throughout his career he arraigned them as 
variously irrational, myopic, immoral, stupid, deceitful, 
and impracticable. His tone was sometimes cool and 
sceptical but more often impassioned, indignant, rancorous, 
and sarcastic.
These facets are clearly visible in Woolf's thought on 
economic imperialism and the problem of white settlers. 
The following examples are illustrative.
Woolf compared the open and explicit acquisition of 
colonies in Africa with the complex and shadowy exercise of 
imperialism in Asia. Imperialism in Asia was characterized 
by ' tortuous subterfuges of diplomacy':
We have sovereign States which are no longer States or 
sovereign, independent rulers who are neither rulers 
nor independent, a network of 'protectorates,' 
'spheres of influence,' 'perpetual leases,' 'peaceful 
penetration, 'concessions, 'diplomatic pressure' or 
'advice,' all of which are designed to conceal the 
powerful but often clumsy, movements of that 
Leviathan, the European State, in its encroachments on
314
Asia.72
In similar style:
The European went into Africa ... desiring to exploit 
it and its inhabitants for his own economic advantage, 
and he rapidly acquired the belief that the power of 
his State should be used in Africa for his own 
economic interests. Once this belief was accepted, it 
destroyed the idea of individual moral responsibility. 
The State, enthroned in its impersonality and a 
glamour of patriotism, can always make a wilderness 
and call it peace, or make a conquest and call it 
civilization. The right of Europe to civilize became 
synonymous with the right of Europe to rob or exploit 
the uncivilized.73
Woolf was at his most mischievous when commenting upon the
astonishing arrogance of the Victorian imperialists. The
following is a typical parody of their views:
Until very nearly the end of the nineteenth century, 
Europeans ... regarded . .. [their colonial conquests] 
with complacent pride as one of the chief blessings 
and glories of Western civilization. The white race of 
Europe, they held, was physically, mentally, and 
morally superior to all other races, and God, with 
infinite wisdom and goodness, had created it and 
developed it so it might be ready, during the reign of 
Queen Victoria of England, to take over and manage the 
affairs of all other peoples on the earth and teach 
them to be, in so far as that was possible for natives 
and heathens, good Europeans and good Christians.74
Woolf saved most of his dissenting venom, however, for the
white settlers. The following is a particularly striking
example. In 1912 the complaints of European farmers in
British East Africa about shortages of labour prompted the
Colonial Government to set up a Native Labour Commission.
The farmers demanded inter alia that native taxation should
be increased in order to force the natives to work on their
72 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 53-4.
73 Ibid. 352-3.
74 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization. 12-13.
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farms. The Commission declared that increasing taxation
for the purpose of forcing the natives to work was not
justifiable. It then went on, however, to recommend an
increase in taxation in order to meet the various other
expenses of its recommendations (e.g. the re-organization
of native reserves). According to Woolf this amounted to
sophistry and cant par excellence:
The casuistry of the Jesuit is famous, but, surely, it 
was never equalled by this casuistry of imperialism. 
For the recommendations of the Commission are not 
intended to promote the interests of the natives; the 
re-demarcation of the Reserves, etc., are recommended 
as a means of increasing the labour supply, of 
promoting the economic interests of the white settler. 
The Commission admits that increased taxation will 
'bring natives into the labour market', it holds that 
increased taxation in order to bring natives into the 
labour market is unjustifiable,* and then it finally 
recommends increased taxation (which will bring 
natives into the labour market) not in order to bring 
them into the market, but in order to pay for other 
recommendations the whole object of which is to bring 
natives into the labour market.75
2. Fabian Paternalism
By ' Fabian paternalism' I have in mind that approach to 
political change, central to early Fabianism, which 
assigned a special role to the scientifically trained, 
technically advanced 'expert'. In this respect social 
progress was analogous to technical progress. Through 
scientific investigation experts were able to objectively 
explain social events and rationally determine the most 
effective means by which they could be controlled and 
improved for the greater good of the community. Only the
75 Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa. 349.
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expert possessed the specialized knowledge necessary to do 
this. Hence paternalism: the communal good should be
entrusted to the specially trained expert since he, by 
definition, knew best.
An example of Fabian paternalism is the 'paternal 
imperialism' of George Bernard Shaw described in Chapter 3. 
Shaw did not see imperialism as iniquitous per se. 
Imperialism could be either iniquitous or 'sound'. If it 
brought the ideas,, values, habits, and institutions of 
'higher' civilizations to those parts of the world 
dominated by 'lower' civilizations, it was perfectly 
justified. Indeed it was a duty.
Another hallmark of Fabian paternalism was belief in 
gradual change. This had both a positive and a normative 
dimension. On the one hand, gradual change would 
inevitably occur if society chose to be governed by reason 
and 'the facts' rather than prejudice and opinion. Hence 
the Fabian motto, coined by Sidney Webb, 'the inevitability 
of gradualness' . On the other hand, change was best - more 
permanent, more just, more beneficial - when gradual. Only 
through gradual change could the evils of social turmoil, 
social injustice, and political reaction be avoided.
Fabian paternalism, in substance and in tone, is 
particularly evident in Woolf's thought on mandates and the 
political education of backward peoples. For the most 
part, as we have seen, Woolf wrote about African peoples as 
if they occupied a much lower level of civilization and 
were helpless in the face of the superior civilization of
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the West. He fully subscribed to the presumption of
Article 22 that, unassisted, they would not be able to
7 stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world7 . The native was 7 no match7 for the European
and was unable to cope with the economic and political
system that had been opposed upon him. It was consequently
the job of the colonial authorities to 7 educate the people
so that they may gradually take their place as free men
both in the economic system and in the government of their
country. 7 76 Accordingly:
The end in view is an African population, with its own 
institutions and civilization, capable of making the 
most economic use of its land, able to understand 
Western civilization and control the forces it has let 
loose on the world, governing itself through organs of 
government appropriate to its traditions and 
environment.
The paternalism of all this is clear: it was the job and 
indeed the duty of Europeans - perhaps with the aid of 
expert bodies such as League Committee for Intellectual Co­
operation - to work out the general lines of economic and 
political development in Africa.77
The paternalism of the following passage, written as 
late as 1943, is particularly striking. Responding to the 
7 extreme left7 opinion that full independence should be 
granted immediately, Woolf stated:
In my opinion to do that would be disastrous - 
disastrous for the Africans. Most of them are 
ignorant and uneducated, terribly poor, ravaged 
by tropical diseases. To think that they are 
capable of suddenly taking over the government of
76Woolf, Mandates and Empire. 12.
77 Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization. 131.
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their countries under the political and economic 
conditions of the modern world is just nonsense.
They would fall victims to the first private 
profiteers and exploiters and the first 
imperialist government who crossed their path.
No, the right way to deal with our African 
colonies ... is to begin at once to educate the 
Africans to govern themselves.78
African peoples needed the paternal guidance of enlightened
Europeans if they were to achieve real independence. They
needed to be 'gradually trained' in democracy and 'the art
of self-government' . Only with such guidance would they
ever be capable of 'standing by themselves'.
78 Woolf, 'Challenge to All of Us' , 18 0.
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Chapter Seven
International Economic Policy
In this chapter I examine Woolf's thought on the 
international economy and what he called 'international 
economic policy'. Unlike a number of other progressive 
writers of the time, most prominently G. D. H. Cole, J. A. 
Hobson, and Maynard Keynes, Woolf did not have a grounding 
in economics. At Trinity he read the Classical Tripos and 
there is no evidence to suggest that he ever turned his 
mind to economic questions. The Apostles, the focal point 
of Woolf's intellectual life at Cambridge, rarely discussed 
social and economic issues - at least not directly. 
Aesthetics, morality, and conduct were their line of 
country, and they tended to discuss these matters in the 
abstract with little reference to social context. G. E. 
Moore, for example, preached the aesthetic doctrine of 
intrinsic beauty, a doctrine which his gifted proteges - 
Keynes, Strachey, Foster, and Woolf - fully absorbed and, 
indeed, never completely abandoned.1
Woolf's introduction to economics, as with other 
social subjects, was practical. The task he set himself as 
Assistant Government Agent in the Hambantota district of
1 See J. M. Keynes, 'My Early Beliefs' in Essavs in 
Biography (Cambridge, 1972), 433-50; Bertrand Russell,
Leonard Woolf, Morton White, and John Wisdom, 'The 
Influence and Thought of G. E. Moore: A Symposium', The 
Listener. 30 April 1959, 755-62. Papers read by Woolf to 
meetings of the Apostles included: 'What is Style?',
'Othello or Lord Byron?', 'The dead man answered thus: 
"What good thing shall God give us?" ', and 'Embryos or 
abortions?'. Leonard Woolf Papers, II, O, 2.
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Ceylon was essentially economic: to raise the welfare of 
the peasant farmers of the district, nearly all of whom 
relied on the unproductive and economically and 
environmentally short-sighted 'chena' method of slash and 
burn; to greatly increase the efficiency of the (Government 
owned) salt industry; and to improve the safety of the 
seasonal activity of pearl diving and insure that the pearl 
trade was regulated as fairly and efficiently as possible. 
In brief, he set out to make Hambantota District the most 
efficient and best administered in Ceylon, a task which in 
his own estimation he achieved.2
On leaving Ceylon, Woolf's education in practical 
economics continued with his work in the London East End 
district of Hoxton for the Women's Co-operative Guild, and 
by way of contrast, in his stewardship of the newly-founded 
Hogarth Press. Woolf originally conceived the Press not as 
a business venture but as a hobby for his wife. In 1915 
Virginia suffered her first mental breakdown. Immersion in 
a practical activity like printing and publishing, Woolf 
thought, would have therapeutic value and would put her 
more firmly on the road to recovery than the simple rest 
prescribed by her physicians. In spite of his avowed 
amateurism, and the stringent criteria he and Virginia 
applied in drawing up their lists, the press soon became a 
considerable commercial success - testimony both to Woolf's
2 See his fascinating account in Growing: An
Autobiography of the Years 1904-11 (London, 1961), 172-245.
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artistic judgement and his business acumen.3
Woolf's induction to the discipline of Economics came 
with his research work on the Co-operative movement and in 
particular on the relationship between consumer Co­
operation and the structure of industry.4 But it is 
doubtful whether he spent much time mugging up on economic 
theory. He was, indeed, rather sceptical of what he called 
'Theoretic Economics' . This and other 'academic' subjects, 
for example, were excluded from his syllabus for a 'Co­
operative College' in preference for practical topics such 
as 'Decasualisation', 'The Minimum Wage', 'Management in 
Industry', and 'Trade Unionism'.5 There is no evidence to 
suggest that Woolf seriously studied Smith, Ricardo, Mill 
or Marshall. Most of Woolf's academic training in 
Economics came from the writings of fellow Fabians and 
radicals - the Webbs, Angell, Cole, Hobson, and Keynes.
If one includes Woolf's writings on economic 
imperialism - which one must even though his interpretive 
economics would not find favour with most professional 
economists6 - his work on economic issues is extensive. As
3 Virginia took little part in the business side of the 
press.
4 In this chapter I use 'Co-operation' to distinguish 
the Co-operative movement and the co-operative system of 
economic organization from cooperation in general.
5 Woolf, Education and the Co-operative Movement 
(London, 1914), 13.
6 I say 'interpretive economics' because, as will be 
remembered from Chapter 5, Woolf did not in the main try to 
explain an objective economic realm but rather to identify 
prevalently held economic ideas and beliefs and explain 
their effects.
322
well as four books, he wrote more than a dozen pamphlets 
and many articles. To these must be added a number of 
works not specifically concerned with economics but in 
which the economic factor, in true Fabian fashion, is never 
far from the surface. In his three volume study of 
'communal psychology', for example, Woolf gave a great deal 
of weight to the influence of economic factors in the 
development of communal ideas about democracy, liberty, and 
the state. As was seen in Chapter 3, economic and 
technological factors were fundamental to Woolf's theory of 
international government.
Along with his two books on economic imperialism 
Woolf's main writings on economic issues are: Co-operation 
and the Future of Industry, first published in 1919; 
Socialism and Co-operation, published in 1921; his only 
single-authored Fabian Tract (though he edited and/or wrote 
introductions for many others) International Co-operative 
Trade. published in 1922; the Labour party pamphlet 
International Economic Organization, published in 1923; and 
his long essay on the relationship between Co-operation and 
peace, 'The Way of Peace', published in 1928.7
The 192 0s was, therefore, a period of considerable 
activity on the economic front particularly on the issue of 
Co-operation. Indeed, despite the 'massive inattention',
7 Woolf, Co-operation and the Future of Industry 
(London, 1919); Socialism and Co-operation (London, 1921); 
International Co-operative Trade. Fabian Tract No.201, 
(London, 1922); International Economic Policy (London, 
1923); 'The Way of Peace' in Percy Redfern (ed.), Self and 
Society: Social and Economic Problems from the Hitherto
Neglected Point of View of the Consumer (Manchester, 1930).
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in Margaret Cole's words, which greeted his books on Co­
operation, Woolf acquired a reputation as one of its 
leading theorists.8 But it is precisely this inattention 
which explains why Woolf wrote so little on the subject 
after this initial period of activity. Even the economic 
crisis of 1929 failed to reinvigorate Woolf's enthusiasm 
for things economic, and by the time the crisis had abated 
Woolf's attention had become firmly locked on a set of 
problems even more pressing in nature.
In this chapter I shall address the following 
questions. First, what did Woolf say about economics and 
the international economy? In particular what were Woolf's 
views on protectionism, free trade, and international 
planning? Second, how cogent is Woolf's analysis and how 
coherent his prescriptions for change? Third, and 
following on from this, to what extent and in what ways can 
Woolf's thought about the international economy be 
described as utopian?
Co-operation, Democracy, and Peace
Woolf's basic thesis was that capitalism was based on 'the 
psychology of competition' which induced and intensified 
hostility among nations and generated a zero-sum view of 
the world. The prevalence of imperialism and protectionism
8 Margaret Cole, 'Woolf, Leonard Sidney (1880-1969): 
Author, Publisher and Socialist', in J. M. Bellamy and J. 
Saville (eds.), Dictionary of Labour Biography (London, 
1979) .
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was evidence of this. Its logical conclusion was war.
Woolf rejected, however, most of the radical solutions 
put forward by liberals and socialists alike. He rejected 
the orthodox liberal solution, free trade, in much the same 
terms that Carr was later to do. Free trade engendered a 
form of social Darwinism where the strong prospered and the 
weak went to the wall. It was also an impracticable 
doctrine given the tendency of modern capitalism towards 
monopoly and the instrumentalist way in which capitalists 
viewed and used the state. Under such conditions trade 
could never be truly free.
He rejected socialist solutions as embodied in 
syndicalism and guild socialism. In the final analysis, 
Woolf claimed, these solutions amounted to nothing more 
than the substitution of one kind of producer control for 
another. There was no reason to think that an oligopoly of 
socialist producers would not be just as inclined to fleece 
the consumer as an oligopoly of capitalist producers. 
Producer control of the economy would inevitably lead to 
the exploitation of the consumer since producer control in 
anv of its forms was ultimately based on the psychology of 
competition or, as he frequently called it, the 7psychology 
of capitalism' . Producers would always seek to maximize 
their own interests, both against other producers, and 
against the community of consumers. They had no interest 
in the welfare of the whole.
But Woolf also rejected the increasingly fashionable 
state socialist solution, and along with it the municipal
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socialist solution as championed by his mentor Sydney Webb. 
For Woolf, the state both at the national and at the 
municipal level was essentially a political institution and 
not one necessarily in tune with the economic interests of 
the people. Periodic elections ensured a degree of popular 
control. But in elections many issues were at stake, not 
just the economic needs and desires of the people. There 
was always a danger, as a result, that these needs and 
desires could be ignored.9
In this connection it is also significant that even as 
early as the early 1920s Woolf feared the rising power of 
the state, whether in its capitalist or its socialist form. 
He argued that the all-powerful modern state could easily 
succumb to tyranny. At the time Woolf was a lonely voice 
in opposing the growing power of the state. Many 
socialists saw it as a social and economic panacea.
The Legacy of Liberal Internationalism
Woolf's thought on international economic organization was 
largely a product of two distinct bodies of thought: 
liberal internationalism and consumers' Co-operation 
(though, as will be seen later, Fabianism and functionalism 
were influential, too). One of the most important points 
to note about this is that whereas the former is a doctrine 
primarily concerned with the international context, 
especially the questions of international peace and
9 Woolf, 'The Co-operative Movement and Socialism: 
Better Than the State or Municipality?', The New Leader. 7 
February 1927.
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prosperity, the latter was a doctrine almost exclusively 
concerned with the domestic context, especially the British 
context though the model was later widely exported. In a 
sense Woolf was bringing together two bodies of thought in 
order to build a democratic and pacific alternative to 
power politics.
On the surface, however, the two bodies of thought 
seem diametrically opposed. Was it not the instability and 
inequity of free trade and laissez faire that the Co­
operative movement sought to supplant? Didn't Co-operation 
involve the regulation and control of the very forces that 
liberal internationalists saw as the surest guarrantee of 
liberty and peace?
By liberal internationalism I mean that body of 
thought, developed by Cobden and the Manchester School, 
which maintained that free trade was the key to a 
prosperous and peaceful world. G. W. Shepherd has 
described the central tenets of liberal internationalism 
succinctly:
The free traders always regarded the world as a unity 
bound together by the mutual interdependence of 
national economies. They shunned the burden of
armaments and sought to settle international disputes 
by arbitration and conciliation, and they believed 
peace would be the natural result of ever increasing 
prosperity arising from the mutual advantage accruing 
from increasing trade and intercourse.10
Woolf shared these tenets but gave them negative rather
than positive expression. He did not so much argue in
10 G. W. Shepherd, The Theory and Practice of
Internationalism in the British Labour Party with Special 
Reference to the Inter-War Period. University of London 
Ph.D. Thesis, 1952, 371.
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favour of free trade as against its opposite, protection. 
This is explained partly by his socialist convictions, and 
partly by the economic and political context of the time: 
Europe was still struggling to recover from the destruction 
and economic dislocation of the First World War and many 
countries were still suffering from extreme economic 
hardship. The working class bore the brunt of this 
hardship through unemployment. Import protection was 
called for in many countries in order to get domestic 
production going again. Woolf, however, was strongly 
opposed to such a move because he felt that protection 
never benefited the working class in any lasting and 
substantial way.11
But protectionism not only conflicted with the 
interests of Labour but also its general social and 
international aims.12 The general social aim was the 
maintenance and improvement of the standard of life of the 
"non-capitalist classes". This entailed a redistribution 
of national income, an increase in wage rates, a decrease 
in the working week, protection against unemployment, and 
" increased efficiency in the organization and management of
11 See Woolf, Taxation (London, 1916), 29.
12 Woolf defined protectionism broadly as " the use of 
fiscal and other administrative measures which directly or 
indirectly affect the commerce, industry, or finance of the 
citizens of two or more states' (Empire and Commerce in 
Africa, 19) . Such a definition is clumsy since according to 
it most actions of government could be described as 
protection. However, Woolf's examples of protection - 
tariffs, prohibitions, embargoes, differential railway and 
shipping rates, and administrative methods of various kinds 
designed to raise the price of foreign goods - are sound. 
See Woolf, International Economic Policy. 1-5.
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industry". The general international aim was "peace and 
co-operation between nations", involving "the development 
of international co-operation in the League of Nations" .13
A policy of protection, Woolf claimed, had the 
following effects: an increase in the profits of the
protected industry; a rise in price of the protected good 
or commodity on the home market; and the encouragement of 
"capitalist rings, combinations, and trusts".14 All these 
things, he claimed, were contrary to the interests of 
Labour and, indeed, all consumers (of which Labour 
constituted the majority). Increased wages would not 
inevitably spring from increased profits even in cases 
where workers were well organized: experience proved that 
"the major part of the tribute levied upon the consumer 
goes to the small group of capitalists in the protected 
industry" .15 A rise in prices or scarcity always hit the 
poorest classes hardest. In addition, selective protection 
tended to give way to generalized protection since 
governments found it difficult to deny to one sector of the 
economy that which it had granted to another. Powerful 
interests, according to Woolf, would inevitably compel the 
government to extend its policy, leading to the weakening 
of the worker vis a vis the capitalist, and a general 
increase in income inequality.
In accordance with the teachings of classical
13 Woolf, International Economic Policy. 1-2.
14 Ibid. 2.
15 Woolf, 'Way of Peace", 12-13.
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political economy, Woolf also contended that protection 
would lead to general impoverishment. This was so because 
even in the event of increased profits, wages, and 
employment, such increases would not be 7equivalent to the 
quantity of goods kept out7 .16 Higher prices would depress 
demand and eventually lead to unemployment. In addition, 
higher prices in one sector would raise costs and thus 
prices in another, this effect multiplying in cases where 
protection was the norm. The outcome would be a general 
reduction in purchasing power and thus a general fall in 
the standard of living.
The only thing that Labour should do with regard to 
foreign competition was to make sure that the cheapness of 
foreign goods was not due to sweating. If it was, the 
correct course of action would be to get international 
agreement on labour legislation aimed at its abolition. 
The 7 indiscriminate7 way in which states usually dealt with 
the problem almost always lead to 7 indiscriminate7 
retaliation.
The effect of protection on the international aims of
Labour were similarly dire. According to Woolf, protection
was both a product and a cause of international hostility.
It was based on the assumption that international trade was
a zero-sum game, an assumption which the practice of
protection merely confirmed:
The policy of Protection is ... based upon a theory of 
the divergence of interests among nations and upon 
international hostility; it actually, by a vicious
16 Ibid. 3.
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circle, creates this divergence of interests and 
hostility.17
Protectionism resulted in a kind of economic warfare which,
under modern conditions, had become "one of the most
powerful engines of international enmity'. In parallel
with Cobden's contentions about the landed aristocracy, and
Hobson's about financiers, Woolf further contended that the
problem was fuelled by a small but powerful group of
capitalists who alone stood to profit.
Hostility was particularly fierce when protection was
discriminatory:
For such 'hostile discrimination' naturally channels 
the hostility bred by tariffs into a particular 
hostility between two nations, and the tariff becomes 
an economic weapon to be used in and to embitter and 
sometimes even to create political differences and 
disputes. Bad as a tariff is, its evil is greatly 
increased if it allows of differential duties and 
discrimination between different nations.18
Nor was the need to safeguard 'key industries' a credible
defence. According to this view, industries producing
goods essential to the war-fighting potential of the nation
needed to be protected during peacetime in order to avoid
reliance on foreign sources of supply during war. In
Woolf's view the relevance of this argument, like the
doctrine of contraband in war, had long been lost. Its
central assumption, that it was possible to distinguish
between 'strategic' and 'non-strategic' goods prior to any
particular conflict breaking out, was no longer tenable.
It was no longer possible to say with any confidence which
17 Ibid. 3.
18 Ibid. 4.
items would be essential and which non-essential to the 
waging of war. In principle practically all items were 
'essential'. Hence practically all industries were 'key 
industries' . The logic of the key industries argument was, 
therefore, the logic of self-sufficiency and self­
containment. Such a policy undermined rather than improved 
national safety since it generated a psychological 
environment of constant fear and preparation for war.
In any event such a policy was impracticable given the 
wide range of goods that could under no circumstances be 
produced at home. Bearing these factors in mind, the best 
policy was diversification of supply.19 The only 
justification for impeding the flow or raising the price of 
foreign goods was in order to safeguard against accidents 
and prevent the spread of diseases.20
The arguments against domestic protection also applied 
to imperial preference - in fact even more so:
. . . even in the limited area of the home territory 
anything like a general tariff must prove disastrous 
to the interests of Labour. Still more disastrous 
would be an attempt to draw up a tariff to satisfy all 
the different interests of the Empire which includes 
not only the highly industrialised home territory but 
Australia, Canada, India, South Africa, and immense 
tropical possessions.21
Furthermore, due to the links between protectionism and
imperialism, and the role of imperialism in causing war,
19 As recommended by the Royal Commission on Supply of 
Food and Raw Materials in Time of War. Cited by Woolf, 
ibid. 4.
20 Ibid. 4-5.
21 Ibid. 5.
332
the international implications of imperial preference were 
even more fearful than the domestic implications. The 
imperial rivalry of the late nineteenth century was largely 
fomented by the mutual fear that colonial possessions would 
be used as exclusive fields of economic exploitation. 
Every player in the colonial game feared being dealt a 
mortal economic blow. This fear was a major cause of the 
War. In light of these facts Woolf concluded that imperial 
preference was ' completely incompatible with any kind of 
lasting peace' . He recommended that all states adopt 
without hesitation the policy of the Open Door.22
Nowhere does Woolf advocate free trade in name. But 
in his rejection of protectionism, notwithstanding the 
working class spin he put on it, the imprint of liberal 
internationalism is clear. He rejected the inherently 
conflictual, zero-sum, world of the protectionists, and 
implicit in his argument is the notion that the world, or 
at least a large part of it23, is in some sense unified by 
being 'bound together by the mutual interdependence of 
national economies'. Protection increased not the wealth 
of any nation but brought conflict upon them. In places 
Woolf even suggests that international trade is in fact a
22 Ibid. 6-8.
23 Excluding the small band of capitalists who gain 
from international hostility. Woolf's repeated references 
to this small group of capitalists suggests that not all 
capitalists were implicated. This further confirms the 
influence of liberal internationalism on his thought since 
the liberals consistently sought to make a distinction 
between good and bad capitalists. See Shepherd, Theory and 
Practice of Internationalism, 40-4.
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positive-sum game:
The form of society developed from the industrial 
revolution requires for its continued existence, both 
politically and economically, an international 
framework. Nations and peoples are so intimately knit 
together, one part of the world is so seriously 
dependent upon all other parts, that, in actual fact, 
one nation's loss is practically always every other 
nations loss, and one nation's gain every other 
nation's gain.24
As well as looking back to Cobden, Woolf here looks forward
to Brandt. He opposed the exploitation of colonial labour
not only on moral grounds but on economic grounds.
Exploitation was not only bad for the exploited but also
bad for the exploiters. He rejected what Lenin called the
'labour aristocracy'. Cheap colonial labour, he asserted,
was 'directly contrary to the interests of Labour, of
industry, and of the world'. He continued:
It is to Labour's interest in Europe that the standard 
of living in Africa and Asia should be raised to the 
highest possible point in order that increased demand 
and consumption in those parts may encourage an 
exchange of commodities between Europe and Asia and 
Africa. The low wages of the African negro and the 
system by which he is forced to work for them make the 
fortune of the individual exploiter; they strike a 
blow at Labour in Europe by consolidating the power of 
capital and by restricting the possible market for 
European manufacturers and the free exchange of 
commodities throughout the world.25
Anti-Capitalism
At this point, however, Woolf parted company with Cobden 
and his twentieth century brethren since by 'free exchange
24 Woolf, 'Way of Peace', 28.
25 Woolf, International Economic Policy. 8. See also 
Empire and Commerce in Africa. 355-6; International Co­
operative Trade. 13-15.
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of commodities' he did not have in mind free exchange 
between private enterprises but simply the absence of state 
interference. Woolf was unbending in his rejection of all 
capitalist methods and institutions - indeed he both shared 
and helped to consolididate the anti-capitalist assumptions 
that until recently have dominated the twentieth century 
British Left.
Woolf's understanding of capitalism was unorthodox. 
In some respects he drew from the Marxist tradition in 
seeing capitalism as inherently exploitative. But he did 
not adopt Marx' s definition of capitalism as a system of 
generalized commodity production in which labour itself is 
a commodity. Nor did he see capitalism in terms of the 
perfect competition model of classical economics - though 
he did share with Adam Smith the view that the interests of 
the consumer were paramount. Like Smith, Woolf was highly 
critical of economic systems which put the interest of the 
producer above the interest of the consumer. He endorsed 
Smith's claim that 'consumption is the sole end and purpose 
of all production' He would, however, have qualified the 
word 'production' with the word 'industrial'. By 
'industrial production' Woolf meant efficient, mass, 
factory production of the basic commodities of life. The 
things that made life worth living - art, literature, 
science, learning, drama, recreations - ought not, Woolf 
believed, be produced by 'industry' since the value of
26 See Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers. 
(London, 1980), 53.
335
these things derived from their production as well as their 
consumption. Industry was necessary because it was 
efficient but the good things in life tended to be 
corrupted once mass-produced and/or commercialized.27
Woolf did not systematically set out his understanding 
of capitalism. It is possible, however, to identify four 
important features in his work:
(i) In sharp contrast to the classical model of perfect 
competition, Woolf understood capitalism in terms of 
monopoly, oligopoly, combination, and price-rigging. 
Through these methods the capitalist, whether a financier, 
manufacturer, wholesaler, or a retailer, sought to drive up 
prices the burden of which always fell on the consumer.28
(ii) Following Robert Owen, capitalism meant production for
profit rather than production for use. Under capitalism
things were produced because the producer felt he could
make a profit out of them rather than because they were
individually or socially useful:
Capitalist industry does not ... produce things 
because they are beautiful, good, or useful, but 
because someone thinks that he will be able to induce 
other people to buy them and that thereby he will make 
a profit for himself.29
27 See Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 44-55, 76-87.
28 Woolf, Education and the Co-operative Movement. 3; 
Co-operation and the War II: Co-operative Action in 
National Crises (London, 1915), 2-4.
29 Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 47. See also 
Robert Owen, A New View of Society and Other Writings 
(London, 1991).
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Profit was not the vital ingredient in the efficient 
working of an economy, as the classical economists 
maintained, but a 7 toll upon society7.30 Underlying this 
view is the assumption that the market is an inadequate 
mechanism for balancing supply and demand. According to 
Woolf, the question the capitalist asked was not 7How can 
I best make things that people want to buy?7 but 7How can 
I best induce people to buy the things I produce at the 
highest price?7 Contrary to the assumption of perfect 
competition that all participants had complete knowledge of 
the price, quality, and quantity of goods for sale, Woolf 
contended that under capitalism it was in the interests of 
all participants to keep all other participants as much in 
the dark as possible.31
(iii) According to Woolf capitalism was an oligarchical 
system. Under capitalism sovereignty resided in the 
producer not the consumer and, therefore, with the few not 
the many. Over the last hundred years various aspects of 
social life had been democratized, but industry remained 
untouched. The producer still decided 7what is to be made; 
how, where, and when7 and consumers and workers had little 
if any influence on their decisions.32
30 Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 40.
31 Woolf, The Control of Industry bv the People 
(London, 1915), 5-6; Co-operation and the War. 5-6.
32 Woolf, Control of Industry bv the People. 3; Co­
operation and the Future of Industry. 10-11.
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(iv) As well as a system, capitalism, for Woolf, was a way
of thinking, a set of ideas and beliefs consciously or
unconsciously held, a 7 psychology'. Accordingly,
'capitalist psychology' meant the attitude that one should
pursue one's own interest regardless of the interest of the
community. This pursuit of self-interest was most
obviously manifested in the pursuit of profit but it was
also evident in the struggle for wages:
The capitalist, in pursuit of his own profits, will 
defraud the State, ruin his fellow capitalist, and 
join with his fellow capitalist to exploit the worker 
and the consumer, while the worker, in his struggle 
for wages, again and again finds that in order to 
protect his own interests he has to sacrifice those of 
his fellow workers or of the whole community.33
Indeed it affected (or 'contaminated' as Woolf sometimes
put it) many aspects of society from art and literature to
the professions to trade unionism and even socialism
itself. Essentially it might be said that by 'capitalist
psychology' Woolf meant egotism.
* * * * *
Woolf's critique of capitalism was wide-ranging. Firstly, 
capitalism was exploitative. Workers were exploited as 
capitalists constantly strove to drive down wages in order 
to increase profits. They were assisted in this task by 
the fact that the supply of labour almost always exceeded 
demand.34 The consumer was exploited through the 
commonplace practices of deception - misleading the
33 Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 11.
34 Woolf, The Control of Industry bv Co-operators and 
Trade Unionists (London, 1914), 4.
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consumer being a perfectly legitimate way of making a 
profit - and price-rigging. Laissez faire meant merely the 
liberty to ' snatch according to the rules of the game from 
the community of fellow men7 .35 The art of the capitalist 
was buying cheap and selling dear, something he showed no 
compunction in doing even in times of hardship, often 
taking advantage of scarcity and consumer ignorance of 
market conditions in the process. In this he was greatly 
assisted by modern advertising which enabled him to further 
hoodwink consumers into buying things they did not need.36
Secondly, capitalism was undemocratic. Capitalists 
wielded enormous power in the political system. As well as 
controlling production, capitalists and 7 a small group of 
property owners7 effectively controlled the state - a 
control strengthened by the near-monopoly capitalists had 
over the media and by the readiness of the law, the army, 
and the police to defend property rights and the
35 Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 9.
36 Ibid. 47, 81-2; Co-operation and the War. 3-4. An 
extended footnote is perhaps justified here. The war, and 
the shortages it generated - particularly the food 
shortages resulting from the German submarine campaign - 
gave rise to the notion of the 7profiteer7 . It became 
widely believed that the war was being kept going by a 
small number of people who were making enormous profits 
from it. Allied with the success of government in 
controlling virtually all aspects of the economy, the 
equation of profit-making with 7profiteering7 did much to 
undermine the legitimacy of the dominant free market 
conception of economic organization. Individualism, 
competition, and the pursuit of profit, came to be seen, 
especially mong working men, as iniquitous and intolerable. 
This helps to explain Woolf7s (far from unique) contempt 
for private capital and profit-making. See Paddy Maguire,
7 Co-operation and Crisis: Government, Co-operation, and
Politics, 1917-19227, in Stephen Yeo (ed.), New Views of 
Co-operation (London, 1988), 192-6.
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'capitalist weapon of starvation' against the worker.37 
Here Woolf's analysis is decidedly Leninist except for the 
fact he believed that socialists, too, were capable of 
capturing the state. They too, he believed, were capable 
of ruling the state in the special interest of the few 
rather than the general interest of the many. Already by 
1921 he had reached this conclusion with respect to the 
Soviet Union.38
Thirdly, capitalism was inefficient. This was 
confirmed by the existence of 'chronic unemployment in one 
part of the world and acute shortage elsewhere of the 
commodities for which the unemployed cannot find 
purchasers' .39 Capitalist psychology led to the failure to 
differentiate between what was socially valuable and what 
was not: whether sewers or champagne were produced was of 
no great moment to the capitalist since all that mattered 
was profit. Capitalist psychology also begot the ca'canny 
worker who did as little as he could get away with knowing 
that the fruits of his labour went not to himself but to 
his boss.40
A further aspect of the inefficiency of capitalism was 
its constant output of 'shoddy, ugly, and useless' goods. 
There is a strong aesthetic dimension to Woolf's analysis. 
Like Ruskin he was appalled by the 'unintelligent
37 Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 9-10, 26-30.
38 Ibid. 32-4.
39 Woolf, 'Way of Peace', 11.
40 Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 43, 47-8.
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repetition' and 'ceaseless mechanical or laborious 
operations' that characterized life in the modern factory. 
Like Morris he felt that capitalism had ' debauched and 
debased our taste for material commodities' . One of the 
central tasks of socialism, Woolf held, was to rid society 
of its materialism and crass commercialism. Nowhere does 
he unambiguously state, however, that these evils are 
exclusively the product of capitalism. The fact that he 
felt socialism could produce like evils suggests that his 
target was not capitalism but industrialism. The problem 
is much complicated, however, by Woolf's eccentric 
definition of capitalism and, in particular, his insistence 
that socialists too were not immune to capitalist 
psychology.41
Finally, in addition to being exploitative,
undemocratic, and inefficient, capitalism was bellicose.
The egotism of capitalist psychology produced a combative
perception of international economic relations. Trade
became 'a struggle for existence or profits'. This
struggle 'gave a new depth and colour to men's fear of
other countries and the love of their own'. Capitalist
psychology thus both intensified international rivalry and
was reinforced by contact with it.42
★ ★ * * *
There are a number of problems with Woolf's understanding 
of capitalism and his critique of it. These can perhaps
41 Ibid. 12-13, 51, 55, 74.
42 Woolf, 'Way of Peace', 6-7.
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best be analyzed by looking at the label 'anti-capitalist' 
which suggests an element of dogmatism on Woolf's part.
Woolf can be described as an anti-capitalist for two 
reasons. First, he makes no attempt to consider 
sympathetically the liberal case for capitalism. He 
focuses his attention entirely on its weaknesses without 
any consideration of its strengths. In saying that 
capitalists think only of profits and shareholders, for 
example, he dismisses too casually the mechanism by which 
the market enables demand to be balanced with supply. He 
does in fact admit that capitalists may occasionally have 
to think of consumers and workers since they need to 
produce things that the former will buy and offer wages 
that the latter will work for. But he then says 'But that 
is all'. For the classical economist, however, this is a 
fact of immense importance. In automatically requiring the 
producer to think of all these things the market enables 
resources to be allocated efficiently without having to 
employ a large and expensive body of experts to do the job 
administratively.43
Woolf also too readily accepts that the dynamism 
generated by capitalism is wasted in the mass production of 
shoddy, useless goods. There may be something in this - it 
has been a consistent line of critique since the time of 
Morris and Ruskin - but in not considering the ostensible 
benefits of capitalist dynamism - constant process and 
product innovation, the extension of consumer choice, the
43 See Woolf, Control of Industry bv the People. 5-6.
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maximization of factor output and aggregate incomes -
Woolf is at best providing only a partial picture.
Similarly, he sometimes too readily assumes that economic
change has generally been for the worse - for example in
his request that
the civilised capitalist ought somehow to explain the 
undoubted fact that all the great scientific 
discoveries of the last 100 years have contributed 
more to the sum of human misery than to the sum of 
human happiness.
Or in his assertion that
If without sentimentality or prejudice we were to 
estimate in terms of human happiness and social 
progress the chief results of all industrial 
inventions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
we should be compelled to say that they are summed up 
in the difference between the slums of Manchester and 
the slums of Constantinople and in the difference 
between the battle fields of the Somme or Flanders and 
the battlefield of Waterloo.44
Again, there may be something in this, but it is, at best,
only a partial picture.
In addition, Woolf uncritically assumes that monopoly
and oligopoly are unavoidable features of capitalism. As
well as not being entirely consistent with his assertions
about 'unfettered capitalism' and capitalism being a
'competitive system',45 such an assumption fails to take
account of the ability of the state to dismantle monopolies
as had already been powerfully demonstrated in the U.S.
Secondly, by defining capitalism in such a broad way -
44 Woolf, Socialism and Co-operation. 14, 59. 
Capitalist psychology responsible for the bad direction 
industrial production had taken (ibid. 56-9).
45 See Woolf, The Control of Industry bv Co-operators 
and Trade Unionists. 2; 'Way of Peace', 5.
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in terms of a 7 competitive psychology' as well as in terms 
of monopoly, private profit, and oligarchy - Woolf was able 
to associate capitalism with a wide range of domestic and 
international ills. This suited his propagandist purpose. 
It enabled him to blame capitalism for bellicosity and even 
some of the defects of socialism as well as for the 
standard ills of social injustice and working class 
poverty. His conception of capitalism was, therefore, a 
weapon at least in part fashioned to bring capitalism down. 
But in equating capitalism in effect with egotism, Woolf 
was blaming it for evils which, even according to the most 
extreme interpretations, considerably pre-date the 
emergence of capitalism as a distinct mode of economic 
organization. One can only conclude that Woolf's 
capitalism is something of a scapegoat.46
Co-operation and Democracy
Much of what Woolf wrote on Co-operation concerned the 
democratic control of industry. For our purposes it is 
important to note his central argument, and also the 
aspects of it which may be regarded as undemocratic. These 
are important because they help to explain why Woolf's 
ideas about international economic organization took little
46 One which, incidently, he was unable to sustain. He 
suggests in one place that the impulse of self-interest is 
'part of human nature'. He suggests in another that 'the 
motive of profit-making has probably always existed in 
human beings' (with industry transforming it into 'the most 
universal and perhaps the strongest of all the streams of 
individual and social psychology'). Woolf, The Control of 
Industry bv Co-operators and Trade Unionists. 11; Socialism 
and Co-operation. 90.
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account of the liberty of states to define and pursue their 
own economic interests. They also help to explain why even 
such a democratically minded socialist as Woolf could 
sometimes suggest things of a highly authoritarian nature.
Woolf conceived democracy in terms of government for 
the whole people by the whole people, and he felt, at least 
up until the late 1920s, that the only way of achieving 
this was through consumers' Co-operation. Woolf was 
critical of certain types of socialism because he felt they 
would lead to government for part of the people by part of 
the people: that is, government for and by a special
interest. This special interest might comprise the 
majority of the population, but it was still, in Woolf's 
view, a special interest since large numbers of people 
would be excluded.47 It was this conception of democracy 
that prompted Woolf's doubts about the Soviet Union: 
government by Soviets was, regardless of the elaborate 
mechanisms and institutions designed to make them 
democratically accountable, government by the Party, and 
the Party was only a small minority of the whole 
population. Similarly, syndicalism, guild socialism, and 
other types of 'producer socialism' could not be considered 
democratic since producers constituted only one part, 
albeit a large one, of the whole population. Calculated in 
straight-forward utilitarian terms, the substitution of 
producer socialism for capitalism would, no doubt, be a
47 Most notably, women, who were far out-numbered by 
men in industrial production. See The Control of Industry 
bv the People, passim.
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great improvement. But it would not necessarily result in
real democracy since government by producers would
inevitably mean government for producers. In this regard
Woolf's observations were highly prescient, at least as far
as the British industrial scene is concerned, in that he
accurately predicted what would happen if producers gained
political power. The trade union syndicalism of the 1970s,
as Noel Annan has recently described it, would have not
surprised Woolf in the least.48
The answer to the problem of the democratic control of
industry and the economy lay not in the Soviet, the guild,
the state, or the municipality, but in the consumer. And
the beauty of the consumer was that everyone was one:
The owners of capital will always be only a small 
minority of the whole community, and industrial 
workers can never be more than a large majority. But 
every one, man, woman and child, is in the nature of 
things a consumer. In a sense therefore the co- 
operator consumers represent the whole community in a 
way in which the capitalists or the workers could 
never represent it.49
Through the dividend on purchase and quarterly and annual
meetings of the whole society, Co-operation, Woolf claimed,
was the optimum, most democratic form of industrial
organization. Unlike capitalism and producer socialism,
Co-operation gave consumers control of what was to be
produced, in what quantities, to what standards, and at
what price. Co-operators also had control over investment
decisions by being able, at the annual meetings of their
48 See Noel Annan, Our Age: The Generation that Made 
Post-War Britain (London, 1991), 453-85, esp. 469.
49 Woolf, Co-operation and the Future of Industry. 36.
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respective societies, to set the level of dividend. Co- 
operators decided who they wanted as managers; they also 
chose their delegates to the CWS.
In characteristic Fabian style Woolf argued that one 
of the advantages the Co-operation over other forms of 
socialism was that it was already a real and living thing 
which had already proven its abilities. By the 192 0s the 
Co-operative Society had a membership of over 4 million and 
was in the process of becoming the country's largest 
commercial concern. Woolf ardently believed that socialism 
could be best achieved by the progressive development of 
Co-operative organization until it became conterminous with 
society as a whole - at which point all citizens would be 
members and all production Co-operative production.
Woolf enthusiastically welcomed the growth of 
international Co-operative trade - trade between the Co­
operative movements of several countries - which had begun 
to take root in the early years after the War. He saw this 
as a means by which gains to trade could be maximized and 
natural endowments exploited without the need to enter the 
international struggle for markets and profits. Each 
national society would become a member of each other 
national society with whom it did business. Each would be 
entitled to receive, as with domestic Co-operative 
organization, a dividend on purchase. The welfare of each 
would thereby be intermeshed with the welfare of all.
In Woolf's view, consumers' co-operation in Britain, 
Germany, and several other countries had reached the stage
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at which its 'ordinary business of supplying its members'
demands and its normal development' would be hampered
unless 'the co-operative system and co-operative control'
could be extended to ' the international exchange of
manufactured or partly manufactured goods and to the import
and export of food stuffs and the raw materials of
industry.' This was a fact of 'immediate and practical
importance' but also one of 'wider significance' . There
were many Co-operators who saw Co-operation as an
alternative to the capitalist system. But, Woolf asserted,
it was obvious that Co-operation could only take the place
of capitalism in a very limited field if it did not adapt
itself to international trade:
Industry, commerce, and finance tend to become ever 
more and more international, and the basis of the 
capitalist's strength is more often than not to be 
found in his control of foreign markets, the foreign 
supplies of raw materials, and the channels of foreign 
trade. The co-operator will never oust capitalism and 
its evils unless it can oust the capitalist from 
foreign trade.50
* * * * *
Three interrelated problems with Woolf's thesis on the 
relationship between Co-operation and democracy merit 
emphasis. The first has to do with Woolf's conception of 
democracy; the second with his notion of the ' spirit of 
democracy'; the third with the relationship between 
coercion and democracy.
Woolf's rejection of producer socialism was based on 
the assumption that democracy meant ' rule by all the
50 Woolf, International Co-operative Trade. 4-5.
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people'. Since producers formed a group which fell well 
short of all the people, producer control of industry could 
not be described as democratic.
There is a problem with this conception of democracy 
which Woolf recognized but never fully addressed. Even if 
Co-operation became conterminous with society as a whole, 
decisions would inevitably be made by a group smaller than 
society as a whole, and even if this group constituted a 
majority, control of industry would still be 'in the hands, 
not of all the people, but of the majority of the 
people' .51 Woolf recommended the setting up of committees 
in order to protect the rights of minorities and suggested 
that clearly identifiable minorities within the movement, 
such as employees, should have permanent representation on 
such committees. But he never managed to convincingly 
square democracy with the need for executive action - 
though it might be said that this is a flaw in the notion 
of direct democracy per se. certainly as applied to large 
and complex societies, as much as it is a flaw in the 
particular brand of it that Woolf was advocating. One 
solution, of course, would be to define democracy in terms 
of universal suffrage and representation rather than to 
rely, as Woolf does, on a literal definition. This would 
satisfy his criterion of universality (government by the 
whole people) without having to concede that failure of all 
the people to participate in all important decisions meant 
that democracy was to that extent deficient. Yet for some
51 Woolf, The Control of Industry by the People. 12.
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reason Woolf was reluctant to go down the 'representative 
democracy' (viv a vis 'direct democracy') road. In one of 
his most substantial and, indeed, highly sophisticated 
treatments of the subject, he defines democracy in terms of 
'politically equal rights and socially equal opportunities' 
involving 'equal rights to happiness' and the treatment 
'politically' of everyone as an individual rather than as 
a member of a particular class or social group.52 This is 
a remarkably broad definition. It is also eccentric in 
making no reference to the process of government or the 
basis of representation in government. Perhaps one reason 
for this is that he could not stomach the idea that if a 
majority chose capitalism, fascism, or communism, that 
decision would, by virtue of that fact, be democratic.53
Secondly, Woolf contended that democracy could not be 
achieved by democratic machinery alone: democratic
machinery had to be accompanied by 'democratic spirit' . By 
this Woolf had in mind a cluster of things such as a sense 
of responsibility, 'a wide and real interest in the 
machinery of government and administration', a willingness 
to actively participate, and a sense of the good of the 
whole.54 With respect to Co-operation, Woolf argues that 
'half the good of democratic control of industry' would be
52 Woolf, 'Can Democracy Survive?' in Mary Adams (ed.) , 
The Modern State (London, 1933), 42, 24-25.
53 In the same volume Lord Eustace Percy accuses Woolf 
of confusing what democracy is with what he would like it 
to do.
54 Woolf, 'Can Democracy Survive?', 7-12,* Co-operation 
and the Future of Industry. 50-55.
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lost if the level of dividend became the main object:
Co-operators ought always to remember that they are 
controlling industry for the people, and that they are 
in a society not in order to make a profit, but in 
order to supply themselves with goods.
While one can sympathise with certain elements of this 
view, it can be objected that it rests on a particular 
conception of the purposes of Co-operation and leaves 
little room for Co-operators to define these purposes 
themselves. What if the majority of Co-operators in any 
given Society decide that their sole objective should be to 
maximize the dividend? For Woolf this would suggest a lack 
of democratic spirit. But the implication of this is that 
whether or not this spirit exists depends on whether or not 
Woolf's conception of the good of the whole is being 
pursued: a dogmatic and undemocratic position.
Thirdly, Woolf's conception of democracy is not 
entirely coercion-free. There are two striking
illustrations of this. While the first, concerning Co­
operative education, might be described as a form of 
paternalism; the second, concerning the organization of 
industrial production, is almost certainly a form of 
authoritarianism. Woolf believed that education was 
central to the proper working of democracy. In particular 
he believed, as mentioned, that ' a wide and real interest 
in the machinery of government and administration' was a 
major ingredient of the democratic spirit. The implication 
of this for Co-operation was that members inter alia would
55 Woolf, The Control of Industry bv the People. 8.
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have to study and understand the business of the Society, 
study and understand its balance sheets, and regularly 
attend its meetings. But what if they didn't? What if 
they were happy to leave all this to their managers and 
delegates?
Woolf argued that lack of interest was ' the most 
serious danger to all democracies ... it is certainly the 
most serious danger to the Co-operative movement' . If a 
citizen or member did not feel responsible for the actions 
of the institutions that governed him, 'real democratic 
control' was absent. His solution was, however, somewhat 
alarming:
I often think that one of the most urgent needs in the 
movement is an organisation which will take this 
matter in hand. For instance, in every society there 
might be a democracy committee possibly of the Women's 
and Men's Guilds. This committee should see that every 
new member of the society is visited personally by 
someone who would explain the democratic nature of the 
movement, and impress upon him or her the importance 
of attending meetings and understanding the business 
of the society. The committee should have pamphlets 
explaining these things and also the meaning of 
balance sheets, and the visitor should leave these 
pamphlets with every new member. Further, the 
committee should watch the attendance at meetings, and 
note the names of those members who do not attend, and 
they should then call personally upon such member 
[sic] and try to persuade them to take an active share 
in the control and affairs of the society.56
While Woolf's intentions - his desire to create an 'active
democracy' - are admirable, his methods, witnessed from a
post-1984 and post-Darkness at Noon world, seem rather like
the Fabian equivalent of ' sending the boys round' .
But Woolf's somewhat sinister paternalism is sometimes
56 Ibid. 11-12.
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accompanied by overt authoritarianism. This is best 
exemplified by his scheme for 'national service in 
industrial production' .57 The way he arrives at this 
scheme is impeccably logical but the outcome is, to say the 
least, disturbing. He contended that capitalism combined 
with industrialism produced shoddy, useless goods that 
consumers were cajoled into buying. He also contended that 
industrial production was a miserable activity which 
delivered not a shred of job satisfaction. Given these 
facts he argued that industry should concentrate on 
producing a smaller range of basic, but well-made goods. 
More elaborate and luxurious goods should be produced in a 
traditional, non-commercial way. He also argued that no 
one should be forced to spend their entire working life in 
' industrial slavery' . A return to a medieval system of 
arts and crafts was not, however, feasible. Industrial 
production was by far the most efficient way of producing 
goods with mass demand.58 It was in this sense it was 
'necessary'. Since, however, industry would in future only 
be devoted to provision of the basics, less manpower would 
be needed to work it. Consequently the most appropriate 
way of organizing industry would be to introduce a scheme 
whereby every able-bodied citizen would be required for 
three months of the year to make themselves available for
57 Woolf, Co-operation and the Future of Industry. 122- 
38; Socialism and Co-operation. 65-110.
58 Woolf also contended that industrial production held 
such a grip on communal psychology that it would be 
impossible to abandon.
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industrial work. For the remainder of the year their time 
would be free to concentrate on producing more 
intrinsically valuable goods. Such a system would be 
egalitarian in that everyone would spend an equal amount of 
time engaged in the horrible but necessary job of 
industrial production; it would be efficient in that the 
best means available for producing the necessities of life 
would be utilized; it would better provide the 'good life' 
since no one would be forced to consume the shoddy products 
of capitalism and everyone would be free for most of the 
year to engage in more satisfying work.59
The problems with such a system are legion and space 
does not permit full consideration of them here. Suffice 
it to say that even to be minimally effective it would 
require almost complete acceptance by all sections of 
society and, most probably, either the organization of the 
economies of other countries on similar lines, or the 
closing down of frontiers to foreign trade. The latter, of 
course, would not be acceptable to Woolf for the 'liberal 
internationalist' reasons outlined above. The
international problem is, however, fundamental since the 
system advocated by Woolf would be vulnerable to cheaper, 
mass-produced imports, which if not artificially kept at 
bay could seriously undermine domestic economic stability.
But what is also striking about the system is its
59 The parallels with Holyoake's view of consumers' 
association as 'a moral art as well as a new form of 
economy' are considerable. See Peter Guerney, 'George Jacob 
Holyoake: Socialism, Association, and Co-operation in
Nineteenth Century England', in Yeo New Views. 52-72.
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reliance on compulsion. What would be done with those who 
refused to perform their democratic duties? Isn't dissent 
inevitable in the absence of severe, perhaps Draconian, 
measures to prevent it? Given his persistent and trenchant 
criticisms of the Soviet model, Woolf's endorsement of such 
a system is surprising to say the least.60
Co-operation and Peace
Woolf contended that the best way of creating a peaceful 
and prosperous international economic system was through 
the expansion of intentional Co-operative trade.61 What 
was it about Co-operation that Woolf believed led to peace?
Despite the boldness of his claims Woolf's explanation 
was brief. Essentially he put forward three related
arguments. First, he maintained that in contrast to the 
producer, and especially the capitalist producer, '[t]he 
psychology of the consumer is economically and 
internationally pacific' .62 The need for the capitalist to 
make a profit meant that he was in constant competition 
with other capitalists, and given the prevalence of 
nationalism, patriotism, and social Darwinism, 
international trade almost always degenerated into
60 Woolf was not unaware of the problem. In Socialism 
and Co-operation (98-100) he accepts that compulsion is an 
'evil' but argues that it is impossible to conceive of an 
economic system which entirely does away with the need for 
it.
61 Or 'inter-co-operative trade'. See Woolf, 
International Economic Policy. 10.
62 Woolf, 'Way of Peace', 18.
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international economic conflict. Even though trade was
undertaken by firms and businesses rather than states it
came to be regarded as a measure of national profit and
loss. For example:
The sale of Lyons silk to a German purchaser in 
Dresden . .. naturally came to be regarded as a gain of 
France at the expense of Germany, and in this crude 
economic psychology the statistics of a nation's 
imports became the measure of its international 
economic loss.63
Co-operation, by contrast, did not involve the pursuit of
profit since its purpose was to satisfy the needs of its
members. Consequently, there was no need to compete
(though Woolf did recognize that until the Co-operative
transformation of the economy was complete, Co-operatives
would have no choice but to compete with capitalists64) and
the dangers of such competition degenerating into open
hostility would therefore be avoided.
Secondly, Woolf maintained that ' [t]he consumer is
your only real internationalist and true citizen of the
world' .65 Consumers, he felt, were essentially indifferent
to the country of origin of the goods they bought. What
mattered to them was the satisfaction of their needs in the
most effective way possible. Thus, for consumers,
international trade was not a zero-sum game but 'a vast and
intricate co-operative enterprise, the sole object of which
63 Ibid. 7.
64 See Woolf, The Control of Industry bv Co-operators 
and Trade Unionists, passim? 'The Co-operative Movement and 
Socialism', passim.
65 Woolf, 'Way of Peace', 14.
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is to supply the world's needs'.66 The consumer was not, 
in consequence, prey to the patriotism and nationalism that 
so accentuated competition among producers. In the 
interests of a peace trade should therefore be organized 
from the point of view of the consumer rather than the 
producer.
Thirdly, Woolf argued that the world was becoming more 
interdependent and that Co-operative organization was more 
in tune with this world than capitalist competition. One 
of the reasons why capitalism, and the economic nationalism 
that went with it, led to international hostility and war 
was that it attempted to force the actual growth of 
international society into a mould that could no longer 
contain it. Consumer co-operation, by contrast, was a type 
of economic organization in keeping with this growth. 
Essentially Woolf was saying was that the development of 
what I called in Chapter 3 the 'cosmopolitan international 
government' meant that economic organization, to be 
effective, needed to be increasingly inclusive and 
transnational rather than exclusive and national.
The Shift to Non-Co-operative International Economic 
Organization
In Woolf's post-Second World War proposals for 
international economic reconstruction, the Co-operative 
movement does not get a mention. This is striking because,
66 Ibid. 14.
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as described above, Woolf was utterly convinced that 
'inter-co-operative trade' (and not only trade, but 
eventually finance too), would be the most effective way of 
organizing the world economy in the interests of peace and 
prosperity. Woolf's relegation of Co-operation is in a 
sense evidence of his realism. His proposals of the 1920s 
were largely ignored by the Labour movement. The extensive 
development of inter-co-operative trade he recommended had 
not materialized. In recognition of these facts Woolf 
shifted his attention to more orthodox ideas about 
international economic reform.
An Economic Council of the League
Yet it should be noted that this was more a stepping-back 
than an about-turn since from the outset there had been 
more than one strand to his thought on the subject. In 
International Government Woolf advanced a highly eclectic 
vision of international economic co-operation.67 As early 
as 1919 he had advocated an ' International Commission of 
the League' for Africa to protect the natives from white 
exploitation and 'guarantee' free trade and the Open Door 
in Africa.68 In 1923 he proposed the formation of an 
'Economic Council of the League' with functions remarkably 
similar to what later became ECOSOC, the IMF, and the
67 See Chapter 3.
68 See Chapter 5; and Woolf, Empire and Commerce in 
Africa. 365-68.
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IBRD.69 This kind of prescription for the treatment of 
international economic ills - the setting up of 
international institutions with research, regulatory, 
supervisory, and sometimes re-distributive functions - was 
a consistent strand in Woolf's thought.
In his important 1923 pamphlet Woolf argued that a 
'negative' international policy of opposing protectionism 
should be accompanied by a 'positive' or 'constructive' 
international policy of co-operation to settle economic 
differences and develop common interests. This could be 
achieved by developing the existing Allied Supreme Economic 
Council into a World Economic Council of the League. This 
would have a seven permanent functions. First, the 
maintenance of credit to ensure the supply and ' fair 
allocation' of important materials and to provide against 
'unnecessary disturbance of world conditions through a 
breakdown of purchasing power in a particular country owing 
to preventable causes.' Second, the 'development of 
international lines and means of communication either where 
the interests of two or more nations are concerned, e.g., 
Baghdad Railway, or where a supply of raw materials or a 
market of world importance could be opened up by the co­
operation of nations in providing credit or labour or 
technical skill or other resources.' Third, the
'regulation of loans and concessions in undeveloped 
countries' and 'the safeguarding of such countries from 
unfair exploitation or monopolisation by particular
69 Woolf, International Economic Policy. 8-10.
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interests of nations7. Fourth, the 'co-ordination and 
development of the work of public international unions' and 
cooperation with them in 'schemes having as their object 
world economic interests' (e.g. the 'international 
organisation of agriculture', the 'international insurance 
of crops', and the collection and publication of 'accurate 
international, economic statistics'). Fifth, the
'promotion of international economic conventions based on 
the widest measure of international co-operation, e.g. 
commercial treaties, Labour conventions, traffic 
agreements'. Sixth, the ' [s]upervision and enforcement of 
international economic conventions' and the 'prevention of 
exploitation by trusts ... operating in the world market'. 
Seventh, the 'promotion and creation of international 
conferences or councils in various industries and economic 
groups, in order to secure the greatest possible measure of 
co-operation in each group' .70
Although novel, indeed revolutionary, at the time/ the 
idea that responsibility for the performance of such 
functions should be entrusted to international institutions 
is now a part of the epistemic fabric of international 
relations. Many of these functions, though not by a single 
overarching body, and not always in the decisive way 
envisaged by Woolf, are now performed by such institutions 
as ECOSOC, the IMF, the IBRD, the FAO, the ILO, the OECD, 
UNCTAD, and the WTO - to name only a few of the more 
illustrious bodies in the field. Although this may not be
70 Ibid. 9-10.
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testimony to Woolf's direct influence on the creation of 
the post-War economic order, it is undoubtedly testimony to 
the influence of a group of left-leaning, progressive 
thinkers who consistently argued for this kind of 'welfare' 
or 'constructive' internationalism. Here I have in mind, 
along with Woolf, such thinkers as Angell, Cole, Hobson, 
Keynes, Mitrany, Arthur Salter and, indeed, in his 
reformist mode, E. H. Carr.71
Although most of the reforms Woolf proposed at this 
time were reformist in nature, not all of them were. In 
places Woolf goes beyond constructive internationalism and 
explicitly advocates central international planning. In 
Wight's terms this is a form of revolutionism.72 Whereas 
constructive internationalism leaves the society of states 
more or less intact, central international planning 
presupposes or implies something which goes beyond it - a 
community of all mankind perhaps with a single world 
government. To illustrate, as well as recommending the 
maintenance of credit to ensure the supply of important 
commodities, Woolf also advocates the allocation of 
'supplies and credit according to need'. He advocates not
71 See Suganami, The Domestic Analogy. 100-111; David 
Long, Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The 
International Theory of J. A. Hobson. University of London 
Ph.D. Thesis, 1991; Craig Murphy, International 
Organization and Industrial Change (Oxford, 1994), 153-87; 
Peter Wilson, 'The New Europe Debate in Wartime Britain', 
in Philomema Murray and Paul Rich (Eds.) , Visions of 
European Unitv (Boulder, CO, 1996).
72 See Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three 
Traditions. eds. Brian Porter and Gabrielle Wight, 
(Leicester, 1991).
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only the 7 co-ordination and development1 of public 
international unions such as the Institute for Agriculture, 
but also 1 the international organisation of agriculture and 
the distribution of agricultural products1. He speaks not 
only of the "supervision1 of international economic 
conventions, but also of their "enforcement1 . He talks not 
only of "preventing exploitation" by trusts, international 
firms, and combines, but also of "controlling their 
operations"
These ideas assume a degree of central control (though 
Woolf left open the composition and decision-making 
procedures of his World Economic Council) which according 
to some definitions would spell the end of state 
sovereignty.74 They also also assume a degree of human 
solidarity and cohesion which greatly exceeds that which 
pertains in the society of states.
A Central World Authority
It was Woolf" s revolutionism rather than his reformism 
which informed his proposals for international economic 
organization in the 1940s. He argued that the primary
73 Woolf, International Economic Policy. 9-10. Woolf"s 
frequent use of the word "control" with respect to commerce 
and industry arguably implies a static conception of these 
activities. He never talks of "encouraging" efficiency or 
"stimulating" innovation or "attracting" investment.
74 See for example Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: 
The Basis of International Society (London, 1986) . It could 
argued that given the universal importance of economics to 
the modern state, distribution of "supplies and credit" by 
a central body would alone severely compromise states" 
"constitutional independence".
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post-War task was to 'establish an economic and political 
authority as the nucleus of international government' 
adding that this would not be possible in the absence of ' a 
radical change in the attitude to and form of what is known 
as national state sovereignty'. He contended that the 
world had become 'so closely integrated' that the claim of 
states to 'economic sovereignty' - 'unregulated and 
irresponsible control of their economic relations and 
power' - must inevitably lead to economic chaos. 
Sovereignty had become an 'unworkable anachronism' : 'a dead 
fossil which must give place to a living organism adapted 
to the new conditions' . This meant that the state 'must 
enter and subject itself to a wider order and 
organisation' .75
But this organization would not take the form of a 
superstate or a federation. It did, however, involve the 
renunciation by states of their right to make decisions 
irrespective of their impact on the rest of the world. The 
scope of the authority would be worldwide, though regional 
organizations would have an important role to play, 
particularly in the fields of economic development and 
transport. So too would functional organizations. Woolf 
applauded the creation of UN Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, and the FAO, and called for 'bold 
experiment' along the lines of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority and, somewhat paradoxically, the trans-Europe
75 Woolf, The International Post-War Settlement 
(London, 1944), 6-7.
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system of heavy industry developed by the Nazis. The
latter, if controlled by an international commission, would
'solve the difficult problem of preventing the great German
monopolists, if they again controlled the heavy industries,
from once more providing the weapons for aggressive war."
In typical functionalist style Woolf contended that:
It is, perhaps, through such cooperation for economic 
purposes that Europe may learn most easily to forget 
some of its fatal obsessions with national frontiers 
and learn to cooperate politically.76
But this said he firmly maintained that regional and
functional organizations could not work effectively without
a 'central world authority'. Such an authority was needed
... both to co-ordinate the activities of regional or 
functional international organs and to deal promptly 
and authoritatively with any action or situation which 
may threaten the world's peace or prosperity.77
Woolf did not spell out what he meant by ' deal promptly and
authoritatively with' but it would not be unreasonable to
conclude that he had something far-reaching in mind: the
'first political task' of the authority would be
establishment of a 'general system of law and order' and
the creation of an 'effective system of collective
security' . This in turn would entail 'effective control of
international force adequate to meet the threat of national
force' and the establishment of the necessary procedures
and machinery to ensure 'prompt decisions and decisive
action' .78
76 Ibid. 7.
77 Ibid. 7.
78 Ibid. 8-9.
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The economic aim of the authority was no less far- 
reaching: 'to enable eventually production, trade,
distribution, and consumption to be organized and 
controlled internationally in the common interests of 
nations and peoples.' Although vague, this statement is 
significant in two respects. First, it shows that Woolf 
did not contemplate much of a role for market forces. This 
is confirmed by his beilef that 'the economic and 
international principles of Socialism are the only sound 
ones and that unless European society is rebuilt on them, 
there can be no prosperity and peace' and that 'Labour's 
policy for the international post-war settlement must be 
founded uncompromisingly on Socialist principles.' It is 
further confirmed by his belief that the move from 
'economic anarchy' to a 'system of international government 
of the world's production and consumption' could not be 
fully achieved until all states were socialist.79 
Secondly, it shows that Woolf did not expect the 
implementation of his scheme to be immediate.80 Indeed 
because of the shortage of socialist states, immediate 
implementation was 'improbable', perhaps even 'impossible'. 
To this extent his revolutionism is qualified.
The vagueness of Woolf's proposals is highlighted by
79 Ibid. 3, 7.
80 Though by the same token he did not say it would be 
gradual. This ambiguity is partly explained by the fact 
that he did not want to give the impression to his largely 
socialist readership that they would have to wait an 
indefinite amount of time before their international 
socialist commonwealth could be created. Ibid. 6-8.
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his estimation of what the authority would be capable of 
doing immediately. He specifies three things: most
radically, the 'encouragement' and 'direction' of 
'production and consumption on a world scale'; less 
radically, the removal of 'uneconomic barriers against 
international trade' (thus permitting 'economic' barriers 
such as the protection of infant industries, and 
'emergency' protection to deal with balance of payments 
crises?) ; and less radically still, the making of rules and 
regulations to 'promote international economic cooperation 
and prevent economic aggression by, e.g., the restriction 
of supplies, the depreciation of exchange rates, or the 
abuse of monopoly powers'.
* * * * *
There are a number of problems with Woolf's proposals for 
non-Co-operative economic organization. Firstly, the 
institutional character and mode of operation of his 
'central world authority' is unclear, as is the source of 
the considerable power he apportioned to it. Secondly, 
Woolf made no attempt to define or clarify such key terms 
as 'organize', 'control', 'direct', and, indeed, 'plan'. 
The exact nature and scope of his scheme remains therefore 
uncertain - although all the evidence points in the 
direction very substantial collective planning on a 
worldwide scale. For some, of course, this was the road to 
serfdom. Thirdly, many of his proposals presuppose the 
existence or immanence of a world community of mankind, a 
presupposition which Woolf makes no attempt to lay bare or
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empirically demonstrate. Finally, in parallel with his 
vision of a 7 Co-operative Commonwealth7, Woolf strongly 
implied that some degree of compulsion would be needed in 
order to achieve the common good, but he failed to examine 
in any detail whether the compulsion of the new system 
would in any way be an improvement on the compulsion of the 
old.
Yet some of these weaknesses may also be strengths. 
It might be argued in particular that his ambiguity is 
largely due to reluctance to indulge in the business of 
drawing up constitutions or detailed blue-prints for future 
world orders. Woolf, like Carr, believed this to be a 
rather futile exercise. He saw great virtue in the 7 trial 
and error7 approach to institution-building.81 Having 
clear goals was important. So too was some idea as to how 
these goals might be accomplished. But elaborate theories 
did not always work in practice. Flexibility and a 
willingness to experiment was needed. So too was a 
willingness to accept progress in increments. The 
important point was to begin the move away from the 
political and economic laissez faire of the old 
nationalist, competitive, conflictual order, towards a new 
order based on cooperation, organization, and rational 
planning.
81 Most explicitly stated in International Co-operative 
Trade. 5, 21, 24.
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The Question of Utopianism
The degree to which Woolf's thought on international 
economic organization can be regarded as utopian is no 
small matter. A comprehensive analysis would have to 
consider not only his proposals for a 'World Economic 
Council of the League', the expansion of 'inter-co­
operative trade', and a post-War 'central world authority', 
but also his anti-capitalism, his anti-protectionism, his 
analysis of the relationship between Co-operation, 
democracy, and peace, and his (highly positive) evaluation 
of Co-operation as a mode of economic organization. To do 
this properly would require the skills not only of the 
international relations theorist but also of the economic 
and social historian - perhaps those of the economist and 
the political theorist, too.
This being said, there are several aspects of Woolf's 
thought in this area which are prime candidates for the 
epithet 'utopian' and which the international relations 
theorist is in a good position to assess.
Firstly, it might be said that Woolf is a utopian to
Carr's view, free trade was an 'imaginary condition that 
has never existed'. The doctrine of free trade was based 
on the erroneous belief in a natural harmony of interests. 
Most damning of all, as highlighted in Chapter 2, free 
trade was not an absolute or universal principle but merely 
'the unconscious reflection of national policy based on a
the extent free trade. In
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particular interpretation of national interest at a 
particular time.'
The simple equation, free trade = liberalism = 
utopianism, however, glosses over the fact that the
centrality of free trade in liberal internationalism 
shifted as the tradition evolved. The Cobdenite
association of free trade with civilization, prosperity, 
and peace, was not something that later thinkers
uncritically accepted. Woolf is interesting from this 
viewpoint because he accepted many of the assumptions of 
nineteenth century 'free trade' liberalism but in a 
negative form as a bastion against the evils of
nationalism and mercantilism and as a stage in the 
transition to a more stable and peaceful international 
order based on Co-operation, regulation, and planning. If 
some of his assumptions were liberal, his vision was 
essentially Owenian and Fabian. He shared Owen's goal of 
'the complete elimination of profit and the profit- 
maker',82 He also shared Owen's 'New Vision of Society in 
which all would work together in a rational manner for the 
common good, without need of a violent revolution' ,83 He 
joined the Fabians in viewing free markets - even if 
preferrable to capitalist 'controlled' markets - as
82 Beatrice Potter, The Co-operative Movement in Great 
Britain (Aldershot, Gower in association with the London 
School of Economics, 1987 [1891]), p.xxxiii. (See also 
Woolf's own account of Owenism in Co-operation and the 
Future of Industry. 17-35).
83 Margaret Cole, 'Preface', in Potter, The Co­
operative Movement, xxiii.
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essentially the freedom to exploit. In connection with all 
these things he shared Wallas's hope that co-operation 
could be substituted for competition as the fundamental 
principle of social organization.84
So, while Woolf borrowed from liberalism in his 
repudiation of mercantilism, his constructive policy 
derives from the British socialist tradition. Indeed, 
Woolf was one of the first thinkers to apply some of the 
doctrines of mainstream British socialist thought to 
international questions. And it is striking that despite 
Woolf's reputation as a utopian and Carr's as a realist 
both men attempted to do this - as will be seen in the next 
chapter - in their proposals for post-War international 
economic organization.
Secondly, it might be said that Woolf's proposals for 
non-co-operative international economic organization were 
utopian in the sense that they ignored certain facts - such 
as the limited degree of solidarity in international 
society - and they failed to take proper account of the 
role of national power. Here a distinction needs to be 
made between Woolf's reformist and revolutionist proposals. 
The former proposals - those pertaining to international 
bodies with research, regulatory, supervisory, and limited 
re-distributive functions - are not so vulnerable to the 
charge of utopianism since, despite jealously guarding 
their sovereignty, states have shown themselves to be
84 M. J. Weiner, 'Wallas, Graham (1858-1932) : Fabian 
Socialist and Political Psychologist', in Bellamy and 
Saville, Dictionary of Labour Biography. 227.
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consistently willing to set up such bodies in order to 
manage common interests. Woolf's reformist proposals are 
only utopian to the extent that the FAO, the ILO, and the 
IBRD are utopian. Woolf's revolutionist proposals - those 
involving central 'direction', 'distribution', 
'enforcement', and 'control' - are more vulnerable to the 
charge. In the main, states have been unwilling to invest 
international bodies with such powers - the Court and 
Commission of the European Union being notable exceptions. 
This is basically due to insufficient solidarity between 
the members of international society with respect to core 
economic interests, values, and goals. While states have 
seen advantages, for example, in setting up and funding 
international financial bodies to help countries in balance 
of payments difficulties, or with short-term liquidity, or 
longer-term structural problems, they have not seen 
advantages in setting up bodies with far-reaching powers to 
'direct' or 'control' production and distribution. This is 
partly due to the hegemonic status of ' embedded' or 
'managed' liberalism in international economic relations 
which, in turn, is largely due to the reluctance of the 
major economic Powers to relinquish to 'outsiders' formal 
control over those areas of their economic lives they deem 
central to their economic, social, and political well­
being. To the extent, therefore, that Woolf overestimated 
the degree of solidarity between states on these core 
matters, or the prospects for achieving such solidarity in 
the near future, his proposals are utopian - though no more
371
utopian than Carr's proposal for a European Planning 
Authority with ultimate responsibility for 'vital decisions 
on European economic policies' .85
Carr claimed that during the utopian stage of the 
political sciences 'investigators ... pay little attention 
to existing "facts" or to the analysis of cause and effect, 
but . .. devote themselves whole-heartedly to the 
elaboration of visionary projects for the attainment of 
ends which they have in view'. It might be said, finally, 
that Woolf's plans for the expansion of international Co­
operative trade constitute such a 'visionary project'. 
Woolf conceived international Co-operative trade as a 
genuine alternative to the faltering 'capitalist system of 
foreign trade' .86 He asserted that the potential for 
developing international Co-operative trade was 'almost 
unlimited' .87 Yet capitalism has not only survived but has 
arguably gone from strength to strength. By contrast, 
international Co-operative trade never really got off the 
ground and Co-operation itself has all but vanished as an 
alternative mode of economic organization.
But the failure of Co-operation does not prove that 
Woolf's ideas at that time and in this respect were
85 See E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace (London, 1942), 
236-75; Chapter 8, below. On the solidarity of 
international society see Hedley Bull's still unsurpassed, 
'The Grotian Conception of International Society', in 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic 
Investigations (London, 1966), 51-73.
86 Woolf, 'The Development of the C.W.S.', 441.
87 Woolf, International Co-operative Trade. 24.
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utopian. This is a complex matter but the following facts 
about Co-operation during the inter-war period seem 
pertinent.
Firstly, the Co-operative system experienced rapid 
growth both vertically and horizontally. The CWS built or 
acquired factories in a range of industries including 
shoemaking, pottery,- textiles, furniture, cutlery, 
building, bread-making, and fish-curing. It became a major 
dairy producer and arable farmer. In 1914 it owned less 
than 3,000 acres of agricultural land. By 1921 it owned 
nearly 35,000 acres. It became one of Britain's biggest 
wheat-growers and its biggest flour-miller. It had since 
before the war been her largest grocer. Due to its growing 
involvement in the building trade, it soon became one of 
her largest timber importers. Also by 1921, 5,550 trade 
union organizations and friendly societies were banking 
with the Co-operative. This was all part of an ambitious 
strategy to radically reduce the dependence of the Co­
operative movement on capitalist manufactures, finance, and 
sources of supply.88
Secondly, the CWS rapidly extended its operations 
overseas. In 1920 alone it acquired an additional 30,142 
acres of tea plantations in India and 1,769 in Ceylon. New 
palm oil depots were opened in West Africa. In Canada
88 Woolf, 'The Development of the C.W.S.', 440-1; Paddy 
Maguire, 'Co-operation and Crisis: Government, Co­
operation, and Politics, 1917-1922', in Yeo, New Visions. 
194.
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10,000 acres of wheat fields were acquired.89
Thirdly, the CWS traded with national Co-operative 
wholesale societies in 19 European countries. In addition 
trade took place between the CWS and local Co-operative 
societies in Australia, Canada, South Africa, India, Egypt, 
Palestine, Brazil, China, and Soviet Russia.90
Fourthly, an international meeting of wholesale 
societies in 1919 agreed on various measures to expand 
international Co-operative trade including the 
establishment, in Manchester, of an International Central 
Bureau for the gathering of statistics and the 
dissemination of information.91
Fifthly, membership of Co-operative societies in 
Britain reached 1 million in 1905, 3 million in 1914, 4.5 
million in 1920, and 6.5 million in 1938 .92
Sixthly, if the Co-operative movement itself did not 
appreciate its strength and potential, capital and the 
state certainly did. Small businesses and their spokesmen 
in Parliament had expressed concern about the growth of the 
movement as early as 1900. During the war the government 
kept the movement, as well as other actual or potential 
oppositional bodies, under surveillance, as did a number of
89 Woolf, 'The Development of the C.W.S.', 440-1.
90 Ibid. 440-1.
91 Ibid. 440-1; International Co-operative Trade. 8.
92 Stephen Yeo, 'Rival Clusters of Potential: Ways of 
Seeing Co-operation', in Yeo, New Views. 5; Maguire, 'Co­
operation and Crisis', 192; Neil Killingback, 'Limits to 
Mutuality: Economic and Political Attacks on Co-operation 
During the 1920s and 1930s', in Yeo, New Views. 213, 216.
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semi-official and private bodies such as the Engineering 
Employers' Federation and the Economic Study Club.93 With 
the onset of the Depression, small shopkeepers in the 
industrial North began a political campaign to thwart the 
growth of the Co-operative movement. By 1932 they had the 
support not only of the multiple-shop companies and 
department stores, but big business and the Rothermere and 
Beaverbrook press. They saw the ability of Co-operatives 
to trade without profit as a major threat to their 
livelihoods which, since the war, had come to depend on the 
control of free competition through a system of price- 
fixing and boycotts. (According to one study, 3% of 
consumer-spending went on price-fixed goods in 1900. By 
1938 the figure had reached 30%) Bodies such as the 
National Chamber of Commerce, the National Traders' Defence 
League, and the explicitly anti-Co-operative National 
Organizations Co-orinated Committee, vigorously lobbied the 
government to tax the 'divided' and the 'trading surplus' 
of Co-operative societies and introduce other measures to 
curb their growth. The Treasury's Ritchie Committee had 
looked at this question in 1905, as had the Royal 
Commission on Income Tax in 1919, and a further Treasury 
investigation of 1927. All these bodies concluded that the 
dividend on purchase was not 'profit' or 'unearned income' 
but a 'rebate' or 'discount'. Co-operative societies were
93 Maguire, 'Co-operation and Crisis', 191-2.
94 J. B. Jeffreys, Retail Trading in Britian 1850-1950 
(Cambridge, 1954), quoted in Killingback, 'Limits to 
Mutuality', 211.
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not therefore benefitting from the 'special treatment' 
alleged by the shopkeepers. By the early 193 0s, however, 
and despite a counter-campaign by the movement, opinion in 
the Treasury and among Conservative MPs had hardened. The 
shopkeepers largely achieved their legisaltive objective in 
1933 when the Government adopted the report of a further 
specially established committee - the 1932 Raeburn 
Committee - which recommended that for tax purposes mutual 
societies should be treated as joint-stock companies 
(though much to the consternation of the shopkeepers it 
also recommended that the dividend should be treated as a 
(non-taxable) trading expense). This 'weakening of 
mutuality', according to one author, did much to thwart the 
development of the Co-operative movement.95
Seventhly, two government enquiries into restrictive 
trade practices were conducted. By comparison with the 
repeated investigations into the tax position of the Co­
operative movement they were half-hearted affairs. No 
action was taken. The status quo was effectively 
vindicated.96
Though this is a big subject these facts go some way 
towards showing that the utopianism of this branch of 
Woolf's thought is far from total. Co-operation did not 
decline sponaneously because it was inherently less 
efficient than capitalism. Rather it was deliberately and
95 See Neil Killingback's excellent, 'Limits to
Mutuality', passim.
96 Ibid. 211, 217.
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successfully attacked and its progress was deliberately and 
successfully thwarted. Woolf provided numerous facts from 
a variety of primary and secondary sources to demonstrate 
the strength of Co-operation and the potential of 
international co-operative trade. He was not indulging in 
wishful thinking. His basic position, indeed, was a sober 
one. He did not maintain that international co-operative 
trade would definitely expand or definitely achieve its 
potential, but rather that a 'peculiarly favourable' moment 
existed for such expansion since ' the failure of the 
capitalist system to right itself' left the field open to 
Co-operators in so many markets.97
He added, however, that 'it is characteristic of 
moments, and particularly favourable ones, that they pass.' 
The possibilities were 'not theoretical or utopian, but 
extremely practical and immediately attainable'. 
Everything depended, however, on whether the movement had 
the desire, knowledge, energy, and confidence to actively 
pursue them.98
Nor was Woolf indulging in 'the elaboration of 
visionary projects for the attainment of ends which he had 
in view' . His main work is not 'visionary' in the sense of 
a 'blue-print' or a 'grand plan' but a an empirical and 
theoretical analysis of the various forms of international 
Co-operative trade and the ways in which they might be
97 Woolf, International Co-operative Trade. 4, 9.
98 Ibid. 9, 24. Co-operators were frequently condemned 
as utopian. See Killingback, 'Limits to Mutuality', 218-9.
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developed. His principal recommendation was not the 
creation of new institutions such as a 'vast' International 
CWS with 'vague and general powers', but wider and more 
effective use of the methods and machinery - the 'depot 
system', joint international purchase, the 'agency system', 
the new Central Bureau - already in existence.
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Chapter Eight
The Challenge of Carr
This chapter examines Leonard Woolf's response to E. H. 
Carr's critique of utopianism in The Twenty Years' Crisis. 
1919-39. After giving an account of Woolf's response, I 
■will assess its validity, particularly in terms of its
accuracy and cogency. I will then compare the Carr-Woolf 
'debate'1 with our conventional understanding of the 
idealist-realist debate, the so-called 'first great debate' 
of IR. In particular I will ask whether, in the light of 
a renewed awareness of the former, our understanding of the 
latter should be in any way modified.
Woolf's Response to Carr
o
The Twenty Years' Crisis is widely regarded as a
comprehensive attack on 'utopian' thought. In one sense 
this is true. It was aimed not only at the League but at
all those 'devoted and energetic intellectuals' who
supported it2, at all those who believed peace and free 
trade to be universal interests, at the Union of Democratic 
Control, at proponents of a United States of Europe, and 
much else besides. But the attack is not comprehensive in
1 I use inverted commas because, as far as I am aware, 
Carr did not reply to Woolf's rebuttal. Nor did Carr 
respond to his other critics - though arguably Conditions 
of Peace and, indeed, the second edition of Twenty Years' 
Crisis, constitutes such a response.
2 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 21-2.
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the sense of being a detailed and systematic analysis and 
critique of the principal standard-bearers of utopian 
thought. Indeed, of all the figures Carr might have chosen 
to examine only four - Norman Angell, Arnold Toynbee, 
Alfred Zimmern, and Woodrow Wilson - are examined in any 
detail. Carr does not refer to Woolf. But given that 
Woolf was not only a staunch supporter of the League, but 
in an indirect way one of its architects, and also given 
that he shared many, though not all, of the ideas and 
aspirations Carr condemned as utopian, it is not surprising 
that he viewed the book, at least in part, as an attack on 
his own position. Indeed, as the following pages will 
show, Woolf was incensed by the book and wrote two stinging 
replies to it.3
Interestingly enough, only a few years before the 
publication of The Twenty Years' Crisis. Woolf had reviewed 
Carr's study of the nineteenth century anarchist Michael 
Bakunin. He praised the book in the highest terms. It 
was, he extolled, 'a model biography', written with 
'remarkable impartiality'.4 By contrast Woolf regarded The 
Twenty Years' Crisis as anything but impartial and 
condemned it for being, among other things, a 
rationalization of violence. With more than a hint of 
Bloomsburyian condescension he even described it as
3 Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality' , Political Quarterly. 11, 
2 (April-June 1940) ,* The War for Peace (London, 1940) .
4 Woolf, 'Unheard of Adventures', Review of Michael 
Bakunin by E. H. Carr, and History of Anarchism in Russia 
by E. Yaroslavsky, New Statesman and Nation. 2 December 
1937.
380
'superficial7, 'vulgar', and 'absurd'.5 Such polemical
language injured rather than aided Woolf's case. In the 
interests of intellectual sobriety, it is largely ommitted 
from the following account.
Before moving on, it is important to note the general 
direction of Woolf's response. Carr's objections to 
collective security and the judicial settlement of 
international disputes were not countered by Woolf, despite 
the fact that he was a staunch advocate of both. 
Similarly, Woolf did not, directly at any rate, challenge 
Carr's conception of international morality - despite the 
fact that Carr claimed that the Utopians completely 
misunderstood the nature of this morality.6 It is also 
significant that although Woolf recognized the duality of 
'reality' and 'utopia' in Carr's analysis, he failed to 
appreciate that Carr conceived them dialectically.7 
Instead, Woolf gave most of his attention to Carr's
5 Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality', 172; War for Peace. 117,
178.
6 Of the many marginal comments expressing puzzlement, 
disbelief, and consternation in Woolf's review copy of 
Twenty Years' Crisis, only one expresses approval: on p.279 
where Carr discusses the role of morality in peaceful 
change and argues that a procedure of peaceful negotiation 
requires 'not merely an acute perception on both sides of 
the strength and weakness of their respective positions at 
any given time, but also a certain measure of common 
feeling as to what is just and reasonable in their mutual 
relations, a spirit of give-and-take and even of potential 
self-sacrifice, so that a basis, however imperfect, exists 
for discussing demands on grounds of justice recognised by 
both.'
7 For a striking interpretation of this aspect of 
Carr's thought see R. H. S. Crossman, 'Illusions of Power -
E. H. Carr', in R. H. S. Crossman, The Charm of Politics 
and other essays in political criticism (London, 1958), 93.
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construction of realism and his realist critique of 
utopianism.
His underlying objection to Carr's thesis was its 
determinism. Like many other writers of the period, Woolf 
believed in the power of reason properly, intelligently, 
applied. He was a voluntarist. He believed that change, 
perhaps fundamental, was possible if enough people believed 
in it. Woolf found Carr's thesis, especially as stated in 
Parts I and II, particularly disturbing because it 
suggested, and not without a certain diabolical relish, 
that good intentions mean nothing, that everything that 
happens happens inevitably, and that nothing can be done to 
make a miserable world less so.
The Meaning of 'Utopian'
Carr claimed that his analysis laid the foundations for a 
'science' of international relations. Woolf rejected this 
claim on the grounds that Carr's principal concepts were 
ambiguous, and no enquiry could claim to be scientific if 
it rested on insecure conceptual foundations. In 
particular, the concept of 'utopia' was used to mean two 
very different things. On the one hand, it was used to 
mean 'false beliefs' or 'falsehoods'. On the other hand, 
it was used to mean 'impossibility of attainment'. One 
could not, in consequence, be sure of what Carr meant when 
he described the doctrines of nineteenth century liberals, 
and the ideas of League supporters, as 'utopian'. Did he 
mean that their ideas and arguments were false? Or did he
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mean that their objectives and policies could not be
attained? According to Woolf, Carr said a good deal about 
the falseness of their beliefs, 'but he never clearly 
demonstrates to us why their objectives and policies were 
impossible of attainment'.8 This failure to distinguish
between the two meanings of the term 'utopian' led, in
Woolf's view, to considerable confusion.
The Utopianism of Realism
Woolf argued that there were two senses in which realism 
was utopian. First, Carr asserted that whereas realism was 
concerned with 'facts', 'realities', and 'cause and 
effect', utopianism was concerned with 'principles', 
'ideals', and 'ends'. Unlike realists, Utopians did not 
analyze political problems, they merely proposed solutions 
to them believing they would work simply because they had 
to.9 Woolf refuted the claim that so-called Utopians pay 
no attention to 'facts'. He refe^ed, for example, to his 
own analysis of the facts of the nineteenth century (in 
International Government) , which demonstrated that the 
organization of human society was becoming increasingly 
international rather than national. It was also a fact, 
Woolf maintained, that national self-determination - the 
logical conclusion of nationalism - was incompatible with 
an international system based on power politics: if power
8 Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality', 172.
9 Woolf, War for Peace. 114. Note also, on the same 
page, Woolf's depiction of Carr's view of utopianism as 'a 
kind of dream world of wishful thinking'.
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and force were to remain the principal determinants of
international relations the independence of small states
could never be more than temporary.10 He also refered to
another set of facts which Carr ignored: the massive swell
of opinion at the end of the war calling for "no more war"
and demanding 'never again'. During this time there was a
deeper and more widespread hatred of war among European
peoples than ever before. According to Woolf,
Their aspiration may or may not have been utopian 
. .. but their convictions, the state of their 
minds were a political reality which was having 
profound effects all over Europe and which not 
even the most realist statesman, general, or
historian could afford to neglect.11
And the achievement of this aspiration was not without
precedent. There had, after all, been a similar swell of
opinion immediately after the previous great war. Just as
public opinion had declared war intolerable in 1918, so it
had declared slavery intolerable in 1815 - and to
considerable effect. In Woolf's words:
Their [the common people's] demand was so 
insistent that, although many practical men and 
professors proved that it was utopian to attempt 
to abolish slavery, it was in the face of 
considerable opposition and with some difficulty 
abolished.12
Carr was mistaken, therefore, to assert that 'Utopians' 
ignored facts.
Carr was also mistaken to claim that only so-called
10 Ibid. 77. This is a good example of the utopian 
propensity to 'couch optative propositions in the 
indicative mood'. See Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 17.
11 Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality', 168.
12 Woolf, War for Peace. 59.
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Utopians were concerned with principles, ideals, and ends. 
In Woolf's view all statesmen pursue ends and even base 
their actions on principles. Bismarck, for example, 
pursued the end (perhaps even the 'ideal') of German 
unification. Hitler pursued the ideal of a New Europe 
based on German supremacy. Both these statesmen pursued 
'ends' which were probably 'ideals', yet neither of them 
were deemed utopian as logic required. On the contrary 
they were deemed realist.
In addition, realism itself might become a 'principle' 
if statesmen believe it with sufficient conviction, 
particularly so if realism was equated with ' the ends 
justify the means'. In Woolf's view, Carr's realism could 
be interpreted in this way. Even if the validity of the 
assertion that utopianism is concerned with 'principles' 
whereas realism is concerned with 'facts' was accepted, 
there remained the problem that Carr sometimes implied that 
the terms 'morality' and 'power' could be substituted, 
respectively, for 'principles' and 'facts'.13 This, Woolf 
argued, came very close to saying that whereas Utopians 
took morality into account in the enactment of policy, 
realists did not. This, in turn, was tantamount to 
suggesting that ends justify means. The problem here was 
that, in Woolf's words: 'If this is realism, it is itself 
a 'principle' and based upon morality, for the judgement 
that the ends [state power, national interest] justify the
13 For example, Carr's comment that 'Every political 
situation contains mutually incompatible elements of Utopia 
and Reality, of morality and power'. Quoted in ibid. 118.
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means is itself an ethical judgement" .14
Carr's claim that realism was not concerned with
"ends", "ideals', "principles', or indeed, "morality", did
not, therefore, stand up. Moreover, this way of looking at
things led to some very odd conclusions:
According to Professor Carr, we should have to say 
that Hitler is utopian in so far as he has ethical 
ends and a realist in so far as he uses power to 
attain them, and that the means, even though they 
attain the ends, are incompatible with the ends. There 
must be something very wrong with a theory and a 
definition which lead to such conclusions.15
The second sense in which Woolf considered realism to
be utopian was its inability to achieve its goals. In
Woolf"s view
... nothing is more "utopian" than the idea that 
you can create a stable and permanent society by 
power and the pursuit of conflicting interests; 
the ideal is unattainable because it involves an 
attempt to use two of the most unstable and 
disintegrating of all social forces, violence in 
the service of cupidity, as the primary 
ingredients in the cement which is to hold 
society together.16
Indeed, realism could not even achieve its own goals with
any degree of permanence. The Great Powers who had
provoked war in 1790, 1815, 1870, 1914, and 1939 had not
gained from their actions,* they had not gained from their
"ruthless pursuit of conflicting interests".17 The
realpolitik of Germany towards Czechoslovakia, for
14 Ibid. 120.
15 Ibid. 119.
16 Woolf, "Utopia and Reality", 177.
17 Ibid. 176.
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instance, could only, at best, achieve temporary gains. If
the hallmark of realism was success, then what was to be
made, Woolf asked, of the 'realism' of Napoleon I, Napoleon
III, Bismarck, Wilhelm II, the Russian Czars, and the
British imperialists? If success was the criterion, these
'realists' were, in fact, 'Utopians'. As Woolf contended
in typically acerbic style:
Five hundred years of European history have 
proved that the 'realist' system of power 
politics, war, and the conflict of interests is 
grotesquely utopian. Its purpose is to ensure 
stability of national power, glory, prosperity, 
and peace; its result has been a kaleidoscope of 
loud voiced jingoism and national glory 
alternating with war, defeat, misery, and 
impoverishment.18
Immutable Interests
According to Woolf, Carr argued that there was something 
intrinsic to states and their relations that gave their 
power and conflicting interests a peculiar reality over and 
above cooperation and common interests, and made a harmony 
of interests impossible.19 'Interests', Woolf contended, 
had become the political and social shibboleth of the
18 Ibid. 178-9. Woolf's view of power politics was not 
at the time an uncommon one, nor indeed one confined to 
radical intellectuals. On the creation of the United 
Nations, President Roosevelt declared: 'It spells - and it 
should spell - the end of the system of unilateral action, 
exclusive alliances, and spheres of influence, and balances 
of power, and all other expedients which have been tried 
for centuries and always failed'. Quoted in Michael Howard, 
'The United Nations and International Security', in Adam 
Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations. 
Divided World: The United Nations' Roles in International 
Relations (Oxford, 1988), 31.
19 Woolf, War for Peace. 124-6.
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twentieth century, just as 'utility7 had been in the
nineteenth century, and 'rights7 in the eighteenth. The
doctrine that certain national interests possessed a
peculiar reality was one among several twentieth century
doctrines in which
interests are treated just as natural rights were 
regarded in the eighteenth century, as fixed and 
immutable 'natural7 elements in society, hard 
facts or realities, like climate or navigable 
rivers or the sun and planets, and therefore 
causes whose effects upon history are naturally 
inevitable and outside human control.20
But in Woolf's view interests in general were not natural
and immutable. On the contrary, they were unstable and
fluid.21 They could change, for example, as a consequence
of broader changes in society. He illustrated this point
with several cases. Carr maintained that
To internationalise government in any real sense means 
to internationalise power; and since independent power 
is the basis of the nation-state, the 
internationalisation of power is really a 
contradiction in terms.
Exactly the same argument had been deployed in the mid­
nineteenth century against socialism when many philosophers 
later sympathetic towards the doctrine, notably J. S. Mill, 
viewed it as an ' ideal standard' but distant from 
'reality'. Socialism was utopian, so the argument ran, 
because society was based on the institution of private
20 Ibid. 129.
21 Woolf refers to the 'chameleon character of 
interests', especially so called 'vital national interests' 
which in theory were concerned with the continued existence 
of the state, but in practice meant 'any interest which the 
government of a state considers important'. Ibid. 98.
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property; in abolishing private property, socialism would 
only succeed in undermining society and thereby itself. 
Socialism and society were therefore incompatible: the
interests of private property were immutable: the idea that 
society could be based on socialism was a contradiction in 
terms.
Woolf noted that such beliefs eroded as the nineteenth 
century progressed. By the first decade of the twentieth 
century many ideas and projects previously regarded as 
utopian were widely accepted as sensible and correct. 
Woolf cited, inter alia, the public provision of primary 
and secondary education, municipal control of certain 
utilities, the extension of the franchise to non-property 
owners, and state provision of old age pensions. Private 
property had not been abolished, but the view that the 
state had an essential role to play in these and other 
sectors of society had become widely accepted. This 
inevitably entailed the limitation if not the abolition of 
property rights.
This example, Woolf felt, clearly demonstrated that 
interests were not natural and unchanging, and he concluded 
that
one must hesitate to accept sweeping statements 
about interests, conflicts of interests, and 
power being such immutable social or political 
'realities7 that they inevitably determine the 
structure of society and make any attempt to 
alter it ... utopian.22
While it would be an overstatement to suggest that Woolf
22 Ibid. 142.
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was putting forward a philosophically idealist conception 
of interests - note his frequent references to ' the facts'
- it is certainly true that in places his notion of 
interests resembles the type of interpretive analysis 
characteristic of C. A. W. Manning. He compared, for 
example, the case of the conflict in the Balkans during the 
years 1900-13, and the conflict in Scandinavia, over the 
desire of Norway to secede from Sweden, which occurred at 
the same time. The former conflict resulted in violence 
and war, whereas the latter was settled peaceably. Woolf 
insisted that it would be wrong to suppose that the Balkan 
states only had conflicting interests, whereas the 
Scandinavian states had only common interests. The states 
involved in both conflicts had common and conflicting 
interests. The key difference was that the Balkan states 
'believed that they had irreconcilable interests which 
could only be settled by power. And because that was the 
way in which they regarded their interests, their interests 
were, in fact, irreconcilable' ,23
In support of this point he gave the further example 
of Anglo-French relations, 18 90-1904. This is a curious 
example since it is often cited as evidence of the realist 
claim that interests are defined in terms of the 
configuration of power. The Entente Cordiale, so the 
realist (and conventional) wisdom goes, was made possible 
by the rising power of Germany, and British and French fear 
of it. Woolf offered a fascinating account of how it
23 Ibid. 161.
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became almost axiomatic in the Britain of the 1890s that 
France was the 'natural e n e m y ' T h e  enmity between the 
two countries was seen as immutable. Then, quite 
dramatically, they began to foster closer relations and 
their mutual enmity began to subside. In Woolf's view this 
was entirely due to the sudden realization that Anglo- 
French differences, though considerable, could be settled 
by cooperation and compromise instead of competition and 
conflict:
Lansdowne and Delcasse did not suddenly see that 
the conflicting interests had suddenly become 
'unreal' and the common interests 'real',* they 
came to the conclusion that in general and in the 
long run the two countries would gain more by 
pursuing common interests and attempting to 
compose conflicting interests by compromise than 
by continuing the pursuit by each of its own 
interests at the expense of the other.25
Thus it was a 'psychological' change that had occurred, not
a realization that certain interests previously considered
'real' had suddenly become 'unreal'.
The realist response that mutual fear of the rising
power of Imperial Germany was the major factor was rather
cavalierly dismissed by Woolf in the following way. If one
held that fear was the key, one was in effect admitting
that psychology, not material reality, determined
international relations. If this was true, the notion that
states could gather together in an association for the
purpose of eliminating war was not utopian, as the realists
claimed, but realistic. Fear of mutual destruction would
24 Ibid. 164-75; 'Utopia and Reality', 180-1.
25 Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality', 18 0.
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provide the necessary incentive. If fear of Germany could 
induce Britain and France to settle their 'immutable' 
interests, then why could fear of mutual destruction not 
induce all states to follow the same path?
However, although Woolf refuted the existence of 
immutable interests, and asserted that interests are fluid 
and changeable, he also strongly implied that real, 
permanent, interests do, in fact, exist. He asserted that 
the previous one hundred years had demonstrated that not a 
single nation had gained anything from war and that the 
vast majority of individuals lost out in war. Indeed, the 
history of Europe since 1815 showed that all nations had a 
common interest in peace and preventing war.26 He 
clarified this point by making a distinction between 
immediate and long-term interests. The conventional view 
that conflicting interests are 'more real' than common 
interests sprang from the fact that most people are more 
conscious of their own, immediate, interests than their 
common interests, since the latter always involve the 
sacrifice, usually painful, of some immediate individual 
interests. Both conflicting and common interests therefore 
exist but whereas the former are immediate and superficial, 
the latter are long-term and substantial. Thus, Woolf 
suggested, 'even the potential murderer is better off in 
the end if he refrains from cutting the rich man's throat' . 
Similarly, 'a class which ruthlessly pursues what it 
considers its own interest at the expense of other classes
26 Woolf, War for Peace. 200-201.
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nine times out of ten digs its own economic grave' .27 And, 
taking an example from international relations, it was not 
the case that the interest of Germany in ' cutting the 
throat' of Czechoslovakia was 'more real' than the interest 
of both in living peacefully and composing their 
differences by compromise and conciliation.28
At root Woolf was saying that there is a long term 
objective interest in peace. But for whom? Clearly he did 
not believe that this objective interest applied only to 
some states but not others. The key to a clear 
understanding of Woolf's thought on interests, and to 
understanding his dispute with Carr over them, lies in his 
notion of the state. In common with many of his 
contemporaries, Woolf did not have a sophisticated notion 
of the state. He commonly used the term 'state' 
interchangeably with 'nation' and conceived it as largely 
synonymous with its people.29 Thus in his discussion of 
state interests in peace and war, Woolf often had in mind
the people or society of the state rather than the
'coercive/institutional' state.30 When Woolf said that it
27 Ibid. 176. This assumption also underlies Carr's 
view of 'peaceful change', i.e. self-sacrifice by the
'haves' in order to appease the 'have-nots' . See Twenty 
Years' Crisis, ch.13, 264-84.
28 Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality', 176.
29 For a clear example of this ('unsophisticated 
realism' in Manning's terms) see War for Peace. 147-9.
30 See Fred Halliday, 'State and Society in
International Relations: A Second Agenda', Millennium:
Journal of International Studies. 16, 2, (1987); and Hidemi 
Suganami, 'Halliday's Two Concepts of State', Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies. 17, 1, (1988).
393
was not in the interests of Germany to 'cut the throat of 
Czechoslovakia" , he had in mind the interests of the German 
people rather than the interests, as defined by those in 
power, of the "notional entity" "Germany" . Two points must 
be made in this connection. First, when Woolf and Carr 
refered to state interests they were referring to different 
things. Carr, at least in his "realist critique", was 
referring to an abstracted state, reified, but, in effect, 
personless. Woolf, by contrast, was for the most part 
referring to the people who constitute the society of the 
state. Secondly, Woolf was ultimately making what many 
would consider the rather banal point that human beings are 
better off when they are living in peace than when they are 
fighting wars.
The Rationalization of Violence
According to Woolf, Carr's theory amounts to a 
rationalization of conflict and violence. It was one among 
several theories (" ex post facto consolatary 
explanations"31) , then commonplace, which sought to prove 
that the increasing frequency and intensity of violence in 
inter-war domestic and international politics was 
inevitable. It amounted, more generally, to the worrying 
view that nothing could possibly happen except in the way 
that it did. This view was particularly evident in Carr's 
treatment of the League. Carr asserted that "The first and 
most obvious tragedy of [the] . . . utopia [of the League]
31 Woolf, 'Utopia and Reality", 170.
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was its ignominious collapse". Woolf retorted that failure 
was not ipso facto ignominious and, moreover, it was not 
the case that just because the League failed, it was bound 
to fail. There was a striking inconsistency, Woolf felt, 
in Carr's logic: after all, appeasement had failed but this 
did not lead Carr to the conclusion that this policy was 
utopian - nor indeed that its failure was "ignominious". 
Similarly, Hitler's policy of creating a new European order 
based on German supremacy would in all probability fail but 
neither did Carr reject this as utopian.
Implicit in Woolf's discussion here is the assumption 
that the whole matter turned on the question of 
"attainability" . It was true that the League had aimed at 
the unattained objective of preventing war. But the 
policies of Hitler and Chamberlain had aimed at the 
unattained objectives of, respectively, German hegemony and 
'peace in our time" . If the criterion of utopia was 
unattainability, Carr should have reached the conclusion 
that "the policies of Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain [were] no 
less utopian than the League policy' .32 But, aided by 
highly selective use of evidence, he had come to the 
opposite conclusion.
All this led Woolf to conclude that the central 
problems of contemporary international politics could not 
be understood or solved through a reliance on the 
distiction between "utopias" (or "illusions", or "shams") 
and "realities". Whether the question was the survival of
32 Ibid. 174.
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democracy, the veracity of liberalism, the relevance of 
internationalism, or the efficacy of the League, this 
fashionable distinction was of no value. The Twenty Years' 
Crisis may have been the most sophisticated analysis to be 
framed in these terms but, Carr's brilliance 
notwithstanding, it failed to specify with any degree of 
precision the criteria by which the 'utopianism' or 
'realism' of any given idea or project could be gauged. In 
particular, Carr failed to demonstrate why the League of 
Nations was 'utopian' except for the fact that it failed.33
Woolf's Critique: An Evaluation
How valid are Woolf's objections to Carr's arguments? 
Before addressing this question, a brief qualification 
should be made. Woolf touched on a number of fundamental 
questions in his response, e.g. the nature of interests, 
the meaning of 'utopianism' and 'realism', and the 
intellectual and moral value of realism as a doctrine of 
international relations. It is not my purpose here to 
confront these questions directly, and certainly not to
33 Ibid. 170-171, 181-182. Several of Carr's critics 
willingly conceded his brilliance. Toynbee described Carr 
as 'a man of very great ability, with a powerful and 
trenchant mind.' His book, however, left one 'in a moral 
vacuum and at a political dead point.' Zimmern described 
him as 'very knowledgeable' but 'a victim of his own 
facility'. His book would 'not have a good influence' due 
to its 'moral nihilism'. Angell was less charitable. Carr's 
book, he proclaimed, was 'completely mischievous, a piece 
of sophisticated moral nihilism' . Toynbee to Angell, 
23.1.40; Zimmern to Angell, 20.1.40; Angell to Noel-Baker, 
12.12.39; Sir Norman Angell Papers, Correspondence.
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give answers to them. Instead I will examine Woolf's 
response with the aim of identifying the most important 
respects in which his assertions are either accurate or 
fallacious.
Objection 1: The Meaning of 'Utopian'
Woolf was correct to contend that a major shortcoming of 
Carr's analysis was his failure to clearly define the term 
'utopia'. To demonstrate this point it may be helpful to 
draw a distinction between Carr's general elaboration of 
the concept of utopia, as explicated in Chapter 2 of The 
Twenty Years' Crisis, and the specific examples of utopian 
doctrine that he cites at various points in the text. The 
essence of Woolf's contention is that Carr's concept of 
utopia is highly ambiguous. This judgement is not without 
merit with respect to Carr's general elaboration of the 
concept. But it is not the most apposite criticism that 
can be made. It is certainly the case that ambiguities 
exist, not least in Carr's failure to be explicit as to his 
understanding of the meaning of 'theory'. It is far from 
certain whether by 'theory' he has in mind explanatory or 
normative theory, though it seems to be the case that he 
usually has in mind the latter. A more incisive criticism, 
however, would be that Carr's exposition was simplistic. 
In his efforts to clarify what he considered to be the 
fundamental antithesis in political thought - between 
utopia and reality - Carr makes a number of sweeping 
generalizations which would, in his own terms, be worthy of
397
the most utopian of Utopians.
These generalizations are highlighted by what Hedley 
Bull has called Carr's 7 breathtaking equation7 that 
utopia:reality = free will:determinism = theoryipractice = 
the intellectual:the bureaucrat = Left:Right.34 The 
boldness of the characterization is only matched by its 
artificiality. Marx, for example, is interpreted as a 
seminal modern realist. It is difficult, to say the least, 
to square this with the assertion that 7 The radical is 
necessarily utopian, and the conservative realist.7 
Indeed, Carr's reading of Marx, the most cited figure in 
The Twenty Years' Crisis along with Hitler, is an 
interesting case in point. Marx was a realist because of 
the importance he attached to historical cause and effect, 
to materialism, and to the 7 relativity of thought to the 
interests and circumstances of the thinker7 . But he was 
also a utopian: (i) because he assumed 'just as firmly as 
did the laissez-faire liberal7 that 'economics and politics 
were separate domains, one subordinate to the other7; (ii) 
because of his moral condemnation of the bourgeoisie; and 
(iii) because of his belief in the immanence of proletarian 
revolution and the culmination of the historical process in 
the creation of a worldwide classless society. In Carr's 
view, therefore, Marx was, in a number of respects, both 
realist and utopian. But this was not unusual. According 
to Carr, all realists are to some extent utopian since
34 To which one could add 7 generalization observation 
= universal:relative = morality:power7. Bull, 7The Twenty 
Years' Crisis Thirty Years On7, 627-8.
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consistent realism is psychologically unsustainable. By 
positing a finite goal, engaging in moral judgement, 
assuming a normative ground for action, and appealing to 
human emotions, realists necessarily dilute their realism 
with utopianism. Therefore, Woolf's claim that Carr's 
realists and Utopians are, to say the least, somewhat 
curious political animals which do not exist and probably 
never have, contains more than a few grains of truth.35
Woolf's charge of ambiguity has more pertinence when 
directed at Carr's specific examples of utopian doctrine. 
In a sense this is not surprising since it is this aspect 
of Carr's analysis that Woolf had in mind when he claimed 
that Carr used the term 'utopian' in at least two different 
senses. This can be shown by looking at one or two 
examples.
One of Carr's primary examples of utopian doctrine is
classical political economy and, in particular, free trade.
/  .Carr makes three obsevations: (1) that classical political 
economy was founded upon the 'negation' of existing, 
mercantilist, reality; (ii) that it was predicated on 
'certain artificial and unverified assumptions about the 
behaviour of a hypothetical economic man'; and (iii) that 
universal free trade - ' the normal postulate of economic 
science' - was an 'imaginary condition which has never 
existed'. Just as no one had ever lived in Plato's 
republic or in a Fourierian phalanstery, no one had ever
35 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 26, 88, 113-19, 148-9, 
289-92.
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lived in a world of universal free trade.36
It is clear that Carr's three observations correspond
to three different meanings of the term utopian. A utopian 
doctrine may be one: (i) that rejects an existing state of 
affairs in preference for a more desirable, but not yet 
existent, other; (ii) that is based on unverified and 
perhaps false assumptions; and (iii) that postulates as an 
economic, political, or moral benchmark a condition that 
has no historical precedent. Whether or not Carr was aware 
of the fact that he had not one but several concepts of 
utopia, and that he was thus guilty of good deal of 
conceptual slippage, is a moot point. The example 
confirms, however, that Woolf was right to contend that his 
use of the term is at best ambiguous.
Woolf was also right to contend that while Carr had
much to say about utopianism in the sense of ' falseness of 
beliefs' , he had little to say about it in the sense of 
'impossibility of attainment'. Carr argued that classical 
political economy was based on certain false or at least 
unproven assumptions. But did this mean that its 
prescriptions were necessarily unattainable? In Woolf's 
view, the doctrine of free trade as conceived by the 
classical economists may have contained certain falsehoods, 
but this did not mean that the goal of free trade was a 
logical impossibility. Much more needed to be said in
36 Ibid. 8-11.
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order to prove such a claim.37
A second example Carr gave of utopian doctrine is 
Benthamite liberalism, in particular the Benthamite 
doctrine of 'salvation by public opinion7.38 According to 
Carr,
The belief that public opinion can be relied upon to 
judge rightly on any question rationally presented to 
it, combined with-the assumption that it will act in 
accordance with this judgement is an essential 
foundation of the liberal creed.39
The pursuit of the good was a matter of 7 right reasoning7,
and 7 right reasoning7 would come within everybody's reach
with the spread of education. Although it was true that
this doctrine had been a brilliant success in a limited
number of countries, its advocates committed the
fundamental error of assuming that it was an a priori
principle of universal validity. In fact, its validity was
strictly relative. Its success derived not from 7 certain
a priori rational principles' but from 'a balance of forces
peculiar to the economic development of the period and the
countries concerned7. To assume otherwise was 'essentially
utopian7 .40
37 For a brief discussion of this point, in the main 
confirming Woolf's argument, see Ieuan John, Moorhead 
Wright and John Garnett, 7 International Politics at 
Aberystwyth 1919-69', in Brian Porter (ed.), The 
Aberystwyth Papers; International Politics 1919-69 (London, 
1972), 93-4.
38 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 33.
39 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 34. Carr held Benthamism 
and 'ninetennth century liberalism7 to be largely 
synonymous.
40 Ibid. 37.
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Even before the the end of the nineteenth century,
serious doubts had been cast on the assumptions of
'Benthamite rationalism'.
Yet [Carr continues] , by one of the ironies of 
history, these half-discarded nineteenth century 
assumptions reappeared, in the second and third 
decades of the twentieth century, in the special field 
of international politics, and there became one of the 
foundation-stones of a new utopian edifice.41
Through The Great Illusion and other books, for example,
Sir Norman Angell sought to end war by convincing the world
that war never brought profit to anyone. War was simply a
failure of understanding which could be rectified by the
correct application of reason:
Reason could demonstrate the absurdity of 
international anarchy; and with increased knowledge 
enough people would be rationally convinced of its 
absurdity to put an end to it.42
But despite its easy appeal, this assumption was not well
founded. It was not long before even the most optimistic
utopian thinkers were forced to recognize that rather than
being right and compelling, international public opinion
was 'almost as often wrong-headed as it was impotent'.43
Again, two possible meanings of 'utopia' can be
discerned in this example which broadly correspond to the
two senses of the term identified by Woolf. On the one
hand, Carr casts doubt on the Benthamite faith in public
opinion by suggesting that its underlying principles were
not only inapplicable to the international sphere but
41 Ibid. 36.
42 Ibid. 35-6.
43 Ibid. 50-3.
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'false' or 'untenable' per se. On the other hand, Carr 
criticizes Bethamite rationalism for imputing universal 
validity to principles strictly limited in their 
application. The success these principles generated in the 
nineteenth century was due to a special set of 
circumstances - Victorian prosperity, technological 
progress, British hegemony - which could not easily be 
replicated elsewhere. Benthamism, contrary to the 
assumptions of the inter-war Utopians, could not be 
transplanted.
Thus the doctrine was utopian: (i) in the sense that 
its assumptions were false or untenable; and (ii) in the 
sense that its principles were only applicable within a 
particular social context.
Free trade and Benthamism are Carr's prime utopian 
suspects. He does, of course, similarly berate a number of 
other things, chief among them being (i) the assumption 
that peace is indivisible; (ii) the assumption that 
disarmament is a universal interest; (iii) the assertion 
that war can be abolished through legal prohibition; (iv) 
the idea of collective security; (v) the idea of an 
international police force; and (vi) the idea of a United 
States of Europe.44 In none of these cases are the grounds 
on which they should be considered utopian absolutely 
clear.
One may conclude, therefore, that although Woolf's 
analysis was incomplete, his argument was broadly speaking
44 See Chapter 2 above for the full list.
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correct. Utopianism, rather than a precisely defined 
scientific concept, is a protean term used by Carr to cast 
in a bad light a range of ideas which he happened to find 
disagreeable.
Objection 2: The Utopianism of Realism
Like other radicals of the period Woolf was concerned to 
show that his outlook on international relations was both 
accurate and practicable. In the second line of response 
identified here, Woolf took this concern to extremes. He 
sought to demonstrate that it was not 'utopianism' that was 
utopian but, on the contrary, realism.
Although not without merit, the arguments made by 
Woolf in this connection are somewhat suspect. The most 
cogent among them turn out to be levelled at the weaker 
aspects of Carr's thesis. Woolf's characterization of 
realism is at best unsophisticated - though one, it should 
be added, that continues to find expression in the IR 
literature45 - and at worst seriously flawed. Here, once 
more, the propagandist element is uppermost. He was not 
addressing a highly specialized IR audience on a rarefied 
theme in academic discourse but a general audience, 
comprised mainly of 'the intelligent reader' , on a theme of 
tremendous practical importance. He was eager to win 
narrowly defined political points as well as to uphold his
45 See Graham Evans, 'E. H. Carr and International 
Relations', British Journal of International Studies. 1, 2 
(1975), 87-8; Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from
Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge, La., 1986) .
404
conception of the political truth. In consequence, he was 
not averse to oversimplifying or even misrepresenting 
certain arguments if it suited his propagandist purpose to 
do so.
Taking the merits first, Woolf was correct to question 
Carr's distinction between realism defined in terms of a 
concern with 'facts', 'realities', and 'cause and effect', 
and utopianism defined in terms of a concern with 
'principles', 'ideals', and 'ends'. Such a distinction 
gives a crude impression of the ideal-type realist vis a 
vis the ideal-type utopian. But it grossly exaggerates the 
differences between actual, flesh and blood, realists and 
Utopians - or more precisely those who have been described 
as realists and Utopians. Clearly, as Woolf pointed out, 
it is nonsense to claim that Utopians are unconcerned with 
'facts' and 'realities', though it is true that those so 
labelled emphasized different kinds of facts. Indeed, as 
we have seen, Woolf is a good example of a thinker 
conventionally labelled utopian who engaged in a good deal 
of factual analysis, though not of the kind necessarily 
appreciated by realists. Similarly, it is nonsense to 
claim that realists are unconcerned with principles and 
ends. After all, the notion that a statesman should act in 
accordance with the national interest is a principle - 
though not necessarily a helpful one - and even the most 
pragmatic statesmen pursue ends in the sense that they have 
some sort of image of a desirable world - albeit one 
limited in ambition and heavily contingent. Indeed,
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' turning the weapons of realism on realism itself',46 it 
might be argued that pragmatism is the principle of action 
of the satisfied Powers. Wishing things to remain more or 
less the same is as much of an ' end' as the wish to 
radically alter them.
This, of course, receives some recognition by Carr.
He rejects the sharp separation of fact and value that a
'consistent and thorough-going realism' presupposes. He 
says, for example, that 'the distinction between the 
analysis of what is from the aspiration of what should be 
can never be absolute' and that 'political scientists can 
never wholly emancipate themselves from utopianism' . In 
this sense pure realists and Utopians do not actually exist 
- all political thought, perhaps action too, contains 
elements of both realism and utopia, with some thinkers and 
practitioners giving more emphasis to one and others to the 
other.47
Woolf was the first of Carr's critics to point out
that lack of precision in this respect constitutes a
serious theoretical flaw.48 Indeed, it leads to some 
heroic inconsistencies. Carr asserts, for instance, that 
a 'pure' utopian or realist cannot exist. But this does
46 See Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 113.
47 Ibid. 13-15, 113-19, 282-84, 287-307.
48 This has since become firmly established in the 
secondary literature on Carr. See L. Susan Stebbing, Ideals 
and Illusions (London, 1941), 6-26/ Hans Morgenthau, 'The 
Political Science of E. H. Carr' , World Politics. 1 (1948- 
49), 134; Bull, 'Twenty Years' Crisis Thirty Years On', 
637-8.
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not prevent him from presenting certain figures as 
unequivocally utopian (Wilson, Angell, Toynbee) , and others 
as unequivocally realist (Hobbes, Machiavelli, Marx). He 
contends that all policies contain the 'mutually 
antagonistic' elements of reality and utopia. But he also 
asserts that certain ideas (democratic control of foreign 
policy, an international police force, a United States of 
Europe) are 'purely utopian' . He strongly implies that the 
antagonism between utopianism and realism is rooted in 
human nature (an unverifiable proposition and therefore 
utopian?) . But he also insists that all knowledge is 
socially constructed.49
Woolf's second and more polemical claim was that 
realism is utopian not only in the sense that ideals and 
goals, pace Carr, are pursued by 'realist' as well as 
'utopian' statesmen, but also in the sense that these goals 
cannot be achieved by realist means. According to Woolf, 
the goals of realism are stability of national power, 
glory, prosperity, peace, and a 'stable and permanent 
society'. The methods of realism are violence, war, power 
politics, and 'pursuit of conflicting interests'. The 
failure of these methods to achieve these goals was, in 
Woolf's view, amply demonstrated by the historical record. 
The historical evidence actually provided by Woolf is, 
however, rather thin. Not only does he give few examples, 
but the examples he does give are undeveloped and leave 
considerable room for interpretation. For instance, though
49 Ibid. 16-19, 24-5, 39, 87, 110-11, 123-30.
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we may be comfortable with the proposition that Napoleon I 
and Wilhelm II failed to achieve their objectives, the 
proposition that Bismarck and 'the British imperialists' 
failed to achieve theirs can be doubted. So too can the 
proposition that the 'Great Powers who provoked war' in 
1790 and 1870 did not gain by their actions. As for the 
1914 War, the question-who provoked it and who is to blame 
- not of course the same question - is still a highly 
contentious matter.
Woolf's line of attack here is too general to be of 
value. The postulated goals of realism are so broad that 
it is impossible to assess, in the absence of further 
clarification, whether they had been achieved or not (or, 
perhaps more pertinently, to what extent) . After all, what 
is to count as 'prosperity', 'glory', 'stability of 
national power' and indeed 'peace'? Further clarification 
of these notions is needed before anything like an accurate 
appraisal can be made.
Woolf's depiction of the instruments of realism is 
similarly broad. He strongly implies that realism has a 
monopoly on the methods of 'violence' and 'war'. But this 
is a fallacy. Woolf himself believed that the use of these 
methods was necessary and justifiable in certain 
circumstances, even though, as we saw in Chapter 4, he 
tended to give them different names. 'Power politics' and 
the 'pursuit of conflicting interests' are notions 
generally associated with realism but again Woolf fails to 
indicate precisely what he means by them. 'Pursuit of
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conflicting interests' is, to say the least, tendentious.
One must conclude, therefore, that although Woolf 
clearly demonstrates his prejudices against realism he 
fails to enhance our understanding of it, or throw much 
light on its shortcomings. Woolf's realist is a straw-like 
man. He did not seriously confront Carr's more 
intellectually robust realist claims regarding the self- 
interested character of thought and the relativity of 
ethics.
Objection 3: Immutable Interests
Woolf claimed that Carr attached a peculiar reality to 
power and conflicting interests over and above cooperation 
and common interests. The clash of interests, in the world 
according to Carr, was immutable and a harmony of interests 
impossible.
This is a valid interpretation of Carr's argument - at
least, that is, the argument contained within his 'realist
critique'. Carr asserts that
realism tends to emphasize the irresistible strength 
of existing forces and the inevitable character of 
existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest 
wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, 
these forces and tendencies.
Moreover,
the outstanding achievement of modern realism ... has 
been to reveal, not merely the determinist aspects of 
the historical process, but the relative and pragmatic 
character of thought.
The intellectual assumed that his theories were objective
and universal. Realism demonstrated, however, that they
were in fact historically conditioned, 'being both products
409
of circumstances and weapons framed for the furtherance of 
interests' . This was the sense in which all thought was 
'pragmatic': it was not only relative to the circumstances 
of the thinker, but also consciously or unconsciously 
directed at the fulfilment of his purposes.50
Those thinkers who postulated a harmony of 
international interests, Carr continued, were in reality 
merely the unthinking proponents of a particular conception 
of national interest at a particular time. The doctrine of 
a harmony of interest in free trade and peace was merely 
the doctrine of the economic and political top dog. 
Walewski's maxim that 'it is the business of a diplomat to 
clothe the interests of the state in the language of 
universal justice' was amply confirmed by utopian 
intellectuals who clothed their own interests in the guise 
of universality for the purpose of imposing them on the 
rest of the world.51 At disarmament talks Britain and the 
US condemned the submarine and submarine warfare as 
'uncivilized' and sought to secure a worldwide ban. It so 
happened, however, that they were speaking from a position 
of naval supremacy, and the invocation of 'civilization' 
failed to resonate with Italy, France, and Japan who viewed 
the submarine as a valuable weapon which they could use to 
challenge such supremacy. Similarly, throughout most of 
the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century until
50 Ibid. 14-15, 87-91.
51 Ibid. 91-6. Count Walewski was French foreign 
minister 1855-1860.
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1931, tariffs and other protectionist measures were 
generally regarded in Britain as immoral. But this 
attitude dramatically changed as Britain' s economic 
fortunes took a turn for the worse. As with the submarine, 
the tariff revealed itself as the weapon of the weaker 
Power. When Britain resorted to a range of protectionist 
measures with the onset of the Depression in the 1930s, the 
moral response was curiously muted.
This summary of Carr's 'realist critique' certainly 
suggests that his rejection of international or universal 
interests was absolute. In reality, such interests were 
nothing more than cleverly disguised national interests. 
Indeed given the rigid determinism of realism this was 
inevitably so. All thought was consciously or unconsiously 
self-interested.52
In Woolf's objection to the 'peculiar reality' that 
Carr attaches to conflicting interests over and above 
common interests, one can detect, therefore, the beginnings 
of a critique of what is arguably the central plank of 
Carr's thesis: that the 'supposedly absolute and universal 
principles [of the utopian] were not principles at all, but 
the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a 
particular interpretation of national interest at a 
particular time.'53
It could be countered, however, that the validity of 
Woolf's argument is limited to the extent that it is
52 Ibid. 16-19, 87-112.
53 Ibid. 110-11.
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directed only at Carr's 'realist critique'. After all, 
Carr was setting up realism as one of the two essential 
elements of political thought and action, and although he 
maintained that realism was a 'necessary corrective to the 
exuberance of utopianism' , and essential for 
'counteracting' the dangerous neglect of the factor of 
power in utopian thought, he did not embrace the doctrine 
in its entirity. Indeed, he argued that realism could be 
'carried to a point where it results in the sterilisation 
of thought and the negation of a c t i o n ' H e  devoted a 
whole chapter to 'The Limitations of Realism' arguing that 
it lacked four essential ingredients for effective 
political thinking: a finite goal,* an emotional appeal; a 
right of moral judgement; and a ground for action. It 
could be argued, therefore, that Carr was not so much 
presenting a manifesto for political realism as re-stating 
and re-defining the case for one of the two elements of 
politics irreconcilably locked together in a dialectical 
relationship - though it would be fair to say that he 
failed to provide anything more than a brief outline of 
that relationship.
Although he recognised that The Twenty Years' Crisis 
was more than just an explication of realism, Woolf did not 
fully appreciate the dialectical nature of Carr's approach. 
However, his view that Carr assumed that there was a 
peculiar reality in conflicting interests finds 
confirmation elsewhere in the book and does not depend
54 Ibid. 14-15.
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exclusively on his 'realist critique7. There is a problem 
in Carr's approach which has been the source of much 
confusion over the years. Although Carr may not have been 
aware of it, it might well have been a fully conscious 
sleight of theoretical hand. The problem can be simply 
stated: Carr does not always distinguish his own view from 
the realist view which, although integral to his analysis, 
was not one, as Chapter 6 and Parts III and IV of the book 
make plain, that he himself necessarily held . This is why 
Woolf and many others since have wrongly interpreted The 
Twenty Years' Crisis as an unambiguous realist tract.55
It is not at all clear, for example, whether Carr's 
account of 'The Harmony of Interests' is the 'realist' 
account or his own. It could easily be assumed that the 
two are synonymous. This can be illustrated by way of a 
few examples. Carr challenges the notion, frequently 
espoused at the time, that war was irrational or immoral 
and that all states had a common interest in peace. 
According to Carr, this notion 'in reality' was a 
reflection of the special interests of the status q u o  
Powers, particularly Britain and the US. He asserts that:
The common interest in peace masks the fact that
55 See for example, Trevor Taylor, 'Power Politics' in 
Trevor Taylor (ed.), Approaches and Theory in International 
Relations (Harlow, 1978), 122-31; Robert Gilpin, 'The
Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism' , 
International Organization. 30, 2 (1984); Gene M. Lyons,
'The Study of International Relations in Great Britain: 
Further Connections', World Politics. 38, 4 (1986), 627-8; 
Steve Smith, ' Paradigm Dominance in International 
Relations: The Development of International Relations as a 
Social Science', Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, 16, 2 (1987), 193.
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some nations desire to maintain the status quo 
without having to fight for it, and others to 
change the status q uo without having to fight in 
order to do so.56
There was a ' fundamental divergence of interests' between
the status cruo Powers and the revisionist Powers. The
world interest in peace was a 'utopian assumption' based on
'a peculiar combination of platitude and falseness'. 'The
fact of divergent interests was disguised and falsified by
the platitude of a general desire to avoid conflict' .57
Similarly, Carr refutes the laissez faire belief,
manifest in numerous official pronouncements during the
period, that international economic conflict was
unnecessary and illusory. He asserts, on the contrary,
that a policy of economic nationalism may not be
detrimental to the states that pursue it. The presumption
of a world economic interest disguised the 'true nature' of
the problem. The harmony of economic interests was the
doctrine of the economically strong; protectionism the
defensive doctrine of the economically weak. 'The clash of
interests', he concluded, 'is real and inevitable; and the
whole nature of the problem is distorted by an attempt to
disguise it' ,58
Evidence for Woolf's claim that Carr attached a
peculiar reality to conflicting interests over and above
common interests can be found, therefore, not only in his
56 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 68.
57 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 2nd. edn., (London, 
1946), 53. Present tense in first edition (p.69).
58 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 69-77.
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"realist critique" but also elsewhere in the book where the
distinction between Carr"s depiction of "realism" and his
personal view is similarly unclear. Since his personal
view is extraordinarily difficult to pin down, Woolf was
not being entirely disingenuous in associating Carr"s voice
with the realist voice. The moral philosopher Susan
Stebbing drew similar • conclusions. Writing the year after
Woolf, she expressed a number of doubts about the coherence
of Carr"s thought on conflicting and common interests:
He usually speaks as if he thought that power and 
conflicting interests of nations were the sole 
realities. In the latter part of the book he 
seems to admit that there really are some common, 
international, interests. It is very confusing.59
Stebbing interpreted Carr"s antonyms (to which she added
' conscience: coercion = goodwill: enmity = self
subordination:self assertion") in the same way as Woolf.
Not only were these antonyms confounding and misleading but
they also helped Carr to believe that " conflicting
interests are significantly "real" and goodwill and common
interests importantly "unreal".'60
Objection 4: Rationalization of Violence
Carr's assertions about real interests and cause and effect 
led Woolf to conclude that The Twenty Years" Crisis
59 Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions. 9. A point echoed by 
Woolf, War for Peace. 60 (Carr "contradicts in the latter 
part of his book almost everything that he says in the 
first part'); and Zimmern in his letter to Angell cited 
above ("The result is a confusion beneath a surface of 
fausse clarte").
60 Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions. 13-14.
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amounted ultimately to little more than a rationalization 
of violence. He took particular exception to Carr's 
assertion - as he saw it - that the League was utopian as 
proved by its failure. The logic of this kind of argument 
was that success was the sole arbiter of practicability. 
To Woolf and other critics this was grossly deterministic. 
As Stebbing put it: 'To make success the criterion is to 
fall into the mistake of supposing that whatever has in 
fact happened inevitably happened' .61
Most worrying was the implication that Fascist 
bullying, dictatorship, intimidation, and violence, was a 
necessary and therefore inevitable part of the historical 
process. Woolf considered this an outrageous claim - 
especially in an age in which the corollary of 'inevitable' 
violence and conflict was recurrent totalitarian war.62
The determinism of Carr's conception of realism is 
certainly striking. He describes the following three 
suppositions as the foundation-stones of political realism: 
(i) that history is a sequence of cause and effect/ (ii) 
that theory does not create practice but practice theory; 
and (iii) that politics is not a function of ethics but 
ethics politics. 'On the "scientific" hypothesis of the 
realists,' he continues, 'reality is thus identified with
61 Ibid. 17. William Pfaff made the same observation of 
The Twilight of Comintern: 'Carr sought to demonstrate, 
tautologically, that those who were successful were right, 
as is proved by their success' . Quoted in W. T. R. Fox, 'E. 
H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision' , Review 
of International Studies. XI, 1 (1985), 6.
62 Woolf, War for Peace. 125.
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the whole course of human evolution, whose laws it is the 
business of the philosopher to investigate and reveal.7 He 
cites Spinoza: 7every man does what he does according to
the laws of his nature and to the highest right of nature7 , 
and adds the famous phrase of Hegel: 7World history is the 
world court7 . He amends the popular but 7misleading7 
paraphrase 7Might is Right7 with the more refined formula:
7History creates rights, and therefore right.763
However, as we have seen in the previous section, Carr 
did not fully .to subscribe to the doctrine of political 
realism he himself so vividly explicated. This is clear, 
among other things, from his use of inverted commas around 
the word "science7 in the sentence quoted above. Woolf7s 
claim that Carr7s determinism resulted in the 
rationalization of violence is therefore only partly true. 
Carr was no bellicist or militarist, though Woolf sometimes 
gives this impression. His later, lesser known, works 
contain far less of the 7 ruthlessness7 and "detached relish 
in the supremacy of things evil"64 than his famous polemic. 
As will be seen in the next section, Carr"s Conditions of 
Peace is markedly progressive, even "utopian" . In 
addition, it should be remembered that the principal policy 
recommendation of The Twenty Years" Crisis is appeasement,
63 Carr, Twenty Years7 Crisis. 81-6. Morgenthau argued 
that Carr"s relativistic and instrumentalist conception of 
ethics made him a "utopian of power" - superior power being 
the necessary repositary of superior morality. Morgenthau, 
"Political Science of E. H. Carr", 136. See also Whittle 
Johnston, "E.H. Carr" s Theory of International Relations: 
A Critique", Journal of Politics. 29 (1967), 874-84.
64 Crossman, 7 Illusions of Power", 91.
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conceived as a relatively peaceful means of securing
necessary adjustments to the status cruo-
Nevertheless, after saying this, some of Carr's
assertions on appeasement and peaceful change do lend
credence to Woolf's claims. To describe such events as
Mussolini's successful conquest of Abyssinia, and Hitler's
successful seizure of the Rhineland, Austria and
Czechoslovakia, as instances of peaceful change does seem,
at the very least, euphemistic. Also, as W. T. R. Fox has
demonstrated, although Carr stated that he did not
substantially revise anything in the second edition of The
Twenty Years' Crisis he had said in the first, one revision
at least is highly significant. In the second edition the
following passage was omitted:
If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it 
inevitable that Czecho-Slovakia should lose part 
of her territory, and eventually her
independence, it was preferable (quite apart from 
any question of justice or injustice) that this 
should come about as the result of discussion 
round a table in Munich rather than as the result 
either of a war between the Great Powers or of a 
local war between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia.65
The omission of this passage suggests that by 1946 Carr was
conscious of the fact that some of his pronouncements could
be interpreted as callous, perhaps even apologetic. It
would, however, be only half the story to interpret this
passage as a rationalization of violence, since the clear
implication is that a certain amount of intimidation may be
65 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 278; W. T. R. Fox, 
'Vision and Revision', 4. Also note Carr's remark in the 
first edition (p.277), substantially modified in the second 
(p.215), that yielding to threats of force 'is a normal 
part of the process of peaceful change'.
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justifiable in order to stave off something much more 
odious: war, especially war between the Great Powers.
Ultimately, whether or not the deterministic elements 
in Carr's thesis amount to a rationalization of violence 
depends on the extent to which such a rigid theory of 
historical cause and effect is true. Woolf believed it 
profoundly untrue. He was, as I have argued, a 
voluntarist. He attached great importance to the 
psychological aspects of human affairs. He believed that 
there was no reason why a body like the League could not 
work as long as the necessary 'internationalist psychology' 
existed to back it up. This psychology had been steadily 
building up for a century or more. It was driven by the 
onward march of technological progress and the inexorable 
demands of modern commercial life. It had received a huge 
boost with the mass revulsion against war which had 
occurred in the wake of World War One. Until 1933 Woolf 
felt that for these and other reasons, that the prospects 
for an effective League based on a strong and widely shared 
internationalist psychology were not discouraging.66 Thus 
radical progessive change was possible in international 
affairs and it was a product of sometimes rapid, but 
usually gradual, changes in people's ideas, attitudes, and 
beliefs. For Woolf it was a travesty to suggest that 
international conflict was 'more real' than international 
cooperation, that conflicting interests were immutable, and
66 See Chapters 3 and 4 above for a more detailed 
treatment.
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that the League was doomed to fail.
"Woolf and Carr Compared
Despite Woolf's rejection of Carr's analysis, and despite 
the fact that Woolf himself noticed little common ground, 
it can be argued that there are many similarities in the 
thought of Woolf and Carr. Indeed, it might be said that 
they argued not from the opposite intellectual poles of 
utopianism and realism but from a very similar perspective. 
This perspective was, broadly speaking, socialist, 
functionalist, and collectivist. They shared the belief 
that nineteenth century liberal democracy and laissez faire 
were obsolete, that the nation-state was obsolescent, and 
that the future lay in economic and social democracy and 
cross-border functional and collective organization.
Woolf did not notice the functionalist and 
collectivist aspects of The Twenty Years' Crisis even 
though they are fairly explicit. This is primarily due to 
the fact that he gave all his attention to the first half 
of the book and largely ignored the second. If he had paid 
more attention to the latter, he would have realized that 
the book was far more than an apologia for violence and 
unbending political realism. This is certainly true of 
Carr's work as a whole. The diversity and indeed 
eclecticism of his thought is clearly revealed in 
subsequent works, Conditions of Peace. Nationalism and 
After, and The New Society in particular.
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To some extent Woolf remedied his omission when he 
reviewed Conditions of Peace.67 He welcomed much of what 
Carr had to say about post-war reconstruction and 
organization, especially the idea that democracy needed to 
be reinterpreted in predominantly economic terns, and the 
view that the right to self-determination needed to be 
incorporated within a wider framework of international 
obligation. Woolf insisted, however, that these ideas were 
far from new. They had, he maintained, long been central 
to radical and socialist thought. Such a reinterpretation 
of democracy had been called for in The Communist Manifesto 
and it had for many decades been the policy of the Labour 
party. Similarly, what was the League, asked Woolf, if it 
was not an attempt to place self-determination within a 
wider framework of obligation? He was astounded that Carr 
failed to acknowledge this, and he boldly concluded that 
Carr 'has always misunderstood and misinterpreted the years 
between the wars, and particularly the history of the 
League of Nations.'68 Woolf's general view was that 
although Conditions of Peace was in the main correct, it 
essentially a naive book since it failed to recognize that 
its central arguments had been made before.
The common ground in the thinking of Carr and Woolf
67 Woolf, review of E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace. 
Political Quarterly. 13, 3 (July-September 1942) .
68 Ibid. 33 0. Norman Angell drew much the same 
conclusion. He argued that the League was not predicated, 
as Carr said, on a harmony of interests but was founded 
precisely in order to create one. 'Who are the "Utopians", 
and Who the "Realists" ?' Headway, January 1940, 4.
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may be illustrated by reference to five points.
First, they both argued that nineteenth century- 
liberal democracy had become hollow, and that, if democracy 
was to remain meaningful in the age of mass production and 
mass participation, narrow 'political* democracy needed to 
be supplemented with economic and social democracy. 
According to Carr, political equality needed to be 
supplemented with 'a progressive advance towards social and 
economic equality'. The will of the ordinary citizen, he 
contended, must be made to prevail against the 'organised 
forces of economic power'. This could be done by giving 
him a much greater say in the process of administration. 
Similarly, Woolf argued that democracy could not survive 
unless vast differences in wealth were reduced, education 
improved, and 'socially equal opportunities' established.69
Second, they both argued that the right of self- 
determination was not an absolute right. It did not permit 
states to do anything they wanted to as long as they had 
the backing of their peoples. So conceived, the right of 
self-determination was destructive. Consequently, both 
argued that it was essential to place it within a framework 
of international obligation. Carr emphasized the need for 
'a new conception of obligation'. The right of self- 
determination, he contended, 'must carry with it a
69 Carr, Conditions of Peace. 36; Woolf, 'Can Democracy 
Survive?' in Mary Adams (ed.), The Modern State (London, 
1933), 42-5. See also E. H. Carr and S. de Madariaga, The 
Future of International Government (London, 1941), where 
Carr asserts (p.3) that if liberty is to be 'effective in 
the modern world' it must be defined as ' something like 
"maximum social and economic opportunity".'
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recognised responsibility to subordinate military and
economic policy and resources to the needs of a wider
community . .."70 Woolf argued that despite the shortcomings
of the minorities treaties, it was necessary to establish
a charter for the rights of minorities which would be
supervised internationally.71
Third, both Carr and Woolf felt that one of the
central problems of reconstruction would be how to deal
with the ' small state". The political and economic
weakness of small states had significantly added to the
instability of Europe during the inter-war years. Carr
argued that small states had become a dangerous
anachronism. The great social revolution of the twentieth
century, of which the two world wars were the creative
birth pangs, demonstrated that the future lay in large
scale economic and political organization. Small states
could survive 'only as an anomaly and an anachronism in a
world which has moved on to other forms of organisation" .72
Carr"s rejection of the Wilsonian belief in national self-
determination was unequivocal:
By treating the principle of national self- 
determination as an absolute and by carrying it 
further than it had ever been carried before, 
[Woodrow Wilson and his associates] fostered the 
disintegration of existing political units, and 
favoured the creation of a multiplicity of 
smaller units, at a moment when strategic and 
economic factors were demanding increased
70 Carr, Conditions of Peace, 62-6.
71 Woolf, "The Future of the Small State", Political 
Quarterly. 14, 3 (July-September 1943), 218.
72 Carr, Nationalism and After (London, 1945), 37.
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integration and the grouping of the world into 
fewer and larger units of power.73
Accordingly, Carr suggested that small states should pursue
their economic and military policies 'jointly' with a Great
Power. This would involve the pooling of resources and the
establishment of some sort of common control.
Woolf's view was that the future of the small state in
the 'international firmament' would be one of the most
crucial and difficult problems of post-war reconstruction.
But in contrast to Carr, he emphasized that the status and
position of the Great Powers was also a matter of crucial
importance. Whilst agreeing with Carr that the sovereignty
and independence of small states, both in political and
economic terms, would have to be curtailed, Woolf was
critical of the notion, strongly implicit in Carr's scheme,
that small states would inevitably be reduced to the status
of mere satellites around the Great Power in whose orbit
they happened to fall. On the contrary, the wings of
sovereignty of Powers both small and great had to be
clipped. All states would have to consent to some form of
international government.74
As well as suggesting that it was specifically the
sovereignty of small states that would have to be
curtailed, Carr, like Woolf, also made a number of
assertions about sovereignty per se. 'The concept of
sovereignty' , he contended, ' is likely to become in the
73 Carr, Conditions of Peace. 49. See also Nationalism 
and After. 54-5.
74 Woolf, 'Future of the Small State', 209, 221-4.
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future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at 
present.' The chief task facing the peace-makers was not, 
therefore, to change the location of frontiers, as had 
happened disastrously at Versailles, but to change their 
meaning. Carr further claimed that 'The military security 
and economic well-being of Great Powers, not less than 
those of smaller countries, is bound up with the acceptance 
of a new conception of obligation.' In doing so he was 
stepping out onto conceptual ground very similar to that 
trodden by Woolf 25 years earlier.75
Fourth, there are pronounced elements of functionalism 
in both Woolf and Carr. As I argued in Chapter 4, Woolf 
was a pioneer of international functonalism. Carr, as will 
be further illustrated in my fifth point, was also thinking 
very much along functionalist lines by the early 1940s. 
There are numerous allusions to functionalist organization 
in Conditions of Peace. He suggests that 'practical 
international cooperation', such as international public 
works, could become a 'psychological substitute for war' . 
He asserts that 'for the control of military and economic 
policy, the national unit has become visibly too small' and 
that ' if a durable international order is to be realised, 
men must be induced to determine themselves into different 
units for different purposes'. He emphasizes 'the 
psychological importance of introducing at an early stage
75 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 295-7; Conditions of 
Peace. 65, 241. Carr's views on sovereignty brought a
stinging response from Charles Manning. See his review of 
Conditions of Peace in International Affairs. XIX, 8 
(1942), 443-4.
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[in post-war reconstruction] the conception of cooperation 
in a common task/ . He talks of 'new loyalties arising out 
of newly felt needs' and the building 'new institutions' on 
the basis of these loyalties. He also talks of forging 
'regional industrial groupings which cut across national 
frontiers' .76
Fifth, both Woolf and Carr contended that the 
achievement of economic and social equality was an absolute 
precondition for the future maintenance of international 
stability, and that this could only be achieved through 
substantial government intervention. The nineteenth 
century idea of the night-watchman state needed to be 
replaced by the twentieth century idea of the social 
service state. Moreover, this 'broadening of national 
policy' needed to go hand in hand with a 'broadening of 
international policy'. The new Europe, as Carr called it, 
would have to be dedicated to the satisfaction of the 
interests of the whole and not just, as had happened in the 
past, the parts. Thus the welfare of Lodz, Lille, and 
Dusseldorf would have to be taken into account as well as 
the interests of Oldham and Jarrow.77 Just as Woolf argued 
that the pursuit of common interests almost always involved 
the sacrifice of some 'immediate individual interests', so 
Carr asserted the importance of self-sacrifice. Indeed, in 
places he gave this an expressly socialist form:
76 Carr, Conditions of Peace. 252, 261, 274. See also 
Nationalism and After. 47-51.
77 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. 306-7.
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the conflict between nations like the 
conflict between classes cannot be resolved 
without real sacrifices, involving in all 
probability a reduction of consumption by 
priviledged groups in priviledged countries.78
Carr went on to advocate international "control7 of trade,
finance, and production. He argued for production for use
rather than production for profit. He asserted that
"Employment has become more important than profit, social
stability than increased consumption, equitable
distribution than maximum production." To ensure full
employment he called for a "programme of economically
unremunerative expenditure" such as the provision of "free
housing, free motor cars, or free clothing". He proposed
the establishment of a European Relief Commission, a
European Transport Commission, a European Construction and
Public Works Commission and, most radically, a Bank of
Europe with "ultimate" contol over national currencies.
The task of "overseeing" these bodies would be given to a
European Planning Authority which should, he recommended,
"be encouraged to develop into the ultimate authority
responsible for vital decisions on European economic
policies". Some of these institutions and their areas of
competence would be created and assumed immediately,
whereas others would be the product of gradual evoluton.79
Together these bodies have more than a passing
78 Ibid. 304.
79 Ibid. 302-7; Conditions of Peace. 236-75. See also 
The New Society (London, 1951), 98-9. Hayek was not 
impressed. See The Road to Serfdom (London, 1986 [1944]), 
138-41.
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resemblance to Woolf's 'International Economic Commission' 
possessing 'very extensive powers' and 'far-reaching 
responsibilities'.80 Most significantly, however, Carr's 
ideas on these matters were similar to the ideas Woolf had 
been discussing and developing over two decades earlier. 
No doubt Carr was much more of a 'regionalist' than Woolf. 
He also envisaged a world (certainly a 'Europe') with a 
much greater degree of central planning. Woolf, by 
contrast, was generally distrustful of extensive 
centralization (though as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4 there 
are some notable exceptions): hence his earlier attachment 
to international Co-operative trade rather than state 
trading. It is clear, however, that despite certain 
differences, the economic and social structure of the post­
war world envisaged by both Woolf and Carr were predicated 
on very similar assumptions. Laissez faire was dead, 
sovereignty was obsolescent, and the era of mass democracy 
had arrived.
Conclusion: Woolf:Carr = Utopianism:Realism?
These similarities in the thought of Woolf and Carr suggest 
that the conventional view that Woolf was a 'utopian' and 
Carr a 'realist' is, to say the least, inadequate. By 
placing Woolf and Carr in opposing schools of thought some 
of their most important ideas and beliefs have been
80 Woolf, 'How to Make the Peace', 374. Chapter 7 
above.
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effectively 7 lost7 . This is especially the case with Carr 
who has generally been characterized in IR on the basis of 
a one-dimensional interpretation of The Twenty Years7 
Crisis. But it is not only 7 realists7 anxious to co-opt 
such a great man to their cause who stand guilty of this 
charge. Thinkers of more 7utopian7 inclinations do too. 
Indeed, Woolf was one' of the first commentators on The 
Twenty Years7 Crisis to misinterpret it as merely a realist 
tract - a view that has regrettably stuck.
Scholars of the "first great debate7 have invariably 
analyzed this debate in simplistic terms.81 By overlooking 
the socialist, functionalist, and collectivist aspects of 
Carr's and Woolf7s thought, analysts of the idealist- 
realist debate have omitted a crucial set of factors.82 
Without reference to these factors the thought of Carr and 
Woolf, and the ideas of notable socialist "Utopians7 such 
as G. D. H. Cole, Harold Laski and H. N. Brailsford, and 
left-liberal "Utopians" such as David Mitrany, J. A. Hobson 
and J. M. Keynes, becomes largely inexplicable.
However, given the fact that Woolf was severely
81 See W. Olson and N. Onuf, "The Growth of the 
Discpline: Reviewed", in Steve Smith (ed), International 
Relations: British and American Perspectives (Oxford,
1985), 24; John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics
(London, 1983), 13-16. No mention of Carr"s functionalism, 
socialism, or collectivism is made in Bull"s "Twenty Years" 
Crisis Thirty Years on". This is significant because it is 
probably the most widely read article on Carr.
82 Not all writers have ignored these elements in 
Carr"s thought: see the works of Hayek and Johnston cited 
above; Suganami, Domestic Analogy. 100-5; K. W. Thompson, 
Masters of International Thought (London, 1980), 67-78. 
Woolf recognized them, as mentioned, in his Conditions 
review.
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critical of the bulk of Carr's thesis, might it not be said 
that the conventional view is not entirely without merit? 
The question turns on the meanings of the terms 
'utopianism' and 'realism'. Both Woolf and Carr might be 
considered utopian in the dual sense that they desired 
radical change of the international system, and that they 
felt that change was not a wholly pre-determined process. 
Both Woolf and Carr challenged the international system of 
supposedly sovereign, independent states and argued for its 
replacement by a more collectivist and functionalist world 
order.
There is, however, a more pronounced element of 
historicism in Carr than there is in Woolf. Carr held that 
a 'great social revolution' was occurring and that the task 
of the political scientist as well as the practitioner was 
to make the transition as painless as possible. Woolf, by 
contrast, believed that international change, like any 
other kind of social change, was primarily a product of 
political purpose and rational choice - though determinism 
is not completely absent from his thought.
In one sense the essence of 'realism' for Carr was the 
ability to comprehend the forces of historical change. 
These forces were primarily economic. Indeed a central 
difference between Woolf and Carr is that whereas Carr 
emphasized the importance of substructure over 
superstructure, Woolf maintained that substructure and 
superstructure were interdependent. Carr's principal 
objection to the League was that it was a blueprint or
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paper scheme. It sought to rid the world of war by simply 
outlawing it. This, to Carr, was unforgiveably 'utopian": 
a form of naive constitutionalism: a naive faith in the 
ability of 'rational' laws and institutions to mould 
behaviour.83 While sharing some of Carr's scepticism, 
Woolf firmly believed that building a new international 
system required not only material foundations but also an 
overall plan or conception. At a minimum, prior agreement 
on the boroad outline of this system was needed if further 
descent into hostile competition and anarchy was to be 
avoided.84
Carr argued that in contrast to Versailles, economic 
and social questions should have priority over political 
and territorial questions. Only after social and economic 
cooperation had been working successfully for some time 
could the question of a permanent international political 
framework be addressed. Woolf, by contrast, argued that 
politics and economics were inextricably linked and that it 
was a fallacy to suppose that if one looked after the 
economics, the politics would look after themselves. 
Concentrating exclusively on social and economic matters - 
which he doubted was possible - would not solve the problem 
of nationalism and national self-determination. It was not
83 Carr (Twenty Years' Crisis. 239) dismissed proposals 
for world federation or a 'more perfect' League of Nations 
as 'elegant superstructures' devoid of foundations. His 
emphasis on substructure led R. W. Seton-Watson to conclude 
that he had ' succumbed to onesided materialism' . See 
'Politics and Power', The Listener. Supplement No.48, 7 
December 193 9.
84 Woolf, 'How to Make the Peace', 376.
431
the case that if Poles, Czechs, and Serbs had enough to 
live on, they would cease to bother about their 
nationality. Woolf agreed with Carr that Versailles was a 
flawed peace. But he considered Carr to be under the 
illusion that if you reverse what is unequivocally wrong, 
you get what is right. Economic and social questions were 
vital and Versailles had largely ignored them. However, if 
the process was reversed, 'we shall do no better with our 
economics than they did with their politics' .85 In any 
case, international economic cooperation and control, as 
advocated by both Woolf and Carr, would immediately and 
inevitably involve one of the most crucial of all political 
questions - sovereignty.
85 Ibid. 370.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion: Woolf in the Zoo of International Theory
In the final volume of his autobiography Leonard Woolf,
casting a sagacious eye over his long career, lamented:
Looking back at the age of eighty-eight over the 
fifty-seven years of my political work in England, 
knowing what I aimed at and the results, meditating on 
the history of Britain and the world since 1914, I see 
clearly that I achieved practically nothing. The world 
today and the history of the human anthill during the 
past fifty-seven years would be exactly the same as it 
is if I had played pingpong instead of sitting on 
committees and writing books and memoranda.1
But Woolf's achievements, as we have seen, were
considerable. His ideas were influential on the creation
of the League of Nations. Through his empirical and
theoretical work on imperialism, he contributed to the
erosion of the intellectual foundations of empire. His
propaganda work for the Fabian Society and Labour Party
contributed to the erosion of its political foundations.
He played a large part in encouraging the Labour movement
to abandon its traditional indifference to foreign affairs
and engage seriously in analysis and debate of broad issues
of international policy. In the process he pioneered
international functionalism, and made a substantial
contribution to the development of what can be broadly
described as 'practical', 'welfare', or 'constructive'
internationalism.
Less tangibly, he was an indefatigable critic, in true
Dissenting mould, of the 'official view' of foreign policy,
1 Woolf, The Journey Not the Arrival Matters. 158.
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and a vigilant opponent of all forms of complacency in 
world politics whether emanating from the Left or the 
Right. In doing so he repeatedly challenged the fatalists 
and dogmatists of his age, as he saw them, to examine and 
re-examine their assumptions.
It was in this role that he penned, among other 
things, a trenchant, if partial, critique of one of the 
most important IR texts of the twentieth century. This was 
the text which, more than any other, established the 
reputation of the inter-war period as the 'utopian' phase 
of IR thinking. Paradoxically, its author, E. H. Carr, 
held many of the beliefs that his acerbic critic, Leonard 
Woolf, had been advocating for over twenty years.
Despite this complicated and paradoxical picture, 
Woolf has been classified in IR historiography, for the 
reasons described in Chapter 1, as an 'innocent' and 
'simple-minded' 'utopian'. I have argued in this thesis 
that this label is misleading and inappropriate.
In Chapter 2 I contended that the core characteristics 
of 'inter-war utopianism' are far from clear. An 
examination of ten well known studies confirmed that it has 
been interpreted in a highly elastic way. From the various 
premises, hypotheses, and prescriptions attributed to 
utopianism, an 'ideal type' was constructed. This brought 
the diversity of contemporary understandings of utopianism 
into sharp relief: the ideal type utopian was seen to
believe in a wide variety of vague and not necessarily 
compatible things.
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I then constructed a framework for analysis consisting 
of three broad objections to utopianism, central to Carr's 
critique, from which virtually all subsequent objections to 
the doctrine derive. I proceeded to explicate the three 
most important areas of Woolf's thought - international 
government, imperialism, and international economic 
organization - and analyze and assess them in terms of this 
framework.
Woolf's thought was shown to exhibit a degree of 
complexity and eclecticism which in itself defies the 
simple designation 'utopian'. It is true that, in Chapters 
4, 6, and 7, some severe shortcomings were found in his use 
of certain concepts, his reliance on certain methods, and 
his articulation of certain prescriptions for change. Some 
of these shortcomings - particularly regarding his use of 
the domestic analogy in his later works, his pronouncements 
and strictures about disarmament and collective security in 
the 1930s, and his understanding of the League's mandates 
system and his proposals for its development in the 192 0s - 
were indeed found to be tantamount to utopianism in two of 
the three senses alluded to above.
But in other areas of his thought - his analysis of 
the progress of international government, his theory of 
economic imperialism, even his proposals for the expansion 
of international Co-operative trade - these charges were 
found to be strangely inappropriate. In these areas it 
cannot be said that Woolf 'ignored facts and payed little 
attention to analysis of cause and effect' . Nor can it be
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said that he 7 underestimated the role of power in 
international relations and overestimated the role of 
morality, law, and public opinion'.
While much of Woolf's vast output was exhortary, 
admonitory, and prescriptive in nature, his best known and 
most substantial books contain a considerable amount of 
detailed empirical analysis. He was, as pointed out in 
several chapters, a political publicist in the Radical 
Dissenting tradition. But he was also a Fabian social 
investigator with a tremendous faith in reason as revealed 
by 'the facts'. Woolf, like Carr, wanted to change the 
world. But he did not, pace Carr, seek to do this by the 
'elaboration of visionary projects' or by uncritical 
reference to a priori principles. Few of his proposals for 
change amount to 'projects' in the sense, nor are they 
based on principles cut-off from their social, economic, 
and political context.
Woolf had a wide and profound historical knowledge. 
He sought to change the world not by discounting this 
knowledge, but by harnessing it for the greater good of 
society as a whole, itself informed by a reading of 
history. His desire to change the world was always 
informed by an interpretation of that world. Indeed, his 
most substantial works on the subject can be seen as an 
attempt to discern and promote the main currents of modern 
historical progress. Yet his work on economic imperialism, 
the rise of militarism and fascism, and the international 
crisis of the 193 0s, demonstrates that he was far from
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blind, pace the strong inference of the term 'utopian', to 
currents of a quite different kind.
This is why comments to the effect that Woolf was an 
early 'critical liberal internationalist' are not as far­
fetched as they first seem. It would be foolish to contend 
that Woolf matched contemporary critical liberal 
internationalists in rigour and theoretical sophistication. 
But his approach to the analysis of world politics was 
essentially the same.
Perhaps the most striking finding of this thesis, 
however, concerns the third, and arguably most important, 
objection to utopianism. As with the other two objections, 
the issues at stake are complex and they involve a high 
degree of subjectivity. But it would be difficult to 
construct an argument to the effect that Woolf's thought 
was, in the ways suggested by Carr, 'self-interested', and 
that his 'espousal of universal values', such as peace,
' amounted to the unconscious defence and promotion of a 
particular status cruo.' The reason for this is, at root, 
quite straightforward.
As argued in Chapter 2, and reaffirmed in Chapters 4 
and 6, The Twenty Years' Crisis is essentially a critique 
of liberalism, particularly the way in which 'nineteenth 
century liberalism' (meaning classical economics plus 
utilitarianism plus constitutionalism) was applied to the 
emerging, twentieth century, field of international 
relations. There are many respects, of course, in which 
Leonard Woolf can be described as a liberal
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internationalist. He inherited much, for example, from the 
Benthamite and Cobdenite radical critique of orthodox 
foreign policy. But he also inhereted much from the 
parallel British tradition of reformist socialism. There 
is a sense in which the former tradition informed his 
critical faculties whereas the latter tradition educated 
his creative desires. While he utilized radical liberalism 
in his critique of protectionism, secret diplomacy, the 
balance of power, colonialism, national armaments, and so 
on, his preferred world order, and the one he felt was 
firmly in the process of becoming, was essentially a 
socialist world order which differed profoundly from the 
world envisioned by nineteenth century liberals.
Woolf cannot, therefore, be accused of 'unconsciously 
defending a particular status cruo' resting on 'nineteenth 
Century' principles since ultimately he rejected these 
principles.
It is when we look at the matter from this perspective 
that we see that Woolf and Carr had much in common. Both 
men rejected the idea of a natural harmony of interests: 
laissez-faire, both economic and political, had become 
obsolete: the promise of a spontaneous world order arising 
from the unfettered pursuit of economic interest and the 
self-determination of free nations, was no longer tenable 
in the heavily armed, industrialized, fiercely 
nationalistic world of the twentieth century.
But this did not mean that some kind of harmony could 
not rationally and purposefully be created. Though there
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were some important differences between them, both Woolf 
and Carr argued for the creation of such a world largely on 
functionalist and collectivist lines. Whether they should 
ultimately be deemed liberal or socialist internationalists 
is a moot point. The important point is that, along with
G. D. H. Cole, J. A. Hobson, Harold Laski, David Mitrany, 
and others, they shared a vision of world order that was 
broadly speaking welfare or constructive internationalist: 
they believed in the possibility of utilizing modern 
scientific knowledge and technical know-how, to construct 
a more rational and harmonious world than the one based on 
the 'anarchy' of unfettered capitalism and unregulated 
inter-state competition.
The realist-utopian dichotomy as it has been 
conventionally understood provides no intimation of this 
community of outlook. As a consequence it gives no 
intimation of an important strand of thinking that was 
developing throughout the inter-war period and to which 
Leonard Woolf was a notable and highly respected 
contributor.
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